Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158364 November 28, 2007
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY Petitioner,
vs.
SOLEDAD C. PASCUAL, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition assails the November 21, 2002 Decision1 and May 8, 2003 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45015 reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80 in Civil Case No. Q-89-3780 dismissing respondent’s complaint for declaration of nullity, reconveyance, and damages.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 3, 1959, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2616 was enacted providing for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate and the sale of the lots to present bonafide occupants. Thereafter, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was designated as administrator of the Tatalon Estate Housing Project by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1261. Pursuant thereto, petitioner NHA awarded in 1983 Lot 3, Block 12 of the Tatalon Estate Urban Bliss Project (TEUBP), containing an area of 65 square meters, to Dolores Maranan, since she was included in the 1958 Araneta Census List of Occupants. On May 25, 1983, a Transfer Notice was given to Maranan and a Deed of Sale with Mortgage was executed on May 31, 1983.3
On August 18, 1983, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT No. 303230 in favor of Maranan who executed in December 1984 a Special Power of Attorney4 in favor of Perlita Canedo with respect to the property and thereafter left the Philippines.5 On December 9, 1985, full payment was given by Perlita Canedo hence, NHA executed on October 22, 1986, a Deed of Cancellation and Release of Real Estate Mortgage and released TCT No. 303230. Later on, Maranan sold the lot to Perlita Canedo for which TCT No. 127373 was issued.6
Respondent Pascual however, assailed the award of the subject lot to Maranan by filing a letter-complaint7 on February 14, 1983 before the General Manager of NHA, alleging that she is the rightful beneficiary of the said lot being the actual occupant thereof and for having resided in the Tatalon Estate since 1968. Pascual averred that after marrying Aurelio Pascual in 1975, they used the subject lot for their domicile and operated a motor shop as well and were included in the 1976 Census. However, sometime in 1983, their house was demolished and relocated to an inner lot.
On June 20, 1983, the Inspector General of NHA recommended to the General Manager that the subject lot be awarded to Pascual considering that she was included in the 1976 Census and her house structure appeared in the aerial photo.8 On the other hand, the Project Manager recommended to award the lot to Maranan and to transfer respondent to an inner lot.9
On October 3, 1983, the General Manager sustained the position of the Project Manager to award the lot to Maranan and to relocate respondent to an inner lot and dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit.10
On December 4, 1984, respondent appealed to the Office of the President.11 In its 1st Indorsement dated December 14, 1984, NHA maintained the propriety of the award of the lot to Maranan.12
On August 4, 1986, the Presidential Staff Director of the Malacañang Public Assistance Center wrote a letter to the General Manager of NHA to reconsider the case of respondent in view of the allegations that Maranan was an absentee awardee. It stated that an inquiry from the United States Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service reveals that Maranan became a lawful resident of Honolulu, Hawaii on September 6, 1979. Hence, it appears that the subject lot which was originally occupied by respondent was awarded to Dolores Maranan under fraudulent circumstances.13
Thereafter, a series of conferences for a possible swapping of homelots was conducted by the NHA. On February 5, 1987, Pascual signed a Conditional Contract to Sell Lot 2, Block 2 of TEUBP previously allocated to her upon petitioner’s prodding that she would lose all her rights to be awarded a lot in the Tatalon Estate.
On September 29, 1987, the Public Complaints Assistance and Action Center reviewed the case and recommended that respondent be awarded another front lot to settle the matter; that the award of the inner lot where she was relocated will be cancelled and payments made shall be applied to the new lot and should there be any disparity in price, a refund or additional payment will be made accordingly.14 However, if respondent insists on her claim on the subject lot, then she must substantiate her claim. Further conferences were made but no settlement was reached between the parties and no ruling was made as to the disqualification of Maranan as an absentee awardee. Hence respondent brought the matter before the courts for redress.
On October 19, 1989, Pascual filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity, reconveyance, and damages before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court against petitioner NHA, Maranan, Canedo, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. She prayed for the declaration of nullity of the award of the subject lot to Maranan; declaration of nullity of the issuance of TCT No. 303230 in the name of Maranan; reconveyance of the subject lot; and for payment of damages.15
On June 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision16 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of defendants Dolores Sabella Maranan and Perlita Canedo, adverse as against the plaintiff.
1. The complaint is dismissed with costs against the plaintiff;
2. Defendant Dolores Sabella Maranan is declared the absolute owner in fee simple title of the land in suit identified as Lot 3, Block 12, of the Tatalon Estate, Quezon City, with an area of sixty five (65) square meters, together with all the improvements thereon, as evidenced by TCT No. 303230 (Exh. "13," pp. 508-509, Record), issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on August 18, 1983, entitled as such with all the dominical rights blossoming forth from her right of ownership thereof, including but not limited to her right to dispose of or sell the same to whoever is interested in the subject property;
3. Plaintiff, her heirs and assigns and all persons claiming rights under her, are ordered to respect and not to molest the peaceful possession and ownership of defendant Dolores Sabella Maranan, her heirs and assigns and representatives over the land in suit.
4. Plaintiff is declared the actual possessor and lawful applicant occupant of that interior lot of the subject Tatalon Estate, where she presently resides, as allotted to her, by way of accommodation or relocation done by defendant National Housing Authority, with right to perfect her ownership thereof, for the eventual issuance of the corresponding title in her name, upon completion of all the requirements and prescribed fees therefor;
5. Plaintiff to pay defendants Maranan and Canedo the amount of P10,000.00 by way of reasonable attorney’s fees;
6. Defendants’ claim for moral and exemplary damages are dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.17
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied hence, she appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45015. Pending resolution of the appeal, Lot 2, Block 2 of the TEUBP was fully paid by respondent in October 1998 and a Deed of Sale was executed by NHA in her favor on September 28, 1999.18
On November 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision setting aside the Decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant appeal. Resultantly, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered:
(a) declaring the award of the lot subject matter of this case to Dolores Sabella Maranan as null and void; as a consequence thereof;
(b) declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303230 issued in the name of Dolores Sabella Maranan and the same is ordered cancelled;
(c) ordering defendant-appellee National Housing Authority to reconvey the subject lot to plaintiff-appellant Soledad Pascual.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
The NHA filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution20 dated May 8, 2003. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
a) The Court of Appeals erred in holding that Dolores Maranan is not qualified to acquire the lot in question;
b) The Court of Appeals erred in ordering the NHA to reconvey the subject lot to Private Respondent;
c) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that Private Respondent is estopped to lay claim on the subject lot as she in fact voluntarily and freely executed a conditional contract to sell and later, a deed of sale, over another lot in TEUBP;
d) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the award of the subject lot is res judicata.21
The principal issue raised by petitioner is whether the award of the subject lot to Dolores Maranan can still be nullified and set aside by the courts. It maintains that the court has no power to do so since the award has attained finality and that the Complaint filed by respondent before the lower court is not the proper remedy to contest the same citing Raymundo v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation.22
Petitioner’s claim that respondent failed to seasonably contest the award has no leg to stand on.23 A careful perusal of the records reveal that respondent has effectively appealed the case to the Office of the President through a letter-complaint. NHA transmitted its 1st Indorsement dated December 14, 1983 to the Presidential Executive Assistant which stated its position on the matter. The Office of the President thereafter gave due course to the complaint and on August 4, 1986, the Presidential Staff Director of the Malacañang Public Assistance Center wrote a letter to the General Manager of NHA to reconsider the case of respondent in view of the allegations that Maranan was an absentee awardee and that the award of the lot to Maranan was made under fraudulent circumstances.24
Respondent’s letter-complaint substantially complied with the requirements of the law regarding administrative appeals. In the exercise of its discretion, the Office of the President gave due course to the appeal.
It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.25 In the case at bar, since petitioner’s decision was seasonably appealed by respondent, the same has not attained finality and the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Consequently, the ruling of the trial court dismissing respondent’s complaint on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies must be reversed. Respondent correctly resorted to the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President and obtained a favorable decision therefrom. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to reconsider and review, as directed by the Office of the President, the qualification and/or disqualification of respondent and Dolores Maranan. The record is bereft of any evidence that petitioner reviewed the qualification of Maranan and issued a ruling thereon. Instead of correcting its own lapse or mistake by reviewing the case, particularly on the qualifications of the intended beneficiaries, it sustained its decision by conducting several conferences and hearings for a possible swapping of homelots between the parties.
As to the propriety of the filing of the Complaint before the trial court, the Court agrees with petitioner that it has the sole power to dispose of lands under its administration. The ruling of this Court in Raymundo v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation26 still stands that:
3. The power to dispose of the lands placed under the administration of the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation (now National Housing Authority) is lodged in said body. There is no provision of law authorizing courts to review decisions of respondent PHHC and to take cognizance of actions to annul awards of sale of any other action made by it pursuant to the authority granted it by law. If the courts are to take cognizance of cases involving errors or abuse of power exercised by the respondent PHHC, the remedy would be by means of an action for certiorari or prohibition to set aside the orders or decisions of the respondent, and not a direct action for specific performance as the one instituted in this case. But this special civil action would not lie unless there is an allegation of abuse of discretion for lack of jurisdiction.27
However, the Raymundo case is not applicable in the case at bar since the Complaint filed primarily sought the nullification of the title issued in the name of Dolores Maranan and not merely the nullification of the award made by petitioner. It should be noted that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303230 was issued in the name of Maranan a few months after the subject lot was awarded to her despite the objections interposed by respondent. In seeking the cancellation of the title, the Complaint prayed for the declaration of nullity of the award which was the basis for the issuance of the title.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, we have sustained the propriety of the action for annulment of title and the consequent nullification of awards granted by the government in favor of wrongful grantees who obtained said grants in violation of public policy or through fraudulent means. In Swan v. Court of Appeals,28 this Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for annulment and cancellation of title which also prayed for the annulment of the award by the NHA of the disputed lot. In sustaining the stand of petitioner therein, the Court held:
x x x Their action in the court below x x x being one for annulment of title of the private respondents, the Regional Trial Courts have original jurisdiction to entertain the same. What Raymundo prohibits is the cognizance by the courts of actions to annul NHA awards of sale of its lots. Actually, the next step for annulling an NHA award of sale is an appeal to the Office of the President within 33 days from receipt of the NHA decision awarding the lot to another party. After which step, the aggrieved party can go to the Courts via Rule 65.29
In an earlier case, Teves v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation,30 this Court also allowed the Complaint for annulment of title and the deed of sale between PHHC and its grantee on the allegation that the deed of sale was executed contrary to public policy and that fraud was exercised by defendants. In remanding the case to the trial court, the High Court ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for if the allegations in the Complaint are supported by evidence. The same case likewise allowed one who is not a party to a contract to ask for its annulment if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which would positively result to him.31 In the case at bar, due to the execution of the deed of sale between petitioner and Maranan, respondent was directly prejudiced such that her house was demolished and relocated to an inner lot thus foreclosing her right to acquire the subject lot as present occupant and censused resident.32
Thus, the Court of Appeals was well within its jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the appeal filed by respondent. Moreover, we find the factual findings to have been duly supported by evidence. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the NHA has the sole authority to identify qualified beneficiaries of the Tatalon Estate but that this discretion must be exercised properly.33 Despite evidence that Maranan was an absentee grantee in view of her being a resident of the United States, yet, petitioner still awarded the lot to Maranan, in grave abuse of its discretion.
The appellate court committed no reversible error when it ruled that the grant of the homelot to Dolores Maranan was void because she is an absentee awardee, which fact remains undisputed. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1261 provides for the order of priority in awarding the lots in the Tatalon Estate as follows:
1. Present occupants who were listed in the 1958 Araneta Census List of Occupants;
2. Present occupants as determined by the Authority in its 1976 Census Surveys; and
3. Squatter families in the Tatalon Estate after the 1976 Census Survey.
Pursuant to this mandate, NHA promulgated the Code of Policies of Tatalon Estate Development Project,34 Part 2.01 of which provides that "(a) censused household who vacates a duly tagged structure continuously for six months" is disqualified from the benefits offered by the development project. Hence, according to its own rules, it is not enough that an awardee is listed in the 1958 and 1976 Census Surveys; she must also continuously reside in the Tatalon Estate. Said requirement was not met by Maranan who became a lawful permanent resident of Honolulu, Hawaii in 1979 and who, after the issuance of title in her name, has left the country. She did not even participate in any of the proceedings to protect and defend her right, if any.
Although respondent has the personality to ask for the annulment of title, however, reconveyance is not proper in the case at bar and it was error for the Court of Appeals to order petitioner to reconvey the lot to respondent. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.35 The ruling nullifying the award of NHA in favor of Maranan has the effect of nullifying the deed of sale executed between her and petitioner and consequently, the issuance of the certificate of title in her name must be canceled. However, this will lead to the reversion of the title back in the name petitioner and not to respondent who has not yet acquired title over the property prior to the issuance of Maranan’s title. Thus, having affirmed the disqualification of Maranan as a lot awardee and consequently canceling her title over the lot in question, the Court of Appeals should have instead ordered petitioner to award the lot to respondent and to proceed with the execution of proper instruments to transfer said property in the name of petitioner in accordance with its rules and regulations.36
Finally, this Court sustains the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent is a qualified beneficiary of the Tatalon Estate Development Project. Respondent’s acceptance of another lot and the execution of the Conditional Deed of Sale over the lot where her house was transferred by petitioner over her objection cannot be taken as a ground to disqualify her from acquiring the lot in litigation as it appears that such acceptance was made with the condition that her right to substantiate her claim over the subject lot will not be forfeited.
There was no indication that respondent abandoned her claim over the subject lot. Even after the execution of the deed of sale, further negotiations were conducted between the parties. The September 29, 1987 proposal of the Public Complaints Assistance and Action Center to award respondent with another front lot or to allow her to substantiate her claim over the subject lot also supports this position as it stated that the award of the present lot will be cancelled and payments made shall be applied to the new lot she will choose and should there be any disparity in price, a refund or additional payment will be made accordingly.
We agree with respondent that being a 1976 Census beneficiary is not a ground for disqualification but is merely a matter for prioritization pursuant to Section 3 of P.D. No. 1261. As to the allegation that respondent is not a censused resident, it should be noted that in pleadings filed by petitioner, allegations were made that respondent’s name appears in the manual list of residents and the October 3, 1983 Resolution37 of the NHA General Manager even recognized that she is a 1976 Census beneficiary and as such belong to the second priority of beneficiary in the allocation/awarding of lots in the project area.38
There is nothing objectionable in the application by the Court of Appeals of the "as is, where is" policy of the NHA. Part 1.06 of the Code of Policies of the Tatalon Estate Development Project provides that the NHA shall strictly enforce its existing policies, rules and regulations without prejudice to the formulation and enforcement of future policies, rules and regulations whether new, amendatory or supplementary in character.39
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that respondent is a qualified beneficiary. The award in favor of Maranan being null and void, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in her name should be cancelled. Respondent is a qualified beneficiary and entitled to be awarded the subject lot as it appears that she is the only person who pursued the claim against the wrongful grantee. Otherwise, it will be the height of injustice should the subject lot be granted to some other applicants who did not pursue a claim over the subject lot.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court Appeals dated November 21, 2002 and May 8, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 45015 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner is ordered to award Lot 3, Block 12 of the Tatalon Estate Urban Bliss Project to respondent and cancel the award to respondent of Lot 2, Block 2 in accordance with its rules and regulations.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 105-115; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Amelita Tolentino.
2 Id. at 116.
3 Records, p. 197.
4 Id. at 198.
5 Id. at 235.
6 Rollo, pp. 88-89.
7 Records, pp. 229-230.
8 Id. at 203-204.
9 Id. at 207-211.
10 Id. at 231. On November 14, 1983, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The records does not reveal any positive action taken by petitioner on respondent’s request/motion for reconsideration.
11 Id. at 238-240.
12 Id. at 530.
13 Id. at 241-242.
14 Id. at 200-201.
15 Id. at 3-4.
16 Rollo, pp. 130-140; penned by Judge Efren N. Ambrosio.
17 Id. at 139-140.
18 Id. at 88-89.
19 Id. at 114; CA rollo, pp. 166-176.
20 Id. at 116; id. at 261.
21 Id. at 89-90.
22 200 Phil. 191 (1982).
23 The decisions, rulings, orders, or resolutions of the National Housing Authority relative to the disposition of the lots or dwelling units or such rights acquired hereunder, or to the ejection of delinquent beneficiaries shall be final, unless appealed to the Office of the President within THIRTY (30) DAYS from receipt of such decision, ruling, order or resolution; Provided, however, that the Office of the President is deemed to have affirmed the appealed decision, ruling, order, or resolution, if within SIXTY (60) DAYS from notice of appeal, the said Offices has not reserved nor modified the same.
24 Records, pp. 241-242.
25 Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 486 (1998).
26 Supra note 22.
27 Id. at 196-197.
28 G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114.
29 Id. at 121-122.
30 132 Phil. 567 (1968).
31 Id. at 576.
32 See Lodovica v. Court of Appeals, 160 Phil. 162 (1975).
33 Rollo, p. 113.
34 Records, pp. 437-439.
35 Caro v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. 157536, May 16, 2005.
36 See Lodovica v. Court of Appeals, supra.
37 Records, p. 488.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 437.
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