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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175946             March 23, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RAYMUNDO DADULLA @ "MUNDO", Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us for review is the September 15, 2006 Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00204 affirming with modification the Decision² dated May 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Guiuan, Eastern Samar, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 1524, finding appellant Raymundo Dadulla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape.

On February 28, 1996, an Information was filed charging appellant with rape. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1995, at about 12:00 o’clock high noon more or less at the house of the accused at x x x and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of trick was able to convince AAA to enter a room in his house, and while AAA was inside the room alone, and was the only person in the house of the accused and by means of force and intimidation AAA become unconscious did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously did lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge with said AAA without her consent and against her will.

Contrary to law.³

When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The facts as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:

At 9:45 A.M. on May 22, 1995, AAA was inside her house at Barangay 6, x x x which she shared with her mother-in-law and a thirteen (13) year old nephew. The private complainant’s husband was a seaman working abroad at that time; while her mother-in-law was not at the house and her nephew was tending their sari-sari-store.

Appellant, a brother-in-law of the victim, then entered the house and asked the private complainant’s help to treat his (appellant) sick common-law-wife (BBB) at their home at Barangay 10. The private complainant, a pharmacist by training, grabbed a blood pressure monitoring instrument and followed appellant to the latter’s home. Upon entering their house, the private complainant inquired where BBB was; appellant directed her to a room where his common-law-wife was purportedly in bed. As she entered the room, appellant followed her, locked the door behind him and blocked said entrance.

Finding that BBB was not around, the private complainant told appellant to open the door as she was going out; but appellant did not do so. The private complainant became afraid, especially when she saw a bolo hanging at a corner of the room’s wall. The victim began feeling chest pains, laid down on the bed on appellant’s instruction and then sat down on the floor of her own volition. She then asked for water; but appellant did not give her any. The accused told her something bad would happen to her; that he would kill her. They then discussed appellant’s family problems which prompted him to plan and to sexually abuse private complainant. The private complainant then fainted.

When the private complainant regained consciousness, she was lying on the floor, her shorts and panty gone, and appellant, naked from the waist down, on top of her and copulating with her. After he had finished, appellant stood up and put on his brief and shorts. The private complainant likewise stood up, put on her panty and shorts, left the appellant’s house and went home.

That same afternoon, the private complainant, accompanied by her sister, went to see [their Barangay Chairman] and reported the incident perpetrated by appellant. Since the private complainant was trembling, could not yet speak well and felt bad, [the Barangay] Chairman CCC scheduled a confrontation between the parties the following day.

During the confrontation, appellant admitted raping the private complainant ("I raped her and that is true; that I raped her") and complied with Chairman CCC’s directive to execute a handwritten note to that effect. Appellant also admitted having written another note in the possession of the private complainant, wherein he asked forgiveness for the wrong he had done and requested the private complainant to desist from filing a complaint against him.

After the confrontation, Chairman CCC accompanied the private complainant to DDD Hospital, thence to Giparlos and Quinapondan, in search of a doctor to conduct a medical examination upon her. They were, however, unable to find a doctor who could conduct the physical examination. The private complainant was eventually able to have herself medically examined in EEE City on May 26, 1995. One Dr. FFF noted the physical injuries she had sustained on her person by reason of the rape, while one Dr. GGG examined her genital parts. Both doctors jointly issued a medical certificate dated May 29, 1995 recording their findings.

The private complainant also reported the incident to the police authorities, executing a sworn statement for the purpose. She had also executed a complaint or denuncia dated May 25, 1995, which initiated a preliminary investigation for rape against appellant with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

When the information for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, appellant was ordered arrested and was placed under detention on January 14, 1996.⁴ (Citations omitted)

The defense presented the appellant as its lone witness. He denied having raped AAA on May 22, 1995. He claimed that he and AAA were lovers since February 1995 and they had been secretly meeting while the latter’s husband worked abroad.⁵

Appellant alleged that AAA was mad at him for trying to end their affair hence she fabricated the charges against him. He testified that in the morning of May 22, 1995, he was alone in the sala of their house lying on the sofa when AAA arrived. Since the door was open, AAA did not knock anymore and went straight inside, sat beside appellant and asked if his wife had already left for Manila. Her arrival did not come as a surprise because she used to come to appellant’s house. In the course of their conversation, appellant told her that he wanted to end their illicit relationship out of remorse and shame for his wife, children, and brother. AAA did not agree. She left the house crying but warned him that something bad would happen to him.⁶

Appellant acknowledged that he signed a document during the confrontation at the barangay hall on May 23, 1995 where he admitted raping AAA but alleged that he did so out of fear for his life. He claimed that during the meeting, three "long-haired" men (allegedly NPA) were present who threatened him with bodily harm should he refuse to sign the document. With regard to the letter he wrote to AAA, he declared that he did not admit therein raping AAA although he asked forgiveness for having ended their relationship.⁷

On May 26, 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of rape, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby SENTENCES accused Raymundo Dadulla, alias Mundo to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is likewise ordered to pay the complainant, AAA the amount of One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages and the amount of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages. The accused is likewise ordered to pay the costs of the suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.⁸

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty of rape but reduced the amount of moral damages from ₱100,000.00 to ₱50,000.00.⁹

Hence, this appeal where appellant raises the following issues:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT [AAA] MORE CREDIBLE THAN THAT OF THE ACCUSED RAYMUNDO DADULLA.

II. LIKEWISE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

At the outset, we note that appellant assails the credibility of AAA’s testimony; that it is allegedly full of inconsistencies and highly incredible. He cites as example AAA’s testimony that she was initially hesitant to go to appellant’s house because of his previous criminal record of having killed somebody in Manila and having threatened to kill her husband, but at the same time she testified that upon reaching appellant’s house, she went directly inside without knocking. According to appellant, AAA’s act of proceeding directly inside the house showed her desire to avoid other people from seeing her entering the house. Moreover, appellant claims that AAA’s testimony that she did not persist in pushing appellant away or shout for help out of fear for her life is incredible considering that appellant was not carrying any weapon which could have endangered her life. Appellant further states that he did not employ force or intimidation which cowed AAA into submission. On the contrary, AAA willingly followed his instructions for her to lie on the bed and thereafter they both voluntarily engaged in the sexual act.

We are not persuaded.

The assessment of the credibility of the witness’ testimony lies with the trial court, for it is in a better position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full opportunity to directly observe the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying. Well settled is the rule that unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the case, its findings carry great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.¹⁰

The trial judge’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness is generally accorded not only the highest degree of respect, but also finality, unless some circumstances of weight and substance, which could change the result of the case, have been ignored or misunderstood. As the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, he/she was in a vantage position to assess the witness’ demeanor and determine whether or not he/she was telling the truth.¹¹

In the instant case, we find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that:

The issue in this case being only credibility and as the testimony of the offended party is more credible than that of the accused, this Court arrived at a considered opinion that the prosecution indeed successfully proved that the complainant had been sexually attacked by the accused, resulting in the consummation of the sexual act by the accused on the complainant. The guilt of the accused for the commission of Rape as charged in this case had been therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt.¹²

Moreover, the findings of the trial court on AAA’s credibility was affirmed by the appellate court, to wit:

We are not persuaded by this contention of the accused-appellant. Although private complainant admitted she was hesitant to go to appellant’s house due to the latter’s criminally violent reputation, this circumstance is still consistent with her act of immediately entering appellant’s house because she had intended to help what she thought was the sick common- law-wife of the appellant who was in need of immediate medical attention and treatment, as misrepresented by appellant.

Although private complainant did not persist in pushing appellant away after he had blocked her way inside [the] house, and she did not shout for help out of fear, such conduct remains natural even if appellant had no deadly weapon on his person at the time.

Private complainant’s behavior must be viewed in the light of her perception and judgment at the time of the rape and not by any hard and fast rule. She had already been trapped in the room by her brother-in-law, whom she knew had once killed a man in Manila and had also threatened to kill her own husband. She was frightened by the sight of a bolo which was hanging on the wall of the room.

The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently. Some may shout, others, as in this case, may faint and be shocked into insensibility. But such conduct does not impair the credibility of a rape victim.

More importantly, the victim’s subsequent act of promptly disclosing and complaining about the incident to the authorities and taking immediate steps to subject herself to medical examination as the availability of medical personnel permitted, done at a time when her seaman husband was abroad and was in no position to immediately discover the sexual assault perpetrated by his brother upon his wife, represent conduct consistent with her straightforward, logical and probable testimony that she was in fact raped by appellant on May 22, 1995. They represent strong and compelling factors that enhance complainant’s credibility as a witness.¹³

AAA’s failure to shout for help does not negate the commission of rape. Although there was a basketball court located outside of the appellant’s house, AAA testified that she did not notice if there were people at the basketball court at the time of rape.¹⁴ She also said that the nearest neighboring house was 25 meters away¹⁵ and the sight of a bolo hanging on the wall and the continuing intimidation by appellant sufficiently cowed her into submission. Indeed, the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal act of the offender.¹⁶ Physical resistance need not be proved in rape when intimidation, as in this case, is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal safety. It suffices that the intimidation produces fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not submit to the bestial demands of the accused, something worse would befall her at the time she was being molested.¹⁷

Different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One person’s spontaneous thinking, or even instinctive, response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another person's reaction may be cold indifference.¹⁸ AAA’s failure to seek help from people in the nearby basketball court, assuming there were indeed any, or from appellant’s neighbors does not make the sexual congress voluntary or make AAA any less a rape victim. Resistance is not an element of rape as it could be committed through force and intimidation. Lack of physical resistance can not be considered consent.

Appellant’s contention that the Medico Legal Report belies the commission of rape as it contains no findings of physical injuries allegedly sustained by AAA lacks merit. The gravamen of the offense of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent. All that is necessary is that force and intimidation were employed by the appellant against her which enabled him to commit the crime. It is not necessary for the victim to sustain physical injuries.¹⁹ Moreover, a medical examination or certificate has never been considered an indispensable element in the prosecution of rape cases²⁰ being merely corroborative in nature.1ªvvphi1.nét²¹ We have ruled in People v. San Juan²² that in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victim is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime, as her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused thereof.

The "sweetheart defense" is also unavailing. It is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence. Appellant’s sweetheart defense must be rejected for lack of corroboration, by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like.²³ In the instant case, other than his self-serving statement, appellant presented nothing to prove that such romantic relationship existed.

We are likewise not persuaded by appellant’s attempt to discredit the credibility of AAA regarding the date when the rape incident occurred. He ascribes error on AAA’s testimony that she was raped on May 22, 1995 which he claims was contradicted by Chairman CCC’s declaration that she reported the incident on May 21, 1995. This is only a minor inconsistency which does not belie the commission of rape by appellant. The exact date of the commission of the offense of rape is not an element of the crime²⁴ for the gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her will.

More importantly, appellant admitted in writing before the Barangay Chairman that he raped AAA. He also wrote a letter to AAA asking for her forgiveness and praying that she desist from filing a complaint. The following is the English translation of the letter:

"To AAA,

AAA, I admit that I have committed a wrong against your person, I deliberate regret for what I have done against you, so its all up to you, because if you submit to the municipal office, I would directly be incarcerated and I greatly pity my mother, because if I will be imprisoned and be transfered to the Guiuan Jail, so AAA try to decide yourself not file a complaint at the Municipal office. AAA, I cried so hard while I am writing this letter of apology.

Your younger brother
pleading for mercy,

(Sgd.) Raymundo Dadulla"²⁵

As regards the amount of damages, this Court has consistently held that civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of rape. We note that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to award civil indemnity. Hence, appellant should be made to pay ₱50,000.00 in civil indemnity. On the other hand, moral damages is awarded upon such finding of rape without need of further proof because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.²⁶ Hence, the appellate court correctly awarded ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to the victim consistent with existing jurisprudence on the matter.²⁷

However, with respect to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that it may be imposed as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Considering that no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 is without basis and should be deleted.²⁸

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00204 finding appellant Raymundo Dadulla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim, AAA ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The award of exemplary damages of ₱50,000.00 is DELETED for lack of basis. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Foonotes

¹ Rollo, pp. 3-8. Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla.

² Records, pp. 116-125. Penned by Judge Ricardo B. Lapesura.

³ Id. at 1.

⁴ CA rollo, pp. 92-96.

⁵ TSN, April 7, 1999, pp. 83-84, 111-112.

⁶ Id. at 78-85.

⁷ Id. at 88-91.

⁸ Records, p. 125.

⁹ Rollo, p. 7.

¹⁰ People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006.

¹¹ People v. Valla, 380 Phil. 31, 40 (2000).

¹² Records, p. 124.

¹³ Rollo, pp. 5-6.

¹⁴ TSN, December 5, 1995, p. 36.

¹⁵ Id.

¹⁶ People v. Glodo, G.R. No. 136085, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 535, 543.

¹⁷ Id.

¹⁸ People v. Roncal, 338 Phil. 749, 755 (1997).

¹⁹ People v. Torres, G.R. No. 134766, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA 61, 67.

²⁰ People v. Agustin

²¹ People v. Gutierrez, 451 Phil. 227, 241 (2003).

²² G.R. No. 105556, April 4, 1997, 270 SCRA 693, 709.

²³ People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 619.

²⁴ Ordinario v. People, G.R. No. 155415, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 773, 779.

²⁵ Exhibit "H," records, p. 430.

²⁶ People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 76, 88.

²⁷ Id.

²⁸ Id. at 88-89.

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