Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167320 January 30, 2007
HEIRS OF SALVADOR HERMOSILLA, namely: ADELAIDA H. DOLLETON, RUBEN HERMOSILLA, LOLITA H. DE LA VEGA, ERLINDA H. INOVIO, CELIA H. VIVIT, ZENAIDA H. ACHOY, PRECILLA H. LIMPIAHOY, and EDGARDO HERMOSILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
Spouses JAIME REMOQUILLO and LUZ REMOQUILLO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Heirs of Salvador Hermosilla, namely: Adelaida H. Dolleton, Ruben Hermosilla, Lolita H. de la Vega, Erlinda H. Inovio,1 Celia2 H. Vivit, Zenaida H. Achoy, Precilla3 H. Limpiahoy, and Edgardo Hermosilla, assail the Court of Appeals’ Decision4 dated September 29, 2004 which reversed the trial court’s decision in their favor and accordingly dismissed their complaint.
Subject of the controversy is a 65-square meter portion of a lot located in Poblacion, San Pedro, Laguna.
On August 31, 1931, the Republic of the Philippines acquired through purchase the San Pedro Tunasan Homesite.
Apolinario Hermosilla (Apolinario), who was occupying a lot in San Pedro Tunasan Homesite until his death in 1964, caused the subdivision of the lot into two, Lot 12 with an area of 341 square meters, and Lot 19 with an area of 341 square meters of which the 65 square meters subject of this controversy form part.
On April 30, 1962, Apolinario executed a Deed of Assignment transferring possession of Lot 19 in favor of his grandson, herein respondent Jaime Remoquillo (Jaime). As the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) later found that Lot 19 was still available for disposition to qualified applicants, Jaime, being its actual occupant, applied for its acquisition before the LTA on May 10, 1963.
On July 8, 1963, Apolinario conveyed Lot 12 to his son Salvador Hermosilla (Salvador), Jaime’s uncle.
Salvador later filed an application to purchase Lot 12 which was awarded to him by the defunct Land Authority on December 16, 1971.
On February 10, 1972, Jaime and his uncle Salvador forged a "Kasunduan ng Paglipat Ng Karapatan sa Isang Lagay na Lupang Solar" (Kasunduan) whereby Jaime transferred ownership of the 65 square meters (the questioned property) in favor of Salvador.
After Apolinario died, his daughter Angela Hermosilla filed a protest before the Land Authority, which became the National Housing Authority (NHA),5 contending that as an heir of the deceased, she is also entitled to Lots 12 and 19. By Resolution of June 10, 1981, the NHA dismissed the protest.
The NHA later awarded on March 16, 1986 Lot 19 to Jaime for which he and his wife were issued a title, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-156296, on September 15, 1987.6
On May 25, 1992, petitioners filed an action for Annulment of Title on the ground of fraud with damages against Jaime and his spouse, together with the Register of Deeds, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, alleging that by virtue of the Kasunduan executed in 1972, Jaime had conveyed to his uncle Salvador the questioned property–part of Lot 19 covered by TCT No. T-156296 which was issued in 1987.
By Decision7 of May 11, 1999, the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25, found the Kasunduan a perfected contract of sale, there being a meeting of the minds upon an identified object and upon a specific price, and that ownership over the questioned property had already been transferred and delivered to Salvador.
On the alleged failure of consideration of the Kasunduan, the trial court held that the same did not render the contract void, but merely allowed an action for specific performance. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiffs as co-owners of the 65 square meters of the 341 square meters covered by TCT T-156296, registered in the name of defendants. The Court hereby directs the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, to cancel said Transfer Certificate of Title, and in lieu thereof, to issue another [to] plaintiffs [as] co-owners of the above portion.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.8 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the trial court, held that the Kasunduan was void because at the time of its execution in 1972, the Republic of the Philippines was still the owner of Lot 19, hence, no right thereover was transmitted by Jaime who was awarded the Lot in 1986, and consequently no right was transmitted by Salvador through succession to petitioners. And it found no evidence of fraud in Jaime’s act of having Lot 19, including the questioned property, registered in his and his wife’s name in 1987.
At all events, the appellate court held that the action had prescribed, it having been filed in 1992, more than four years from the issuance to Jaime and his wife of the Transfer Certificate of Title.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners argue that the application of the law on prescription would perpetrate fraud and spawn injustice, they citing Cometa v. Court of Appeals;9 and that at any rate, prescription does not lie against a co-owner. Cometa involves a different factual milieu concerning the right of redemption, however. And petitioners’ contention that prescription does not lie against a co-owner fails because only the title covering the questioned property, which petitioners claim to solely own, is being assailed.
While this Court finds that the action is, contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, not barred by the statute of limitations, it is still dismissible as discussed below.
Albeit captioned as one for Annulment of Title, the Complaint ultimately seeks the reconveyance of the property.
From the allegations of the Complaint, petitioners seek the reconveyance of the property based on implied trust. The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title,10 if the plaintiff is not in possession, but imprescriptible if he is in possession of the property.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover the title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is undisputed that petitioners’ houses occupy the questioned property and that respondents have not been in possession thereof.12 Since there was no actual need to reconvey the property as petitioners remained in possession thereof, the action took the nature of a suit for quieting of title, it having been filed to enforce an alleged implied trust after Jaime refused to segregate title over Lot 19. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.13 From the body of the complaint, this type of action denotes imprescriptibility.
As priorly stated, however, when the Kasunduan was executed in 1972 by Jaime in favor of Salvador – petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest – Lot 19, of which the questioned property forms part, was still owned by the Republic. Nemo dat quod non habet.14 Nobody can give what he does not possess. Jaime could not thus have transferred anything to Salvador via the Kasunduan.
Claiming exception to the rule, petitioners posit that at the time the Kasunduan was executed by Jaime in 1972, his application which was filed in 1963 for the award to him of Lot 19 was still pending, hence, the Kasunduan transferred to Salvador Jaime’s vested right to purchase the same, in support of which they cite a law on estoppel, Art. 1434 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[w]hen a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it and later, the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee."15
Petitioners’ reliance on Article 1434 of the Civil Code does not lie. The principles of estoppel apply insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of the Civil Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws.161avvphi1.net
Land Authority Administrative Order No. 4 (1967), "Rules and Regulations governing Disposition of the Laguna Settlement Project in San Pedro, Laguna," proscribes the conveyance of the privilege or preference to purchase a land from the San Pedro Tunasan project before it is awarded to a tenant or bona fide occupant, thus:
SEC. 6. Privilege of Preference to Purchase Intransferable; Waiver or Forfeiture Thereof. – From the date of acquisition of the estate by the Government and before issuance of the Order of Award, no tenant or bona fide occupant in whose favor the land may be sold shall transfer or encumber the privilege or preference to purchase the land, and any transfer or encumbrance made in violation hereof shall be null and void: Provided, however, That such privilege or preference may be waived or forfeited only in favor of the Land Authority . . .17 (Italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners’ insistence on any right to the property under the Kasunduan thus fails.
[T]he transfer "became one in violation of law (the rules of the PHHC being promulgated in pursuance of law have the force of law) and therefore void ab initio." Hence, appellant acquired no right over the lot from a contract void ab initio, no rights are created. Estoppel, as postulated by petitioner, will not apply for it cannot be predicated on an illegal act. It is generally considered that as between the parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy.18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners go on to postulate that if the Kasunduan is void, it follows that the 1962 Deed of Assignment executed by Apolinario in favor of Jaime is likewise void to thus deprive the latter of any legal basis for his occupation and acquisition of Lot 19.
Petitioners’ position fails. Petitioners lose sight of the fact that, as reflected above, Jaime acquired Lot 19 in his own right, independently of the Deed of Assignment.
In another vein, since the property was previously a public land, petitioners have no personality to impute fraud or misrepresentation against the State or violation of the law.19 If the title was in fact fraudulently obtained, it is the State which should file the suit to recover the property through the Office of the Solicitor General. The title originated from a grant by the government, hence, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.20
At all events, for an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence not only his title to the property but also the fact of fraud. Fraud is never presumed. Intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner injure him must be specifically alleged and proved by the plaintiff by clear and convincing evidence.21 Petitioners failed to discharge this burden, however.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing ratiocination, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Erlinda H. Inovio died on July 12, 2004. She is substituted in this case by her husband Feliciano and two sons Enrico and Richard, rollo, pp. 9-12.
2 Identified as "Cecilia," Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), September 22, 1993, p. 31.
3 Signed as "Priscila" in the Answer to Written Interrogatories, records, p. 60, and in the verification and certification portion of the petition, rollo, p. 29.
4 Penned by Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman with the concurrence of Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador.
5 Historically, the function of administering the acquisition and disposition of landed estates were discharged by the following government agencies: By authority of Commonwealth Act No. 378, the President of the Philippines created the Rural Progress Administration under Executive Order No. 191 (March 2, 1939) which was charged with the disposition and administration of all landed estates of the government. Executive Order No. 376 (November 28, 1950) transferred such powers and functions to the Landed Estates Division of the Bureau of Lands. Subsequently, Section 28 of Republic Act No. 1400 (September 9, 1955) abolished the Landed Estates Division and transferred its functions, powers, duties, personnel and records to the Land Tenure Administration. Such functions were later assigned to the Land Authority under Republic Act No. 3844 (August 8, 1963). The Department (later, Ministry) of Agrarian Reform became the successor of the Land Authority, before the National Housing Authority assumed such functions by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757 (July 31, 1975).
6 Rollo, pp. 33-34.
7 Penned by Judge Hilario F. Corcuera.
8 Rollo, p. 44.
9 G.R. No. 141855, February 6, 2001, 351 SCRA 294.
10 Alfredo v. Borras, G.R. No. 144225, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 145, citing the Civil Code, art. 1456.
11 Id. at 164.
12 Specifically, these are the houses of Celia, Precilla and Edgardo. See TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 13-14, 17, and October 31, 1993, p. 13; Exhibit "D," records, p. 128.
13 Arlegui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126437, March 6, 2002, 378 SCRA 322,324.
14 One cannot give what one does not have. Vide Cavite Development Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 131679, February 1, 2000, 324 SCRA 346, 356, where it was held that in a contract of sale the principle of nemo dat quod non habet applies at the consummation stage. Under Article 1459 of the Civil Code, it is required that at the time of delivery the seller be the owner of the thing sold.
15 Civil Code, art. 1434, as applied in a number of cases cited in Piscueña v. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. No. 132803, August 31, 1999, 313 SCRA 384, 386.
16 Ibid., art. 1432, see also art. 1637 which provides that the provisions on the law on sales are subject to the rules laid down by the Land Registration Law with regard to immovable property.
17 64 O.G. No. 27 6850 (July 1968).
18 Ibay v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67279, June 3, 1992, 209 SCRA 510, 515.
19 Vide Domaoal v. Bea, No. L-30167, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 512, 513.
20 Vide De Ocampo v. Arlos, G.R. No. 135527, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 716, 728.
21 Vide Barrera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123935, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 312, 316-317; Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., G.R. No. 130876, December 5, 2003, 417 SCRA 115, 124.
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