Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1461. March 31, 2005
MA. TERESA D. COLUMBRES, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANICETO L. MADRONIO, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is the letter (with annexes) dated June 8, 20011 of Ma. Teresa D. Columbres, addressed to and directly filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) but eventually referred to the Court, relative to certain actuations of Judge Aniceto L. Madronio, Sr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan in connection with Civil Case No. 1014 (SJ-99), entitled Lucille S. Columbres vs. Ma. Teresa Columbres, an action for forcible entry with damages filed against the letter-writer by her stepmother, Lucille S. Columbres. More specifically, the letter submits for the Court’s consideration the propriety of Judge Madronio’s actuations/inaction in the same case, to wit: (a) issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction without the benefit of hearing; (b) ordering writer Ma. Teresa Columbres as defendant in the same case to surrender to the plaintiff therein a Volkswagen car not involved in the suit; and (c) failure to act for an unlimited period of time on Teresa’s motion to lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in said case.
The background facts:
On October 22, 1999, in the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan then presided by Judge Madronio, Ma. Teresa’s stepmother Lucille S. Columbres filed against her a complaint2 for forcible entry with damages, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 1014 (SJ-99).
The complaint alleged that on or about the second week of October 1999, defendant Ma. Teresa with several companions, by means of force, strategy and stealth unlawfully entered Lucille Columbres’ premises at 144 San Ildefonso Poblacion, San Jacinto, Pangasinan and carted away personal belongings and goods found in her store amounting to ₱300,000. Before leaving, the intruders even padlocked the house and the store. Despite demand, defendant refused to vacate the premises. Plaintiff thus prayed that defendant Ma. Teresa be ordered to vacate the premises and its possession restored to plaintiff and for the defendant to account for valuables and stocks taken from plaintiff’s store, plus damages and litigation expenses.
In her answer3 dated November 5, 1999, defendant Ma. Teresa denied the material allegations of the complaint and asked for its dismissal, and the award of her counterclaim for damages, incidental expenses and attorney’s fees.
Meanwhile, on November 3, 1999, plaintiff filed a Motion For Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction4 so that she may be restored to the possession of the premises in question.
On November 25, 1999, defendant Ma. Teresa filed her Opposition5 to the aforementioned motion, arguing that said motion, aside from having been filed out of time under Section 15, Rule 70, is also not verified, contrary to the requirement of Section 4, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court.
As evidently no writ of preliminary mandatory injunction has yet been issued by Judge Madronio, plaintiff filed on December 3, 1999 an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of the desired writ. On December 14, 1999, after considering the allegations in said motion and the earlier opposition interposed by the defendant, Judge Madronio granted said urgent ex-parte motion thru his handwritten notation6 at the bottom of the same motion, to wit:
Granted as prayed for but the movant is hereby ordered to post a bond of P30,000 to answer for any damage which the defendant may suffer.
On December 16, 1999, Judge Madronio formalized his handwritten notation by actually issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction7 addressed to the City and Provincial Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Dagupan City reading, as follows:
G R E E T I N G S :
A verified complaint and an Urgent Motion to Reiterate Motion For the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction having been filed before this Court against defendant Ma. Teresa Columbres, praying that a preliminary injunction issue against said defendant restraining her from continuing with the performance of certain acts mentioned in the complaint and in her urgent motion and the affidavit of the plaintiff, as well as the evidence presented for the purpose, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that this case where a Writ of Injunction should issue, sufficient reasons having been alleged and the bond required by law having been given thru surety in the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, to the satisfaction of the Court;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned Judge, that, until further orders, you the said Ma. Teresa Columbres and all your attorneys, representatives, agents and any other persons assisting you or acting in your behalf, to restore the possession to the plaintiff of the residential house/ premises in question which you forcibly took possession through force, strategy and stealth by padlocking the same and to refrain from carting away personal belongings of herein plaintiff from the residential house/ premises, particularly the Volkswagen Car (Emphasis Supplied).
On December 23, 1999, plaintiff Lucille Columbres filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Break Open,8 alleging that despite the earlier writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, defendant Ma. Teresa padlocked the gate of the premises.
On January 20, 2000, defendant Ma. Teresa filed a Motion To Lift Writ of Preliminary Injunction And To Reconsider Order to Surrender Volkswagen,9 therein denying having carted away plaintiff’s personal belongings nor padlocking the latter’s room. As regards the Volkswagen car, defendant claimed that it has always been in her possession and is not involved in the forcible entry suit.
In her subject letter of June 8, 2001, Ma. Teresa represents that as of said date, her aforesaid motion, filed way back on January 20, 2000, was merely sat upon by the Judge and remained unresolved "for an unlimited period of time".
Required by OCA to comment on the letter, Judge Madronio, by way of a return indorsement, submitted his Comment10 on July 27, 2001.
In said Comment, Judge Madronio denied Ma. Teresa’s allegation in her letter that he issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction without the benefit of hearing. He alleged that Ma. Teresa was furnished with a copy of plaintiff’s motion therefor and that the latter in fact filed her opposition thereto, adding that he issued the writ only after due consideration of the allegations in the motion and Ma. Teresa’s opposition. He averred that Ma. Teresa, despite having been furnished with a copy of the writ, defied the same, thus constraining him to issue a break open order as prayed for by the plaintiff.
Anent Ma. Teresa’s lament that he merely sat on her motion to lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and to reconsider his order to surrender the Volkswagen car, the judge averred that he had already resolved and denied the same.
In the same Comment, Judge Madronio, while admitting having granted plaintiff’s motion for a writ of preliminary injunction thru mere handwritten notation at the bottom of the motion, explained that he formalized the grant by actually issuing the desired writ on December 16, 1999.
In a Resolution11 dated November 20, 2002, the Court had the case docketed as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest within ten (10) days from notice whether they are willing to submit the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. No response was received from both of them. Hence, in a subsequent Resolution of April 12, 2004,12 the Court required the parties to show cause why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with for such failure, and again to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
On June 20, 2004, respondent judge manifested his willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings at hand.13
In its Memorandum Report, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that respondent judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for which he should be ordered to pay a fine of ₱10,000 with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Indeed, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in Civil Case No. 1014 (SJ-99) without any notice of hearing. Section 15, Rule 70 on Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer, in conjunction with Section 5, Rule 58, on preliminary injunction of the Rules of Court, respectively read:
"Sec. 15. Preliminary Injunction. – The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof".
"Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order" (Emphasis Supplied).
The above provisions expressly prohibit the grant of preliminary injunction without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. But courts are authorized to issue ex-parte a temporary restraining order (TRO) if it should appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter could be heard on notice. The TRO, however, shall be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period, the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. At the end of such period, the TRO automatically terminates without need of any judicial declaration to that effect, leaving the court no discretion to extend the same.14
In Civil Case No. 1014 (SJ-99), the plaintiff filed her motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction twelve (12) days after the complaint for forcible entry was filed. Opposed by defendant Ma. Teresa, the plaintiff again filed an ex-parte and urgent motion for the issuance of the writ. Without conducting a hearing within the time prescribed by law, respondent judge granted the motion based merely on the allegations in the application therefor and the opposition thereto. Thus, no opportunity was given both parties to be heard and to introduce evidence on the propriety for the issuance of the injunctive writ.
We also take note of the fact that the motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was belatedly filed, in contravention of Rule 70, Section 15 of the Rules of Court which explicitly mandates that the application for injunction must be filed within 5 days from the filing of the complaint. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly administration of justice.15
We likewise find irregular the directive of the respondent judge in the writ he issued on December 16, 1999 for defendant Ma. Teresa to turn over the Volkswagen car to plaintiff. Recovery of possession of personal property is misplaced in a forcible entry case, a summary action to recover material or physical possession of real property when the person who originally held it was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.16
We have ruled that judges should not be disciplined on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment. However, it is equally imperative that they should be conversant with basic rules in order to merit the confidence of the citizenry.17 In the present case, respondent judge’s disregard of the basic rules of procedure and his failure to abide by them constitute an offense of grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
Lastly, on Ma. Teresa’s allegation that respondent judge merely sat on her motion to lift the writ of preliminary injunction and to reconsider the directive vis a vis the Volkswagen car, respondent judge claims that he had already resolved the motion by denying the same. However, no evidence was ever presented by him to substantiate his claim. There is no way for us then to determine whether the motion was actually resolved within the reglementary period or, worse, if it was ever resolved at all considering that, as alleged by the complainant, she was not given a copy of said alleged resolution.
Under Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the Constitution, judges of lower courts are required to decide cases or resolve matters within three (3) months from the date of their submission for resolution. However, in cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, first level courts are allowed only thirty (30) days following receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment.
It bears repeating that the public’s faith and confidence in the judicial system depends, to a large extent, on the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and other matters pending before the courts. As we emphatically stated in Sanchez v. Vestil,18 and reiterated in Bernardo vs. Fabros19:
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them.
As to the recommended penalty by the OCA, the amount of ₱10,000 appears to be commensurate with respondent judge’s infraction. In Adao vs. Lorenzo,20 which is akin to the case at bar, we imposed the same amount of ₱10,000 for grave abuse of authority and undue delay in resolving an incident in a civil case.
Considering that respondent judge already retired from the service, the ₱10,000 is ordered deducted from the ₱50,000 previously withheld21 from his retirement benefits, precisely on account of the pendency of this case and another administrative complaint against the same respondent judge.22
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Aniceto L. Madronio, Sr., former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan is hereby found GUILTY of grave abuse of discretion and gross inefficiency and is meted a fine of ₱10,000.00, the amount to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 1- 21.
2 Annex "A", letter; Rollo, pp. 3-5.
3 Annex "B’, letter, Rollo, pp. 6-10.
4 Annex "C", letter; Rollo, pp. 12-13.
5 Annex "D", letter, Rollo, pp. 14-15.
6 Annex "F", letter, Rollo, p. 18.
7 Annex "F-2", letter, Rollo, p. 19.
8 Annex "E", letter, Rollo, pp. 16-17.
9 Annex "G", letter, Rollo, pp. 20-21.
10 Rollo, pp. 23-24.
11 Rollo, p. 30.
12 Rollo, p. 35.
13 Rollo, p. 42.
14 Mendoza vs. Ubiadas, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1712, 8 December 2003, 417 SCRA 183.
15 Gil vs. Lopez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1453. 29 April 2003, 401 SCRA 635; Don Tino Realty and Development Corp. vs. Florentino, 372 Phil. 882 [1999].
16 DeLa Paz vs. Panis, G.R. No. 57023, 22 June 1995, 245 SCRA 242; Times Broadcasting Network vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122806, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 366.
17 Supra, see Note 13.
18 358 Phil. 477 [1998].
19 366 Phil. 485 [1999].
20 375 Phils. 28 [1999].
21 Pursuant to the Court’s Resolution of October 20, 2004; Rollo, p. 45.
22 Rollo, p. 41.
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