G.R. No. 161640




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 161640 December 9, 2005 SAMSON B. BEDRUZ, GREGORIO M. MONREAL, and EMMA C. LUNA, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION, Respondent. D E C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Samson B. Bedruz, Gregorio M. Monreal and Emma C. Luna seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan dated February 24, 2003, which granted the motion of the Special Prosecutor for their suspension from office pending the trial of Criminal Case No. 26683 where the petitioners are the accused. Also assailed in this petition is the Resolution dated November 21, 2003 of the same tribunal denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Bedruz is the Officer-in-Charge of the City Engineer’s Office (CEO), petitioner Monreal is the City Assessor, while petitioner Luna is the City Administrator of Tagaytay City. On April 6, 2000, the Spouses Yolanda and Jose Liongson filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging the petitioners together with CEO personnel Noel C. Baybay and Leonardo B. Olegario, and Col. Hernando Barba, head of the Tagaytay Office of Public Safety (TOPS) with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In their Complaint-Affidavit, the Liongsons alleged that they are the owners of three parcels of land located at Bo. Neogan, Tagaytay City, with a total area of 2,948 square meters, and designated as Lot Nos. 2542, 2543, and 8217, Cad-355. They averred that, sometime in November 1998, they applied for a building permit with the CEO of Tagaytay City for the construction of a residential house on the said property. The spouses narrated that, on July 13, 1999, a group of people from the said office, headed by the petitioners, Baybay, Olegario and Barba fenced the front and middle portions of the property using woven bamboo slats or sawali, without their knowledge and consent. Their son, Orland Liongson, and their caretaker objected to the intrusion. The fencing of the property practically shut off the points of ingress and egress thereto. The Liongson spouses attributed malicious intent on the part of the said government officials to force them out of their property by fencing the stairway leading to their house and the only water faucet in the property. They averred that the said persons showed bias in favoring Edgardo Peña, the representative of the spouses Reynaldo S. Suarez and Maria Lourdes Suarez who are claiming interest over the said property.2 The petitioners, Baybay, Olegario, and Barba filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit denying the imputations against them. They averred in sum that the Suarez spouses, through their attorney-in-fact, Edgardo Peña, applied for a fencing permit before the CEO. They asserted that the applicants, through Peña, presented their title and tax declaration on the subject property and complied with all the requirements; hence, petitioner Bedruz and petitioner Luna granted the application and issued Fencing Permit No. 23-99-55808 to them. According to them, sometime in July 1999, the spouses Suarez, through Peña, scheduled the actual fencing work and requested assistance to maintain peace and order. Barba, together with TOPS and Philippine National Police personnel, rendered assistance by proceeding to the area and explaining the situation to the Liongsons’ caretaker. The Liongsons’ representatives were duly informed that the purpose of Barba’s presence was to maintain peace and order.3 The petitioners, Baybay, Olegario, and Barba clarified that the persons who did the actual fencing in the property were private individuals engaged by Peña. They maintained that the petitioners, Baybay and Olegario took no part in the alleged illegal fencing work on the property and they were not present at the subject area at any given time during the assailed activity. Their only participation was limited to the processing and signing of the fencing permit in their official capacity.4 In their Reply, the Liongsons assailed the application and approval of the fencing permit issued by the petitioners, Baybay, Olegario, and Barba to the Suarez spouses which only took about a month of processing. In contrast, their application for a building permit was never acted upon after it was filed sometime in November 1998 despite payment of the required fees which they gave to Engr. Narciso Yamat, City Engineer, in the presence of the petitioners who were inside the CEO at that time. Nonetheless, no permit has been issued. Petitioners refused to divulge the whereabouts of Yamat and the documents relative to their permit application were missing.5 After the preliminary investigation, the Graft Investigation Officer issued a Resolution recommending that the petitioners be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e)6 of R.A. No. 3019 while the complaint against Yamat, Baybay, Olegario and Barba be dismissed for want of probable cause. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation. An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan on June 28, 2001, thus: That on or about 10 June 1999, sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Tagaytay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused SAMSON B. BEDRUZ and EMMA C. LUNA, and GREGORIO C. MONREAL, all are public officers, being then the City Engineer and City Administrator, and City Assessor, respectively, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, and taking advantage of their official functions, acting with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally process, sign and approve the fencing permit application of Spouses Reynaldo and Ma. Lourdes Suarez, through Attorney-in-Fact, Edgardo Pena, inspite of the blatant defects on the documents submitted, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to Spouses Suarez, to the damage and prejudice of private parties, Spouses Liongson.7 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26683. On July 16, 2001, the petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Resolution finding probable cause. On August 7, 2001, they filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Reinvestigation alleging that their motion for partial reconsideration was still pending with the Ombudsman and that they had meritorious defenses.8 Finding merit in the said motion, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and directed the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation.9 On February 28, 2002, Ombudsman Prosecutor Eusebio M. Avila, Sr. submitted his reinvestigation report recommending that the previous finding of a probable cause against the petitioners be sustained. The Ombudsman approved this recommendation.10 During the arraignment of the petitioners, they pleaded not guilty to the charge.11 Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite,12 which was set for hearing on May 13, 2002. During the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, appeared and prayed the Sandiganbayan to grant them a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file their Opposition to the motion. The petitioners agreed to submit the motion for resolution upon the filing of the Comment/Opposition. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. The petitioners subsequently filed an Opposition to the motion on the ground that the acts charged clearly do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019. However, they also alleged that a pre-suspension hearing must first be conducted to test the credibility of the Information conformably with the ruling of this Court in People v. Albano.13 On June 21, 2002, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation praying that his motion to suspend the petitioners be considered submitted for resolution.14 The petitioners did not oppose the manifestation. In a Resolution dated February 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion of the Special Prosecutor and ordered the suspension of the petitioners from office: WHEREFORE, the instant motion is GRANTED and the Court hereby orders the suspension pendente lite of SAMSON B. BEDRUZ, EMMA C. LUNA and GREGORIO M. MONREAL from their position as City Engineer, City Administrator and City Assessor respectively, of Tagaytay City and from any other position they may now or hereafter be holding for a period of ninety (90) days. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Honorable Mayor of Tagaytay City for the implementation of the suspension order. The said official shall inform this court of any action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. The said official or his duly authorized representative shall advise this court of the date of the actual implementation of the suspension of the accused as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day hereof so that the same may be lifted at the proper time. SO ORDERED.15 The Sandiganbayan declared that the Information filed against the accused was valid as it contained all the elements of the crime charged in accordance with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. The Sandiganbayan also declared that by pleading not guilty thereto, the petitioners had impliedly acquiesced to its validity. In addition, the Sandiganbayan ruled that there was no need for a pre-suspension hearing considering that the petitioners had been given ample opportunity to argue against their suspension.16 The petitioners moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan’s resolution but on November 21, 2003, the latter denied the motion and reiterated its previous ruling that there was no need for it to conduct a pre-suspension hearing. It ratiocinated that the hearing on the prosecution’s Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, which was vigorously opposed by the accused, was sufficient compliance with the requisite pre-suspension hearing.17 In this case, the petitioners aver that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the motion of the Special Prosecutor for their mandatory suspension without setting said motion anew for hearing. The petitioners assert that there was no basis for their suspension pendente lite as the acts with which the petitioners are being charged do not constitute a violation of the anti-graft law. Contrary to the allegations in the Information, they did not act with partiality and bad faith, or gave unwarranted benefits to the Suarezes, in approving the latter’s fencing permit application as it was supported with an indefeasible title and the Suarezes have fully complied with all the requirements. They point out that in support of their application, the Suarezes submitted Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-21997, Tax Declaration No. 98-002-0127, Pahintulot ng Punong Barangay, and a Certification from the City Planning and Development Office. Neither can it be said that the Liongsons suffered damage and prejudice when they approved the fencing permit application considering that they are not the registered owners of the property. As opposed to the Suarezes, the Liongsons submitted only a Deed of Absolute Sale over a property, with a technical description different from that contained in TCT No. T-21997.18 Moreover, no pre-suspension hearing was conducted before the prosecution’s Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite was granted. The petitioners maintain that this is contrary to the pronouncement of the Court in People v. Albano19 that before a suspension order can be issued, a hearing on the validity of the information must first be held. They argue that, in light of the indefeasible title of the Suarezes over the property and absence of a single piece of evidence that the fenced property is not owned by the Suarezes, the Sandiganbayan should have denied the motion for suspension pendente lite.20 The respondent, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, stresses that what is contemplated by the requisite pre-suspension hearing is that the accused be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him. The requirement is considered complied with when the accused is heard on the matter through the various pleadings he filed. In this case, the petitioners have filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause against them. It was followed by a Motion for Reinvestigation, which was granted by the Sandiganbayan. When the Office of the Ombudsman maintained its earlier finding of probable cause, the petitioners allowed themselves to be arraigned, thereby putting the issue of the validity of the Information to rest. In addition, they filed an Opposition to the prosecution’s Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite. And when the motion was granted, the petitioners also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution.21 The respondent adds that the matters raised by the petitioners as to the indefeasibility of the title of the Suarezes as well as the absence of evidence that the fenced property was not owned by them are matters completely extraneous in the determination of the validity of the Information. It points out that it is not required that the guilt of the petitioners be established in a pre-suspension proceeding. With their arraignment, the petitioners cannot now probe into the validity of the Information filed against them. In any case, the respondent maintains the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman that bad faith and manifest partiality attended the issuance of the fencing permit to the Suarezes.22 The petition is bereft of merit. A writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.23 "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law—mere abuse of discretion is not enough.24 In this case, the petitioners failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion of the Special Prosecutor to suspend pendente lite the petitioners. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan granting the motion of the Special Prosecutor for the suspension pendente lite of the petitioners, reads: After considering the arguments of both parties in connection with the prosecution’s "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite," this Court found that the records of the instant case did not show that the proceedings leading to the filing of the information against the accused were tainted with any irregularity so as to invalidate the same. Likewise, the allegations contained in the said information meet the essential elements of the offense as defined under Sec. 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019. Indeed, the accused had already been given a fair and adequate opportunity to ventilate and argue their position against the issuance of the questioned suspension order. In Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636, the Supreme Court held that there was no hard and fast rule as to the conduct of the "pre-suspension hearing" and that it was sufficient "that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him." And in the earlier case of Luciano v. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187, the Supreme Court ruled: "By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or under provisions of the Revised Penal Code in bribery, pursuant to section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case." Moreover, when the accused separately entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, and thereafter when they participated in the trial on the merits of the case without raising any objection on the validity of the information filed against them, the accused were deemed to have impliedly admitted the validity of the said information.25 The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is in accord with case law. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 provides that: SEC. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. — Any e\incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. In the leading case of Luciano v. Mariano,26 the Court set out the guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension under the law, to wit: (c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to Section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order or suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in the contrary case. (d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the Act upon determination of the pendency in court of a criminal prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the information and setting the same for trial on the merits. The pre-suspension hearing envisaged in the afore-quoted law is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis either to suspend the accused and proceed with the trial of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.27 The law does not require that the guilt of the accused be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds.28 Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case.29 A resolution of a challenge of the criminal proceeding on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 3019, as what was claimed by the petitioners, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under the said law.30 The issue of whether the acts of the petitioner constitute a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in light of the evidence on hand is something that should be threshed out in the hearing of the case on the merits. It is not appropriate in this preliminary stage of the criminal proceedings, which is merely confined to the determination of whether their suspension pendente lite is proper. In the present case, the petitioners had been given ample opportunity to be heard on the motion for suspension pendente lite. Said motion was set on May 13, 2002 at 2:00 p.m. Their counsel appeared during the hearing but prayed the Sandiganbayan that they be allowed to file a comment or opposition to the motion. They even agreed to submit the motion for resolution of the Sandiganbayan upon their filing of the said comment or opposition. The prosecutor did not object and so, the Sandiganbayan granted the petitioners’ motion. The petitioners, in fact, filed their opposition to the motion of the Special Prosecutor. With the filing by the petitioners of their opposition to the motion, there was no more need for the Sandiganbayan to still set the motion of the Special Prosecutor for hearing on a specific date and time therefor. The Sandiganbayan declared that the information filed by the Ombudsman contains all the essential elements of the crime charged in the information. Patently then, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when it issued its resolution granting the motion of the Special Prosecutor to suspend the petitioners from office. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated February 24, 2003 and November 21, 2003 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairman MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairman, Second Division C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice Footnotes 1 Penned by Associate Justice Efren N. de la Cruz, with Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., concurring. 2 Records, pp. 10-11. 3 Id. at 13. 4 Id. at 13-14. 5 Rollo, p. 106. 6 SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — x x x x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. 7 Records, pp. 1-2. 8 Id. at 42. 9 Id. at 83. 10 Id. at 114 11 Id. at 126. 12 Id. at 131-132. 13 169 SCRA 511. 14 Sandiganbayan rollo, p. 184. 15 Rollo, pp. 21-22. 16 Id. at 20-21. 17 Id. at 23. 18 Rollo, pp. 177-183. 19 Nos. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511. 20 Rollo, p. 183. 21 Id. at 151-159. 22 Id. at 159-161. 23 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455. 24 Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 155618, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 611. 25 Rollo, pp. 24-25. 26 G.R. No. 32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187. 27 Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 116259-60, February 20, 1996, 253 SCRA 773. 28 People v. Albano, supra, note 19. 29 Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001, 356 SCRA 636. 30 People v. Albano, supra. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation