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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 147417 July 8, 2005

SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ and CRISTINA AGRAVIADOR AVISO, Petitioners,
vs.
ANTONIO HERMANO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution¹ of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioners’ original action for certiorari under Rule 65 for being filed out of time. Assailed as well is the Resolution² dismissing petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:

On 27 April 1998, petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor and Milagros Perez filed a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio Hermano before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 224.³ On 15 May 1998, respondent (then defendant) Hermano filed his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On 17 January 2000, respondent Hermano filed a "Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial" which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 28 February 2000.

This Order was received by petitioners on 21 March 2000. On 23 March 2000, petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on 25 May 2000 and received by petitioners on 18 June 2000. On 17 August 2000, petitioners filed an original action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing the complaint against respondent Hermano.

On 19 October 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari "for having been filed beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended." On 02 March 2001, the second assailed Resolution was promulgated dismissing petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals holding that:

From the time petitioners received the assailed Order on March 21, 2000 and filed their motion for reconsideration, four (4) days had elapsed. On June 18, 2000, petitioners received the denial of their motion for reconsideration. When the instant petition was filed on August 17, 2000, a total of 63 days had elapsed.

A.M. No. 00-2-03-50 further amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the New Rules on Civil Procedure states that the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, Order or Resolution and in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

Viewed from its light, the assailed Orders had already attained finality, and are now beyond the power of this Court to review.⁴

Aggrieved by the foregoing ruling, petitioners are now before us assigning the following –

MANIFEST AND/OR SERIOUS ERROR COMMITTED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE PETITIONERS FILED THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE IT AND CONSEQUENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE APPRECIATION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, WITH ITS FINDING OF FACT NOT BEING BORNE BY THE RECORD OR EVIDENCE, AND THUS ITS CONCLUSION IS ENTIRELY BASELESS.⁵

According to petitioners, following the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, their petition was filed on the 60th day, thus, within the reglementary period. Respondent insists, on the other hand, that the petition was filed on the 61st day while the Court of Appeals had declared that the petition was filed on the 63rd day.

We agree in the position taken by petitioners.

Admittedly, at the time petitioners filed their petition for certiorari on 17 August 2000, the rule then prevailing was Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 effective 01 September 1998, which provides:

Sec. 4. Where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, or if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied)

However, on 01 September 2000, during the pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals, Section 4 was amended anew by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC⁶ which now provides:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied)

Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file the petition starts to run from receipt of notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if one is filed.⁷

In Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission,⁸ we described this latest amendment as curative in nature as it remedied the confusion brought about by Circular No. 39-98 because, "historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari." Curative statutes, which are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements, by their very essence, are retroactive.⁹ And, being a procedural rule, we held in Sps. Ma. Carmen and Victor Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge Benito Legarda¹⁰ that "procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent."

Consequently, petitioners had a fresh period of 60 days from the time they received the Order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration on 18 June 2000. When they filed their petition with the Court of Appeals on 17 August 2000, exactly 60 days had elapsed following the rule that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included.¹¹ Hence, there can be no doubt that the petition was filed within the reglementary period for doing so and it was reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in not giving said petition due course. However, instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals which would only unduly prolong the disposition of the substantive issue raised, we shall resolve the petition originally filed therein.

Petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the lone issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Hon. Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 224, Quezon City] HAD PLAINLY AND MANIFESTLY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS AGAINST RESPONDENT ANTONIO HERMANO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-98-34211.¹²

Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano should not have been dismissed from the complaint because: (1) He did not file a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and, in fact, his "Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial" was filed almost two years after he filed his Answer to the complaint; (2) There was no misjoinder of causes of action in this case; and (3) There was no misjoinder of parties.

The case filed by petitioners against respondent Hermano and the other defendants, namely Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras and Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele, was one for "Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction" docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-34211 and raffled to Branch 224.

Petitioners presented three causes of action in their complaint, the first for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., the second for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into between petitioners and respondent Hermano and the third for damages against all defendants.

For the first cause of action, petitioners allege that sometime in November 1997, they entered into a Contract to Sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Zenie Sales-Contreras, for the purchase of five (5) parcels of land in the total amount of Nineteen Million One Hundred Four Thousand Pesos (P19,104,000.00). As part of their agreement, a portion of the purchase price would be paid to them as down payment, another portion to be given to them as cash advance upon the execution of the contract and another portion to be used by the buyer, Zescon Land, Inc., to pay for loans earlier contracted by petitioners which loans were secured by mortgages.

Re-pleading the foregoing in their second cause of action, petitioners contend that "in a tricky machination and simultaneous with the execution of the aforesaid Contract to Sell," they were made to sign other documents, two of which were Mortgage deeds over the same five properties in favor of respondent Hermano, whom they had never met. It was allegedly explained to them by Sales-Contreras that the mortgage contracts would merely serve to facilitate the payment of the price as agreed upon in their Contract to Sell. Petitioners claim that it was never their intention to mortgage their property to respondent Hermano and that they have never received a single centavo from mortgaging their property to him. Petitioners acknowledge, however, that respondent Hermano was responsible for discharging their obligations under the first mortgage and for having the titles over the subject lands released, albeit not to them but to respondent Hermano. They seek a TRO against respondent Hermano who had informed them that he would be foreclosing the subject properties.

In their third cause of action, petitioners pray for damages against all the defendants alleging that:

Due to the failure and refusal, without any valid justification and reason, by defendants Zescon and Contreras to comply with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, including their failure and refusal to pay the sums stipulated therein, and in misleading and misrepresenting the plaintiffs into mortgaging their properties to defendant Antonio Hermano, who in turn had not paid the plaintiffs the proceeds thereof, putting them in imminent danger of losing the same, plaintiffs had suffered, and continue to suffer, sleepless nights ….

By reason of defendants Zescon and Contreras’s failure and refusal to pay the sums stipulated in the Contract to Sell, and of defendant Antonio Hermano’s not having paid plaintiffs the proceeds of the mortgage agreements, plaintiffs had been deprived of the beneficial use of the proceeds and stood to lose, as they continue to lose, by way of unearned profits at least P1,000,000.00.¹³

In his Answer with (Compulsory) Counterclaim dated 15 May 1998, respondent Hermano denied petitioners’ allegations.¹⁴ Then, on 19 February 1999, respondent Hermano filed a civil case entitled "Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage" against petitioner Aviso docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-36914 and raffled to Branch 216 of the RTC of Quezon City. On 17 January 2000, respondent Hermano filed a "Motion With Leave To Dismiss The Complaint Against Defendant Antonio Hermano, Or Ordered Severed For Separate Trial" before Branch 224. In said motion, respondent Hermano argued that there was a mis-joinder of causes of action under Rule 2, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. To quote respondent Hermano:

3. In the instant case, the plaintiffs’ action for the Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for The Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc., and/or its President Zenie Sales Contreras, may not, under Rule 2, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, join defendant Hermano as party defendant to annul and/or rescind the Real Estate Mortgages of subject properties. There is a misjoinder of parties defendants under a different transaction or cause of action; that under the said Rule 2, Section 6, upon motion of defendant Hermano in the instant case, the complaint against defendant Hermano can be severed and tried separately; . . . .¹⁵

Over petitioners’ opposition to said motion, the same was granted by the trial court in its Order dated 28 February 2000 on the justification that:

. . . [D]efendant having filed a special civil action for judicial foreclosure of mortgage and now pending before RTC Branch 216, he should be dropped as one of the defendants in this case and whatever claims plaintiffs may have against defendant Hermano, they can set it up by way of an answer to said judicial foreclosure.¹⁶

And, in an Order dated 25 May 2000, the trial court resolved petitioners’ motion for reconsideration by dismissing the same, to wit:

After going over the arguments of the parties, the Court believes that defendant Hermano has nothing to do with the transaction which the plaintiffs entered into with defendant Zescon Land, Inc. Besides, the said motion raised matters and defenses previously considered and passed upon by the Court.¹⁷

It is these two Orders that were brought up by petitioners to the Court of Appeals on petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The pivotal issue to be resolved, therefore, is whether or not respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against respondent Hermano in Civil Case No. Q-98-34211.

As far as we can glean from the Orders of the trial court, respondent Hermano was dropped from the complaint on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that there was no misjoinder in this case.

To better understand the present controversy, it is vital to revisit the rules on joinder of causes of action as exhaustively discussed in Republic v. Hernandez,¹⁸ thus:

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.

As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.

The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder.

Section 6, Rule 2 on misjoinder of causes of action provides:

Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.

There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule 2 are not met. Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

As far as can be gathered from the assailed Orders, it is the first condition - on joinder of parties - that the trial court deemed to be lacking. It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction.¹⁹

In herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint that after they had already agreed to enter into a contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them other documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties but for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds over the same properties in favor of respondent Hermano with accompanying notes and acknowledgment receipts for Ten Million pesos (P10,000,000) each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their properties which they had already agreed to sell to the latter.

From the above averments in the complaint, it becomes reasonably apparent that there are questions of fact and law common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising from a series of transaction over the same properties. There is the question of fact, for example, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano. There is also the question of which of the four contracts were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, respondent Hermano will definitely be affected if it is subsequently declared that what was entered into by petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by them) because this would mean that the contracts of mortgage were void as petitioners were no longer the absolute owners of the properties mortgaged. Finally, there is also the question of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as represented by Sales-Contreras, and respondent Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make them liable for damages.

Prescinding from the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the joinder of causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners’ cause of action against respondent Hermano.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 19 October 2000 dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and its Resolution dated 02 March 2001 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, dated 28 February 2000 and 25 May 2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is further ordered to reinstate respondent Antonio Hermano as one of the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-98-34211. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice	ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairman, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now a member of this Court) and Elvi John S. Asuncion concurring; Rollo, p. 180.

² Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio vice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Elvi John S. Asuncion concurring; Rollo, pp. 187-188.

³ Presided by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.

⁴ Rollo, pp. 187-188.

⁵ Rollo, pp. 17-18.

⁶ Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 141959, 29 September 2000, 341 SCRA 533, 537.

⁷ Sps. Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge Benito Legarda, G.R. No. 139067, 23 November 2004.

⁸ Supra, note 6, at 538.

⁹ Ibid; citations omitted.

¹⁰ Supra, note 7.

¹¹ Article 13, Civil Code.

¹² Rollo, p. 29.

¹³ Rollo, p. 45.

¹⁴ Id. at 86-91.

¹⁵ Id. at 166.

¹⁶ Id. at 40.

¹⁷ Id. at 36.

¹⁸ G.R. No. 117209, 09 February 1996, 253 SCRA 509, 524-525 (citations omitted).

¹⁹ Flores v. Mallare-Phillipps, No. L-66620, 24 September 1986, 144 SCRA 377, 382.

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