Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170823 March 27, 2007
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, rep. by OIC-SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
OROVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORP., rep. by ANTONIO H. TIU and WALDO G. REBOLOS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) assails the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated July 18, 2005, which declared the 48.8939-hectare property subject of this case as not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and its Resolution2 dated November 15, 2005, which denied the DAR’s motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On July 7, 1997, petitioner [Oroville Development Corporation] applied with DAR Regional Office No. X for exclusion of the subject property from CARP coverage pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 06, s. of 1994, entitled "Guidelines for the Issuance of Exemption Clearance Based on Section 3 [c] of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990." According to petitioner, the property was reclassified into residential use prior to June 15, 1998, the date of effectivity of RA [No.] 6557, per Town Plan and Zoning Ordinance No. 880,s. of 1979 of Cagayan de Oro City, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) on September 24, 1980, and covering tax declarations.
On May 25, 1998, DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order denying petitioner’s application. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued DENYING the exemption application and DECLARING that the 48.8939 hectare agricultural land embraced by TCT numbers [sic] T-85121, T-85135, and T-104365 located at Maitum, Upper Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City as COVERED by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARP).
Petitioner failed in its move to reconsider the said May 25, 1998 Order, as shown in the Order issued by DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza on June 20, 2002, which decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 June 1998 filed by applicant-movant Oroville Development Corporation, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Secretary dated 25 May 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Unfazed, petitioner elevated the DAR Orders to the Office of the President (OP). However, the OP rendered a Decision on June 27, 2003, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Orders dated 25 May 1998 and 20 June 2002 of the DAR Secretary are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal DISMISSED.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the OP in its Resolution dated December 9, 2003.3
On petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals was faced with the issue of whether the subject property is classified as agricultural as found by the DAR Secretary and affirmed by the Office of the President, or residential as alleged by respondent Oroville Development Corporation (Oroville).
The appellate court initially declared in its Decision4 dated March 16, 2005 that the subject property is agricultural on the basis of a later certification to this effect dated February 10, 1997 issued by the City Development Coordinator of the City Planning and Development Office which superseded the Certification dated November 22, 1993 issued by the same authority.
Upon Oroville’s motion for reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals set aside its earlier Decision and ruled that the subject property has been reclassified as residential and therefore beyond the coverage of CARP. This time, the appellate court gave credence to three (3) Zoning Certifications dated July 23, 2004 issued by the Assistant City Development Coordinator of the City Planning and Development Office to the effect that the subject property is within the city’s potential growth areas for urban expansion. According to the Court of Appeals, these certifications were not considered by the court in the resolution of Oroville’s petition because they were not yet in existence when the petition was filed on February 24, 2004.
The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.
In its Petition for Review5 dated January 9, 2006, the DAR seeks the reversal of the appellate court’s Amended Decision, arguing that the latter precipitately relied on the Zoning Certifications issued by the City Planning and Development Office and erroneously assumed that a local government unit such as Cagayan de Oro City has unconditional authority to classify and reclassify lands within its territorial jurisdiction. The DAR points out that the Assistant City Development Coordinator herself clarified, in a letter dated December 2, 2005, that the zoning classification of the subject property remains to be agricultural considering that the 1979 Zoning Code of Cagayan de Oro City is still in force. Further, the Zoning Certifications do not qualify as newly discovered evidence because the supposed basis for these certifications, City Ordinance No. 7959, was already in effect in 2001, years before the Court of Appeals rendered its original Decision in 2005.
The DAR maintains that the Certification dated February 10, 1997 to the effect that the subject property is agricultural should be upheld because it was based not only on a zoning ordinance but, more importantly, was approved prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) in 1988, by the then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the national agency then charged with the classification and reclassification of lands.
Oroville centers its Comment6 dated May 11, 2006 on the argument that the subject property had been classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL and the Local Government Code (LGC). The DAR’s insistence, invoking Sec. 20 of the LGC, that further approval by the national agency concerned is essential in order to effect the reclassification of the subject property from agricultural to residential because City Ordinance No. 7959 which was made the basis for the Zoning Certifications issued by the City Planning and Development Office was enacted only in 2001, is therefore erroneous. Moreover, Oroville avers that the subject property has been consistently declared as residential land as shown in previous tax declarations.
In its Reply7 dated August 8, 2006, the DAR asserts that tax declarations are not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes.
The question upon which the resolution of this case turns is whether the subject property is agricultural or residential based on Cagayan de Oro City’s zoning ordinances. The conflicting certifications issued by the City Planning and Development Office, which has unquestioned primary jurisdiction to rule on matters of classification of lands within its territorial jurisdiction, need to be scrutinized in order to arrive at a definitive ruling.
A review of the case’s antecedents shows that in its Orders dated May 25, 1998 and June 20, 2002, the DAR declared the property to be agricultural on the basis primarily of the Certification dated February 10, 1997 prepared by the City Planning and Development Office which states "that Lot No. 184398 (F-V-12713), Lot No. H-4321 and Lot No. H-16-4, located at Upper Puerto, this City, is within AGRICULTURAL DISTRICT per provision of Section 22-A of the 1994 Certified Ordinance of the City of Cagayan de Oro."8
Oroville claims, however, that the earlier Certification dated November 22, 1993, which states "that Lot No. 19801 Cad. 369-0 located at Puerto, this City is within Residential classification per Section 9; Article IV of Zoning Ordinance, Ordinance No. 880 series of 1979,"9 should prevail over the February 10, 1997 Certification.
It is at once evident that the 1993 certification pertains generally to a lot located in Puerto, while the 1997 certification makes specific reference to Upper Puerto. This distinction gains significance in light of the DAR’s finding, in its Order dated June 20, 2002, that Section 9(b), Article IV of Ordinance No. 880, Series of 1979, does classify lands in Barangay Puerto as within the residential area, but explicitly provides that lands within Barangay Upper Puerto, among others, are within the agricultural zone.10
It is also significant to note that, as mentioned in the assailed Amended Decision, the 1993 certification pertains only to Lot No. 19801 Cad. 369-0 which covers two portions of the subject land, namely: the portion encompassed by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-85121 and T-104365.11 In contrast, as detailed in the DAR Secretary’s Order dated June 20, 2002, the 1997 certification is more encompassing as it concerns all the parcels subject of this case, i.e., the parcels covered by TCT Nos. T-85121, T-104365 and T-85135.12
Moreover, an actual field verification conducted by the DAR Region X Regional Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation in the presence of Oroville’s representative, Atty. Marilou Aban, revealed that about a hundred persons composed of potential farmer-beneficiaries and indigenous peoples reside in the subject property and that the same is devoted to crops such as corn and cassava, and gemelina and fruit trees.
We cannot simply brush aside the DAR’s pronouncements regarding the status of the subject property as not exempt from CARP coverage considering that the DAR has unquestionable technical expertise on these matters.13 Factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, a situation that obtains in this case. The factual findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who, by reason of his official position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.14 More so, because the DAR’s findings have gone up the ladder of administrative process and have been affirmed by the Office of the President.
We certainly consider it error for the appellate court to overturn its own Decision on the basis solely of the Zoning Certifications dated July 23, 2004 also issued by the City Planning and Development Office to the effect that in accordance with City Ordinance No. 7959, the subject property "x x x is located within Potential Growth Areas for Urban Expansion. x x x "15
The certifications were only attached to Oroville’s Reply to DAR’s Comment on the petition filed with the Court of Appeals. While it is true, as the appellate court held, that the certifications dated July 23, 2004 could not have been attached to the petition which was filed on February 24, 2004 as they were not in existence then, it does not escape notice that the zoning ordinance upon which the certifications were based was passed as early as 2001. By the exercise of reasonable diligence, Oroville could have easily secured these certifications in time for the filing of its petition and the appellate court could have already then passed upon their value.
Moreover, these certifications have been clarified by the same person who issued them in a letter16 dated December 2, 2005, to the effect that the certifications state only that the properties mentioned are within the potential growth areas for urban expansion under the city’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan and do not affect the zoning classification of the properties as agricultural in accordance with the city’s Zoning Code.
Indeed, the zoning certifications should be construed to mean simply that under the city’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan, the subject property is categorized as a "potential growth area" for whatever purpose the city would deem suitable. The term "potential growth area" is not a land classification category. That the subject property was identified as a "potential growth area" does not denote that it has been reclassified as a mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land to qualify it for exemption from CARP coverage.
To summarize, in order to be exempt from CARP coverage, the subject property must have been classified as industrial/residential before June 15, 1988.17 In this case, the DAR’s examination of the zoning ordinances and certifications pertaining to the subject property, as well as its field investigation, disclosed that the same remains to be agricultural. The Zoning Certifications to the effect that the land is within the city’s potential growth area for urban expansion are inconsequential as they do not reflect the present classification of the land but merely its intended land use.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 18, 2005 and Resolution dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 16, 2005 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Asscociate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Foonotes
1 Rollo, pp. 27-34; CA-G.R. SP No. 82135; Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and concurred in by Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Mariano C. Del Castillo.
2 Id. at 36-39.
3 Id. at 45-46.
4 Id. at 44-50.
5 Id. at 8-24.
6 Id. at 84-94.
7 Id. at 118-121.
8 CA rollo, p. 54.
9 Rollo, p. 101.
10 CA rollo, p. 53.
11 Rollo, p. 28.
12 CA Records, p. 54.
13 Roxas and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 727 (1999).
14 Sebastian v. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 609 (2003); Junio v. Garilao, G.R. No. 147146, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 173, 186.
15 Rollo, p. 113.
16 Id. at 71.
17 Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 355, 363 (2000).
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