Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 175324 October 10, 2007
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
EDISON MIRA, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
This case serves to remind trial judges of their obligation to conduct a searching inquiry when confronted with a plea of guilt to a capital offense. At the same time, it also reiterates that the improvidence of the guilty plea will not prevent the conviction of the accused if the evidence duly presented does establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Before us for automatic review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00452 dated 19 July 2006 which affirmed with modification the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 687 finding appellant Edison Mira guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Appellant was charged with rape in an information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about January 6, 1997, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Interior, Municipality of San Jacinto, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his 11-year old daughter [AAA],3 against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On arraignment, appellant entered a guilty plea to the offense charged. Thereafter, the trial court proceeded with the reception of evidence for the prosecution which presented five witnesses, namely: AAA, the victim; Nema Cabug (Cabug), the victim’s teacher; BBB,5 the victim’s sister; Dr. Rosario P. Mores (Dr. Mores), Medical Officer, and Lodeña Barruga (Barruga), Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer. Their testimonies established the following facts:
On the night of 6 January 1997 in San Jacinto, Masbate, AAA, who was then 11 years old and BBB, then 8 years old, were sleeping inside their room when appellant, their father, arrived. He laid down beside AAA, removed her shorts, placed himself on top of her, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.6 BBB witnessed the whole incident.7 AAA further revealed that she had been raped several times in the past by her father in the presence of her siblings.8 AAA recalled that on 26 December 1996, she met her teacher Cabug and told her about her father’s molestations.9 Three days after learning about AAA’s plight, Cabug told her aunt, Felicisima Bartolata (Bartolata). The latter sought the help of Barruga.10 On 7 January 1997, Barruga and Bartolata went to Barangay Interior to conduct home visit and interview AAA. Cabug sent her pupils to fetch AAA and BBB in their house. During the interview, AAA narrated the rape incident.11
On 9 January 1997, AAA was brought to the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Mores. The medical findings showed that AAA’s hymen was no longer intact and there were abrasions around the vulva.12 Dr. Mores concluded that AAA was no longer a virgin; that the sexual intercourse had been forced as evidenced by the abrasions on AAA’s vulva; and, that the abrasion on AAA’s vagina was caused by a human male organ.13
Unsurprisingly, the defense did not present evidence to counter the charges against appellant, considering his earlier plea of guilt.
On 23 May 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The trial court relied heavily on the testimonies of the victim and her younger sister in establishing the identity of appellant and the act of rape committed against AAA. It regarded the children’s testimony as credible and invoked the adage that no child in her right mind would testify on a carnal and bastardous act if it were not true:
[AAA] and her sister could not testify and narrate the said heinous crime against their father if this is not true x x x and this Court is indeed convince [sic] that the child would not put up this [sic] testimonies if it were not true. What makes these bastardous act more appalling is the fact that this rape is being committed in front and at the very eyes of her [sic] other children. Indeed, the bestial act committed by the father against his own flesh and blood deserves the highest penalty which this Court could impose. Now could the father [sic] commit this grievous crime against his own daughter when it should be the former who should protect and care for the latter is a question as perplexing and enigmatic as todays’ time. Everyday, it is judicial knowledge how common this type of canards are being committed by the parents against their [helpless] children. The very least that this Court could do is to minimize[,] if not to eliminate this heinous crime is by way of showing an example by meting out the [s]upreme penalty to the perpetrator of this crime so as to deter others from committing this kind of mayhem, specially so when this Court is convinced beyond any doubt as to the complicity of the accused. Indeed, what a horrendous [world this would] be if the child could no longer trust their parents because of their bestial deeds. When the two daughters, [AAA] and [BBB] were asked whether or not they still love their father, the duo immediately without an iota of hesitation, responded in the negative. When asked why, they answered that they don’t love their father [any] longer because of the rape; the sexual molestation committed by Edison. Truly, no daughter in her right mind could continue to love their father if the latter continuously commits this kind of malfeasance.14
Appellant directly appealed his conviction to this Court. In a Resolution15 dated 14 December 2004, the Court resolved to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.16
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed judgment affirming with modification the trial court’s decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding Defendant-Appellant EDISON MIRA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the death sentence imposed by the trial court is hereby REDUCED to Reclusion Perpetua. Additionally, Defendant-Appellant shall pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs against the Defendant-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.17
Appellant filed the instant appeal. In a Resolution18 dated 5 February 2007, the parties were required to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Both parties manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs filed before the appellate court.19 Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and in failing to inform him if he desires to present evidence in his behalf.20
The controversy centers on the legal consequences of an improvident plea of guilt.
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree to culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Based on this rule, there are three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilt by the accused: (1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. 21
In People v. Gumimba, we had occasion to revisit the raison d’etre for the rule:
There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," or as to the number and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its individual merit. However, the logic behind the rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the imposable penalty is death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.http://elibrary.supremecourt.gov.ph/DOCUMENTS/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/2007/FEB2007.zip%3E8e,df%7CFEB2007/174056.htm - _ftn31
An improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.22
This Court, time and again, has reiterated the guidelines to be observed by the trial court in the proper conduct of a searching inquiry:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.23
The searching inquiry conducted by the trial court falls short of these requirements. The inquiry consisted of two simple questions. We quote in full:
CLERK OF COURT:
(The accused was arraigned in an information read and translated in a language understandable to him [sic]. When asked of his plea, [he] voluntarily entered a plea of guilty.)
COURT:
[T]o accused
Q – Do you understand the meaning of plea of guilty for the crime charged against you for rape?
A – I admit the crime, Your Honor.
Q – Do you know that when you pleaded [sic] guilty you can be meted out of the supreme penalty; death or life imprisonment?
A – Yes, Your Honor.24
The questions propounded by the trial court judge to appellant were clearly inadequate. The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilt plea. In fact, as argued by appellant, he was led to believe that the penalty for his crime could still be reduced upon his plea of guilty, especially when the trial court informed him that he could be meted the supreme penalty of death or life imprisonment.25 Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. Verily, appellant was deprived of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellant’s guilty plea, we are not inclined to remand the case to the trial court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.26
The RTC and the Court of Appeals are unanimous in sustaining the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The trial court made the following observations:
All the [p]rosecution witnesses are one in pin-pointing Edison Mira as the one who raped [AAA]. The testimonies of his two (2) children, [BBB], an 8-year old, younger sister of [AAA] and [AAA] herself categorically declared without hesistation regarding the [c]ertainty of the rape committed by Edison Mira against [AAA]. This two (2) children [are] [very] credible and convincing and defense were not able to destroy the testimonies.27
The Court ordinarily puts great weight on the factual findings of the judge who conducted the trial of the case and heard the testimonies of the witnesses themselves. This is especially true in rape cases where the crime is usually committed in the presence of no other person than the victim and the accused. Compared to appellate magistrates who are merely faced with the cold and inanimate pages of the transcript of records brought before them, the trial judge comes face to face with the rape victim herself on the witness stand. He personally observes her conduct and demeanor while responding to the questions propounded by the prosecutor on direct examination as well as those from the defense counsel on cross examination. Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the chance to pose clarificatory questions to the victim. Thus, when the trial judge makes his findings as to the issue of credibility, such findings bear great weight upon the appellate court. 28
The appellate court even concurred with the trial court and went on to cite the jurisprudential edicts, thus:
Evidently, [AAA’s] testimony is straightforward. She positively identified her father-ravisher and narrated what transpired with simplicity and veracity. Such revelation of [AAA], a young innocent girl, deserves full credit.
It is settled in a catena of cases, that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit considering that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Reason and experience dictate that a child, who barely understands sex and sexuality, would not impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape. Truly, youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity as in the case at bench.29
We find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the courts below. Indeed, AAA remained steadfast in her claim that she was raped by her father. In her Affidavit dated 10 January 1997, AAA stated that she was molested by her father on 6 January 1997. 30 During the preliminary investigation conducted by MCTC Judge Joaquin A. Arevalo, AAA narrated her harrowing experience in the form of answers to questions, thus:
Q: Where were you last January 6, 1997, in the evening?
A: I was at Barangay Interior, San Jacinto, Masbate, together with my brethren[,] namely: [BBB], [CCC], [Michael], Edwin and Elmer, who is about 15 years old.
Q: During the aforementioned time and place, were your brothers and sisters all in the house?
A: Yes sir, except Manoy Elmer who was ordered by my father to see a movie.
Q: What did you do after eating your supper?
A: We went to sleep.
Q: Did your father aid with [sic] you?
A: He did not [join] us.
Q: While you were sleeping[,] do you remember any unusual incident?
A: Yes, sir, there was an unusual incident.
Q: What was the incident?
A: While I was sleeping beside [BBB][,] my father arrived smelling of gin and then removed his clothes.
Q: What did he do after he has removed his clothes?
A: He removed my shorts and laid on top of me.
Q: What else did he do after he was on top of you?
A: He placed his manhood inside me and as I suffered paid I cried.
Q: When you cried[,] did you wake your sister especially [BBB] who was sleeping beside you?
A: My sister was still awake when my father raped me.
x x x x
Q: Do you recall the number of times that your father had molested you?
A: Many times.
x x x x 31
Later at the witness stand, on direct examination, AAA reiterated:
Q: How many times that your father mounted at [sic] you?
A: Many times.
Q: More than ten (10) times, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When your father was molesting you[sic], was anybody present?
A: Yes sir, my younger brother and sister.
Court:
Proceed.
Pros. Rapsing:
Q: Did you remember when was the last time your father mounted at [sic] you and inserted his penis [in]to your organ, do you remember when was that?
A: January 6, 1997.
Q: How about the first time, can you still remember when was the first time when your father raped you?
A: I can no longer remember.
Q: What you only recall is the last time[sic]?
A: Yes, sir.32
The defense counsel tried to muddle the facts during the cross-examination but AAA did not waver, thus:
Q: Madam witness, you were staying at Barangay Interior, San Jacinto, Masbate, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And your house is situated within the Barangay site of Interior?
A Yes, sir.
Q Of course, you have neighbors [sic] in your house, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q [In fact], you also have friends?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about to your friends, did you sleep at the house of your friends?
A No[,] sir.
Q You have also a relative in your locality, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q [In fact], during night time, you were sleeping in the house of your relatives?
A No, sir.
Q Do you have classmates in your school?
A Yes[,] sir.
Q Because you were classmates, so, you were friends, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, you have boy friends?
A No, sir
Q Eventhough you have no boy friends but [sic] you usually play with some boys?
A No, sir.33
x x x x
Q Madam Witness, previous to the incident on January 6, 1997, were you able to meet physical accident, example, you were slide [sic] or you were thrown out of balance?
A No, sir.
Q Did you ride a bicycle?
A I do not know how to ride a bicycle.
Q How about a carabao?
A We have no carabao.34
AAA testified in a very clear, convincing and straightforward manner which leaves us with nary a doubt that she was indeed raped by her father. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated on all material points by her sister BBB who was herself an eyewitness to the rape. BBB related:
Q: You are staying in the house of your father[,] Edison Mira, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q You are staying at the same time with [AAA], your sister, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q During nighttime, you are sleeping with [AAA], is that true?
A Yes, sir.
Q During nighttime, you have you seen your father Edison Mira sleeping with you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was he doing with AAA, your sister?
A She is sleeping with AAA.
COURT:
The Court will allow the prosecution to ask leading questions considering that the witness is a minor.
PROS. RAPSING:
Q Do you want to tell us that Edison Mira was sleeping side by side with your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q When your father was sleeping beside your sister, [AAA], were you awake?
A Yes, sir.
Q Have you seen your father mounting your sister[,] [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your sister[,] [AAA][,] doing whenever your father is mounting her?
A She was crying.
COURT TO WITNESS:
Q Was she naked?
A Both of them naked.
PROS. RAPSING:
Q And whenever your father is mounting your sister[,] [AAA] also crying[,] is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your father doing on top of your sister when you saw him?
A He was telling my sister to keep quiet.
Q Was your father moving while on top of your sister?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your father doing on top of your sister when you saw him?
A He was telling my sister to keep quiet.
Q Was your father moving while on top of your sister?
A Yes, sir.
Q His buttocks was moving?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while the buttocks of your father was moving, your sister was crying?
A Yes, sir.35
These testimonies, taken together with the medical findings that AAA sustained abrasions on the vulva and that her hymen was no longer intact, lead to no other conclusion that she had been raped and that appellant, her father, was the perpetrator.
The prosecution has successfully proven the elements of simple rape, namely: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) the same was committed by use of force or intimidation.36 When the offended party is under 18 years of age and the offender is an ascendant of the victim, rape is qualified and becomes punishable by death as provided under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.
In incestuous rape, it is essential that the relationship and minority be conjointly alleged in the information and duly proved.37 The Information states that "accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his 11-year old daughter AAA, against her will and without her consent."38 The filial relationship between appellant and AAA was sufficiently alleged in the Information and established by the testimonies of AAA39 and BBB.40 However, during trial, the prosecution failed to submit any written evidence to prove the age of the victim. No birth certificate, baptismal record, or testimony relating to the age of AAA was presented. Even if the complainant's minority and filiation to the appellant were never refuted nor contested by the defense, proof thereof is critical, considering the penalty of death imposed for qualified rape.41
As eloquently explained by the Court of Appeals:
To justify the imposition of death, proof of the victim’s age is indubitable, and there must be sufficient and clear evidence proving her age, even if not denied by the accused. As pronounced in People v. Umayam, (n)either her obvious minority nor the absence of any contrary assertion from the defense, or even an admission by the appellant can exempt the prosecution from the requirement of proving it. Thus, in the absence of [AAA’s] Certificate of Live Birth, the prosecution should have presented before the trial court her baptismal certificate or school record to prove her age at the time of the commission of the crime. In the case at bench, the prosecution failed. Accordingly, the Defendant-Appellant may only be convicted of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.42
In the more recent case of People v. Biyoc,43 this Court did not appreciate minority as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape for failure of the prosecution to adequately prove that the victim was only 11 years old when she was raped. We observed:
From the accusatory portion of the information quoted . . . AAA was alleged to be 11 years old at the time of the alleged rape. The certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents were not presented. There is no showing that the prosecution claimed that the said documents had been lost, destroyed or were otherwise unavailable, hence, CCC’s testifying on AAA’s age does not suffice to prove that AAA was below the age of 12.
When either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the Information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. In the instant case, relationship may thus be considered as an aggravating circumstance. However, it may not serve to raise the penalty because in simple rape, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua which is single and indivisible.44
Finally, we affirm the award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, without need of further proof, is likewise proper.45 Relationship between appellant and the victim is an aggravating circumstance which justifies the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to deter other fathers with perverse or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their daughters.46
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00452, finding appellant Edison Mira guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 4-20. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
2 CA rollo, pp. 9-12. Penned by Judge Manuel S. Pecson.
3 The real name of the victim is withheld per R.A. No. 7610 and R.A. No. 9262. See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006.
4CA rollo, p. 5.
5Supra note 3. Name of sister withheld.
6 Records, pp. 7-8.
7 TSN, 10 March 1997, p. 10.
8 TSN, 11 March 1997, p. 26.
9 Id. at 24.
10 TSN, 10 March 1997, p. 5.
11 Id. 13.
12 Records, p. 17.
13 Rollo, p. 7.
14 CA rollo, p. 12.
15 Id. at 122.
16 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
17 Rollo, p. 19.
18 Id. at 21.
19 Rollo, pp. 22, 25.
20 CA rollo, pp. 28-29. Brief for Accused-Appellant dated 20 September 2002.
21 People v. Espidol, G.R. No. 150033, 12 November 2004, 442 SCRA 360, 372, citing People v. Bello, G.R. Nos. 130411–14, 13 October 1999, 316 SCRA 804, 811; People v. Galvez, 428 Phil. 438, 444 (2002), citing People v. Aranzado, G.R. Nos. 132442-44, September 24, 2001.
22 G.R. No. 174056, 27 February 2007.
23 People v. Pioquinto, G.R. No. 168326, 11 April 2007; People v. Murillo, G.R. No. 134583, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 342; People v. Tonyacao, G.R. No. 134531-32, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 513; People v. Ernas, 455 Phil. 829, 839-840 (2003).
24 TSN, 10 March 1997, p. 2.
25 CA rollo, p. 28.
26 People v. Gumimba, G.R. No. 168326, 27 February 2007.
27 CA rollo, p. 11.
28 People v. Rayles, G.R. No. 169874, 27 July 2007.
29 Rollo, p. 14.
30 Records, p. 4.
31 Records, pp. 7-8.
32 TSN, 11 March 1997, p. 26.
33 Id. at 29-30.
34 Id. at pp. 29-31.
35 TSN, 10 March 1997, pp. 9-13.
36 Revised Penal Code, Art. 266-B.
37 People v. Orillosa, G.R. Nos. 148716-18, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 689.
38 Supra note 4.
39 TSN, 11 March 1997, p. 24.
40 TSN, 10 March 1997, p. 8.
41 People v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 138742, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 86, 102 citing People v. Gavino, 399 SCRA 285 (2003).
42 Rollo, pp. 17-18.
43 G.R. No. 167670, 7 September 2007.
44 People v. Hermocilla, G.R. No. 175830, 10 July 2007, citing People v. Esperanza, 453 Phil. 54, 75-76 (2003).
45 Garces v. People, G.R. No. 173858, 17 July 2007.
46 Supra note 42; People v. Ebio, G.R. No. 147750, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 421.
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