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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174277             February 8, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL DIUNSAY-JALANDONI, Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us for review is the June 13, 2006 Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01002, which affirmed with modification the March 15, 2005 Decision² of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86, in Criminal Case No. Q-00-91317, finding appellant Samuel Diunsay-Jalandoni guilty of qualified rape; sentencing him to death; and, ordering him to indemnify the victim in the sum of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.

Appellant was charged with Rape in an Information³ dated April 3, 2000 which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of March 2000 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of AAA a retardate by then and there dragging said complainant inside the guard out post located inside xxx Subdivision xxx, this city by removing her shorts and inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty, after which, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, namely: (1) AAA, the private complainant, (2) BBB, mother of private complainant, (3) Wilfredo Aganon, a construction worker, (4) Chris Pastor, Aganon’s co-worker, (5) Dr. Ma. Cristina Morelos, a psychiatrist, and (6) Nimia de Guzman, a psychologist.

The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on March 31, 2000 at about 10 o’clock in the morning, Wilfredo Aganon and Chris Pastor, both construction workers, were passing by x x x Subdivision in x x x, Quezon City on the way to their jobsite. When they came across a guard outpost, they noticed appellant, an ice cream vendor, pushing AAA on the floor of the outpost and in the act of unzipping his pants. From a distance of about 10 meters, Pastor said to appellant, "Hoy, bawal yan, bitay ang aabutin mo diyan." However, the two did not intervene any further and proceeded to walk towards their jobsite.

AAA testified that after appellant pushed her into the outpost and forcibly laid her on its floor, appellant held her thighs and punched her stomach. He ordered her to keep silent, otherwise, he would maul and kill her. Thereafter, he unzipped his pants and removed his briefs, and undressed her. He then placed himself on top of her, and succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina.

Meanwhile, Aganon and Pastor had not traveled far when they heard AAA shout, "Tama na po, tama na po, ayaw ko na." Upon hearing AAA’s cry, Aganon and Pastor went back to the guard outpost. Before they could reach the outpost, they saw appellant immediately stand up and ring his ice cream bell while AAA pulled up her short pants. Aganon and Pastor then reported the incident to the subdivision guards and homeowners. They brought appellant to the Barangay Hall and thereafter turned him over to the x x x Police Station where he was detained pending the filing of formal charges against him.

After the rape incident, BBB asked her daughter about the surrounding circumstances leading thereto. She found out that this was not the first time that appellant had raped her daughter and that appellant had previously threatened AAA not to reveal to anyone what he had done to her, otherwise, he would harm her.

Dr. Ma. Cristina Morelos, a psychiatrist, and Nimia C. De Guzman, a psychologist, both from the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), testified on the mental capacity of AAA. Psychological tests showed that AAA’s current mental capacity was at a severe level of mental retardation with the mental age of a four-year old although at the time of the commission of the rape, AAA was already 21 years old. She had a very limited attention span and concentration. She was also easily cajoled and pleased, and responded with unthinking eagerness to do anything requested of her as long as her needs were satisfied. During her testimony, De Guzman also noted that when she interviewed AAA, the latter answered spontaneously and narrated vividly how she was raped by appellant. She pointed out that a person with the mental age of a four-year old could not fabricate a story; and relates events as he or she experiences them. Neither could such a person be coached on the witness stand because of his or her limited attention span.

The defense presented the testimonies of Rosauro Gonzales and appellant himself.

Gonzales was presented as a hostile witness it appearing that he was listed as a prosecution witness but was not presented by the prosecution. He testified that on March 31, 2000, he was the officer on duty in the Barangay Hall located at x x x, Quezon City; that at around one o’clock in the afternoon, a certain Chris Pastor, together with several others, went to the Barangay Hall to turnover appellant; that he was told that a crime was committed in the guard outpost and Pastor was a witness to its commission; that appellant was subsequently turned over to the x x x Police Station.

Appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was selling ice cream at x x x Subdivision in x x x, Quezon City, when AAA approached his ice cream cart to buy ice cream. He was not feeling well so he sat down to rest on the guard outpost. He claimed that AAA was "makulit" and kept on hitting him ("binubunggo bunggo") while he was sitting on the floor of the outpost. AAA held him by the shoulders so he stood up and pushed her. When AAA fell on the floor of the outpost, she was shocked. He wanted to help her stand up but she shouted. He was about to leave the place when Pastor and Aganon approached him and asked, "What did you do with the girl?" to which he replied, "Wait a moment, how could I do that thing that you are accusing me at this time and place." He was then brought to the Barangay Hall and placed in the detention cell. Thereafter, at around one o’clock in the afternoon, he was brought to the Police Station and was placed inside the detention cell without first being interrogated.

On March 15, 2005, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting appellant of qualified rape. It ruled that aside from the use of force, threat or intimidation and the fact that the victim was a mental retardate, the rape was attended with the special qualifying circumstance under Article 266-B(10)⁴ of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, because appellant knew of AAA’s mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime as shown by the fact that appellant called AAA "makulit" and "abnormal." Thus, it imposed the supreme penalty of death and ordered him to pay damages:

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Samuel Diunsay-Jalandoni guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of death, and to indemnify the private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs.⁵

Conformably with our ruling in People v. Mateo,⁶ the records of this case were forwarded to the Court of Appeals for review. On June 13, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision affirming appellant’s conviction and increasing the amount of civil indemnity from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00:

WHEREFORE, the appealed DECISION is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Samuel Diunsay-Jalandoni is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He is also ordered to indemnify AAA the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

In his Brief,⁷ appellant contends that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime because it was done in broad daylight, along a subdivision street and within the public’s view. He claims that it is inconceivable for him to have committed such dastardly acts in the guard outpost and in such manner and time, and that even a hardened criminal is not indiscriminate in his actions.

We are not persuaded.

We note that the pictures of the guard outpost, as shown by the pictures presented in evidence,⁸ had an opening and three side walls which were about waist high. The walls of the outpost were high enough to conceal the crime taking place on the floor thereof. Thus, there is no merit in appellant’s contention that he could not have raped AAA inside the guard outpost because the place was in plain view of passersby. Besides, during the commission of the crime, no other person was traversing the street where the rape took place, aside from Aganon and Pastor.

As we have often ruled, lust is not a respecter of time and place. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house or where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where there are other members of the family who are sleeping.⁹ Indeed, when the bestial passion of man is aroused, rape could be committed anywhere. We find, therefore, the commission of the rape on the floor of the guard outpost to be neither impossible nor inconceivable.

Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of commission of the alleged rape because it failed to present the doctor who conducted the medico-legal examination of AAA.

The contention lacks merit.

The records show that after the rape incident, BBB brought AAA to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City to undergo a medical examination. The Initial Medico-Legal Report¹⁰ prepared by Dr. James M. Beljira showed the presence of "deep healed laceration at 4 o’clock and shallow healed laceration at 9 o’clock positions," and was "negative for spermatozoa." The report concluded that AAA is in a "non-virgin state physically" and that there are "no external signs of application of any form of physical trauma." However, for reasons not borne by the records, the prosecution failed to present Dr. Beljira to authenticate and affirm the contents of this report.

However, this omission is not fatal. In a long line of cases, we have ruled that a medical examination is not essential in the prosecution of a rape case because it is merely corroborative in character.¹¹ Further, the absence of external signs of violence does not negate the commission of rape. Nor is the absence of spermatozoa material in the prosecution of a rape case. A freshly broken hymen is, likewise, not an essential element of rape, and healed lacerations do not negate rape because full penetration is not necessary to consummate rape. Penetration of the penis by entry into the labia of the pudendum of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape.¹²

What matters greatly is the clear, unequivocal and credible testimony of the victim.¹³ To be sure, an accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature. In the instant case, we find AAA’s unflinching testimony, which related the details of her traumatic experience, coupled with the corroborating testimonies of Aganon and Pastor, who saw appellant with AAA under incriminating circumstances shortly before and soon after the rape incident, to be sufficient for conviction of rape. Pertinent portions of AAA’s testimony sufficiently described her horrible ordeal thusly:

Q. Did [appellant] approach you on that particular day [March 31, 2000]?

A. He approached me, sir, then he undressed me. My shorts was removed.

Q. Where did this undressing take place?

A. At the guardhouse. He told me to lie down, then he placed himself on top of me.

Q. When he undressed you, what happened next?

A. He threatened me that if I will report to my parents, he will kill me.

Q. Who told you that statement that he will kill you?

A. That man, Mamang ice cream, Manong Samuel.

Q. When you were told of this statement, was he holding you?

A. Yes, he abused me.

Q. When he was holding you, what portion of your body was he holding you?

A. My both thighs.

Q. When the accused was holding you what happened next?

A. He said that he will kill me. He also said he will maul me.1awphi1.net

Q. After this was made, what happened next?

A. He said that if I will not keep silent, he will maul me.

Q. Did the accused maul you?

A. He said, "uupakan kita pag nagsumbong ka."

Q. Did the accused hurt you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What portion of your body did the accused hurt you?

A. He boxed my stomach.

Q. What did you do when he boxed your stomach?

A. I did not fight back.

Q. What happened next after boxing you?

A. I kicked him and I said it is enough.

Q. Why do you say it is enough?

A. Because he was forcing me to lie down in the guardhouse.

Q. Were you able to lie down because of this pressure from the accused?

A. Yes, sir, he forced me to lie down.

Q. When you were lying down, were you undressed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. While being undressed, what happened?

A. He removed my shorts, he tore it?

x x x x

Q. Did the accused also undress in your presence?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What particular clothes were taken off by the accused?

A. His briefs.

Q. And after undressing his briefs, what did he do to you?

A. He placed himself on top of me.

Q. Did it hurt when he placed his body on top of you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what part of the body did it hurt?

A. He inserted something on my private part (witness pointing to her private part).

Q. Can you identify the thing that was inserted on your private part?

A. His private organ.

Q. Can you inform the Court what is the shape of the private organ?

A. He inserted it on my private part.

Q. After inserting it in your private part, what did he do next?

A. He inserted it.

Q. After inserting his private part on your private part, what did the accused do?

A. He inserted his private part on my private part.¹⁴

During AAA’s testimony, the trial court noted that there were instances when she could not immediately comprehend the questions propounded to her, and that she was sometimes repetitious in her answers. These were attributed to her mental condition as she was found to be suffering from severe mental retardation with the mental age of a four-year old although she was already 21 years old at the time of the commission of the rape. Despite this, the trial court found AAA’s testimony to be spontaneous, credible and replete with details of her ordeal at the hands of appellant. It observed that given AAA’s low mental age, it is improbable that she could concoct or fabricate such a serious charge of rape. Neither was it possible that she was coached into testifying against appellant considering her limited attention span and concentration. Under such circumstances, only a very startling event would leave a lasting impression on her which she would be able to recall when asked about it.

We sustain the above findings of the trial court under the settled rule that appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses considering that it is in a better position to observe their candor and behavior on the witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct and attitude. Its assessment is respected unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.¹⁵ These exceptions are not present in this case.

We now determine the appropriate penalty.

The trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, convicted appellant for qualified rape and sentenced him to death under Article 266-B(10)¹⁶ of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353. It reasoned that appellant knew of AAA’s mental retardation at the time of the commission of the rape since, during his testimony, appellant referred to AAA as the "makulit" and "abnormal" person who kept on annoying him while he rested in the guard outpost.¹⁷

Indeed, under Article 266-B(10), knowledge by the offender of the mental disability of the offended party at the time of the commission of the rape is a special qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty.¹⁸ However, the long settled rule is that qualifying circumstances must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and, thus, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape but is convicted of its qualified form even if the attendant qualifying circumstance is not set forth in the information.¹⁹ In the instant case, the information merely states that AAA is a retardate without specifically stating that appellant knew of her mental disability at the time of the commission of the rape. Thus, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape under Article 266-A, par. 1²⁰ in relation to 266-B²¹ of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353, and his sentence should be accordingly reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Anent the award of damages, the Court of Appeals awarded to the victim ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, with our finding that appellant should be convicted of simple rape only and not of qualified rape, the civil indemnity must be reduced to ₱50,000.00 conformably with prevailing jurisprudence.²² Nonetheless, AAA is entitled to ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages pursuant to our ruling in People v. Catubig.²³ In Catubig, we held that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Further, we noted in that case that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, now requires that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information in order to be validly appreciated by the court. However, the retroactive application of these procedural rules cannot adversely affect the rights of a private offended party that have become vested where the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of said rules²⁴ as is the case here. Consequently, aggravating circumstances which were not alleged in the information but proved during the trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining appellant’s liability for exemplary damages.²⁵ In the instant case, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by the offender of the offended party’s mental disability, although not alleged in the information, was proved during trial, which justifies the award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 in consonance with current rulings.²⁶

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01002 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is found GUILTY of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua; he is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice	ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Asscociate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice	MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Asscociate Justice
(On Leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice	CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES Asscociate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice	ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Asscociate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice	MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Asscociate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice	PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Asscociate Justice

(On Leave)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Rollo, pp. 2-20. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

² Records, pp. 228-239. Penned by Judge Teodoro A. Bay.

³ Id. at 1.

⁴ Art. 266-B. Penalties. — x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: x x x

10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

⁵ Records, p. 239.

⁶ G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

⁷ Rollo, pp. 36-49.

⁸ Records, pp. 217-223; Exhibits "I" to "I-F."

⁹ People v. Gabayron, 343 Phil. 593, 608 (1997).

¹⁰ Records, p. 11.

¹¹ People v. Iluis, G.R. No. 145995, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 396, 406.

¹² Id.

¹³ Id. at 407.

¹⁴ TSN, June 27, 2002, pp. 4-8.

¹⁵ People v. Yaoto, 421 Phil. 963, 973 (2001).

¹⁶ Supra note 4.

¹⁷ TSN, April 3, 2003, p. 5.

¹⁸ People v. Limio, G.R. Nos. 148804-06, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 597, 615.

¹⁹ People v. Bernaldez, 379 Phil. 493, 505 (2000); People v. Limio, supra.

²⁰ Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

x x x x

d) When the offended party is x x x demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

²¹ Art. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

²² Supra note 18 at 616; Supra note 19 at 506. Cf. People v. Salome, G.R. No. 169077, August 31, 2006.

²³ 416 Phil. 102, 120 (2001).

²⁴ Id. at 120-121.

²⁵ People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 76, 88-89.

²⁶ Supra note 23 at 121.

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