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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154975             January 29, 2007

GENERAL CREDIT CORPORATION (now PENTA CAPITAL FINANCE CORPORATION), Petitioner,
vs.
ALSONS DEVELOPMENT and INVESTMENT CORPORATION and CCC EQUITY CORPORATION, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner General Credit Corporation, now known as Penta Capital Finance Corporation, seeks to annul and set aside the Decision¹ and Resolution² dated April 11, 2002 and August 20, 2002, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 31801, affirming the November 8, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in its Civil Case No. 12707, an action for a sum of money thereat instituted by the herein respondent Alsons Development and Investment Corporation against the petitioner and respondent CCC Equity Corporation.

The facts:

Shortly after its incorporation in 1957 as a finance and investment company, petitioner General Credit Corporation (GCC, for short), then known as Commercial Credit Corporation (CCC), established CCC franchise companies in different urban centers of the country.³ In furtherance of its business, GCC had, as early as 1974, applied for and was able to secure license from the then Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage also in quasi-banking activities.⁴ On the other hand, respondent CCC Equity Corporation (EQUITY, for brevity) was organized in November 1994 by GCC for the purpose of, among other things, taking over the operations and management of the various franchise companies. At a time material hereto, respondent Alsons Development and Investment Corporation (ALSONS, hereinafter) and Conrado, Nicasio, Editha and Ladislawa, all surnamed Alcantara, and Alfredo de Borja (hereinafter the Alcantara family, for convenience), each owned, just like GCC, shares in the aforesaid GCC franchise companies, e.g., CCC Davao and CCC Cebu.

In December 1980, ALSONS and the Alcantara family, for a consideration of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos, sold their shareholdings – a total of 101,953 shares, more or less – in the CCC franchise companies to EQUITY.[5] On January 2, 1981, EQUITY issued ALSONS et al., a "bearer" promissory note for P2,000,000.00 with a one-year maturity date, at 18% interest per annum, with provisions for damages and litigation costs in case of default.⁶

Some four years later, the Alcantara family assigned its rights and interests over the bearer note to ALSONS which thenceforth became the holder thereof.⁷ But even before the execution of the assignment deal aforestated, letters of demand for interest payment were already sent to EQUITY, through its President, Wilfredo Labayen, who pleaded inability to pay the stipulated interest, EQUITY no longer then having assets or property to settle its obligation nor being extended financial support by GCC.

What happened next, as narrated in the assailed Decision of the CA, may be summarized, as follows:

1. On January 14, 1986, before the RTC of Makati, ALSONS, having failed to collect on the bearer note aforementioned, filed a complaint for a sum of money⁸ against EQUITY and GCC. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 12707, was eventually raffled to Branch 58 of the court. As stated in par. 4 of the complaint, GCC is being impleaded as party-defendant for any judgment ALSONS might secure against EQUITY and, under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, against GCC, EQUITY having been organized as a tool and mere conduit of GCC.

2. Answering with a cross-claim against GCC, EQUITY stated by way of special and affirmative defenses that it (EQUITY):

a) was purposely organized by GCC for the latter to avoid CB Rules and Regulations on DOSRI (Directors, Officers, Stockholders and Related Interest) limitations, and that it acted merely as intermediary or bridge for loan transactions and other dealings of GCC to its franchises and the investing public; and

b) is solely dependent upon GCC for its funding requirements, to settle, among others, equity purchases made by investors on the franchises; hence, GCC is solely and directly liable to ALSONS, the former having failed to provide …EQUITY the necessary funds to meet its obligations to ALSONS.

3. GCC filed its ANSWER to Cross-claim, stressing that it is a distinct and separate entity from EQUITY and alleging, in essence that the business relationships with each other were always at arm’s length. And following the denial of its motion to dismiss ALSONS’ complaint, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and want of cause of action, GCC filed its Answer thereto and set up affirmative defenses with counterclaim for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Presented by ALSONS, but testifying as adverse witnesses, were CB and GCC officers. Among other things, ALSONS’ evidence, which included the EQUITY-issued "bearer" promissory note marked as Exhibit "K" and over sixty (60) other marked and subsequently admitted documents,⁹ were to the effect that five (5) incorporators, each contributing P100,000.00 as the initial paid up capital of the company, organized EQUITY to manage, as it did manage, various GCC franchises through management contracts. Before EQUITY’s incorporation, however, GCC was already into the financing business as it was in fact managing and operating various CCC franchises. Presented in evidence, too, was the September 29, 1982 letter-reply of one G. Villanueva, then GCC President, to EQUITY President Wilfredo Labayen, bearing on the sale of EQUITY shares to third parties, part of the proceeds of which the Alcantaras wanted applied to liquidate the promissory note in question. In said letter, Mr. Villanueva explained that the GCC Board denied the Alcantaras’ request to be paid out of such proceeds, but nonetheless authorized EQUITY to pay them interest out of EQUITY’s operation income, in preference over what was due GCC.¹⁰

Albeit EQUITY presented its president, it opted to adopt the testimony of some of ALSONS’ witnesses, inclusive of the documentary exhibits testified to by each of them, as its evidence.

For its part, GCC called only Wilfredo Labayen to testify. It stuck to its underlying defense of separateness and presented documentary evidence detailing the organizational structures of both GCC and EQUITY. And in a bid to negate the notion that it was conducting its business illegally, GCC presented CB and SEC-issued licenses authoring it to engage in financing and quasi-banking activities. It also adduced evidence to prove that it was never a party to any of the actionable documents ALSONS and its predecessors-in-interest had in their possession and that the November 27, 1985 deed of assignment of rights over the promissory note was unenforceable.

Eventually, the trial court, on its finding that EQUITY was but an instrumentality or adjunct of GCC and considering the legal consequences and implications of such relationship, came out with its decision on November 8, 1990, rendering judgment for ALSONS, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [ALSONS] and against the defendants [EQUITY and GCC] who are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff:

1. the principal sum of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) together with the interest due thereon at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) annually computed from Jan. 2, 1981 until the obligation is fully paid;

2. liquidated damages due thereon equivalent to three percent (3%) monthly computed from January 2, 1982 until the obligation is fully paid;

3. attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to twenty four percent (24%) of the total obligation due; and

4. the costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets added.)

Therefrom, GCC went on appeal to the CA where its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 31801, ascribing to the trial court the commission of the following errors:

1. In holding that there is a "Parent-Subsidiary" corporate relationship between EQUITY and GCC;

2. In not holding that EQUITY and GCC are distinct and separate corporate entities;

3. In applying the doctrine of "Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction" in the case at bar; and

4. In not holding ALSONS in estoppel to question the corporate personality of EQUITY.

On April 11, 2002, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed Decision,¹¹ affirming that of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati in Civil Case No. 12707 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

In time, GCC moved for reconsideration followed by a motion for oral argument, but both motions were denied by the CA in its equally assailed Resolution of August 20, 2002.¹²

Hence, GCC’s present recourse anchored on the following arguments, issues and/or submissions:

1. The motion for oral argument with motion for reconsideration and its supplement were perfunctorily denied by the CA without justifiable basis;

2. There is absolutely no basis for piercing the veil of corporate fiction;

3. Respondent Alsons is not a real party-in-interest as the promissory note payable to bearer subject of the collection suit is but a simulated document and/or refers to another party. Moreover, the subject promissory note is not admissible in evidence because it has not been duly authenticated and it is an altered document;

4. The fact of full payment stated in the ten (10) deeds of sale of the shares of stock is conclusive on the sellers, and by the patrol evidence rule, the alleged fact of its non-payment cannot be introduced in evidenced; and

5. The counter-claim filed by GCC against Alsons should be granted in the interest of justice.

The petition and the arguments and/or issues holding it together are without merit. The desired reversal of the assailed decision and resolution of the appellate court is accordingly DENIED.

Instead of raising distinctly formulated questions of law, as is expected of one seeking a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of a final CA judgment,¹³ petitioner GCC starts off by voicing disappointment over the "perfunctory" denial by the CA of its twin motions for reconsideration and oral argument. Petitioner, to be sure, cannot plausibly expect a reversal action premised on the cursory way its motions were denied, if such indeed were the case. Such manner of denial, while perhaps far from ideal, is not even a recognized ground for appeal by certiorari, unless a denial of due process ensues, which is not the case here. And lest it be overlooked, the CA prefaced its assailed denial resolution with the clause: "[F]inding no reversible error committed to warrant the modification and/or reversal of the April 11, 2002 Decision," suggesting that the appellate court gave the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration the attention it deserved. At the very least, the petitioner was duly apprised of the reasons why reconsideration could not be favorably considered. An extended resolution was not really necessary to dispose of the motion for reconsideration in question.

Petitioner’s lament about being deprived of procedural due process owing to the denial of its motion for oral argument is simply specious. Under the CA Internal Rules, the appellate court may tap any of the three (3) alternatives therein provided to aid the court in resolving appealed cases before it. It may rely on available records alone, require the submission of memoranda or set the case for oral argument. The option the Internal Rules thus gives the CA necessarily suggests that the appellate court may, at its sound discretion, dispense with a tedious oral argument exercise. Rule VI, Section 6 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the CA, provides:

SEC. 6 Judicial Action on Certain Petitions.- (a) In petitions for review, after the receipt of the respondent’s comment on the petition, … the Court [of Appeals] may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit …, otherwise, it shall give due course to it.

xxx xxx xxx

If the petition is given due course, the Court may consider the case submitted for decision or require the parties to submit their memorandum or set the case for oral argument. xxx. After the oral argument or upon submission of the memoranda … the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.

In the case at bench, records reveal that the appellate court, in line with the prescription of its own rules, required the parties to just submit, as they did, their respective memoranda to properly ventilate their separate causes. Under this scenario, the petitioner cannot be validly heard, having been deprived of due process.

Just like the first, the last three (3) arguments set forth in the petition will not carry the day for the petitioner. In relation therewith, the Court notes that these arguments and the issues behind them were not raised before the trial court. This appellate maneuver cannot be allowed. For, well-settled is the rule that issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on review in higher courts.¹⁴ Springing surprises on the opposing party is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process; hence, the proscription against a party shifting from one theory at the trial court to a new and different theory in the appellate level. On the same rationale, points of law, theories, issues not brought to the attention of the lower court or, in fine, not interposed during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.¹⁵

There are, to be sure, exceptions to the rule respecting what may be raised for the first time on appeal. Lack of jurisdiction over when the issues raised present a matter of public policy¹⁶ comes immediately to mind. None of the well-recognized exceptions obtain in this case, however.

Lest it be overlooked vis-à-vis the same last three arguments thus pressed, both the trial court and the CA, based on the evidence adduced, adjudged the petitioner and respondent EQUITY jointly and severally liable to pay what respondent ALSONS is entitled to under the "bearer" promissory note. The judgment argues against the notion of the note being simulated or altered or that respondent ALSONS has no standing to sue on the note, not being the payee of the "bearer" note. For, the declaration of liability not only presupposes the duly established authenticity and due execution of the promissory note over which ALSONS, as the holder in due course thereof, has interest, but also the untenability of the petitioner’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees and exemplary damages against ALSONS. At bottom, the petitioner predicated such counter-claim on the postulate that respondent ALSONS had no cause of action, the supposed promissory note being, according to the petitioner, either a simulated or an altered document.

In net effect, the definitive conclusion of the appellate court – affirmatory of that of the trial court – was that the bearer promissory note (Exh. "K") was a genuine and authentic instrument payable to the holder thereof. This factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal, save for the most compelling reasons,¹⁷ such as when that determination is clearly without evidentiary support or when grave abuse of discretion has been committed.¹⁸ This is as it should be since the Court, in petitions for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law. Stated otherwise, it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of the factual holdings of lower courts.¹⁹

As nothing in the record indicates any of the exceptions adverted to above, the factual conclusion of the CA that the P2 Million promissory note in question was authentic and was issued at the first instance to respondent ALSONS and the Alcantara family for the amount stated on its face, must be affirmed. It should be stressed in this regard that even the issuing entity, i.e., respondent EQUITY, never challenged the genuineness and due execution of the note.

This brings us to the remaining but core issue tendered in this case and aptly raised by the petitioner, to wit: whether there is absolutely no basis for piercing GCC’s veil of corporate identity.

A corporation is an artificial being vested by law with a personality distinct and separate from those of the persons composing it²⁰ as well as from that of any other entity to which it may be related.²¹ The first consequence of the doctrine of legal entity of the separate personality of the corporation is that a corporation may not be made to answer for acts and liabilities of its stockholders or those of legal entities to which it may be connected or vice versa.²²

The notion of separate personality, however, may be disregarded under the doctrine – "piercing the veil of corporate fiction" – as in fact the court will often look at the corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate juridical personality of the corporation unifying the group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two (2) business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or one and the same.²³

Whether the separate personality of the corporation should be pierced hinges on obtaining facts, appropriately pleaded or proved. However, any piercing of the corporate veil has to be done with caution, albeit the Court will not hesitate to disregard the corporate veil when it is misused or when necessary in the interest of justice.²⁴ After all, the concept of corporate entity was not meant to promote unfair objectives.

Authorities are agreed on at least three (3) basic areas where piercing the veil, with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from any other legal entity to which it may be related, is allowed.²⁵ These are: 1) defeat of public convenience,²⁶ as when the corporate fiction is used as vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation;²⁷ 2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime;²⁸ or 3) alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.²⁹

The CA found valid grounds to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner GCC, there being justifiable basis for such action. When the appellate court spoke of a justifying factor, the reference was to what the trial court said in its decision, namely: the existence of "certain circumstances [which], taken together, gave rise to the ineluctable conclusion that … [respondent] EQUITY is but an instrumentality or adjunct of [petitioner] GCC."

The Court agrees with the disposition of the appellate court on the application of the piercing doctrine to the transaction subject of this case. Per the Court’s count, the trial court enumerated no less than 20 documented circumstances and transactions, which, taken as a package, indeed strongly supported the conclusion that respondent EQUITY was but an adjunct, an instrumentality or business conduit of petitioner GCC. This relation, in turn, provides a justifying ground to pierce petitioner’s corporate existence as to ALSONS’ claim in question. Foremost of what the trial court referred to as "certain circumstances" are the commonality of directors, officers and stockholders and even sharing of office between petitioner GCC and respondent EQUITY; certain financing and management arrangements between the two, allowing the petitioner to handle the funds of the latter; the virtual domination if not control wielded by the petitioner over the finances, business policies and practices of respondent EQUITY; and the establishment of respondent EQUITY by the petitioner to circumvent CB rules. For a perspective, the following are some relevant excerpts from the trial court’s decision setting forth in some detail the tipping circumstances adverted to therein:

It must be noted that as characterized by their business relationship, [respondent] EQUITY and [petitioner] GCC had common directors and/or officers as well as stockholders. This is revealed by the proceedings recorded in SEC Case No. 25-81 entitled "Avelina Ramoso, et al., vs. GCC, et al., where it was established, thru the testimony of EQUITY’s own President … that more than 90% of the stockholders of … EQUITY were also stockholders of … GCC ….. Disclosed likewise is the fact that when [EQUITY’s President] Labayen sold the shareholdings of EQUITY in said franchise companies, practically the entire proceeds thereof were surrendered to GCC, and not received by EQUITY (EXHIBIT "RR") xxx.

It was likewise shown by a preponderance of evidence that not only had …GCC financed … EQUITY and that the latter was heavily indebted to the former but EQUITY was, in fact, a wholly owned subsidiary of …GCC. Thus, as affirmed by EQUITY’s President, … the funds invested by EQUITY in the CCC franchise companies actually came from CCC Phils. or GCC (Exhibit "Y-5")…. that, as disclosed by the Auditor’s report for 1982, past due receivables alone of GCC exceeded P101,000,000.00 mostly to GCC affiliates especially CCC EQUITY. …; that [CB’s] Report of Examination dated July 14, 1977 shows that … EQUITY which has a paid-up capital of only P500,000.00 was the biggest borrower of GCC with a total loan of P6.70 Million ….

xxx xxx xxx

It has likewise been amply substantiated by [respondent ALSONS’] evidence that not only did … GCC cause the incorporation of … EQUITY, but, the latter had grossly inadequate capital for the pursuit of its line of business to the extent that its business affairs were considered as GCC’s own business endeavors. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

ALSONS has likewise shown …that the bonuses of the officers and directors of … EQUITY was based on its total financial performance together with all its affiliates… both firms were sharing one and the same office when both were still operational … and that the directors and executives of … EQUITY never acted independently … but took their orders from … GCC….

The evidence has also indubitably established that … EQUITY was organized by … GCC for the purpose of circumventing [CB] rules and regulations and the Anti-Usury Law. Thus, as disclosed by the Advance Report … on the result of Central Bank’s Operations Examination conducted on … GCC as of March 31, 1977 (EXHIBITS "FFF" etc.), the latter violated [CB] rules and regulations by : (a) using as a conduit its non-quasi bank affiliates …. (b) issuing without recourse facilities to enable GCC to extend credit to affiliates like … EQUITY which go beyond the single borrower’s limit without the need of showing outstanding balance in the book of accounts. (Emphasis over words in brackets added.)

It bears to stress at this point that the facts and the inferences drawn therefrom, upon which the two (2) courts below applied the piercing doctrine, stand, for the most part, undisputed. Among these is, to reiterate, the matter of EQUITY having been incorporated to serve, as it did serve, as an instrumentality or adjunct of GCC. With the view we take of this case, GCC did not adduce any evidence, let alone rebut the testimonies and documents presented by ALSONS, to establish the prevailing circumstances adverted to that provided the justifying occasion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between GCC and EQUITY. We quote the trial court:

Verily, indeed, as the relationships binding herein [respondent EQUITY and petitioner GCC] have been that of "parent-subsidiary corporations" the foregoing principles and doctrines find suitable applicability in the case at bar; and, it having been satisfactorily and indubitably shown that the said relationships had been used to perform certain functions not characterized with legitimacy, this Court … feels amply justified to "pierce the veil of corporate entity" and disregard the separate existence of the percent (sic) and subsidiary the latter having been so controlled by the parent that its separate identity is hardly discernible thus becoming a mere instrumentality or alter ego of the former. Consequently, as the parent corporation, [petitioner] GCC maybe (sic) held responsible for the acts and contracts of its subsidiary – [respondent] EQUITY - most especially if the latter (who had anyhow acknowledged its liability to ALSONS) maybe (sic) without sufficient property with which to settle its obligations. For, after all, GCC was the entity which initiated and benefited immensely from the fraudulent scheme perpetrated in violation of the law. (Words in parenthesis in the original; emphasis and bracketed words added).

Given the foregoing considerations, it behooves the petitioner, as a matter of law and equity, to assume the legitimate financial obligation of a cash-strapped subsidiary corporation which it virtually controlled to such a degree that the latter became its instrument or agent. The facts, as found by the courts a quo, and the applicable law call for this kind of disposition. Or else, the Court would be allowing the wrong use of the fiction of corporate veil.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are accordingly AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.(now a member of this Court) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona; Rollo, pp. 109 et seq.

² Id. at 251-252.

³ CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo p. 116.

⁴ Id.

⁵ Via ten (10) identical Deeds of Sales of Shares of Stock; Rollo, pp. 316 et seq.

⁶ Id. at 335.

⁷ CA Decision, p. 3, citing Exh. "K"; Rollo, p 111.

⁸ Annex "A," Petition, Rollo, pp. 69 et seq.

⁹ RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 339.

¹⁰ Id. at 4-5; Rollo, 98-99.

¹¹ Supra note 1.

¹² Supra note 2.

¹³ Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment … of the [CA] … whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

¹⁴ Magellan Capital Management Corp. v. Zosa, G.R. No. 129916, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 157, citing cases.

¹⁵ Union Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134068, June 25, 2001, 359 SCRA 480; Villaranda v. Villaranda, G.R. 153447, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 571.

¹⁶ Del Rosario v. Bonga, G.R. No. 136308, January 23, 2001, 350 SCRA 101.

¹⁷ Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 116372, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 45.

¹⁸ Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713, citing Remalante v. Tibe, 158 SCRA 145 (1988) Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. CA, G.R. 117434, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 445.

¹⁹ PT& T v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152057, September 29, 2003, 412 SCRA 263.

²⁰ Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 124715, January 24, 2000, 323 SCRA 102.

²¹ Reynoso IV v. CA, G.R. Nos. 116124-25, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 335, citing Yu v. NLRC, 245 SCRA 134 (1995).

²² Panay, Inc. v. Clave, L-56076, September 21, 1983, 124 SCRA 638.

²³ PHIVIDEC v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85266, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 669, citing Abney v. Belmont Country Club Properties, Inc. 279 Pac., 829.

²⁴ Reynoso IV v. CA, supra.

²⁵ Villanueva, Commercial Law Review, 2004 ed., p. 576.

²⁶ Traders Royal Bank v. CA, G.R. 93397, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 15.

²⁷ Ibid, citing First Phil. International Bank v. CA, 252 SCRA 259.

²⁸ Koppel (Phil.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496 (1946).

²⁹ Ibid; Umali v. CA, G.R. No. 89561, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 529.

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