FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004
SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceño at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.4 On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of age and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.8 It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information.9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967 which has not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989 which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioner’s submission, therefore, that the information was defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised.12 It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity.13 All of these have been sufficiently established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,21 which is a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term should be taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.
Concurring Opinion
CARPIO, J.:
I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago finding appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of bigamy.
The material facts are not in dispute. On 18 September 1967, Abunado married Narcisa Arceno. While his marriage with Arceno remained unannulled, Abunado married Zenaida Biñas on 10 January 1989. Subsequently, on 29 October 1999, Abunado obtained from the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Arceno. On 18 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal rendered a decision convicting Abunado of bigamy.
The sole issue is whether the second marriage of Abunado to Biñas on 10 January 1989 constitutes the crime of bigamy under Article 3491 of the Revised Penal Code. More precisely, the issue turns on whether Abunado’s first marriage to Arceno was still subsisting at the time Abunado married Biñas.
Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of nullity of the first marriage, one must first secure a final judgment declaring the first marriage void. Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988, before the second marriage of Abunado on 10 January 1989.
Prior to the Family Code, one could contract a subsequent marriage on the ground of nullity of the previous marriage without first securing a judicial annulment of the previous marriage. If subsequently the previous marriage were judicially declared void, the subsequent marriage would not be deemed bigamous. The nullity of the previous marriage could even be judicially declared in the criminal case for bigamy,2 although the person remarrying "assume(d) the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy"3 should the court uphold the validity of the first marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code has changed this.
Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before he is freed from the marital bond or vinculum of the previous marriage. If he fails to secure a judicial declaration of nullity and contracts a second marriage, then the second marriage becomes bigamous. As the Court stated in Domingo v. Court of Appeals4 in explaining Article 40 of the Family Code:
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage, he is liable for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital vinculum of the previous marriage to subsist for purposes of remarriage, unless the previous marriage is judicially declared void by final judgment. Thus, if the marital vinculum of the previous marriage subsists because of the absence of judicial declaration of its nullity, the second marriage is contracted during the existence of the first marriage resulting in the crime of bigamy.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage that is void ab initio subsists only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes other than remarriage, marriages that are void ab initio, such as those falling under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code, are void even without a judicial declaration of nullity. As the Court held in Cariño v. Cariño:5
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. x x x . (Emphasis supplied)
Cariño, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself, contradicts the statement in her present ponencia that "under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding." I believe the ruling in Cariño is correct and should not be disturbed. As Justice Jose C. Vitug explained in his recent textbook on Civil Law (Volume I):
The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted; x x x.6 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration of nullity. The only recognized exception7 under existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage.
Article 40 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where the previous marriage suffers from nullity while the second marriage does not. Under Article 40, what requires a judicial declaration of nullity is the previous marriage, not the subsequent marriage. Article 40 does not apply to a situation where the first marriage does not suffer from any defect while the second is void.
Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals finding appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of the crime of bigamy.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Danilo B. Pine.
2 Exhibit "C", Records, p. 68.
3 Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.
4 Records, p. 202.
5 Records, p. 1.
6 Penned by Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez; Rollo, pp. 33-42.
7 Rollo, p. 53.
8 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).
9 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Sec. 6.
10 Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 144785, 11 September 2003.
11 Rollo, p. 30; underscoring ours.
12 People v. Villamor, G.R. No. 124441, 7 October 1998, 297 SCRA 262, 270.
13 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
14 Rollo, p. 51.
15 Annex "1", Records, p. 208
16 Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA 327, 335.
17 Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122, 133.
18 Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
19 Supra.
20 Garcia v. People, supra.
21 Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.
CARPIO
1 Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: "Bigamy- The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."
2 People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
3 Landicho v. Relova, et al., 130 Phil. 745 (1968).
4 G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
5 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127.
6 Civil Law, Persons and Family Relations, Vol. I, (2003 Ed.)
7 See also note 4.
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