Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161657 October 4, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, CARMELO V. CACHERO, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and TARCILA LAPERAL MENDOZA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Via this verified petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic," for short), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), comes to this Court to nullify and set aside the decision dated August 27, 2003 and other related issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in its Civil Case No. 99-94075. In directly invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, without challenge from any of the respondents, the Republic gave as justification therefor the fact that the case involves an over TWO BILLION PESO judgment against the State, allegedly rendered in blatant violation of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence.
By any standard, the case indeed involves a colossal sum of money which, on the face of the assailed decision, shall be the liability of the national government or, in fine, the taxpayers. This consideration, juxtaposed with the constitutional and legal questions surrounding the controversy, presents special and compelling reasons of public interests why direct recourse to the Court should be allowed, as an exception to the policy on hierarchy of courts.
At the core of the litigation is a 4,924.60-square meter lot once covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 118527 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila in the name of the herein private respondent Tarcila Laperal Mendoza (Mendoza), married to Perfecto Mendoza. The lot is situated at No. 1440 Arlegui St., San Miguel, Manila, near the Malacañang Palace complex. On this lot, hereinafter referred to as the Arlegui property, now stands the Presidential Guest House which was home to two (2) former Presidents of the Republic and now appears to be used as office building of the Office of the President.1
The facts:
Sometime in June 1999, Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance and the corresponding declaration of nullity of a deed of sale and title against the Republic, the Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty. Fidel Vivar. In her complaint, as later amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94075 and eventually raffled to Branch 35 of the court, Mendoza essentially alleged being the owner of the disputed Arlegui property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of and over which the Register of Deeds of Manila issued TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic.
Answering, the Republic set up, among other affirmative defenses, the State’s immunity from suit.
The intervening legal tussles are not essential to this narration. What is material is that in an Order of March 17, 2000, the RTC of Manila, Branch 35, dismissed Mendoza’s complaint. The court would also deny, in another order dated May 12, 2000, Mendoza’s omnibus motion for reconsideration. On a petition for certiorari, however, the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 60749, reversed the trial court’s assailed orders and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.2 On appeal, this Court, in G.R. No. 155231, sustained the CA’s reversal action.3
From Branch 35 of the trial court whose then presiding judge inhibited himself from hearing the remanded Civil Case No. 99-94075, the case was re-raffled to Branch 37 thereof, presided by the respondent judge.
On May 5, 2003, Mendoza filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file a Third Amended Complaint with a copy of the intended third amended complaint thereto attached. In the May 16, 2003 setting to hear the motion, the RTC, in open court and in the presence of the Republic’s counsel, admitted the third amended complaint, ordered the Republic to file its answer thereto within five (5) days from May 16, 2003 and set a date for pre-trial.
In her adverted third amended complaint for recovery and reconveyance of the Arlegui property, Mendoza sought the declaration of nullity of a supposed deed of sale dated July 15, 1975 which provided the instrumentation toward the issuance of TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic. And aside from the cancellation of TCT No. 118911, Mendoza also asked for the reinstatement of her TCT No. 118527.4 In the same third amended complaint, Mendoza averred that, since time immemorial, she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful and adverse possession of the property as well as of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 118527. Such possession, she added, continued "until the first week of July 1975 when a group of armed men representing themselves to be members of the Presidential Security Group [PSG] of the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had forcibly entered [her] residence and ordered [her] to turn over to them her … Copy of TCT No. 118525 … and compelled her and the members of her household to vacate the same …; thus, out of fear for their lives, [she] handed her Owner’s Duplicate Certificate Copy of TCT No. 118527 and had left and/or vacated the subject property." Mendoza further alleged the following:
1. Per verification, TCT No. 118527 had already been cancelled by virtue of a deed of sale in favor of the Republic allegedly executed by her and her deceased husband on July 15, 1975 and acknowledged before Fidel Vivar which deed was annotated at the back of TCT No. 118527 under PE: 2035/T-118911 dated July 28, 1975; and
2. That the aforementioned deed of sale is fictitious as she (Mendoza) and her husband have not executed any deed of conveyance covering the disputed property in favor of the Republic, let alone appearing before Fidel Vivar.
Inter alia, she prayed for the following:
4. Ordering the … Republic to pay plaintiff [Mendoza] a reasonable compensation or rental for the use or occupancy of the subject property in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS a month with a five (5%) per cent yearly increase, plus interest thereon at the legal rate, beginning July 1975 until it finally vacates the same;
5. Ordering the … Republic to pay plaintiff’s counsel a sum equivalent to TWENTY FIVE (25%) PER CENT of the current value of the subject property and/or whatever amount is recovered under the premises; Further, plaintiff prays for such other relief, just and equitable under the premises.
On May 21, 2003, the Republic, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for Extension (With Motion for Cancellation of scheduled pre-trial). In it, the Republic manifested its inability to simply adopt its previous answer and, accordingly, asked that it be given a period of thirty (30) days from May 21, 2003 or until June 20, 2003 within which to submit an Answer.5 June 20, 2003 came and went, but no answer was filed. On July 18, 2003 and again on August 19, 2003, the OSG moved for a 30-day extension at each instance. The filing of the last two motions for extension proved to be an idle gesture, however, since the trial court had meanwhile issued an order6 dated July 7, 2003 declaring the petitioner Republic as in default and allowing the private respondent to present her evidence ex-parte.
The evidence for the private respondent, as plaintiff a quo, consisted of her testimony denying having executed the alleged deed of sale dated July 15, 1975 which paved the way for the issuance of TCT No. 118911. According to her, said deed is fictitious or inexistent, as evidenced by separate certifications, the first (Exh. "E"), issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila and the second (Exh. "F"), by the Office of Clerk of Court, RTC Manila. Exhibit "E"7 states that a copy of the supposed conveying deed cannot, despite diligent efforts of records personnel, be located, while Exhibit "F"8 states that Fidel Vivar was not a commissioned notary public for and in the City of Manila for the year 1975. Three other witnesses9 testified, albeit their testimonies revolved around the appraisal and rental values of the Arlegui property.
Eventually, the trial court rendered a judgment by default10 for Mendoza and against the Republic. To the trial court, the Republic had veritably confiscated Mendoza’s property, and deprived her not only of the use thereof but also denied her of the income she could have had otherwise realized during all the years she was illegally dispossessed of the same.
Dated August 27, 2003, the trial court’s decision dispositively reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the deed of sale dated July 15, 1975, annotated at the back of [TCT] No. 118527 as PE:2035/T-118911, as non-existent and/or fictitious, and, therefore, null and void from the beginning;
2. Declaring that [TCT] No. 118911 of the defendant Republic of the Philippines has no basis, thereby making it null and void from the beginning;
3. Ordering the defendant Register of Deeds for the City of Manila to reinstate plaintiff [Mendoza’s TCT] No. 118527;
4. Ordering the defendant Republic … to pay just compensation in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P143,600,000.00) PESOS, plus interest at the legal rate, until the whole amount is paid in full for the acquisition of the subject property;
5. Ordering the plaintiff, upon payment of the just compensation for the acquisition of her property, to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favor of the defendant Republic …; and, on the other hand, directing the defendant Register of Deeds, upon presentation of the said deed of conveyance, to cancel plaintiff’s TCT No. 118527 and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of the defendant Republic;
6. Ordering the defendant Republic … to pay the plaintiff the sum of ONE BILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (P1,480,627,688.00) PESOS, representing the reasonable rental for the use of the subject property, the interest thereon at the legal rate, and the opportunity cost at the rate of three (3%) per cent per annum, commencing July 1975 continuously up to July 30, 2003, plus an additional interest at the legal rate, commencing from this date until the whole amount is paid in full;
7. Ordering the defendant Republic … to pay the plaintiff attorney’s fee, in an amount equivalent to FIFTEEN (15%) PER CENT of the amount due to the plaintiff.
With pronouncement as to the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket and emphasis added.)
Subsequently, the Republic moved for, but was denied, a new trial per order of the trial court of October 7, 2003.11 Denied also was its subsequent plea for reconsideration.12 These twin denial orders were followed by several orders and processes issued by the trial court on separate dates as hereunder indicated:
1. November 27, 2003 - - Certificate of Finality declaring the August 27, 2003 decision final and executory.13
2. December 17, 2003 - - Order denying the Notice of Appeal filed on November 27, 2003, the same having been filed beyond the reglementary period.14
3. December 19, 2003 - - Order15 granting the private respondent’s motion for execution.
4. December 22, 2003 - - Writ of Execution.16
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
By Resolution17 of November 20, 2006, the case was set for oral arguments. On January 22, 2007, when this case was called for the purpose, both parties manifested their willingness to settle the case amicably, for which reason the Court gave them up to February 28, 2007 to submit the compromise agreement for approval. Following several approved extensions of the February 28, 2007 deadline, the OSG, on August 6, 2007, manifested that it is submitting the case for resolution on the merits owing to the inability of the parties to agree on an acceptable compromise.
In this recourse, the petitioner urges the Court to strike down as a nullity the trial court’s order declaring it in default and the judgment by default that followed. Sought to be nullified, too, also on the ground that they were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, are the orders and processes enumerated immediately above issued after the rendition of the default judgment.
Petitioner lists five (5) overlapping grounds for allowing its petition. It starts off by impugning the order of default and the judgment by default. To the petitioner, the respondent judge committed serious jurisdictional error when he proceeded to hear the case and eventually awarded the private respondent a staggering amount without so much as giving the petitioner the opportunity to present its defense.
Petitioner’s posture is simply without merit.
Deprivation of procedural due process is obviously the petitioner’s threshold theme. Due process, in its procedural aspect, guarantees in the minimum the opportunity to be heard.18 Grave abuse of discretion, however, cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the respondent judge on account of his having issued the default order against the petitioner, then proceeding with the hearing and eventually rendering a default judgment. For, what the respondent judge did hew with what Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court prescribes and allows in the event the defending party fails to seasonably file a responsive pleading. The provision reads:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence ….19
While the ideal lies in avoiding orders of default,20 the policy of the law being to have every litigated case tried on its full merits,21 the act of the respondent judge in rendering the default judgment after an order of default was properly issued cannot be struck down as a case of grave abuse of discretion.
The term "grave abuse of discretion," in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.22 The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in a capricious manner. The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.23
Under the premises, the mere issuance by the trial court of the order of default followed by a judgment by default can easily be sustained as correct and doubtless within its jurisdiction. Surely, a disposition directing the Republic to pay an enormous sum without the trial court hearing its side does not, without more, vitiate, on due procedural ground, the validity of the default judgment. The petitioner may have indeed been deprived of such hearing, but this does not mean that its right to due process had been violated. For, consequent to being declared in default, the defaulting defendant is deemed to have waived his right to be heard or to take part in the trial. The handling solicitors simply squandered the Republic’s opportunity to be heard. But more importantly, the law itself imposes such deprivation of the right to participate as a form of penalty against one unwilling without justification to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff.
And going to another point, the petitioner would ascribe jurisdictional error on the respondent judge for denying its motion for new trial based on any or a mix of the following factors, viz., (1) the failure to file an answer is attributable to the negligence of the former handling solicitor; (2) the meritorious nature of the petitioner’s defense; and (3) the value of the property involved.
The Court is not convinced. Even as the Court particularly notes what the trial court had said on the matter of negligence: that all of the petitioner’s pleadings below bear at least three signatures, that of the handling solicitor, the assistant solicitor and the Solicitor General himself, and hence accountability should go up all the way to the top of the totem pole of authority, the cited reasons advanced by the petitioner for a new trial are not recognized under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court for such recourse.24 Withal, there is no cogent reason to disturb the denial by the trial court of the motion for new trial and the denial of the reiterative motion for reconsideration.
Then, too, the issuance by the trial court of the Order dated December 17, 200325 denying the petitioner’s notice of appeal after the court caused the issuance on November 27, 2003 of a certificate of finality of its August 27, 2003 decision can hardly be described as arbitrary, as the petitioner would have this Court believe. In this regard, the Court takes stock of the following key events and material dates set forth in the assailed December 17, 2003 order, supra: (a) The petitioner, thru the OSG, received on August 29, 2003 a copy of the RTC decision in this case, hence had up to September 13, 2003, a Saturday, within which to perfect an appeal; (b) On September 15, 2003, a Monday, the OSG filed its motion for new trial, which the RTC denied, the OSG receiving a copy of the order of denial on October 9, 2003; and (c) On October 24, 2003, the OSG sought reconsideration of the order denying the motion for new trial. The motion for reconsideration was denied per Order dated November 25, 2003, a copy of which the OSG received on the same date.
Given the foregoing time perspective, what the trial court wrote in its aforementioned impugned order of December 17, 2003 merits approval:
In the case at bar, it is clear that the motion for new trial filed on the fifteenth (15th) day after the decision was received on August 29, 2003 was denied and the moving party has only the remaining period from notice of notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. xxx
Accordingly, when defendants [Republic et al.] filed their motion for new trial on the last day of the fifteen day (15) prescribed for taking an appeal, which motion was subsequently denied, they had one (1) day from receipt of a copy of the order denying … new trial within which to perfect [an] appeal …. Since defendants had received a copy of the order denying their motion for new trial on 09 October 2003, reckoned from that date, they only have one (1) day left within which to file the notice of appeal. But instead of doing so, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration which was later declared by the Court as pro forma motion in the Order dated 25 November 2003. The running of the prescriptive period, therefore, can not be interrupted by a pro forma motion. Hence the filing of the notice of appeal on 27 November 2007 came much too late for by then the judgment had already become final and executory.26 (Words in bracket added; Emphasis in the original.)
It cannot be over-emphasized at this stage that the special civil action of certiorari is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction; it is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. Hence, the petitioner’s lament, partly covered by and discussed under the first ground for allowing its petition, about the trial court taking cognizance of the case notwithstanding private respondent’s claim or action being barred by prescription and/or laches cannot be considered favorably. For, let alone the fact that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract, as here, does not prescribe;27 that a void transfer of property can be recovered by accion reivindicatoria;28 and that the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud,29 the trial court’s disinclination not to appreciate in favor of the Republic the general principles of prescription or laches constitutes, at best, errors of judgment not correctable by certiorari.
The evidence adduced below indeed adequately supports a conclusion that the Office of the President, during the administration of then President Marcos, wrested possession of the property in question and somehow secured a certificate of title over it without a conveying deed having been executed to legally justify the cancellation of the old title (TCT No. 118527) in the name of the private respondent and the issuance of a new one (TCT No. 118911) in the name of petitioner Republic. Accordingly, granting private respondent’s basic plea for recovery of the Arlegui property, which was legally hers all along, and the reinstatement of her cancelled certificate of title are legally correct as they are morally right. While not exactly convenient because the Office of the President presently uses it for mix residence and office purposes, restoring private respondent to her possession of the Arlegui property is still legally and physically feasible. For what is before us, after all, is a registered owner of a piece of land who, during the early days of the martial law regime, lost possession thereof to the Government which appropriated the same for some public use, but without going through the legal process of expropriation, let alone paying such owner just compensation.
The Court cannot, however, stop with just restoring the private respondent to her possession and ownership of her property. The restoration ought to be complemented by some form of monetary compensation for having been unjustly deprived of the beneficial use thereof, but not, however, in the varying amounts and level fixed in the assailed decision of the trial court and set to be executed by the equally assailed writ of execution. The Court finds the monetary award set forth therein to be erroneous. And the error relates to basic fundamentals of law as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
As may be noted, private respondent fixed the assessed value of her Arlegui property at ₱2,388,990.00. And in the prayer portion of her third amended complaint for recovery, she asked to be restored to the possession of her property and that the petitioner be ordered to pay her, as reasonable compensation or rental use or occupancy thereof, the sum of ₱500,000.00 a month, or ₱6 Million a year, with a five percent (5%) yearly increase plus interest at the legal rate beginning July 1975. From July 1975 when the PSG allegedly took over the subject property to July 2003, a month before the trial court rendered judgment, or a period of 28 years, private respondent’s total rental claim would, per the OSG’s computation, only amount to ₱371,440,426.00. In its assailed decision, however, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay private respondent the total amount of over ₱1.48 Billion or the mind-boggling amount of ₱1,480,627,688.00, to be exact, representing the reasonable rental for the property, the interest rate thereon at the legal rate and the opportunity cost. This figure is on top of the ₱143,600,000.00 which represents the acquisition cost of the disputed property. All told, the trial court would have the Republic pay the total amount of about ₱1.624 Billion, exclusive of interest, for the taking of a property with a declared assessed value of ₱2,388,900.00. This is not to mention the award of attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the amount due the private respondent.
In doing so, the respondent judge brazenly went around the explicit command of Rule 9, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court30 which defines the extent of the relief that may be awarded in a judgment by default, i.e., only so much as has been alleged and proved. The court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an amount beyond the claim made in the complaint or beyond that proved by the evidence.31 While a defaulted defendant may be said to be at the mercy of the trial court, the Rules of Court and certainly the imperatives of fair play see to it that any decision against him must be in accordance with law.32 In the abstract, this means that the judgment must not be characterized by outrageous one-sidedness, but by what is fair, just and equitable that always underlie the enactment of a law.
Given the above perspective, the obvious question that comes to mind is the level of compensation which – for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property - would be fair to both the petitioner and the private respondent and, at the same time, be within acceptable legal bounds. The process of balancing the interests of both parties is not an easy one. But surely, the Arlegui property cannot possibly be assigned, even perhaps at the present real estate business standards, a monthly rental value of at least ₱500,000.00 or ₱6,000,000.00 a year, the amount private respondent particularly sought and attempted to prove. This asking figure is clearly unconscionable, if not downright ridiculous, attendant circumstances considered. To the Court, an award of ₱20,000.00 a month for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property, while perhaps a little bit arbitrary, is reasonable and may be granted pro hac vice considering the following hard realities which the Court takes stock of:
1. The property is relatively small in terms of actual area and had an assessed value of only P2,388,900.00;
2. What the martial law regime took over was not exactly an area with a new and imposing structure, if there was any; and
3. The Arlegui property had minimal rental value during the relatively long martial law years, given the very restrictive entry and egress conditions prevailing at the vicinity at that time and even after.
To be sure, the grant of monetary award is not without parallel. In Alfonso v. Pasay City,33 a case where a registered owner also lost possession of a piece of lot to a municipality which took it for a public purposes without instituting expropriation proceedings or paying any compensation for the lot, the Court, citing Herrera v. Auditor General,34 ordered payment of just compensation but in the form of interest when a return of the property was no longer feasible.
The award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 15% of the amount due the private respondent, as reduced herein, is affirmed.
The assessment of costs of suit against the petitioner is, however, nullified, costs not being allowed against the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law.35
The assailed trial court’s issuance of the writ of execution36 against government funds to satisfy its money judgment is also nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments.37 Republic v. Palacio38 teaches that a judgment against the State generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiff’s claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by processes of law.
Albeit title to the Arlegui property remains in the name of the petitioner Republic, it is actually the Office of the President which has beneficial possession of and use over it since the 1975 takeover. Accordingly, and in accord with the elementary sense of justice, it behooves that office to make the appropriate budgetary arrangements towards paying private respondent what is due her under the premises. This, to us, is the right thing to do. The imperatives of fair dealing demand no less. And the Court would be remiss in the discharge of its duties as dispenser of justice if it does not exhort the Office of the President to comply with what, in law and equity, is its obligation. If the same office will undertake to pay its obligation with reasonable dispatch or in a manner acceptable to the private respondent, then simple justice, while perhaps delayed, will have its day. Private respondent is in the twilight of her life, being now over 90 years of age.39 Any delay in the implementation of this disposition would be a bitter cut.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated August 27, 2003 insofar as it nullified TCT No. 118911 of petitioner Republic of the Philippines and ordered the Register of Deeds of Manila to reinstate private respondent Tarcila L. Mendoza’s TCT No. 118527, or to issue her a new certificate of title is AFFIRMED. Should it be necessary, the Register of Deeds of Manila shall execute the necessary conveying deed to effect the reinstatement of title or the issuance of a new title to her.
It is MODIFIED in the sense that for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property, petitioner Republic is ordered to pay private respondent the reasonable amount of ₱20,000.00 a month beginning July 1975 until it vacates the same and the possession thereof restored to the private respondent, plus an additional interest of 6% per annum on the total amount due upon the finality of this Decision until the same is fully paid. Petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent attorney's fees equivalent to 15% of the amount due her under the premises.
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari is hereby ISSUED in the sense that:
1. The respondent court’s assailed decision of August 27, 2003 insofar as it ordered the petitioner Republic of the Philippines to pay private respondent Tarcila L. Mendoza the sum of One Billion Four Hundred Eighty Million Six Hundred Twenty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Eight Pesos (₱1,480,627,688.00) representing the purported rental use of the property in question, the interest thereon and the opportunity cost at the rate of 3% per annum plus the interest at the legal rate added thereon is nullified. The portion assessing the petitioner Republic for costs of suit is also declared null and void.
2. The Order of the respondent court dated December 19, 2003 for the issuance of a writ of execution and the Writ of Execution dated December 22, 2003 against government funds are hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the presiding judge of the respondent court, the private respondent, their agents and persons acting for and in their behalves are permanently enjoined from enforcing said writ of execution.
However, consistent with the basic tenets of justice, fairness and equity, petitioner Republic, thru the Office of the President, is hereby strongly enjoined to take the necessary steps, and, with reasonable dispatch, make the appropriate budgetary arrangements to pay private respondent Tarcila L. Mendoza or her assigns the amount adjudged due her under this disposition.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Page 12 of the Decision of the RTC of Manila, Br. 37; rollo, p. 59.
2 Annex "I," Petition; id. at 77 et seq.
3 Annex "J," Petition, id. at 93.
4 Annex "K," Petition; id. at 94 et seq.
5 Annex "M," Petition; id. at 108.
6 Annex "A,’ Petition; id. at 47.
7 Id. at 105.
8 Id. at 106.
9 Engr. Hernando Gozon, Jr. of the Cuervo Appraisers, Inc.; Mr. Renato Chico of the Land Bank; and Engr. Israel Soguilon.
10 Per Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo; Annex "B," Petition; rollo, pp. 48 et seq.
11 Annex "C," Petition; id. at 62 et seq.
12 Annex "D," Petition; id. at 70.
13 Annex "E," Petition; id. at 71.
14 Annex "F," Petition; id. at 72 et seq.
15 Annex "G," Petition; id. at 75.
16 Annex "H," Petition; id. at 76.
17 Rollo, p. 341.
18 Roces v. Aportadera, Adm. Case No. 2936, March 31, 1995, 243 SCRA 108, citing cases.
19 First par. of Sec. 3
20 Citibank, N.A. v. Chua, G.R. No. 102300, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 75.
21 Lesaca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96432, October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 17, citing Coombs v. Santos, 24 Phil 446 (1913).
22 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 8th Revised Edition, p. 718, citing Benito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134913, Jan. 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 705.
23 Olanolan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165491, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 807, citing cases.
24 Section. 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. – xxx (a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his right; or (b) Newly discovered evidence ….
25 Supra note 14.
26 Rollo, pp. 72-73.
27 Art. 1410, Civil Code.
28 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1991 ed., p. 632.
29 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60169, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 1990, citing Acot v. Kempis, 55 O.G. 2907.
30 (d) Extent of relief to be awarded. - A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
31 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 8th ed., p. 173, citing Pascua v. Florendo, L- 38047, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 208.
32 Lim Tanhu v. Remolete, No. L-40098, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 452.
33 106 Phil. 1017 (1960).
34 102 Phil. 875 (1958).
35 Sec. 1, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court.
36 Supra note 16.
37 Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616.
38 No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899, citing Merritt v. Insular Government, 34 Phil. 311 (1916).
39 See Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution, Annex "Q," Petition; rollo, pp. 134 et seq.
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