Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 172038             April 14, 2008

DANTE D. DE LA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC. and ELITE SHIPPING A.S., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari¹ seeks to set aside the November 26, 2004 decision² and March 9, 2006 resolution³ of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74097.

Respondent Elite Shipping A.S. hired petitioner Dante D. de la Cruz as third engineer for the vessel M/S Arktis Morning through its local agency in the Philippines, co-respondent Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. The contract of employment was for a period of nine months, starting April 19, 1999, with a monthly basic salary of US$1,004.00 plus other benefits.

Petitioner was deployed to Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates and boarded M/S Arktis Morning on May 14, 1999.

In a logbook entry dated June 18, 1999, chief engineer Normann Per Nielsen expressed his dissatisfaction over petitioner's performance:

Said Article 1 (7) of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between respondent Elite Shipping A.S. and its employees reads:

This entry was followed by another one dated June 26, 1999 which was similar in content.

On June 27, 1999, petitioner was informed of his discharge through a notice captioned "Notice according to CBA Article 1 (7)," to wit:

Petitioner was then made to disembark at the port of Houston, Texas and was repatriated to Manila on July 17, 1999.

Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for the monetary equivalent of the unexpired portion of his contract, damages and attorney's fees in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on September 21, 1999.

The labor arbiter (LA) ruled that petitioner was dismissed without just cause and due process as the logbook entry (which respondents claimed to be the first notice to petitioner) was vague. It failed to expound on or state the details of petitioner's shortcomings or infractions. As such, petitioner was deprived of a real or meaningful opportunity to explain his side. Hence, the LA ruled that petitioner was entitled to a monetary equivalent of salaries for three months, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

On appeal, the NLRC upheld the LA's finding of illegal dismissal but deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages. Respondents moved for reconsideration. It was denied.

Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for certiorari (under Rule 65) with the CA. It granted the petition. It held that, although the findings of fact of the LA and NLRC were entitled to great respect, this rule was inapplicable because the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the LA's decision. The findings were not only unsupported by substantial evidence but were also based solely on the ground that the logbook entries were vague and without concrete standards.

The CA deemed the logbook entries to be sufficient compliance with the first notice requirement of the law. It was a written appraisal of petitioner's poor job performance coupled with a warning that should he fail to improve his performance, he would be signed off in accordance with the provisions of the CBA. It reasoned that a probationary employee may be dismissed at anytime during the probationary period for failure to live up to the expectations of the employer.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. It was denied. Hence, this petition.

The main issue raised before us is whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed by respondents.

Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we need to settle two preliminary issues. First, respondents interposed in their comment that the present petition should be dismissed outright as the motion for extension of time to file this petition for review was filed late.

In his petition, petitioner indicated that he received a copy of the CA resolution (dated March 9, 2006) denying his motion for reconsideration on March 24, 2006. He, therefore, had until April 8, 2006 to appeal said resolution to this Court or to file a motion for extension of time to file the petition. However, as April 8, 2006 fell on a Saturday, petitioner deemed it sufficient compliance to file his motion for extension on April 10, 2006, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court:

Respondents countered that A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on Saturday, Sunday or Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted) clarified that the aforementioned rule is applicable only to the filing of pleadings other than motions for extension of time, such that when a party seeks an extension to file a desired pleading, the provision no longer applies and the motion should be filed on the due date itself, regardless of the fact that it falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.

Respondents' contention is incorrect.

A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC provides:

Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the circular, is clear. Should a party desire to file any pleading, even a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, and the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, he may do so on the next working day. This is what petitioner did in the case at bar.

However, according to the same circular, the petition for review on certiorari was indeed filed out of time. The provision states that in case a motion for extension is granted, the due date for the extended period shall be counted from the original due date, not from the next working day on which the motion for extension was filed. In Luz v. National Amnesty Commission,⁴ we had occasion to expound on the matter. In that case, we held that the extension granted by the court should be tacked to the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such period.

In the case at bar, although petitioner's filing of the motion for extension was within the period provided by law, the filing of the petition itself was not on time. Petitioner was granted an additional period of 30 days within which to file the petition. Reckoned from the original period, he should have filed it on May 8, 2006. Instead, he did so only on May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late.

Nevertheless, we will gloss over this technicality and resolve the case on its merits in the exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction as we have done in a number of cases.⁵

Well settled is the rule that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities.⁶ In accordance with this legal precept, this Court has ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review does not automatically warrant the dismissal thereof,⁷ specially where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition.⁸ Such is the case here.

The second preliminary issue we need to address is the matter of this Court's jurisdiction in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45. It should be noted that our jurisdiction in such cases is limited only to questions of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. This doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases.⁹ As such, the findings of fact of the CA are binding and conclusive upon this Court. However, this rule is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions. Factual findings may be reviewed in a case when the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC are in conflict with those of the CA.¹⁰ In this case, the LA and the NLRC held that respondents did not comply with the notice requirement; the CA found otherwise. Thus, although the instant petition involves a question of fact, that is, whether or not the notice requirement was met, we can still rule on it.

Now, the merits of the instant controversy.

The CA committed an error in holding that petitioner was not illegally dismissed. The contrary findings and conclusions made by the LA and the NLRC were supported by jurisprudence and the evidence on record.

An employer has the burden of proving that an employee's dismissal was for a just cause. Failure to show this necessarily means that the dismissal was unjustified and therefore illegal.¹¹ Furthermore, not only must the dismissal be for a cause provided by law, it should also comply with the rudimentary requirements of due process, that is, the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself.¹²

These requirements are of equal application to cases of Filipino seamen recruited to work on board foreign vessels. Procedural due process requires that a seaman must be given a written notice of the charges against him and afforded a formal investigation where he can defend himself personally or through a representative before he can be dismissed and disembarked from the vessel.¹³ The employer is bound to furnish him two notices: (1) the written charge and (2) the written notice of dismissal (in case that is the penalty imposed).¹⁴ This is in accordance with the POEA Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions).

Section 17 of the POEA Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions laid down the disciplinary procedures to be taken against erring seafarers:

Furthermore, the notice must state with particularity the acts or omissions for which his dismissal is being sought.¹⁵

Contrary to respondents' claim, the logbook entries did not substantially comply with the first notice, or the written notice of charge(s). It did not state the particular acts or omissions for which petitioner was charged. The statement therein that petitioner had "not been able to live up to the company's SMS job description for 3^rd Engineer" and that he had "been informed that if he [does] not improve his job/working performance within [a] short time he will have to be signed off according to CBA Article 1 (7)" was couched in terms too general for legal comfort.

The CA held that the logbook entries were sufficient to enable petitioner to explain his side or to contest the negative assessment of his performance and were clearly intended to inform him to improve the same. We cannot fathom how the CA arrived at such a conclusion. The entries did not contain any information at all as to why he was even being warned of discharge in the first place. Even we were left to speculate as to what really transpired, calling for such an extreme course of action from the chief engineer. The entries raised more questions than answers.

How exactly was he unable to live up to the company's SMS job description of a third engineer? Respondents should have indicated the grounds for the threatened termination, the specific acts or omissions illustrating the same, along with the date and the approximate time of their occurrence. For how else could petitioner be expected to meet the charges against him if all he was given as reason for his discharge was a vague and general accusation such as that handed down by the chief engineer? Even if the chief engineer verbally informed him of what his specific shortcomings were, as insisted upon by respondents, the POEA Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions and jurisprudence require that the charges be put in writing.

The same thing may be said of the written notice of dismissal. It sorely lacked the necessary details that should accompany it. Instead of delving into the grounds for petitioner's discharge, it merely echoed the logbook entries by nebulously justifying his dismissal on the ground that the chief engineer "[did] not find [petitioner] qualified for the position as 3^rd engineer." Much like the first notice, it barely made mention of the grounds for his discharge. Again, we were left in the dark as to the nature of the acts or omissions relied upon as basis for the termination of petitioner's employment.

These ambiguities, attributable solely to respondents, should be resolved against them.

Moreover, we observed that the records were devoid of any proof indicating that petitioner was ever given an opportunity to present his side. In their comment, respondents in fact admitted not having conducted any formal investigation:

They also insisted that as petitioner was served notice of his termination, the same constituted sufficient compliance with the requirement of notice and due process as the notice gave him an opportunity to defend himself.¹⁶

Clearly, respondents were unmindful of the requirements explicitly laid down by law and jurisprudence. Anything short of complying with the same amounts to a dismissal. Thus, no amount of justification from respondents can move us now to declare the dismissal as being in accordance with the procedural requirements provided for by law. It cannot be overemphasized that sufficient notice should be given as part of due process because a worker's employment is his property in the constitutional sense.¹⁷

As to the substantive aspect of the requirement, suffice it to say that respondents dismally failed to prove that petitioner's termination from employment was for cause. As the logbook entries were too general and vague, we cannot even reach any conclusion on whether or not respondents had a valid cause to discharge petitioner. Not only was petitioner's dismissal procedurally flawed, it was also without just cause.

Lastly, petitioner and respondents were at odds over the former's employment status when he was discharged from the vessel. It was petitioner's position that he was already a regular employee when his services were terminated; respondents, on the other hand, insisted that he was then still on probationary status. This, according to respondents, entitled them to dismiss him in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 (7) of the CBA (which allows the master to terminate the contract of one under probation by merely serving a written notice 14 days prior to the contemplated discharge) and the requirements on the termination of a probationary employee's employment as laid down in Manila Hotel Corporation v. NLRC.¹⁸

It is well to remind both parties that, as early as Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora,¹⁹ we already held that seafarers are not covered by the term regular employment, as defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code. This was reiterated in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission.²⁰ Instead, they are considered contractual employees whose rights and obligations are governed primarily by the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen (POEA Standard Employment Contract), the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, and, more importantly, by Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.²¹ Even the POEA Standard Employment Contract itself mandates that in no case shall a contract of employment concerning seamen exceed 12 months.

It is an accepted maritime industry practice that the employment of seafarers is for a fixed period only. The Court acknowledges this to be for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer. Seafarers cannot stay for a long and indefinite period of time at sea as limited access to shore activity during their employment has been shown to adversely affect them. Furthermore, the diversity in nationality, culture and language among the crew necessitates the limitation of the period of employment.²²

While we recognize that petitioner was a registered member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines which had a CBA with respondent Elite Shipping A.S. providing for a probationary period of employment, the CBA cannot override the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The law is read into, and forms part of, contracts. And provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.²³

In Millares v. NLRC,²⁴ this Court had occasion to rule on the use of the terms "permanent and probationary masters and employees" vis-à-vis contracts of enlistment of seafarers. In that case, petitioners made much of the fact that they were continually re-hired for 20 years by private respondent Esso International. By such circumstances, they claimed to have acquired regular status with all the rights and benefits appurtenant thereto. The Court quoted with favor the NLRC's explanation that the reference to permanent and probationary masters and employees was a misnomer. It did not change the fact that the contract for employment was for a definite period of time. In using the terms "probationary" and "permanent" vis-à-vis seafarers, what was really meant was "eligible for re-hire."

This is the only logical explanation possible as the parties cannot and should not violate the POEA's directive that a contract of enlistment must not exceed 12 months.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The November 26, 2004 decision and March 9, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74097 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 22, 2002 resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 029139-01 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Carpio, Azcuna*, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes