Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4515 July 14, 2008
CECILIA A. AGNO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cecilia A. Agno against respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The record shows that respondent was the President of International Services Recruitment Corporation (ISRC), a corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas employment. On July 12, 1988, ISRC’s recruitment license was cancelled by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for violation of labor law provisions and subsequently, on August 9, 1988, ISRC was forever banned from participating in overseas recruitment.1
On Sepetember 19, 1988, the respondent appealed the DOLE’s cancellation of ISRC’s license with the Office of the President. The appeal was resolved by the said office in respondent’s favor in the Resolution dated March 30, 19932 which set aside the order of cancellation and directed both the DOLE and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) to renew the recruitment license of ISRC subject to the payment of a guarantee bond which was double the amount required by law.
Since ISRC’s recruitment license had already expired on September 17, 1989, ISRC filed on April 12, 1994, an application for renewal of its recruitment license with the POEA.3
However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal with the Office of the President, particularly on August 9, 1992, the respondent entered into a Memorandum of Agreement4 with a United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr. Khalifa H. Juma,5 the husband of herein complainant, Cecilia A. Agno. The Memorandum of Agreement is quoted in toto hereunder:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the undersigned, Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, U.A.E. national, and Mr. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Filipino citizen, have entered into this Memorandum of Agreement this 9th day of August 1992, at Manila, Philippines, concerning the joint ownership and operation of INTERNATIONAL SERVICING AND RECRUITMENT CORPORATION (ISRC) and have mutually agreed, in connection therewith, as follows:
1. That ISRC shall be jointly owned by the herein parties on a 50-50 basis and accordingly, immediate steps shall be taken to submit the necessary documents to the Securities and Exchange Commission to legalize the arrangement and to cause the issuance of the corresponding certificate of stocks to Mr. Khalifa and his group;
2. That likewise, the sharing of the profits shall be on an equal basis (50-50) after deducting all the pertinent expenses that the officers of the corporation shall be: Chairman of the Board of Directors – Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, President and General Manager, Mr. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN or his designated representative, Treasurer, Ms. Cecilia Agno all of whom shall be members of the Board of Trustees together with two others;
3. That for and in consideration of the above joint ownership of the corporation, Mr. KHALIFA undertakes as his contribution to the stock ownership thereof, the following:
(a) To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱250,000.00) initially on or before AUGUST 25, 1992, said amount to be used to have the license of ISRC reinstated;
(b) Upon the release of the license, to pay the additional amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱250,000.00) to start the business operations of the corporation and to liquidate pending government and other obligations, if any;
4. The management of the corporation shall be handled by Mr. KHALIFA and his group while the legal and government liaisonship shall be the responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN; mutual consideration with each other in the course of the business operations shall be maintained in order to avoid problem with the government, the workers and the employers;
5. There shall be a regular accounting of the business every month, with the assistance of a qualified accountant and each of the herein parties shall be furnished copy thereof; the share of the parties may be released to each of them as often as the parties agree, however, advances against the share of each may be agreed upon by the parties;
6. Any claim of workers or other parties against the ISRC before the signing of this agreement shall be the sole responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN and Mr. KHALIFA or his 50% ownership shall be free from such claims.
Manila, August 9, 1992.
JOMA HUMED KHALIFA MARCIANO J. CAGATAN
CECILIA AGNO
WITNESSES:
_______________ _________________
On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years after the execution of the aforesaid agreement, a Complaint-Affidavit6 for disbarment was filed with this Court by the complainant against the respondent claiming that the latter used fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, in enticing her husband, Khalifa, to join ISRC and invest therein the amount of ₱500,000.00 and that although the respondent received the aforesaid amount, the complainant learned from her inquiries with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the POEA that the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement. The complainant found out that the said Memorandum of Agreement could not be validated without the approval of the Board of Directors of ISRC. While respondent even had the complainant sign an affidavit stating that she was then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her appointment as Treasurer was not submitted to the SEC. The records of the SEC showed that the Board of Directors, officers and stockholders of ISRC remained unchanged and her name and that of her husband did not appear as officers and/or stockholders thereof. From the POEA, on the other hand, the complainant learned that ISRC’s recruitment license was yet to be reinstated.
The complainant claimed that respondent used for his own personal benefit the ₱500,000.00 that she and her husband invested in ISRC. When she demanded that respondent return the said sum of money, respondent issued a bank check dated March 30, 19947 in favor of the complainant in the amount of ₱500,000.00 which was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Despite repeated demands by complainant, the respondent failed to settle his obligation or redeem his dishonored check, prompting the complainant to file a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondent. An information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal, charging the respondent with the said offense and a warrant of arrest was issued against respondent after the latter failed several times to attend his arraignment. The complainant prayed for the disbarment of the respondent for issuing a bouncing check and for his act of dishonesty in assuring her and her husband that the Memorandum of Agreement would suffice to install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC which induced them to invest in said corporation the amount of ₱500,000.00.
In his Comment,8 respondent denied the charges against him and averred that while ISRC’s recruitment license was cancelled by the DOLE in 1988, such cancellation was lifted by the Office of the President on March 30, 1993, on appeal. During the pendency of the said appeal, he and complainant’s husband Khalifa entered into a Memorandum of Agreement because the latter offered to buy shares of stock of ISRC in order to finance the then pending appeal for the reinstatement of the ISRC license and for Khalifa and the complainant to undertake the full management and operation of the corporation. The respondent further alleged that Khalifa H. Juma, through the complainant, paid on various dates the total amount of ₱500,000.00, which respondent claimed he used to reimburse borrowed sums of money to pursue the appeal with the Office of the President. According to the respondent, while there were still legal procedures to be observed before the sale of shares of ISRC to non-stockholders, Khalifa and complainant were in a hurry to start the business operation of ISRC. Consequently, respondent sold and assigned his own shareholdings in ISRC for ₱500,000.00 to Khalifa as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment9 dated April 26, 1993. The respondent, in turn, issued a check in the amount of ₱500,000.00, which was not intended to be encashed but only to guarantee the reimbursement of the money to Khalifa and the complainant in case the appeal would be decided adversely against ISRC. Conversely, the check would be returned to respondent if the appeal is resolved in favor of ISRC. The respondent denied employing fraud or misrepresentation since allegedly, Khalifa and the complainant decided to buy his shares after being told, upon inquiry in Malacanang, that ISRC had a good case. The respondent averred that complainant was motivated by bad faith and malice in allegedly fabricating criminal charges against him instead of seeking rescission of the Deed of Assignment and refund of the consideration for the sale of the shares of stock. The respondent surmised that they decided not to proceed with the Memorandum of Agreement when complainant had secured her own license after she had received the Deed of Assignment and assumed the position of acting treasurer of the ISRC. The respondent justified the non-submission of copies of the Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of Assignment and complainant’s appointment as Acting Treasurer with the SEC because of the cancellation of ISRC’s license to recruit and the pendency of the appeal for reinstatement since 1989. Aside from a copy of the Deed of Assignment in favor of the complainant and her husband Khalifa regarding the five hundred shares of stock, respondent also presented in support of his allegations copies of 1) his Letter10 dated April 12, 1994 to the POEA requesting the renewal of ISRC’s license, and 2) a Letter11 dated May 24, 1994 from the Licensing and Regulation Office of the POEA requiring him: (1) to submit an escrow agreement with a reputable commercial banking corporation in the amount of ₱400,000.00 to answer for any valid and legal claim of recruited workers; cash bond deposit of ₱200,000.00; and surety bond of ₱100,000.00; and (2) to clear ISRC’s pending cases with said agency before respondent’s request for reinstatement of ISRC’s license as a land based agency.
In a Resolution12 dated May 22, 1996, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, held several hearings, the last of which was on November 13, 2003. During those hearings, the complainant presented her evidence. For his part, the respondent, instead of presenting his defense before the CBD in open court, opted to present a position paper which was allowed by the Order dated April 20, 200413 of Commissioner San Juan. However, in lieu of said position paper, the respondent submitted a Memorandum14 after the complainant had filed her formal offer of evidence. Eventually, on October 12, 2004, Commissioner San Juan submitted her Report and Recommendation.15 Said the Commissioner in her report:
There is no question that the Memorandum of Agreement between the parties was executed on 9 [August] 1992. In said Memorandum, no mention was made of the assignment of shares of stock in favor of the complainant and her husband. The conditions stated therein was that the amount to be contributed by the complainant shall be used for the reinstatement of the license of the ISRC. No mention was made regarding the assignment of shares in favor of the complainant and her husband. Respondent presented a Deed of Assignment of shares of stock in favor of the complainant and her husband worth ₱500,000.00 dated 26 April 1993, however, it is noted that there is a super imposed date of 24 November 1994 in a notarial series of 1993 of Mario S. Ramos, Notary Public, which raises doubt as to the date it was executed. Apparently, the Deed of Assignment was executed when the complainant started her investigation regarding the true condition of the corporation. Anent the reinstatement of the license of the company there is no showing that the respondent used the amount he received from the complainant in compliance with the respondent’s undertakings in the Memorandum of Agreement. The accusation of enticement employed by respondent is supported by the fact that complainant was made to appear that she will be appointed as treasurer of the corporation, however there was no action on the part of the respondent to change the composition of the Board of Directors and the treasurer in the records of the corporation on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondent did not fully reveal the true condition of the corporation regarding the reinstatement of the corporation’s license to operate. Likewise the issuance of a check in favor of the complainant on 30 March 1994 against a closed account shows the respondent had no desire to return the money entrusted to him for the reinstatement of the license of the corporation. The letter of the POEA dated 24 May 1994 xxx clearly show that the payment of surety bond will not suffice to reinstate the license of the corporation in view of several cases of violations of recruitment pending before the POEA against said corporation. This fact was not disclosed to complainant when the Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the parties.
Thus, the Commissioner’s recommendation:
Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that respondent manifested lack of candor, when he knowingly failed to provide the complainant with accurate and complete information due her under the circumstances. It is respectfully recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law in the maximum period prescribed by law and to return the money received from the complainant.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2005-10216 adopting and approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding, the Recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s lack of candor when he knowingly failed to provide complainant with the accurate and complete information due her, Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and Restitution of the money received from complainant.
Two (2) days later, or on November 24, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to this Court the Notice of Resolution together with the records of Administrative Case No. 4515.17
On January 4, 2006, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 of the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. In IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-8319 dated January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
After this Court noted the aforementioned IBP Resolution on June 28, 2006, a Motion for Reinvestigation20 was filed by the respondent on September 12, 2006.
Subsequently, on November 15, 2006, the parties were required to manifest within ten (10) days from notice, if they were willing to submit this case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.21
In our Resolution22 dated March 5, 2007, we noted without action respondent’s motion for reinvestigation in view of respondent’ subsequent compliance and Manifestation dated December 27, 2006. In the same resolution, the Court noted (1) the said respondent’s compliance and manifestation of December 27, 2006 relative to the aforementioned November 15, 2006 Resolution; (2) complainant’s Manifestation dated December 19, 2006, stating that she was willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed and the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors; (3) respondent’s Comment on Complainant’s Manifestation dated January 4, 2007; and (4) complainant’s Manifestation dated January 10, 2007.
At the outset, the Court shall resolve respondent’s challenge as to complainant’s personality to file this complaint. In his Motion for Reconsideration23 of the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation of October 12, 2004, respondent contends that complainant, not being a party-in-interest in the agreement between respondent and Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, has no legal standing to file the instant complaint.
Respondent’s argument lacks merit.
Section 1, Rule 139-B24 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the IBP upon the verified complaint of any person. Accordingly, we held in Navarro v. Meneses III,25 as reiterated in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin,26 that:
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions. (Emphasis ours)
The rationale was explained by us in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,27 viz:
[The] rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. (Word in brackets ours)
Prescinding therefrom, it is, therefore, immaterial whether or not complainant herein was a party to the subject transaction. In any event, complainant is actually a party-in-interest thereto because she is mentioned as the treasurer of ISRC in the Memorandum of Agreement;28 as well as one of the assignees in the Deed of Assignment of shares of ISRC stocks which respondent alleged to have executed;29 and as the payee in the bank check issued by the respondent for the amount of ₱500,000.00.30
We shall now proceed to the merits of the case.
The pivotal issue herein is whether respondent employed fraud, deceit or misrepresentation when he entered into the Memorandum of Agreement with Khalifa and received from the latter a sum of money in the amount of ₱500,000.00.
We rule in the affirmative.
The complainant contends that pursuant to their agreement, she gave the amount of P500,000.00 to the respondent to be used for the reinstatement of ISRC’s recruitment license as well as to start the business operation of the corporation. The respondent, however, claims that complainant misinterpreted their agreement because the ₱500,000.00 the latter gave him was in payment of his personal shares of ISRC stock, as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment.
We are constrained to give credence to the complainant’s contention. The due execution and authenticity of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the parties are undisputed. Moreover, the terms thereof are clear and explicit that for and in consideration of the joint ownership of ISRC, the husband of the complainant, Mr. Khalifa Juma, would pay the amount of ₱500,000.00, ₱250,000.00 of which would be used for the reinstatement of ISRC’s license, while the other ₱250,000.00 was for the start of the operation of the corporation and to liquidate pending government and other obligations, if any.31 Nowhere in said MOA is the alleged assignment of shares mentioned. The testimony of the complainant32 on this score is more credible than that of the respondent because it conforms with the written stipulations in the MOA. In contrast, the respondent’s explanations with respect to the ₱500,000.00 in question had been inconsistent. The respondent averred in his Comment that the ₱500,000.00 was given to him initially for the purpose of pursuing the appeal with the Office of the President and that he used the same to pay loans or to "reimburse borrowed money" spent for the said purpose. However, respondent also alleged that since the complainant was in a hurry to start the business operation of ISRC, the money was used to buy his own shareholdings in the corporation for which he executed a Deed of Assignment in complainant’s favor, which respondent claimed he could validly do without the approval of ISRC’s Board of Directors. His subsequent Memorandum33 submitted to the IBP contained new allegations that aside from the ₱500,000.00 paid by the complainant for his personal shares of ISRC stocks, an additional ₱500,000.00 should have been given to him as fresh capital of the corporation and because of this failure of complainant to put up the alleged fresh capital, ISRC was not able to put up the deposits required by the POEA resulting in the non-renewal of the license of ISRC up to the present.
Indeed, the deceit and misrepresentation employed by the respondent was seemingly evident right at the outset when he entered into the MOA concerning the joint ownership and operation of ISRC with the complainant’s husband, knowing fully well that he could not do so without the consent of and/or authority from the corporation’s Board of Directors. The unilateral execution by respondent of the Deed of Assignment is a lame excuse offered by the respondent. We agree with the observation of Commissioner San Juan that the said deed, which was not at all mentioned in the MOA, was executed by the respondent after the complainant had conducted her investigation of the true condition of the corporation. The so-called "guarantee check" appears to have also been issued by respondent for the same reason.
Moreover, while the respondent made it appear in the MOA that the complainant would be appointed treasurer and her husband Chairman of the Board of ISRC, the respondent had not complied with the said undertaking as per the Certification34 dated October 13, 1995 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The respondent could not justify his non-compliance with the terms of the MOA by citing ISRC’s inability to comply with other governmental requirements for the reinstatement of its license for various reasons, since the respondent failed to disclose the same to the complainant and her husband.
Particularly, the respondent failed to apprise the complainant as to the true state of ISRC’s affairs that the reinstatement of the corporation’s recruitment license would require not only a favorable action by the Office of the President on ISRC’s appeal and the payment of a surety bond, but also ISRC’s clearance or exoneration in its other cases for recruitment violations pending with the POEA.35 The respondent could not pass the blame to the complainant because of his belated excuse that complainant failed to infuse an additional amount of ₱500,000.00. This new defense is clearly an afterthought and not supported by evidence.
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as his attorney’s oath.
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following :
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.1avvphi1
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. 36 A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.37 For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the public’s faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. 38 Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others.39 Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.40
Hence, in this case, we are in accord with the findings of the IBP Commissioner, as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors. What is more, we find respondent to be guilty of gross misconduct for issuing a worthless check.1avvphi1
In Sanchez v. Somoso,41 the Court ruled that a lawyer who paid another with a personal check from a bank account which he knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers, thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the profession which he should hold in high esteem. In Moreno v. Araneta, 42 we held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.
Respondent herein admitted having issued a check but claimed that it was only to guarantee the reimbursement of the ₱500,000.00 given to him by the complainant in case of an adverse decision in ISRC’s appeal with the Office of the President. We note, however, that said check was issued on March 30, 1994 or one year after the appeal adverted to had already been favorably acted upon on March 30, 1993. Hence, our conclusion is that the check was issued only after the complainant demanded the return of their ₱500,000.00 investment in ISRC. In any event, respondent’s act of issuing a guarantee check for ₱500,000.00, when he was presumably aware that at the time of his issuance thereof his bank account against which the check was drawn was already closed, clearly constitutes gross misconduct for which he should be penalized.
In sum, the amount of ₱500,000.00 was received by the respondent for the reinstatement of the license, but there is no showing that it was used for such purpose, as the respondent failed to give any credible accounting or explanation as to the disbursement of the said amount in accordance with the stipulations in the MOA. Respondent failed to disclose all the existing hindrances to the renewal of ISRC’s recruitment license, which enticed complainant and her husband to part with the aforesaid sum of money. He also admittedly issued a check drawn against a closed account, which evinced his lack of intention to return the money to the complainant pursuant to his supposed guarantee. It is thus proper for the Court to order its restitution as recommended by the IBP.
We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years by the IBP Board of Governors to be too harsh considering that this is respondent’s first administrative offense. It is settled that the appropriate penalty which the Court may impose on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.43 Accordingly, for employing deceit and misrepresentation in his personal dealings as well as for issuing a worthless check, we rule and so hold that the penalty of suspension for one (1) year and one (1) month from the practice of law is sufficient to be meted out to respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) MONTH from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty; and ordered to RESTITUTE the amount of ₱500,000.00 to the complainant.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice |
(On leave)
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO*
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Footnotes
* On leave.
1 POEA Certification dated June 29, 1995; rollo, p. 181.
2 Id., pp. 33-39
3 Id., p. 45.
4 Id., p. 5.
5 Also referred to as Joma Humed Khalifa or Khalifa Humed Juma Al-Nasser.
6 Rollo, pp. 1-4.
7 Id., p. 15.
8 Id, pp. 23-29.
9 Id., p. 44.
10 Id., p. 45.
11 Id., pp. 42-43.
12 Id., p. 66.
13 Id., p. 194.
14 Id., pp. 195-211.
15 Id., pp. 512-516.
16 Rollo, p. 511.
17 Id., p. 510.
18 Id., pp. 518-526.
19 Id., p. 517.
20 Id., pp. 542-546.
21 Id., p. 547.
22 Id. p. 559.
23 Id., pp. 518-526.
24 In full, this provision reads:
SECTION 1. How instituted. – Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
25 CBD A.C. No.313, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 586.
26 A.C. No. 6554, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 634.
27 A.C No. 2884, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 93.
28 Paragraph 2, Memorandum of Agreement; Rollo, p. 5.
29 Supra, at note 9.
30 Supra, at note 7.
31 Paragraph 3, Memorandum of Agreement; rollo, p. 5.
32 TSN, 19 April 2002, pp. 264, 269 & 283.
33 Rollo, pp. 195-211.
34 Id., p. 177.
35 Letter from POEA; rollo, p. 45.
36 Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 569, 571.
37 Id.
38 Olbes v. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5365, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 341, 352.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Supra at note 17, p. 572.
42 A.C. No. 1109, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 329, 337.
43 Soriano v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4676, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 328, 343.
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