THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. P-06-2115 February 23, 2006
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 04-1897-P)
ANGELES MANGUBAT, Complainant,
vs.
JOEL FRANCIS C. CAMINO, and Sheriff III, MTCC, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao, Respondent.
R E S O LU T I O N
TINGA, J.:
For resolution is an administrative case filed by Angeles Mangubat (Mangubat) against Joel Francis C. Camino (Camino), Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Island Garden City of Samal, Davao for gross misconduct, dishonesty, and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Complainant Mangubat was convicted of slander in Criminal Case No. 8541 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Angeles Mangubat" and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor and to pay private complainant therein, Eduardo Plaza (Plaza), the amount of ₱10,000.00 by way of moral damages.2 Subsequently, she was granted probation. On 16 December 2003, a writ of execution was issued directing respondent Sheriff Camino to execute the award of moral damages.3
Mangubat alleges that on 8 January 2004, Camino went to her house, showed her the writ of execution, and inquired for goods and chattels that can be levied upon. He was at that time accompanied by a livestock buyer. Having found no other goods or chattel, Camino turned to her only carabao, which her husband used in the farm where they worked as tenants. Camino allegedly warned that if she could not pay the moral damages, she may be imprisoned. Out of fear, Mangubat was allegedly forced to sell her carabao to the livestock buyer who paid her ₱12,500.00. Camino then took the ₱10,000.00 and issued her a temporary receipt.4
On 29 January 2004, Mangubat filed the instant administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman which was later referred to this Court for appropriate action. She assailed Camino’s act on the ground that her carabao was exempt from execution under paragraph (c), Section 13, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.5 She further alleged that he did so to unduly favor Plaza by ensuring her payment of moral damages to the latter.
In his Comment6 dated 27 May 2004, Camino denies the charges against him. According to him, he went to Mangubat’s house on 7 January 2004 purposely to implement the writ of execution issued in Criminal Case No. 854. On the way thereto, he met Florian Rebong, the Process Server of MTCC-Branch 1, who was also going to her residence to serve an order of the court. They then went together to Mangubat’s house.
When they arrived at Mangubat’s residence, Camino tendered to her a copy of the Sheriff’s Letter of Demand7 pursuant to the writ of execution after the latter refused to receive it. He claims that he did so in a courteous manner, explaining and interpreting to her the contents of the writ. After conferring with her husband, Mangubat conveyed to Camino her willingness to comply with the court order and requested him to come back the following day as they would still look for means to pay the ₱10,000.00 moral damages stated in the writ.
In the morning of 8 January 2004, Camino went back to Mangubat’s house. However, her husband instructed him to come back in the afternoon as they had decided to sell one of their livestock that day. Camino claims that prior thereto, he had no knowledge that the spouses would sell their carabao. When he returned, Mangubat readily handed to him the amount of ₱10,000.00 and he, in turn, issued the corresponding receipt. Thereafter, he proceeded to Barangay San Isidro to locate Plaza, to whom he turned over the amount of ₱10,000.00 for which the latter issued and signed the corresponding temporary receipt.8 Camino attached to his comment the affidavits9 of Florian Rebong and Miguel Cuberos, the livestock buyer who bought the Mangubats’ carabao. They essentially corroborate Camino’s statement that Mangubat sold her carabao to satisfy the writ of execution voluntarily and without any intervention from Camino.
In her Reply10 dated 11 June 2004, Mangubat admits that respondent went to her house on 7 January 2004 together with process server Florian Rebong and policeman Antolin San Juan of the Samal City Police Station. However, she denies asking Camino to come back the next day. She claims that it was he who suggested that he would come back the following day together with a livestock buyer.
Mangubat assails Camino’s act of delivering the amount of ₱10,000.00 to Plaza as illegal because it violates par. 2, Sec. 9(a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on execution of judgments for money enforced through immediate payment on demand.11 She opines that it is another indication of his giving undue favor and advantage to Plaza.
In his Rejoinder12 dated 2 July 2004, Camino points out alleged lies and inconsistencies in Mangubat’s statements. First, while her affidavit-complaint skirted the 7 January 2004 incident, when Camino first went to her house, she subsequently admitted the same in her reply. Second, Mangubat’s stress on the 30-kilometer distance between his and Plaza’s residence was misleading. He points out that although Plaza’s residence was far from his station, the former was only two (2) kilometers away from Mangubat’s house so that he deemed it more practicable to give the money personally to Plaza than to turn it over to the Clerk of Court that very same day due to distance and time constraints. He submits that although there may have been a shortcut in the procedure, he never intended to violate it. Camino likewise professes that he learned of the name of Miguel Cuberos only after he made inquiries to aid him in filing his comment.
On 15 February 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) rendered a report13 to this Court which the Second Division noted in a Resolution14 dated 27 April 2005. In the same Resolution, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed and submitted. Camino complied on 2 June 2005 while Mangubat did so only on 2 December 2005. Hence, this resolution.
The Court Administrator, through Retired Justice Narciso Atienza,15 found Camino’s version of the facts to be more credible compared to Mangubat’s. He concluded that Mangubat voluntarily sold her carabao in order to satisfy the writ of execution against her. However, he found Camino’s act of delivering the ₱10,000.00 personally to Plaza as illegal. Under the second paragraph of Sec. 9 (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,16 if the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff who shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality. Justice Atienza further made the following findings:
Respondent’s deviation from the afore-quoted provision merits no justification. In fact it was risky for respondent to go out of his way to seek the judgment obligee whose residence he did not even know. His recourse is not sanctioned by law, for which appropriate sanction is warranted. However, as no bad faith or malice was established, and that respondent was apparently pressed by the circumstances, it is deemed that the sanction be accordingly tempered.17
The Court Administrator recommended that Camino be reprimanded for neglect of duty by failing to strictly follow the procedure required by law for the execution of judgments for money.
We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator.lavvph!1.net
The nature of a sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial such that he exercises no discretion as to the manner of executing the same.18 He has the duty to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon him and any method of execution falling short of the requirement of the law deserves reproach and should not be countenanced.19
While Camino did not strictly adhere to the required procedure, Mangubat failed to establish malice on his part in so doing. Neither did he cause delay in the execution of the final judgment in Criminal Case No. 854. In fact, the judgment obligor received the amount on the very same day Mangubat paid Camino. In addition, Camino made a return20 of the writ of execution and reported to the court which issued the writ the manner and circumstances by which the said judgment was satisfied. Considering the foregoing, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules of procedure.
Although Camino’s departure from Sec. 9(a), Rule 39 appears excusable under the circumstances, we find that he committed other violations which, if taken together with the rest, merit a stiffer penalty than reprimand.
First, the writ of execution clearly commanded Camino to cause the execution of the money judgment pursuant to the procedure outlined in Rule 39 by demanding from Mangubat the immediate payment of the full amount stated therein, or by levying her personal properties, and in case the same is insufficient, by levying so much of her real property as sufficient to satisfy the judgment.
Camino admitted that he went to Mangubat’s house on 7 January 2004 to execute the writ. He further admitted that he came back the following day at her request, as she will still look for means to pay the amount. When he returned on 8 January 2004, he again agreed to come back in the afternoon to collect the payment.
In Torres v. Cabling,21 we held that a sheriff is not required to give the judgment debtor some time to raise cash. Otherwise, the property may be placed in danger of being lost or absconded. After Mangubat refused to receive Camino’s letter of demand and to pay the amount stated in the writ, he should have levied on whatever personal properties he found in her house and in default thereof, her real properties. By coming back to her house twice, he risked the possibility that the judgment may not be satisfied.
Second, although he made a return of the writ, he did so belatedly and in clear violation of Sec. 14, Rule 39 which provides, viz:
The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties. (Underscoring ours.)
The raison d' etre behind this requirement is to update the court on the status of the execution and to take necessary steps to ensure the speedy execution of decisions. 22
The judgment in Criminal Case No. 854 was fully satisfied when Camino received Mangubat’s payment on 8 January 2004 and turned it over to the judgment obligor on the same date. However, his Sheriff’s Return was dated 26 February 2004 and was received by the MTCC only on 11 March 2004. Camino had the duty to make the return immediately. However, it took him two (2) long months to comply thereto. He had evidently been negligent.
We have held before23 that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs play a significant role in the administration of justice. They are primarily responsible for the execution of a final judgment which is "the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law."24 Thus, sheriffs must at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. As officers of the court, they are expected to uphold the norm of public accountability and to avoid any kind of behavior that would diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.
In sum, we find that Camino disregarded the rules on execution of judgment which is tantamount to neglect or dereliction of duty. Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law considers simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense punishable by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Meanwhile, this offense is punishable with suspension from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year under Sec. 52 (B), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding respondent Joel Francis C. Camino GUILTY of neglect or dereliction of duty and is hereby meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from office for two (2) months.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Asscociate Justice |
Footnotes
1 Raffled to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte, Branch 1.
2 Rollo, p. 6.
3 Ibid.
4 Annex "B" of the Affidavit-Complaint; id. at 7.
5 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39, Sec. 13, par. (c) provides:
"SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
x x x x
(c) Three horses, or three cows, or three carabaos, or other beasts of burden, such as the judgment obligor may select necessarily used by him in his ordinary occupation;
x x x x"
6 Rollo, pp. 16-27, with annexes.
7 Id. at 20.
8 Id. at 26.
9 Id. at 21-24.
10 Id. at 40-43.
11 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39, Sec. 9(a), par. 2 provides:
SEC. 9 Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –
(a) Immediate payment on demand. --
x x x x
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality.
x x x x
12 Rollo, pp. 60-61.
13 Id. at 64-67.
14 Id. at 68.
15 Consultant in the Office of the Court Administrator.
16 Applicable to criminal procedure pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 1 thereof.
17 Rollo, p. 67.
18 Sps. Biglete v. Deputy Sheriff Maputi, Jr., 427 Phil. 227 citing Portes v. Tepace, 334 Phil. 839 (1997).
19 Sps. Biglete v. Deputy Sheriff Maputi, Jr., supra, citing Remollo v. Garcia, 357 Phil. 86 (1998).
20 Rollo, p. 27.
21 A.M. No. P-97-1249, July 11, 1997, 275 SCRA 329.
22 Benitez v. Acosta, A.M. P-01-1473, March 27, 2001, 355 SCRA 386.
23 Jumio v. Egay-Eviota, A.M. P-92-746, March 29, 1994, 231 SCRA 551, citing Maya v. Bassig, A.M. No. 2769-P, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 49, 47 Am. Jur. Sheriffs, Police and Constables 855; De Castro v. Santos, A.M. No. P-90-474, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 245; Vda. de Tisado v. Tablizo, et al., A.M. No. P-94-1025, February 20, 1996, 324 Phil. 1 (1996); Portes v. Tepace; Sps. Biglete v. Deputy Sheriff Maputi, Jr., supra.
24 Eduarte v. Ramos, A.M. P-94-1069, November 9, 1994, 238 SCRA 41 citing Tan v. Herras, A.M. No. P-90-904, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 1.
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