SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155311 March 31, 2004
DOY MERCANTILE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE and ERNESTO RIOVEROS, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
TINGA, J.:
On June 1, 1990, petitioner Doy Mercantile, Inc. (DOY) through its then counsel, respondent Atty. Eduardo P. Gabriel, Jr., filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a Complaint for Annulment of Contract, Damages with Preliminary Injunction against AMA Computer College, Inc. (AMA) and one Ernesto Rioveros.
Petitioner alleged that it owns Lots 2-A and 2-B, and the improvements thereon, located at No. 640 Osmeña Boulevard, Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 68951 and 68952. DOY assailed the Deed of Conditional Sale supposedly executed by one of DOY’s directors, Dionisio O. Yap, in favor of AMA. Dionisio allegedly sold the properties to AMA without proper authorization from DOY’s Board of Directors. DOY also questioned the Secretary’s Certificate which was executed by DOY Corporate Secretary Francisco P. Yap, authorizing Dionisio to sell the properties and to sign the contract in behalf of DOY.
Through Atty. Gabriel, Jr., DOY filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order, which was granted by the RTC on June 14, 1990. On June 23, 1990, Atty. Gabriel also filed an Answer to Defendant’s Counterclaim. On July 2, 1990, he filed DOY’s Formal Rejoinder to AMA’s Opposition for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He also filed on July 24, 1990, an Omnibus Motion seeking (1) the reconsideration of the order denying DOY’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, (2) the setting of the case for pre-trial and trial on the merits, and (3) the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to Atty. Winston Garcia, who notarized the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Secretary’s Certificate. On August 31, 1990, Atty. Gabriel also filed a Rejoinder to AMA’s Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, etc.
During this period, that is, before pre-trial, DOY filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (CA-G.R. S.P. No. 22727) with the Court of Appeals. It questioned the Order of the RTC dated July 5, 1990, denying DOY’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and dissolving the temporary restraining order previously issued. DOY also assailed the Order dated August 10, 1990, which denied DOY’s Omnibus Motion. Atty. Gabriel, Jr., signed the petition together with Atty. Enrique C. Andres of the law firm of Salonga, Andres, Hernandez and Allado.
During pre-trial, AMA proposed to enter into a compromise agreement with DOY, which proposal the parties later agreed to adopt. The agreement was signed by Fernando Yap in behalf of DOY, with the assistance of Atty. Gabriel, Jr. and Atty. Andres. On November 29, 1990, a Judgment based on the compromise agreement was rendered by the RTC. In light of said compromise, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. S.P. No. 22727 for mootness.
DOY, however, refused to satisfy Atty. Gabriel, Jr.’s attorney’s fees, prompting the lawyer to file with the RTC a Motion to Allow Commensurate Fees and to Annotate Attorney’s Lien on T.C.T. Nos. 68951 and 68952. At this point, DOY had already obtained the services of a new counsel to attend to the enforcement of the Judgment of the RTC.
On December 27, 1991, the RTC fixed Atty. Gabriel, Jr.’s fees at ₱200,000.00 and ordered that a lien be annotated on the TCTs. A Writ of Execution was later issued by the trial court in Atty. Gabriel, Jr.’s favor.
Upon Atty. Gabriel Jr.’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC increased his fees to ₱500,000.00. It then issued another Writ of Execution to enforce the new award but denied the Motion to Annotate the Award at the back of the TCTs.
DOY, for its part, filed several petitions with the Court of Appeals to set aside the RTC Orders involving the award of attorney’s fees. Eventually, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision,1 fixing Atty. Gabriel, Jr.’s fees at ₱200,000.00 and affirming the subsequent Order of the RTC not to annotate such award on the TCTs.
This Decision is now the subject of the present petition.
DOY contends that the Decision is not consistent with the guidelines prescribed by Section 24, Rule 1382 of the Rules of Court and Rule 20.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. DOY avers that except for the statement that the compromise agreement benefited DOY and that Atty. Gabriel, Jr., was a competent lawyer, the Court of Appeals made no pronouncement as to the importance of the subject matter in controversy, the extent of services rendered and the professional standing of Atty. Gabriel, Jr., DOY also submits that the Court of Appeals should not have merely relied on the value of the properties involved as the basis for its award. Furthermore, while Atty. Gabriel admitted that he already received Eighty Two Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱82,950.00) from DOY for incidental and partial attorney’s fees, a fact affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the latter still awarded ₱200,000.00 to him.
Atty. Gabriel, Jr., comments, however, that the attorney’s fees awarded by the appellate court were commensurate and, perhaps, even less than, the value of the services he rendered. He then enumerates the pleadings he drafted and the appearances he made to dispose of the main case.
Atty. Gabriel, Jr., also alleges that he handled interrelated cases for DOY. He purportedly prepared and filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Cebu City the following: a case for Illegal Detainer with Damages, an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration, and a Motion to Dismiss.
Atty. Gabriel, Jr., also draws attention to the criminal case filed by Rolando Piedad, director of AMA, before the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor charging Dionisio Yap and Francisco Yap with estafa through falsification of public document. He claims that it was he who prepared and filed with said Office the Joint Affidavit of Messrs. Dionisio and Francisco Yap against Rolando Piedad for Perjury, as well as the Yaps’ Counter-Affidavit in the criminal case. The case was eventually dismissed by the fiscal.
Finally, Atty. Gabriel, Jr., stresses that, through his efforts and resourcefulness, AMA had no choice but to concede to the compromise agreement resulting in the cancellation of the Deed of Conditional Sale between DOY and AMA. According to him, AMA was operating a school on the property, which did not have an area of at least 1,000 square meters as required of a school campus, in violation of the directives of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). AMA also did not have a business permit from the city government. Atty. Gabriel thus made formal representations with the DECS and the City of Cebu, which ordered AMA to cease operations. Atty. Gabriel, Jr., also verified from the Philippine National Bank whether AMA applied for a loan with which to pay DOY as stipulated in the Deed of Conditional Sale, and was informed that AMA’s application was held in abeyance due to its poor credit reputation.
The petition has no merit. It is not accurate for petitioner to state that the Court of Appeals did not take into account the time spent and the extent of the services rendered by Atty. Gabriel Jr. The Court of Appeals found that:
That Atty. Gabriel, Jr. was the counsel of DMI [DOY] up to the time the compromise agreement was confirmed by the trial court. He only withdrew his appearance as counsel for co-plaintiffs Fred and Felipe Yap, who were eventually dropped as parties to the case, along with the other individual defendants, as it was held that only DMI was the real-party-in-interest.
It is evident that Atty. Gabriel, Jr. served as co-counsel together with Atty. Enrique C. Andres. DMI was assisted by the former. Evidence of which was the service of a copy of the Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement, including the Decision dated January 30, 1991, which dismissed C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 22727, on Atty. Gabriel, Jr..
A perusal of the pleadings enumerated by the plaintiff-appellant reveals the competence of Atty. Gabriel, Jr. in handling the case. The degree and extent of service rendered by an attorney for a client is best measured in terms other than the mere number of sheets of paper.4
Indeed, the assailed Decision even contains an enumeration of the pleadings filed by counsel in behalf of his client.5
In fixing the award of attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals also considered the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service in fixing Atty. Gabriel, Jr.’s fees, thus:
…. While it is true that Civil Case No. CEB 9043 was terminated by virtue of a compromise agreement by the parties, this is still to be taken as beneficial to DMI as the dispute was finally resolved without having to resort to a full-blown trial on the merits which often would take time before the light at the end of the tunnel may be seen.
….
DMI also assails the use of the value of the property involved in the litigation to serve as a basis or standard in computing and awarding attorney’s fees. A simple perusal of the provisions of Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as well as Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, would show that "the value of the property" was not enumerated as one of the factors but instead they used "the importance of the subject matter" as a determinant of the amount of award of attorney’s fees. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has included as one of the determinants for the reasonableness of the award of attorney’s fees "the value of the property affected by the controversy." ….
....
The issue of the reasonableness of attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit is a question of fact and well-settled is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the lower courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons.
The trial court’s initial award of ₱2000,00.00 as attorney’s fees of Atty. Gabriel, Jr. is reasonable. On the other hand, the increased award of ₱500,000.00 cannot be justified, taking into account the recognized parameters of quantum meruit.6
The Court of Appeals then ended on this note:
Lastly, we take this occasion to reiterate the fact that while the practice of law is not a business, the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice and, hence, the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition on the part of his client just as the client can claim protection against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting only of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if, after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.7
This Court finds no reversible error in the above disquisition.
Petitioner’s contention that the appellate court should also have taken into account the importance of the subject matter in controversy and the professional standing of counsel in determining the latter’s fees is untenable. Although Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility list several other factors in setting such fees, these are mere guides in ascertaining the real value of the lawyer’s service.8 Courts are not bound to consider all these factors in fixing attorney’s fees.
While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees,9 no hard and fast rule maybe set in the determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is not. That must be established from the facts in each case.10 As the Court of Appeals is the final adjudicator of facts, this Court is bound by the former’s findings on the propriety of the amount of attorney’s fees.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 In CA-G.R. CV No. 43958.
2 SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
3 Rule 20.01 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
4 Rollo, pp. 31-32.
5 Id. at 30.
6 Id. at 31-34.
7 Id. at 35.
8 Code of Professional Ethics, §12.
9 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 20.
10 De Guzman v. Visayan Rapid Transit, Co., Inc., et al., 68 Phil. 643.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
