Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175338 October 9, 2007
AIR MATERIEL WING SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., COL. RICARDO L. NOLASCO, [JR.], PAF (Ret.); COL. THADDEUS P. ESTALILLA, PAF (Ret.); COL. ISMAEL A. ABAD; 2LT. MORADO O. MERCADO, PAF (Ret.); 2LT. CESAR S. TOLEDANES, PAF (Ret.); COL. DOMINGO E. DIMAPILIS JR., PAF; COL. ANTONIO S. GUMBA, PAF (Ret.); 2LT. RICARDO P. PERIDO; 2LT. CEDRIC V. REYES, PAF (Ret.); BGEN. RUBEN C. ESTEPA, PAF (Ret.); COL. ANGEL E. TAPAC, PAF (Ret.); and MAJ. ROLANDO S. CACABELOS, PAF (Ret.), Petitioners,
vs.
COL. LUVIN S. MANAY, PNP (Ret.); COL. ANTONIO MANTUANO, PAF (Ret.); COL. ANSELMO R. GERONIMO, PAF (Ret.); MAJ. JOSE A. ELAURZA, PAF (Ret.); LT. JOHNSON NESTOR OCFEMIA, PAF (Ret.); and HON. JESUS B. MUPAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, BRANCH 117, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 92372, and its Resolution2 dated November 10, 2006. The assailed Decision annulled and set aside the Orders3 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, Branch 117, dated October 14, 2005 and October 28, 2005 in RTC SEC CASE NO. 05-001-CFM.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Air Materiel Wing Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AMWSLAI) is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. Under its By Laws,4 the eleven (11) members of its Board of Trustees (Board) shall hold office for a term of three (3) years.
Conceding to the clamor for a new set of Trustees, respondents Col. Luvin S. Manay, (Ret.); Col. Antonio Mantuano (Ret); 2Lt. Johnson Nestor Ocfemia (Ret.); Maj. Jose A. Elaurza (Ret.); and Col. Anselmo R. Geronimo (Ret.) and petitioners Col. Ricardo Nolasco, Jr., Col. Thaddeus Estalilla, and Lt. Morado Mercado, then members of the Board of Trustees (Board), cut short their terms and submitted en masse their letters of resignation dated July 22, 2005, effective at the close of business hours of September 14, 2005. Three (3) other members of the Board had earlier resigned from their positions.
On September 7, 2005, the Board accepted the mass resignation effective upon the election and proclamation of winners; and declared vacant all the eleven seats, embodied in Board Resolution No. 2005-353.5 The said Resolution likewise provided for the holding of a general election on October 14, 2005.
Pursuant to Article XIII of AMWSLAI By-Laws, the Board created a Committee on Elections (AMWSLAI-COMELEC) composed of MGen. Rodolfo S. Estrellado (Ret.) (Estrellado), as Chairman, and Col. Gregorio G. Paduganan (Paduganan) and Lt. Col. Rolando G. Jungco (Jungco) as Members.
Respondents and petitioners Col. Nolasco, Jr., Col. Estalilla, Lt. Mercado, Col. Ismael Abad, BGen. Ruben Estepa, Col. Domingo Dimapilis, Jr., Col. Antonio Gumba, Col. Angel Tapac, Maj. Rolando Cacabelos, Lt. Cesar Toledanes, Lt. Ricardo Perido, and Lt. Cedric Reyes, filed their respective Certificates of Candidacy for the October 14 election. Unfortunately, the AMWSLAI-COMELEC disqualified respondents, declaring them ineligible to run in the election purportedly for committing acts indicated in the Report of Examination of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).6 Accordingly, notices of disqualification were individually sent to them.7 Consequently, respondents tried to withdraw their respective resignations on the ground that these were tendered upon an understanding that there would be a fair and honest election on October 14, 2005. It appears, however, that the withdrawals were not acted upon by the former Board.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Petition for Election Protest With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Prohibition and/or Temporary Restraining Order8 on October 12, 2005, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City against the AMWSLAI-COMELEC, represented by Estrellado, Paduganan and Jungco, and AMWSLAI. Respondents sought to enjoin the AMWSLAI-COMELEC from disqualifying them as candidates and to stop the holding of the October 14 election. Respondents averred that the act of AMWSLAI-COMELEC in disqualifying them to run for office was unwarranted because their alleged violations which were the bases of the disqualification were still under investigation by the BSP.
Also on even date, respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Immediate/Special Raffle and/or Cognizance and Issuance of An Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order.
On October 13, 2005, Executive Judge Caridad H. Grecia-Cuerdo of the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order9 granting respondents’ prayer for a 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), as follows:
The petitioners have fully established to the satisfaction of this Court that if the holding of the "GENERAL ELECTIONS" of the members of the Board of Trustees of AMWSLAI, scheduled on October 14, 2005 from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. will not be enjoined or restrained, they stand to suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury. The matter is also of extreme urgency taking into consideration that the act sought to be enjoined/restrained is scheduled to be held tomorrow, October 14, 2005.
WHEREFORE, an Executive Temporary Restraining Order is hereby issued for a period of 72 hours from today, restraining the Respondents [petitioners] from holding and/or conducting the subject election scheduled on October 14, 2005 at 8:00 a.m. to 5 p.m. This is without prejudice to the provision of Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff or any [of] her Deputy Sheriff is hereby ordered to cause the implementation of this Order. Service of the required notice of hearing shall be served by the commercial court to which this case will be assigned."
On the same date, Sheriff Virgilio Villar (sheriff Villar) served copies of the Summons (with copy of Complaint and its Annexes), Notice of Raffle and the 72-Hour TRO, at the AMWSLAI Building, thru Ms. Kathy Liong (Ms. Liong), an "authorized receiving personnel," as shown in the Sheriff’s Return hereunder reproduced:
SHERIFF’S RETURN
This is to certify that on this date October 13, 2005, undersigned Sheriff IV, caused the service of Summons together with the attached Complaint and its Annexes, copy of Order dated October 13, 2005 and Notice of Raffle dated October 13, 2005 in connection with the above-entitled case upon defendants, THE COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS OF AIR MATERIEL WING SAV. AND LOAN ASSOC., MAJ. GEN. RODOLFO S. ESTRELLADO, COL. GREGORIO G. PADUGANAN, LTC. ROLANDO G. JUNGCO AND AIR MATERIEL WING SAV. AND LOAN ASSOC., INC., all of AMWSLAI BLDG., cor. B. Serrano and 18th St., Murphy Quezon City, thru MS. KATHY LIONG, AMWSLAI’s authorized receiving personnel who personally received copies of said Court Processes on behalf of all the above-named defendants, as shown by her signature appearing on the original copy of summons, Order and Notice of Raffle.10
However, in the afternoon of the same day, Ms. Liong returned all the pleadings/notices and orders to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Pasay City. In her letter, Ms. Liong stated that she was returning the documents because they were mistakenly left with her although she was not authorized to receive the copies on behalf of Estrellado, Paduganan and Jungco.11
The following day, the Presiding Judge of Branch 117, RTC, Pasay City (where the case was subsequently raffled) conducted a hearing on the application for the 20-day TRO. Counsels for respondents and AMWSLAI appeared. On the other hand, intervenor Atty. Fe Padilla, one of the candidates for the Board, entered her appearance on her behalf.12
After the aforesaid hearing, the RTC issued an Order13 dated October 14, 2005 denying the issuance of a TRO upon a finding that summonses were not properly served upon the members of AMWSLAI-COMELEC. The RTC ratiocinated that the summonses intended for the members of the COMELEC were erroneously served upon Ms. Liong without any showing that she was authorized to receive them on behalf of the COMELEC members. There was, likewise, no showing that the COMELEC members were holding office and conducting business in the given address. The court further emphasized that resort to substituted service was not warranted because of the failure of the Sheriff to exert effort to effect personal service, evidenced by the above-quoted sheriff’s return. Consequently, no summons, no petition, and no restraining order were served upon them, thus, the court had not acquired jurisdiction over these persons.14
Meanwhile, the October 14 election was held as scheduled, where the petitioners were declared winners.15 They then took their oath on October 17, 2005,16 and subsequently, assumed office as members of the Board.
On October 19, 2005, Sheriff Villar submitted a Sheriff’s Supplemental Report17 explaining the resort to substituted service. Forthwith, respondents filed a Motion to Recall Order Declaring Non-Service of Order,18 which virtually sought reconsideration of the order denying the issuance of the TRO. The RTC denied the motion in an Order19 dated 28 October 2005.
Failing to obtain a favorable judgment, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to nullify the assailed RTC Orders for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. They likewise prayed that the October 14 election be nullified and that respondents be eventually reinstated to the contested positions in a hold over capacity until a new set of trustees be validly elected in a new election called for the purpose.20
In a Decision dated August 15, 2006, the CA found merit in the petition, annulled the assailed RTC Orders and invalidated the October 14 election.21 Considering that the AMWSLAI-COMELEC did not have a personality separate from AMWSLAI, and that the members of the former were using the letterhead of the latter in all their correspondence, the CA held that the summons served on Ms. Liong was sufficient. The appellate court gave credence to the Sheriff’s Supplemental Report in validating the resort to substituted service of summons. Thus, the CA concluded that the holding of the election despite the 72-hour TRO which was effectively served on AMWSLAI-COMELEC, deprived the respondents of the right to assail their disqualification, and was, therefore, null and void.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration proved futile. Hence, the present petition.
Meantime, on the strength of the CA decision, respondents filed a Motion for Reinstatement22 before the RTC, praying that they be reinstated to their position as members of the AMWSLAI Board which the RTC granted in an Order23 dated November 22, 2006.
However, on November 28, 2006, this Court issued a TRO enjoining implementation of the CA Decision dated August 15, 2006 and Resolution dated November 10, 2006. On December 4, 2006, the Court amended the November 28, 2006 Resolution, stating further that "x x x and in the event that respondents have been reinstated, they are temporarily enjoined from discharging or further performing the functions of the members of the AMWSLAI Board and to vacate their positions immediately."24 This TRO has remained in force up to this date, albeit respondents have repeatedly filed motions to lift the same.
The issues for resolution, as set forth in the Memorandum for the petitioners, are the following:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE 72-HOUR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAID ORDER WAS A NULLITY, AND THE ISSUANCE THEREOF WAS IMPROPER, ILLEGAL AND INVALID, FOR HAVING VIOLATED THE INTERIM RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSIES.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, BRANCH 117, THAT THERE WAS NO VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND THE 72-HOUR TRO UPON THE AMWSLAI-COMELEC AND/OR UPON MAJ. GEN. RODOLFO S. ESTRELLADO, COL. GREGORIO G. PADUGANAN AND LT. COL. ROLANDO G. JUNGCO, IS CORRECT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE JUDGE GINGOYON GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE DENIED THE RESPONDENTS’ APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND THE MOTION TO RECALL SAID ORDER.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS WERE DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO ASSAIL THEIR DISQUALIFICATION TO BE ELECTED AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF AMWSLAI IN THE OCTOBER 14, 2005 ELECTION AND THE RESULTS OF THE SAID ELECTION.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 22, 2006 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, BRANCH 117, IS CORRECT, SHOULD BE GIVEN CREDENCE.
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT CREDENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT AMWSLAI WILL SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY WHILE THIS CASE REMAINS UNRESOLVED AND THE DECEMBER 4, 2006 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) OF THIS HONORABLE COURT REMAINS EFFECTIVE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT LIFTING THE TRO IS PREMATURE AT THIS STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATION OF THE RESPONDENTS THAT PETITIONER RICARDO NOLASCO, JR., WHO IS ACTING AS CHAIRMAN OF THE AMWSLAI BOARD, HAS ENGAGED IN IRREGULAR TRANSACTIONS CLEARLY INIMICAL TO THE INTEREST OF AMWSLAI, IS FALSE, UNFOUNDED AND UNSUBSTANTIATED.25
At the outset, we must emphasize that the TRO issued by this Court on November 28, 2006, as amended on December 4, 2006, is valid.
It may be noted that the resignations of the previous occupants of the contested positions were accepted by the Board in its Resolution No. 2005-35326 dated September 7, 2005. However, in accordance with the said Board Resolution, the effective date of the resignations was not September 14, 2005 as set forth in their resignation letters; nor September 7, which is the date of the acceptance of the resignation, but upon the election and proclamation of the winners in the election. Considering that the election was invalidated by the CA, a new election is yet to be conducted. Following the terms of the board resolution, respondents would have the right to continue occupying the contested positions until the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the valid election and proclamation of the winning members of the Board of Trustees. But the order of reinstatement was prematurely issued by the RTC. It was, in fact, an implementation of the CA decision, which at that time was not yet final and executory because of the timely appeal before this Court. Well settled is the rule that there can be no execution until and unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e., the period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been taken; or, having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in which event, execution shall issue as a matter of right.27 True, there are exceptions to the above rule such as an execution pending appeal and decisions which are immediately executory notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal. The instant case, however, does not fall under any of the exceptions.
Now, to the question of the validity of the 72-hour TRO issued by RTC Pasay Executive Judge Caridad Grecia-Cuerdo.
Petitioners assail the validity of this 72-hour TRO on the following grounds: that its issuance contravenes the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies which requires a hearing; that there was no justifiable reason for its issuance this not being an exceptional case; and that the respondents failed to post a bond. Petitioners further insist that the TRO had no force and effect because there was no valid service of summons in accordance with the Rules of Court. They also contend that, even assuming that the 72-hour TRO is valid, the conduct of the election in defiance of the TRO only gave rise to the right to hold the AMWSLAI-COMELEC in contempt, but not to nullify the election.
We are not persuaded.
The Executive Judge of the RTC of Pasay is not precluded by the Interim Rules from issuing the 72-hour TRO. Section 1, Rule 10 thereof explicitly allows a party to apply for any available provisional remedy provided in the Rules of Court. And Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court grants the Executive Judge (of a multiple-sala court) the authority to issue ex parte a TRO effective for only 72-hours. The proscription on the issuance of a TRO without a hearing was never intended to bar the court absolutely from exercising its power to issue the same when the court deems it imperative. In any event, the requirement for the conduct of a hearing was satisfied when a summary hearing was immediately scheduled and held at the Pasay RTC, Branch 117 to which the case was raffled.
The other issues raised, i.e., whether or not the case was exceptional and whether or not the respondents posted a bond, are factual in nature. Suffice it to state that an inquiry into these issues necessitates a review of factual and evidentiary matters which is proscribed in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules.28 Indubitably, this Court has stressed that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction (or restraining order) rests in the sound discretion of the court since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with.29
Next, we confront the issue of the validity of the service of summonses --- and of the TRO --- on the members of the AMWSLAI-COMELEC.
Petitioners assert that the service of the summonses and the TRO on Ms. Liong was defective, because Ms. Liong was not duly authorized to receive them on behalf of the COMELEC members.
The contention lacks merit.
The rules on valid service of summons are laid down in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The aforesaid provisions read:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly may the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. 30 These requirements are necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.31
Cognizant of the foregoing standard, we find it necessary to recall the facts surrounding the service of summons on the petitioners. Sheriff Villar served copies of the Summons (with copy of the Complaint and its Annexes), Notice of Raffle and the 72-Hour TRO, on October 13, 2005 at the AMWSLAI Building, through Ms. Liong, an authorized receiving personnel, who personally received copies of said court processes on behalf of all the petitioners; the same was then reflected in the Sheriff’s Report quoted earlier. However, Ms. Liong returned all the pleadings/notices and orders in the afternoon of the same day at the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Pasay City. In her covering letter, Ms. Liong stated that she was returning the documents as they were mistakenly left with her because she had no authority to receive the copies on behalf of the members of the AMWSLAI-COMELEC. The RTC, thus, ruled that service of summons was not validly effected. A few days thereafter, Sheriff Villar submitted a supplemental report32 explaining with particularity what transpired during the service of the court processes.
The authority of Ms. Liong to receive the documents on behalf of the officers of AMWSLAI is undisputed. There is no gainsaying that she is the person in charge of the AMWSLAI office. The only questions left for us to answer are whether or not sheriff Villar exerted enough effort to effect personal service, and whether or not Ms. Liong was authorized to receive the documents for the COMELEC members.
We answer both questions in the affirmative. The supplemental report clearly established the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time. Service was made on October 13 and the election sought to be enjoined would take place the following day. The Sheriff, in serving the Court’s processes, is not expected to wait for the arrival of all the officers of AMWSLAI and the members of the COMELEC at the AMWSLAI Building just to be able to effect personal service. While not unmindful of the strict interpretation of the Rules on this matter, considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case at that given moment in time, we find and so hold that the action of the Sheriff substantially complied with the Rules. Besides, the lack of a detailed explanation in the first Sheriff’s Report on how service was made on the AMWSLAI officers was never raised in issue, and generally, we cannot permit the petitioners to adopt a contrary stand on the service made on the COMELEC members.
Still, in order to buttress their claim that no valid substituted service of summons was effected, petitioners insist that the members of the COMELEC were not holding office at the AMWSLAI Building, and thus, the service on Ms. Liong was not valid.
We do not agree.
MGen. Estrellado, Col. Paduganan and Lt. Col. Jungco were impleaded not in their individual capacities but in their official roles as members of the AMWSLAI-COMELEC. The AMWSLAI-COMELEC was created only to oversee the election of the members of the AMWSLAI Board, with no personality of its own. We can, therefore, conclude that its members maintain their office in the same building. Moreover, as correctly found by the CA, the letter used by Ms. Liong bears the AMWSLAI letterhead with address at AMWSLAI Building corner Boni Serrano and 18th Avenues, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. AMWSLAI-COMELEC also used the same letterhead with the same office address.33 This fact alone belies any contrary assertion.
Clearly then, if the Court puts the stamp of validity on the substituted service made on the AMWSLAI officers, the same seal of legitimacy should be accorded to the substituted service made on the COMELEC members. Logic then dictates that the service of the 72-hour TRO was also valid and binding on all the parties. Perforce, at the time the election was conducted on October 14, 2005, there was a valid TRO and thus, the election was held in violation thereof.
An injunction or restraining order must be obeyed while it remains in full force and effect until the injunction or restraining order has been set aside, vacated, or modified by the court which granted it, or until the order or decree awarding it has been reversed on appeal. The injunction must be obeyed irrespective of the ultimate validity of the order, and no matter how unreasonable and unjust the injunction may be in its terms.34
Petitioners contend that violation of a TRO opens the parties to liability for contempt of court but does not give the court the authority to nullify the act done in defiance thereof. To bolster their claim, they cite the case of Velasco v. Court of Appeals,35 where the Court pronounced that any violation of the injunction or temporary restraining order which is in full force and effect constitutes contempt of court and is punishable as such, and the remedy of the aggrieved party is to institute contempt proceedings where the court in appropriate cases may punish the violator for the purpose of preserving and enforcing the rights of the persons for whose protection the injunction or restraining order was granted.36 There is no doubt that a person guilty of defying a court process may be held liable for contempt of court. But contempt of court is not the solitary consequence of disobedience to a court order. The Court cannot be restricted to this singular response to an insolent challenge to its dignity and authority. The Court is not precluded from declaring as invalid the act committed in violation of its lawful order.
As correctly claimed by the petitioners, we declared in the early case of Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals37 that a restraining order, like an injunction, operates upon a person. It is granted in the exercise of equity jurisdiction and has no in rem effect to invalidate an act done in contempt of an order of the court except where by statutory authorization, the decree is so framed as to act in rem on property.38 However, in the same case, we also held that the act is ordinarily valid and legally effective, except as to the person who obtained the injunction and those claiming under him, and as to them, the act is valid unless and until they attack it in a proper manner.39 Stated in another way, transfers and contracts, or agreements in violation of injunction are invalid as to the complainant or those claiming under him and may be set aside except as against innocent third persons or when it appears on final hearing that there was no ground for granting injunction.40 Clearly, there is no proscription to invalidating the act, but only with respect to the parties. The effect of invalidity shall in no way apply to persons who do not have notice of the existence and enforcement of the injunction/restraining order.
In the present case, the TRO was obtained by the respondents to restrain the conduct of the October 14 election. The election which was held nonetheless, despite the TRO, is, therefore, invalid as to the respondents and thus may be set aside. The respondents attacked the validity of the election in their petition for certiorari before the CA and they specifically prayed for its annulment. The Court is, thus, empowered to annul the election and the consequent assumption of office by the newly elected trustees. Contrary however to the conclusion of the CA as embodied in the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, the election, along with the results thereof, is not null and void.41 Rather, the same is, as it is hereby annulled.
In light of AMWSLAI Board Resolution No. 2005-353 accepting the resignation of the incumbent trustees effective only upon the election and proclamation of the winners, these former trustees --- the respondents herein, together with petitioners Nolasco, Jr., Estalilla and Mercado --- are entitled to occupy the contested positions and remain as trustees of AMWSLAI. It is understood, however, that they shall occupy the same only until the election and proclamation of winners in a valid, lawful and orderly election.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 15, 2006, and its Resolution dated November 10, 2006, are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the election held on October 14, 2005, and the results thereof, are ANNULLED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court in its Resolution dated November 28, 2006, as amended on December 4, 2006, is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 62-76.
2 Id. at 78-83.
3 Penned by Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon; id. at 127-130 and 143-146.
4 CA rollo, pp. 64-71.
5 Rollo, pp. 263-264.
6 Said acts were later the subject of a formal charge against the respondents for violation of BSP Circular No. 396, Series of 2003 (Breach of Trust) and Section 56 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8791 (conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner) in relation to Section 37 of R.A. No. 7653; id. at 350-354.
7 Rollo, pp. 104-109.
8 Id. at 110-125.
9 Id. at 186-187.
10 Id. at 210.
11 Id. at 66.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 127-130.
14 Id. at 130.
15 Id. at 273.
16 Id. at 274-290.
17 Id. at 211-212.
18 Id. at 137-142.
19 Id. at 143-146.
20 Id. at 162.
21 The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
UPON THE PREMISES, the assailed Orders dated 14 October 2005 and 28 October 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the election of the Board of Trustees of AMWSLAI held on 14 October 2005 is INVALIDATED and the result thereof declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 75.)
22 Rollo, pp. 361-374.
23 Id. at 460-462.
24 Id. at 557.
25 Id. at 1206-1207.
26 Id. at 263-264.
27 Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. Columbus Foods, Incorporated, G.R. No. 164857, April 11, 2005, 455 SCRA 272, 276.
28 Pascual v. People, G.R. No. 160540, March 22, 2007.
29 Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 164548, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 639, 660.
30 Spouses Jose v. Spouses Boyon, 460 Phil. 354, 363 (2003).
31 Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. (GUCCI) v. Torres, G.R. No. 170926, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 182, 195; Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 21, 33; Ang Ping v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil 607, 614 (1999).
32 Rollo, pp. 211-212.
33 Id. at 72.
34 Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147191, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 668, 687; 43A C.J.S. Injunctions §286.
35 385 Phil. 1038 (2000).
36 Id. at 1050.
37 G.R. No. L-28782, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 110.
38 Id. at 129.
39 Id.; 42 Am. Jur. 2d, §317; Lee v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34, at 689.
40 Candler v. Wallace Candler, Inc., 365 Mich. 613, 113 N.W.2d 901.
41 Pursuant to the pronouncement of the Court in Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals that an act done in violation of injunction is not a nullity.
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