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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172607               October 26, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RUFINO UMANITO, Appellant.

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA, J.:

On appeal is the Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006, affirming the Judgment² of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 dated 15 October 1997 finding Rufino Umanito (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the private complainant in the sum of ₱50,000.00.³

On 9 January 1990, appellant was charged with the crime of rape in a Criminal Complaint⁴ which reads:

That on or about 9:00 P.M. of July 15, 1989, at Brgy[.] Daramuangan, Municipality of Naguilian, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who was armed with a fan knife and by means of force and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having a sexual intercourse to [sic] the undersigned who is unmarried woman of good reputation, a woman who is over 12 but below 18 years old [sic] of age, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.⁵

It was only five (5) years later, or sometime in 1995, that appellant was arrested. It took place when he went to the Municipal Hall of Naguilian to secure a police clearance.

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.

The appellate court’s chronicle of the facts is as follows:

It was around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of July 15, 1989, while on her way to her grandmother’s home, when private complainant [AAA]⁶ was accosted by a young male. It was only

later when she learned the name of accused-appellant UMANITO. She recounted that accused-appellant UMANITO waited for her by the creek, and then with a knife pointed at [AAA]’s left side of the [sic] abdomen, he forced her to give in to his kisses, to his holding her breasts and stomach, and to his pulling her by the arm to be dragged to the Home Economics Building inside the premises of the Daramuangan Elementary School where accused-appellant UMANITO first undressed her [AAA] and himself with his right hand while he still clutched the knife menacingly on his left hand. Private complainant [AAA] recounted that she could not shout because she was afraid. She further recounted that accused-appellant UMANITO laid her down on a bench, 4 meters long and 24 inches wide, set the knife down, then mounted her, inserting his penis into her [AAA’s] vagina and shortly thereafter, accused-appellant UMANITO dressed up and threatened [AAA] while poking the knife at her neck, not to report the incident to the police or else he said he would kill her. Accused-appellant UMANITO then left, while the victim [AAA] went on to her grandmother’s house and she noticed that it was already around 1:00 o’clock in the morning when she reached there.

In January 1990, 6 months after the incident, private complainant [AAA’s] mother, [BBB],⁷ noticed the prominence on [AAA]’s stomach. It was only then when the victim, private complainant [AAA], divulged to her mother the alleged rape and told her the details of what had happened in July, [sic] 1989. After hearing private complainant [AAA]’s story, her mother brought her to the police station.⁸

Appellant’s version on the stand was different. Denying the accusations of AAA, he claimed that on 15 July 1989, he was home the whole day, helping his family complete rush work on picture frames ordered from Baguio. He did not step out of their house on the evening in question, he added.⁹ Concerning his relationship with AAA, appellant admitted that he had courted her but she spurned him. He conjectured, though, that AAA had a crush on him since she frequently visited him at his house.¹⁰

Finding that the prosecution had proven appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify AAA in the sum of ₱50,000.00.¹¹ In so doing, the court a quo held that the discrepancies in AAA’s testimony did not impair her credibility. Despite some inconsistencies in her statement, the RTC observed that AAA’s demeanor on the witness stand did not indicate any falsehood in her narration.¹²

The trial court likewise rejected appellant’s defense of alibi, ruling that he did not prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime given the testimonies that he and complainant were residing in the same barrio.¹³

Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,¹⁴ appellant’s appeal before us was transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review. On 15 February 2006, the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision. Finding AAA to be a credible witness, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the inconsistencies in her statements were too trivial and inconsequential to impair the credibility of her testimony.¹⁵

In this appeal, appellant seeks his acquittal on reasonable doubt by reason of the belated filing of the case against him and the questionable credibility of AAA with respect to her varying allegations.

Appellant asserts that the court a quo erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of the complaining witness and in not acquitting him on reasonable doubt. He avers that apparently AAA filed the complaint against him only upon the prodding of her mother.¹⁶ This aspect, appellant insists, negates AAA’s claim that he was the one who raped her but rather supports his assertion that the sexual congress AAA engaged in was with another man, her real lover who was married to another woman.¹⁷ Appellant further puts in issue the long delay in AAA’s filing of the complaint.¹⁸

Appellant capitalizes on the alleged serious inconsistencies in AAA’s assertions, and further characterizes her actions and contentions as incredible and unnatural.¹⁹ In particular, appellant highlights AAA’s contradictory declarations on when she met appellant and the nature of their relationship. He also alludes to AAA’s purportedly inconsistent statements on whether it was appellant or she herself, upon his orders, who took off her clothes. Finally, appellant points out the supposedly conflicting assertions of AAA on whether it was at the creek or in the school building that he kissed her face and other parts of her body.

Once again, this Court is called upon to determine whether the prosecution has successfully met the level of proof needed to find appellant guilty of the crime of rape.

Among the many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense, the disharmony on a certain point stands out. Appellant, on one hand, testified that although he had courted AAA, they were not sweethearts. Therefore, this testimony largely discounts the possibility of consensual coitus between him and AAA. On the other, AAA made contradictory allegations at the preliminary investigation and on the witness stand with respect to the nature of her relationship with appellant. First, she claimed that she met appellant only on the day of the purported rape; later, she stated that they were actually friends; and still later, she admitted that they were close.²⁰

Amidst the slew of assertions and counter-assertions, a happenstance may provide the definitive key to the absolution of the appellant. This is the fact that AAA bore a child as a result of the purported rape. With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child. If he is not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not sire the alleged victim’s child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis.²¹ If he is found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate decision in this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and AAA’s child to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing²² under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence²³ (the Rules), which took effect on 15 October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.

DNA print or identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can aid immensely in determining a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.²⁴ Verily, as we pointed out in People v. Yatar,²⁵ the process of obtaining such vital evidence has become less arduous –

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.²⁶

The ground work for acknowledging the strong weight of DNA testing was first laid out in Tijing v. Court of Appeals,²⁷ where the Court said –

x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.²⁸

The leading case of Herrera v. Alba,²⁹ where the validity of a DNA test as a probative tool to determine filiation in our jurisdiction was put in issue, discussed DNA analysis as evidence and traced the development of its admissibility in our jurisdiction. Thus:

DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA profile can determine his identity.

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins. We quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order with approval:

Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individual’s blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.

The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an individual’s DNA determines his or her physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."

Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."

How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.

Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.

As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father (Emphasis in the original).

x x x x

The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Court’s wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case, where we stated that "DNA, being a relatively new science, x x x has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts." In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accused’s DNA profile. We affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death.

x x x x

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on DNA testing: People v. Yatar and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa. In Yatar, a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejo’s footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the victim’s child does not preclude the convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.³⁰

The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections³¹ likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to."³²

It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings.³³ Hence, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.

What should be the proper scope of such hearings? Section 4 of the Rules spells out the matters which the trial court must determine, thus:

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order.–The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

The Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.³⁴

Given our earlier pronouncements on the relevance of the DNA testing, it would be unbecoming of the RTC to conclude otherwise, Section 4 (d) notwithstanding. The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set in Section 4 (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the Rules.

Should the RTC find the DNA testing feasible in the case at bar, it shall order the same, in conformity with Section 5 of the Rules.³⁵ It is also the RTC which shall determine the institution³⁶ to undertake the DNA testing and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice of DNA testing center.

After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence. The RTC, in evaluating the DNA results upon presentation, shall assess the same as evidence in keeping with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules, to wit:

SEC. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. – In assessing the probative value of the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider the following:

(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;

(b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;

(c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established; and

(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.

The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply suppletorily.

SEC. 8. Reliability of DNA testing methodology.–In evaluating whether the DNA testing methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the following:

(a) The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested;

(b) The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods;

(c) The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific community;

(d) The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of data gathered;

(e) The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and

(f) The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles.

The trial court is further enjoined to observe the requirements of confidentiality and preservation of the DNA evidence in accordance with Sections 11³⁷ and 12³⁸ of the Rules.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the RTC shall consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.³⁹

Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in the handling of the samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne in the records, i.e.: that the samples are collected by a neutral third party; that the tested parties are appropriately identified at their sample collection appointments; that the samples are protected with tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons in possession thereof at each stage of testing thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering and explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he performed in relation thereto.

In light of the fact that this case constitutes the first known application of the Rules, the Court is especially interested in monitoring the implementation thereof in this case, for its guidance and continuing evaluation of the Rules as implemented. For purposes of supervising the implementation the instant resolution, the Court designates Deputy Court Administrator Reuben Dela Cruz (DCA Dela Cruz) to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the Rules; and (b) assess and submit periodic reports on said implementation to the Court. Towards the fulfillment of such end, the RTC is directed to cooperate and coordinate with DCA Dela Cruz.

A final note. In order to facilitate the execution of this Resolution, though the parties are primarily bound to bear the expenses for DNA testing, such costs may be advanced by this Court if needed.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is remanded to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance with the terms of this Resolution. The RTC is further directed to report to the Court the results of the proceedings below within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Rollo, pp. 3-15. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.

² CA rollo, pp. 20-34. Penned by Judge Jose G. Paneda.

³ Id. at 34.

⁴ Records, p. 1.

⁵ Id.

⁶ The real name of the victim is withheld per R.A. No. 7610 and R.A. No. 9262. See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419.

⁷ The real name of the victim’s mother is likewise withheld to protect her and the victim’s privacy. See People v. Cabalquinto, supra.

⁸ Supra note 1 at 5-6.

⁹ TSN, 11 February 1997, pp. 6-8.

¹⁰ Id. at 10.

¹¹ Supra note 2 at 33-34.

¹² CA rollo, p. 31.

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

¹⁵ Supra note 1 at 8, 11.

¹⁶ CA rollo, p. 58.

¹⁷ Id. See also TSN, 11 February 1997, pp. 5, 9-10, 12.

¹⁸ CA rollo, pp. 58-59.

¹⁹ Records, p. 392.

²⁰ Id. at 3; TSN, 29 March 1995, p. 4; TSN, 13 March 1996, pp. 2-3, 20-24.

²¹ See In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for De Villa, 442 SCRA 706 (2004).

²² In People v. Marquez (430 Phil. 383 [2002]), we characterized DNA testing as synonymous to DNA typing, DNA fingerprinting, DNA profiling, genetic tests, and genetic fingerprinting.

²³ A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, 15 October 2007.

²⁴ People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504, 514.

²⁵ G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 505 (2004).

²⁶ Id. at 515.

²⁷ 406 Phil. 449 (2001).

²⁸ Id. at 461.

²⁹ G.R. No. 148220, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA 197. See also Agustin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162571, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA 315.

³⁰ Id. at 209-213. Citations omitted.

³¹ G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277.

³² Id. at 345.

³³ Carlos v. Sandoval, 471 SCRA 266 (2005).

³⁴ Rule On DNA Evidence, Sec. 4.

³⁵ SEC. 5. DNA Testing Order. – If the court finds that the requirements in Section 4 hereof have been complied with, the court shall. —

(a) Order, as appropriate, that biological samples be taken from any person or crime scene evidence;

(b) Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect the integrity of the biological sample, the testing process and the reliability of the test results, including a condition that the DNA test results shall be simultaneously disclosed to parties involved in the case; and

(c) If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the conduct of confirmatory testing by the other or the adverse party and where additional biological samples of the same kind can no longer be obtained, issue an order requiring all parties to the case or proceedings to witness the DNA testing to be conducted.

x x x The grant of a DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof.

³⁶ Among the current known institutions offering DNA testing are the University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute and St. Luke’s Medical Center.

³⁷ SEC. 11. Confidentiality. – DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall be confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court:

(1) Person from whom the sample was taken;

(2) Lawyers representing parties in the case or action where the DNA evidence is offered and presented or sought to be offered and presented;

(3) Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;

(4) Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and

(5) Other persons as determined by the court.

Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented or sought to be offered and presented.

Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of his DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, the same may be disclosed to the persons named in the written verified request.

³⁸ SEC. 12. Preservation of DNA evidence.–The trial court shall preserve the DNA evidence, in its totality, including all biological samples, DNA profiles and results or other genetic information obtained from DNA testing. For this purpose, the court may order the appropriate government agency to preserve the DNA evidence as follows:

(a) In criminal cases:

i. for not less than the period of time that any person is under trial for an offense; or,

ii. in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time as the accused has served his sentence; and

(b) in all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where the DNA evidence was introduced has become final and executory.

The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before the expiration of the periods set forth above provided that:

(a) a court order to that effect has been secured; or

(b) the person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has consented in writing to the disposal of the DNA evidence.

³⁹ People v. Vallejo, 431 Phil. 798, 817 (2002).

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