THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140746 March 16, 2005
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN, Petitioner,
vs.
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated July 23 1999 and Resolution2 dated November 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38453, entitled "Standard Insurance Company, Inc., and Martina Gicale vs. PANTRANCO North Express, Inc., and Alexander Buncan."
In the afternoon of October 28, 1984, Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale, respondent herein. It was then raining. While driving north bound along the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus, owned by Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by Alexander Buncan, also a petitioner, was trailing behind. When the two vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, the passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the balance of P13,415.00.
Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from petitioners Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Manila, a complaint for sum of money.
In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.
On June 5, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision3 in favor of respondents Standard and Martina, thus:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Standard Insurance Company and Martina Gicale, and against defendants Pantranco Bus Company and Alexander Buncan, ordering the latter to pay as follows:
(1) to pay plaintiff Standard Insurance the amount of P8,000.00 with interest due thereon from November 27, 1984 until fully paid;
(2) to pay plaintiff Martina Gicale the amount of P13,415.00 with interest due thereon from October 22, 1984 until fully paid;
(3) to pay the sum of P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees;
(4) to pay the expenses of litigation and the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision4 dated July 23, 1999, affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that:
"The appellants argue that appellee Gicale’s claim of P13,415.00 and appellee insurance company’s claim of P8,000.00 individually fell under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. This is not correct because under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, it is the sum of the two claims that determines the jurisdictional amount.
x x x
In the case at bench, the total of the two claims is definitely more than P20,000.00 which at the time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial Court.
Appellants contend that there was a misjoinder of parties. Assuming that there was, under the Rules of Court (Sec. 11, Rule 7) as well as under the Rules of Civil Procedure (ditto), the same does not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint.
x x x
It does not need perspicacity in logic to see that appellees Gicale’s and insurance company’s individual claims against appellees (sic) arose from the same vehicular accident on October 28, 1984 involving appellant Pantranco’s bus and appellee Gicale’s jeepney. That being the case, there was a question of fact common to all the parties: Whose fault or negligence caused the damage to the jeepney?
Appellants submit that they were denied their day in court because the case was deemed submitted for decision "without even declaring defendants in default or to have waived the presentation of evidence." This is incorrect. Of course, the court did not declare defendants in default because that is done only when the defendant fails to tender an answer within the reglementary period. When the lower court ordered that the case is deemed submitted for decision that meant that the defendants were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence. If they failed to adduce their evidence, they should blame nobody but themselves. They failed to be present during the scheduled hearing for the reception of their evidence despite notice and without any motion or explanation. They did not even file any motion for reconsideration of the order considering the case submitted for decision.
Finally, contrary to the assertion of the defendant-appellants, the evidence preponderantly established their liability for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated November 4, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the following assignments of error:
"I
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT OF THE ACTION CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS’ RESPECTIVE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION NOR ARE THERE QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACTS COMMON TO BOTH PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE TO RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT SHOWN ANY RIGHT TO THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS."
For their part, respondents contend that their individual claims arose out of the same vehicular accident and involve a common question of fact and law. Hence, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
I
Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of action of each respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that there are no common questions of law and fact common to both parties. Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,5 provides:
"Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. – All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest."
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.6
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first.7 Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:
"Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
x x x
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction."
The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is involved.8 The issue of whether respondents’ claims shall be lumped together is determined by paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 1299 which states, among others, that "where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions."
As previously stated, respondents’ cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.
Respondent Standard’s claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has "exclusive original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)." Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994.
II
The finding of the trial court, affirmed by the Appellate Court, that petitioners are negligent and thus liable to respondents, is a factual finding which is binding upon us, a rule well-established in our jurisprudence. It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's factual findings, when affirmed by the Appellate Court, are conclusive and binding upon this Court, if they are not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence. Petitioners have not presented sufficient ground to warrant a deviation from this rule.10
III
There is no merit in petitioners’ contention that they were denied due process. Records show that during the hearing, petitioner Pantranco’s counsel filed two motions for resetting of trial which were granted by the trial court. Subsequently, said counsel filed a notice to withdraw. After respondents had presented their evidence, the trial court, upon petitioners’ motion, reset the hearing to another date. On this date, Pantranco failed to appear. Thus, the trial court warned Pantranco that should it fail to appear during the next hearing, the case will be submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence presented. Subsequently, Pantranco’s new counsel manifested that his client is willing to settle the case amicably and moved for another postponement. The trial court granted the motion. On the date of the hearing, the new counsel manifested that Pantranco’s employees are on strike and moved for another postponement. On the next hearing, said counsel still failed to appear. Hence, the trial court considered the case submitted for decision.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.11
Petitioner Pantranco filed an answer and participated during the trial and presentation of respondents’ evidence. It was apprised of the notices of hearing issued by the trial court. Indeed, it was afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain its side of the controversy. Clearly, it was not denied of its right to due process. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing which is not present here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 23 1999 and Resolution dated November 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38453 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr. and Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. (all retired); Rollo at 24-30.
2 Id. at 46-47.
3 CA Records at 34-37.
4 Rollo at 25-30.
5 The complaint was filed prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
6 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Seventh Revised Edition at 81.
7 Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81909, September 5, 1991, 201 SCRA 343.
8 Regalado at 71.
9 Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
10 Mirasol, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 44.
11 Zacarias vs. National Police Commission, G.R. No. 119847, October 24, 2003.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
