Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169596 March 28, 2007
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and PEDRO BALUBAL, Respondents
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review is the Court of Appeals’ Decision1 dated September 6, 2005 dismissing for lack of merit the appeal of petitioner Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (petitioner), docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61144.
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing public transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, swerved and crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC).
The incident was initially investigated by respondent PNCC’s toll way patrol, Sofronio Salvanera, and respondent Pedro Balubal (Balubal), then head of traffic control and security department of the South Luzon tollway.2 The bus3 was thereafter turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own investigation of the incident. Because of lack of adequate space, the bus was, on request of traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera (Lopera), towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound where it was stored.4
Subsequently, petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release the bus, but respondent Balubal denied the same, despite petitioner’s undertaking to repair the damaged radio room. Respondent Balubal instead demanded the sum of ₱40,000.00, or a collateral with the same value, representing respondent PNCC’s estimate of the cost of reconstruction of the damaged radio room. By petitioner’s estimate, however, the damage amounted to ₱10,000.00 only.5
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property (replevin) with damages6 against respondents PNCC and Balubal with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, praying as follows:
x x x x
2. after trial on the issues, judgment be rendered –
a) adjudging that plaintiff has the right to the possession of subject personal property and awarding the material possession of said property to plaintiff as the sole and absolute owner thereof;
b) ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the following:
(1) the sum of P500,000.00 representing unrealized income as of the date of the filing of the instant complaint and, thereafter, the sum of P7,500.00 daily until subject passenger bus shall have been delivered to and in actual material possession of plaintiff;
(2) the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
(3) the sum of P20,000.00 as litis expenses; and
(4) the cost of suit.7
In view of its inability to put up the bond for the issuance of a writ of replevin, petitioner opted to forego the same and just wait for the court’s final judgment.
In respondents’ Answer8 to the complaint, they claimed that they merely towed the bus to the PNCC compound for safekeeping pursuant to an order from the police authorities; that respondent Balubal did not release the bus to petitioner in the absence of an order from the police authorities; that petitioner, in claiming the bus, failed to present the certificate of registration and official receipt of payment to establish ownership thereof; and that the bus subject of the complaint was not the same bus involved in the December 13, 1990 accident.
By way of Counterclaim, respondents prayed for the award of ₱40,326.54 in actual damages, ₱50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and ₱130,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
By Decision of December 9, 1997, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint. On respondents’ Counterclaim, it ordered petitioner to pay respondent PNCC the amount of ₱40,320.00 representing actual damages to the radio room.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals9 which held that the storage of the bus for safekeeping purposes partakes of the nature of a deposit, hence, custody or authority over it remained with Lopera who ordered its safekeeping; and that Lopera acted as respondent PNCC’s agent, hence, absent any instruction from him, respondent PNCC may not release the bus.
The appellate court thus concluded that the case should have been brought against the police authorities instead of respondents.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised in the petition, the Court resolves to dispose first the procedural issues raised by respondents in their Comment.10
Respondents contend that the petition raises only questions of fact and suffers from a procedural defect in that it failed to include "such material portions of the record as would support the petition" as required under Section 4, Rule 4511 of the Rules of Court, hence, it should be dismissed outright.
Contrary to respondents’ contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of which is whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint.
In any event, while it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties, a number of exceptions have nevertheless been recognized by the Court. These exceptions are enumerated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals:12
It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. x x x (Italics in original; underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
As will be discussed below, number 11 of the foregoing enumeration applies in the present case.
Respecting the second procedural issue, as a rule, the failure of a petitioner to comply with any of the requirements under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition constitutes sufficient ground for its dismissal.13
In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may be disregarded so that a case may be resolved on its merits. As held in Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan:14
It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The facts and circumstances attendant to the case dictate that, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court resolves it on the merits.
On to the substantive issues. Tillson v. Court of Appeals15 discusses the term replevin as follows:
The term replevin is popularly understood as "the return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the action;" "the writ by or the common-law action in which goods and chattels are replevied," i.e., taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin;" and to replevy, means to recover possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of goods or chattels under a replevin order. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as "a form of action which lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein described and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title, or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority states that the term, "to replevy" means " to re-deliver goods which have been distrained to the original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of replevin." The term therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered,16 and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.17
Petitioner’s ownership of the bus being admitted by respondents,18 consideration of whether respondents have been wrongfully detaining it is in order.
Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the bus was towed by respondents on the request of Lopera.19 It was thus not distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis.
In upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, the Court of Appeals held that while "there is no law authorizing the impounding of a vehicle involved in an accident by the police authorities, x x x neither is there a law making the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents illegal." It added that "the Supreme Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter."20 The appellate court is mistaken.
The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures. Thus, Section 2, Article III provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Underscoring supplied)
The seizure and impounding of petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s request, were unquestionably violative of "the right to be let alone" by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.21
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo 22 to justify the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents by police authorities is misplaced. The Victory Liner case was an administrative case against a trial court judge. This Court explicitly declined to rule on the legality of such an order:
In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of respondent’s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative case. x x x
x x x x
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from us through an administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of the established rules of procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing of a property petition, including the payment of docket fees. Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that issue in this case.23 (Underscoring supplied)
This Court’s statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a "clear-cut policy" refers to the practice, rightly or wrongly, of trial court judges of issuing orders for the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents. It has no application to the instant case which involves the seizure and distraint implemented by respondents upon a verbal order by Lopera without the benefit or color of legality afforded by a court process, writ or order.
That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was criminally charged for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property in which the bus could possibly be held as evidence does not affect the outcome of this case.24 As explained in Bagalihog v. Fernandez:25
It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar, 26 "A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ." Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)
Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is, in light of the foregoing discussion, thus in order.
As for petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court finds that it cannot pass upon the same without impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to respondents for safekeeping, a contract of deposit27 was perfected between them and respondents.
Petitioner’s failure to implead indispensable parties is not, of course, fatal to its cause of action, misjoinder or non-joinder of parties not being a ground for its dismissal.28 Domingo v. Scheer29 elucidates:
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
For petitioner to pursue its claim for damages then, it or the trial court motu proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties ─ Lopera and any other responsible police officers.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The prayer of petitioner, Superlines Transportation Company, Inc., for recovery of possession of personal property is GRANTED.
The records of the case are REMANDED to the court of origin, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, which is DIRECTED to REINSTATE petitioner’s complaint to its docket if petitioner is still interested to pursue its claim for damages and to act in accordance with the foregoing pronouncement of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Foonotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso; CA rollo, pp. 147-158.
2 TSN, January 16, 1997, pp. 3-7; TSN, June 14, 1996, pp. 7-8.
3 Description:
Make – Fuso (replaced with Nissan Engine)
Type – Bus
Motor Number – 072020 (replaced with Motor No. 05184)
Serial/Chassis Number – BM 115LL-20359
Certificate of Registration No. – 0200047-1
Official Receipt No. – 316890066
Bus Body No. - 719
Plate No. – TB-DVN-19
(CA rollo, pp. 148-149; Folder of Exhibits, pp. 1-2)
4 TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6.
5 TSN, December 8, 1994, pp. 5-6; Folder of Exhibits, p. 3.
6 Records, pp. 1-8.
7 Id. at 5.
8 Id. at 15-19.
9 CA rollo, pp. 147-158.
10 Rollo, pp. 42-47.
11 Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Contents of petition. – The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioner or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; 9c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.
12 G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85-86.
13 Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
14 G.R. No. 167136, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 801, 809.
15 G.R. No. 89870, May 28, 1991, 197 SCRA 587, 597-598.
16 Distilleria Washington, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 622 (1996).
17 Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 368.
18 Records, p. 16.
19 TSN, November 8, 1996, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 6-8.
20 CA rollo, p. 156.
21 Vide Bagalihog v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 96356, June 27, 1991, 198 SCRA 614.
22 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 79.
23 Supra at 87-88.
24 Folder of Exhibits, p. 43.
25 Supra at 621.
26 108 Phil. 560 (1960).
27 Article 1962 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is not deposit but some other contract.
28 Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
29 G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 468, 483-484.
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