Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174405 August 26, 2008
FLORA BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD CASTILLO MERCADO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25426 which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 36, finding petitioner Flora Bautista y Maniego (Flora) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
On 13 February 1976, an Information for Estafa was filed before the RTC against petitioner, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 82-3506. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That sometime in the month of January, 1972, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Felicidad Castillo Mercado in the following manner to wit: the said accused received in trust from the said Felicidad Castillo Mercado Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4031 covering a parcel of land located at Barrio Ulat, Silang, Cavite, containing an area of 29,234 sq. m. more or less, with the understanding and under express obligation on the part of said accused of mortgaging the same as evidenced by Special Power of Attorney executed by Felicidad Castillo Mercado in favor of said accused and turning over the proceeds of the said loan, if mortgaged, or of returning the said certificate of titles to said Felicidad Castillo Mercado, if unable to do so, upon demand, but the said accused hence, having successfully mortgaged the above described property and having thereby received the loan in the amount of P100,000.00 far from applying with her aforesaid obligation, despite repeated demands made upon her to do so, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapplied, misappropriated and converted the proceeds of the said loan in the amount of P100,000.00 to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said Felicidad Castillo Mercado, in the aforesaid sum of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency.3
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty, whereupon trial was held.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Technical Sergeant (T/SGT.) Romeo Cudia, the Office of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), Camp Crame, Quezon City, who investigated the complaint for Estafa filed by respondent Felicidad Castillo Mercado against Flora; (2) Alicia Ignacio, representative of Feati Bank and Trust Company (Feati Bank), who testified that Flora was able to obtain P100,000.00 loan by means of a special power of attorney signed by Felicidad with TCT No. 4031 as collateral, and that the said amount was released to Flora; (3) Felicidad Castillo Mercado (Felicidad), the alleged victim in this case, who testified that she and Flora agreed to enter into a piggery business together and that pursuant thereto, she gave to the petitioner two titles to her lands and executed a special power of attorney in favor of petitioner to use the same as collaterals for a loan, with the understanding that the latter would turn over to her the proceeds thereof; (4) Francisca Mercado Abinante (Francisca), the sister in-law of Felicidad, whose testimony corroborated that of the victim; (5) Atty. Tomas Torneros Jr., the Acting Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City, whose testimony confirmed that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4031 was mortgaged to Feati Bank, that the mortgage was executed by Felicidad through her attorney-in-fact Flora Bautista, and that said property was foreclosed and sold at public auction to Feati Bank.
As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered the following: Exhibit "A" – Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4031; Exhibit "A-6" – the Special Power of Attorney executed by Felicidad in favor of Flora; Exhibit "C" – the Real Estate Mortgage executed between Flora, as attorney-in-fact, and Feati Bank; Exhibit "D" - the Notice of Sale of the land covered by TCT No. 4031; and Exhibit "E" - the Final Deed of Sale of the mortgaged property covered by TCT NO. 4031 in favor of Feati Bank.
The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that in the afternoon of the last week of January 1972, Felicidad, a resident of Silang, Cavite, went to the nearby house of her sister-in-law Francisca. Francisca and Flora were conversing when Felicidad arrived. In the course of their conversation, Flora introduced her plan to engage in a piggery business and to obtain the capital thereof from a loan to be granted by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and to be collateralized by a real estate mortgage. Upon knowing that Felicidad had titled parcels of land, Flora invited her to be part of the business plan. Flora urged Felicidad to have her real properties mortgaged with DBP and use the proceeds of the loan as capital for the business proposal. Felicidad told Flora that she had no time to process the papers for the loan application. Flora, however, responded that she would be the one to take care of the loan application. Flora also requested Felicidad to execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in her favor authorizing her to use the two parcels of land (covered by Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. 4030 and 4031, both located in Tagaytay City) as collaterals for the loan application. Before signing the SPA, Felicidad made it clear that she wanted the proceeds of the loan handed to her. With Flora’s assurance that she would take steps towards the procurement of the loan, and that she would turn over the proceeds of the loan to Felicidad, the latter signed the SPA. Felicidad then delivered the titles covering the two parcels of land to Francisca who, in turn, gave the same to Flora. Whenever Flora visited Felicidad, she would tell her that the loan application was already being processed by the DBP. After several months had elapsed, Flora stopped visiting and informing Felicidad of the status of the loan. Suspicious of Flora’s disappearance, Felicidad sent Francisca to the DBP to withdraw the loan application. Francisca discovered that only one parcel of land covered by TCT No. 4030 was used in the loan application with the DBP; hence, only one title was returned by the bank. Later, Felicidad received a demand letter dated 9 March 1973 from Feati Bank and Trust Company, informing her of her failure to settle her obligations with the said bank in the amount of P73,000.00.
Upon verification, it was disclosed that the other piece of land owned by Felicidad and covered by TCT No. 4031 was used by Flora as a collateral for two loan applications dated 5 April 1972 and 14 June 1972 for the amounts of P30,000.00 and P70,000.00, respectively, with Feati Bank. It was also revealed that the proceeds of the two loans were released by the bank to Flora.
Felicidad requested Francisca to look for Flora. When Francisca finally located Flora, she and Felicidad confronted Flora who admitted that she had already spent the proceeds of the loans and promised to pay the loans with Feati. A year elapsed, and Felicidad received a notice from the provincial sheriff of Cavite informing her that her property covered by TCT No. 4031 would be foreclosed and sold at public auction. Felicidad and Francisca again tried to approach Flora, who was nowhere to be found. This prompted Felicidad to bring the matter to the CIS for investigation. After investigating the case, the CIS endorsed the same to the Office of the Prosecutor.
The defense presented Flora, its lone witness. Flora testified that she knows Felicidad and Francisca, the latter being the aunt of her husband. She came to know Felicidad because Francisca introduced Felicidad to her. Flora averred that she and Francisca were engaged in the rice-dealing business, she being the supplier of Francisca. For every delivery, Francisca paid Flora on installment. This transaction lasted for two or three years until Francisca incurred obligations to Flora in the amount of P30,000.00 for the rice deliveries.4 In order to pay off her debts to Flora, Francisca delivered to the former two titles to lands which were in the name of Felicidad. In order to make use of the titles, Flora asked Francisca to obtain an SPA from Felicidad authorizing her to mortgage the two parcels of land. She, however, stressed that the transaction was between her and Francisca only. After Francisca delivered to her the titles and the SPA, Flora used the titles and the SPA to obtain personal loans with the Feati Bank in the total amount of P100,000.00.
On 2 June 20005, the RTC rendered a decision finding Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the penalty that should be imposed upon accused Flora Bautista is the indeterminate penalty of Three (3) Years, Two (2) Months and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused Flora Bautista is also ordered to indemnify the complaining witness, Felicidad Castillo Mercado the sum of P100,000.00 and to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.6
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, Flora elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated 30 January 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC, with modification on the penalty imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Decision appealed from convicting accused-appellant Flora Bautista y Maniego of the crime of Estafa is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. All the other aspects of the judgment STAND.7
On 25 April 2006, Flora filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 18 August 2006.
Hence, the instant recourse.
Flora asserts that the RTC erred in declaring that the P100,000.00 loan was granted by Feati Bank in favor of Felicidad and not in her own. She also insists that she has no obligation to account for the proceeds of the loan she obtained from the bank, since it was contracted for her personal benefit. Absent such obligation to account for the proceeds of the said loan, she could not have committed the crime of estafa through misappropriation or conversion as charged. Stated otherwise, she maintains that the first element of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) is lacking.
Flora’s arguments are not persuasive.
.
Flora is charged with committing the crime of estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
315. Swindling (estafa).- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration;
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property;
The elements of estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, are:
(1) the offender receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same;
(2) the offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or property;
(3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) the offended party demands that the offender return the money or property.8
Petitioner wants this Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis the defense witnesses. It has often been said, however, that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best examined by, and left to, the trial courts.9 When the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed by the appellate court, the general rule applies.10 This Court will not consider factual issues and evidentiary matters already passed upon. The petitioner raises the same issues she brought before the appellate court, which gave credence to the findings and decision of the trial court.
Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, having been overlooked or misinterpreted, might materially affect the disposition of the case.11 The assessment by the trial court of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
In the case under consideration, we find that the trial court did not overlook, misapprehend, or misapply any fact of value for us to overturn the findings of the trial court.
Contrary to Flora’s claim, the prosecution was able to establish the first element of estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315. Flora received in trust Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 4030 and 4031 from Felicidad for the specific purpose of using the same as collateral and with the obligation to turn over the proceeds of the mortgage to Felicidad. Hence, a fiduciary relationship between Flora and Felicidad existed. Flora, who was admittedly a business-minded person, came up with the idea of establishing a piggery business. Lacking necessary funds to raise such project, and knowing that respondent had titled lands in her name, petitioner convinced respondent to be her partner in the piggery business. Petitioner focused on respondent because she was aware that the DBP had a loan accommodation program for individuals interested in piggery business, and that DBP would grant such loan conditioned upon the applicant’s capacity to offer titled land as collateral. Having been swayed by the bright prospect of the project, respondent acceded to be a part of the business venture. Respondent then entrusted her transfer certificates of title covering two parcels of land to petitioner. Flora lost no time in securing a special power of attorney from respondent authorizing her to secure a mortgage loan with the DBP. Persuaded by the promises of Flora that she would have the loan approved and that she would turn over the proceeds of the loan to respondent, the latter parted with titles to her two properties and the SPA and handed them to Flora, thus:
Q: Now, do you know the accused Flora Bautista y Maniego?
A: Yes, sir because I have a business transaction with her.
Q: And what is that business transaction you had with her?
A: That happened in the last week of January 1972 when this woman Flora Bautista in the house of my sister-in-law and during that time they were talking about the piggery business. When she knew that I had a piece of land she tried to convince me to be her partner in the piggery project.
x x x x
Q: What was your participation supposed to be in the business?
Q: When she learned that I had a piece of land, she told me if we could be partners and I told her that I had no time to expedite the papers for the loan.
x x x x
A: With all her assurances, she told me that she will expedite the loan, the papers for the loan in the DBP.
Q: When she told you and with her assurance, what steps were taken towards the procurement of the loan?
A: She requested for a special power of attorney made in her favor.
Q: For what was that special power of attorney?
A: To mortgage my two parcels of land as security for the loan.
Fiscal Mendoza --
Q: Did you agree to that proposition?
A: At first I did not sign the special power of attorney but because I had trust and confidence in her and with all the assurances she is going to give to me the proceeds of the loan, and I will be the one to deposit the money for said business, so I signed the special power of attorney.12
Witness Francisca corroborated Felicidad in this wise:
Fiscal
Q: And what topic if any was taken up among the three of you?
A: We three talked about piggery business where Flora Bautista said that if Fely had any title it would be easy to secure an application for loan with the DBP.
Q: And how did Felicidad Castillo react to that suggestion?
A: Felicidad Castillo was very much interested because it was a business.
Q: So, being interested in the piggery business, what did she do if any?
A: Both of them agreed that Fely will give Flora Bautista her title, sir.
Q: And what was the agreement about the giving of title to Flora Bautista?
A: It was agreed that if they could get the loan the amount would be given to Felicidad Castillo.13
It is ineluctably clear that Flora has the responsibility of turning over the proceeds of the loan obtained through the land covered by TCT No. 4031. However, Flora failed to turn over the proceeds to Felicidad since she used the same for her own benefit.
With the overwhelming evidence adduced by the prosecution against Flora, her contention that she used Felicidad’s title as collateral to obtain a loan because the latter’s sister-in-law, Francisca, owed her money, is just a desperate attempt to exculpate herself from the wrongdoing she knowingly committed.
Petitioner likewise makes much of the fact that the prosecution did not adduce written evidence that Flora and Felicidad had formally agreed and entered into a piggery business. She states that in a business partnership, no matter how small, there are certain aspects that have to be delineated, such as the amount of the capital, the contribution of each partner and the percentage of dividend to be received.
This contention is not well-taken. Although there was no written evidence to prove that Flora and Felicidad agreed to engage in a piggery business as partners, the prosecution was able to present credible testimonies to establish such fact.
The Court of Appeals imposed upon Flora an indeterminate penalty ranging from 3 years, 2 months and 11 days of prision correccional as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty in estafa cases where the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, as in the present case, to wit:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).–Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000.00 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed in the aforementioned provision is composed of two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 6514 of the same code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty imposed forming one period of each of the three portions.15 Applying the latter provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty given are:
Minimum – 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days
Medium – 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Maximum – 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
In this case, since the amount involved is P100,000.00, which amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 further states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.16
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against Flora is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.17
The amount defrauded by Flora was P100,000.00. Hence, the penalty prescribed above should be imposed in its maximum period. The maximum period thereof following the rule prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code ranges from six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days to eight (8) years.
Inasmuch as the amount of P100,000.00 is P78,000.00 more than the above-mentioned benchmark of P22,000.00, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years. Finding no error in the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, the Court sustains the same.
Also affirmed is the Court of Appeals decision ordering Flora to indemnify Felicidad in the sum of P100,000.00 as actual damages, because the said amount represents the money that was not yet paid by Flora in favor of Felicidad.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 30 January 2006 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 25426 finding Flora Bautista y Maniego GUILTY of Estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the prison term ranging from 3 years, 2 months and 11 days of prision correccional as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordering her to indemnify Felicidad Castillo Mercado in the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Edgardo F. Sundiam with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring. Rollo, pp. 60-70.
2 Penned by Judge Wilfredo D. Reyes, rollo, pp. 19-34.
3 Records, p. 3.
4 TSN, 26 January 1999, p. 6.
5 The disposition of this case suffered a long delay because the records were destroyed by fire that gutted the 4th floor of the Manila City Hall on 19 November 1981. Upon the motion of the prosecution, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were again heard by the RTC on 11 January 1982 onwards. After numerous postponements due to petitioner’s non-appearance, the defense finished the presentation of its evidence on 1 March 1999.
6 CA rollo, p. 94.
7 Rollo, pp. 97-98.
8 Salazar v. People, G.R. No. 149472, 18 August 2004, 437 SCRA 41, 46; Serona v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 508, 517 (2002).
9 People v. Matito, 468 Phil. 14, 24 (2004).
10 People v. Gallego, 453 Phil. 825, 849 (2003).
11 People v. Piedad, 441 Phil. 818, 838-839 (2002).
12 TSN, 27 February 1978, pp. 4-8.
13 TSN, 6 November 1978, pp. 11-13.
14 ART. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. – In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.
15 People v. Gabres, 335 Phil. 242, 257 (1997); Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 126, 140-141 (1996).
16 Id.
17 Id.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
