SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154282 April 7, 2006
VANGIE BARRAZONA, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY and SAN-AN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by RODRIGO CHUA TIU, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Order dated June 19, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Baguio City, denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 5238-R, entitled "SAN-AN REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by RODRIGO CHUA TIU, plaintiff, v. VANGIE BARRAZONA, defendant."
San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent, owns a building located at Naguilian corner Asin Road, Baguio City. Vangie Barrazona, petitioner, has been leasing portions of the building identified as Units 203 A and B at the second floor. The period of the lease is for two (2) years, commencing July 15, 2001 and ending June 30, 2003. The monthly rental is P400.00 per square meter for Unit 203 A and P500.00 per square meter for Unit 203 B.
Starting August 2001, petitioner defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals and failed to pay despite demands by respondent. Thus, on May 14, 2002, respondent filed with the RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 5238-R.
On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the allegations therein clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment (illegal detainer) which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Petitioner pointed out the following allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint showing that it is not for sum of money but for ejectment:
4. That the defendant has failed to pay the rentals for the said leased premises for the month of August 2001 up to the present;
5. That the plaintiff has demanded the defendant to pay her overdue account, now amounting to P971,838.15, the last demand to vacate and payment of arrears having been made in writing on March 27, 2002 xxx.
In an Order dated June 19, 2002, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
Forthwith, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that: (1) the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the Resolution denying her Motion to Dismiss is unconstitutional as it does not state its legal basis.
On the other hand, respondent, in praying for the dismissal of the petition, contends that (1) the complaint is for the collection of unpaid rentals as there is absolutely no allegation that its intent is to eject petitioner from the premises; (2) petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the extraordinary suit of certiorari; and (3) the assailed order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss is interlocutory and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.1avvphil.net
We hold that in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x x x x
b.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.
As mentioned earlier, petitioner stated in her motion that respondent’s allegations in its complaint show that it is one for ejectment cognizable, not by the RTC but, by the MTC of Baguio City.
In Herrera, et al. v. Bollos, et al.,1 we emphasized the basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
It bears reiterating paragraph 5 of the complaint, thus:
5. That the plaintiff has demanded the defendant to pay her overdue account, now amounting to P971,838.15, the last demand to vacate and payment of arrears having been made in writing on March 27, 2002 xxx.
This allegation clearly shows that respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay her overdue rentals and to vacate the premises; and that the last demand to pay and vacate in writing was on March 27, 2002. Respondent thus complied with Section 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. (2a)
Indeed, while the complaint is captioned "Collection of Sum of Money with Damages," the allegations therein show that respondent’s action is for ejectment. All ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of the MTC.2
Next, petitioner maintains that the Order of the RTC denying her Motion to Dismiss violates the Constitution as it does not state the facts and the law on which it is based. The challenged Order is reproduced as follows:
O R D E R
This Court finds that the grounds stated in the Motion to Dismiss to be without merit, hence, the same is denied.
SO ORDERED.
We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute order or resolution like the one specified above. A trial court should state in its order the reasons for the dismissal of the complaint so that when the order is appealed, the appellate court can readily determine from a casual perusal thereof whether there is a prima facie justification for the dismissal.3
Under Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, we require that resolutions disposing of a motion to dismiss shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor, thus:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion. — After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
This requirement proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily dismissing a motion to dismiss for "lack of merit." Such cavalier dispositions can often pose difficulty and misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the same, usually on certiorari.4
While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appeallable, however, if the denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies from such order of denial.5 In Time, Inc. v. Reyes,6 this Court, speaking through Justice J.B. L. Reyes, held: The motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent court’s lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action; and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of an action or on the basis of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.7 Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.8
Lastly, we cannot go along with respondent’s contention that petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the remedy of certiorari. While the rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must first file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court of the act or order complained of,9 however, such rule is not without exception. We have, in several instances, dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a lower court’s ruling, such as: where the proceedings in which the error occurred is a patent nullity;10 where the question is purely of law; when public interest is involved; where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may cause great and irreparable damage;11 and where the court a quo has no jurisdiction,12 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated June 19, 2002 issued by the RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 5238-R, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Asscociate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002, 374 SCRA 107; see also R.V. Marzan Freight, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128064, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 597.
2 Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 137533, November 22, 2002, 392 SCRA 506.
3 Continental Bank v. Tiangco, G.R. No. 50480, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 715.
4 Regalado, Volume I, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 260.
5 Ablan, Sr. v. Madarang, No. L-32963, September 30, 2971, 41 SCRA 213; Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, G.R. No. 62082, February 26, 1992, 206 SCRA 582.
6 L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, cited in Ablan, Sr. v. Madarang, supra.
7 Id.
8 Aguilar v. Tan, L-23600, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 205; Bautista, et al. v. Sarmiento, et al.¸ L-45137, September 23, 1985, 138 SCRA 587.
9 Villa-Rey Transit v. Bello, L-18957, April 23, 1963, 7 SCRA 735; Yao v. Perello, G.R. No. 153828, October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA 474; Go v. Tong, G.R. No. 151942, November 27, 2003, 416 SCRA 557.
10 Director of Lands v. Santamaria and Javellana, No. 20151, March 6, 1923, 44 Phil. 594.
11 Philippine Industrial Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 152688, November 19, 2003, 416 SCRA 245.
12 Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., L-24224, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 801.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
