G.R. No. 152954




EN BANC G.R. No. 152954 March 10, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PAULINO SEVILLENO y VILLANUEVA, a.k.a. "Tamayo Sevilleno", appellant. D E C I S I O N PER CURIAM: On July 25, 1995, appellant Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva alias Tamayo was charged with rape with homicide in an Information1 which reads: That on or about 10:00 o’clock a.m., July 22, 1995 at Hacienda San Antonio, Barangay Guadalupe, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one VIRGINIA BAKIA, a minor, 9 years of age, against the latter’s will and consent; and after attaining his purpose of ravishing said Virginia Bakia, accused, did, then and there, with intent to hide his identity and to prevent discovery thereof, with intent to kill, strangled said Virginia Bakia which directly resulted to her death. CONTRARY TO LAW. On arraignment, appellant entered a guilty plea. Trial proceeded to determine the voluntariness and full comprehension of the plea. However, during the pendency of the proceedings, appellant escaped from prison but he was recaptured several months later. On March 6, 1997, the appellant was found guilty as charged by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57, and sentenced to death and to pay the heirs of his victim P50,000.00 plus costs. On automatic review before this Court, it was found that the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the appellant of the consequences of his plea of guilty. It likewise appeared that the defense lawyers were remiss in their duties to explain to appellant the nature of the crime and the gravity of the consequences of his plea. Finding that appellant was not properly apprised of his fundamental right to be informed of the nature of the accusation leveled against him, this Court set aside and annulled the trial court’s decision of March 6, 1997 and remanded the case to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the appellant until terminated. Appellant was thus re-arraigned on February 23, 2000, where he entered a plea of "not guilty". Trial on the merits ensued and the following facts were established: At around 10:00 in the morning of July 22, 1995, 9-year old Virginia and 8-year old Norma, both surnamed Bakia, met appellant on their way to a store in Brgy. Guadalupe, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Appellant offered them bread and ice candy then invited Virginia to watch a "beta show."2 Appellant and Virginia thereafter headed to the direction of the sugarcane fields while Norma followed. However, she changed her mind and went home instead. Rogelio Bakia, Virginia’s and Norma’s father, came home at around 11:00 that same morning and looked for Virginia. They were informed by Norma that Virginia went with appellant to Sitio Guindali-an. Rogelio immediately set out after her. He met appellant in Sitio Guindali-an but he denied any knowledge of Virginia’s whereabouts. Rogelio noticed fingernail scratches on appellant’s neck and a wound on his left cheek. The following day, Rogelio and Eugenio Tiongson again met appellant at the house of former barangay captain Paeng Lopez. When asked where Virginia was, appellant answered that she was in a sugarcane field known as Camp 9, also located in Brgy. Guadalupe. Immediately, they proceeded to the designated place where they found Virginia’s corpse covered with dried sugarcane leaves. She was naked except for her dress which was raised to her armpits. Her legs were spread apart and her body bore multiple wounds. Another prosecution witness, Maria Lariosa, testified that on July 22, 1995 at around noontime, she saw appellant and Virginia pass by her house near Camp 9. The following day, July 23, 1995, she saw appellant emerge alone from the sugarcane fields in Camp 9 with scratches on his face and neck. Dr. Arnel Laurence Q. Portuguez, Health Officer of San Carlos City, autopsied Virginia’s body and found the following: linear abrasion over hematoma, 3.0 x 2.0 cm., right superior anterior neck; linear abrasion over hematoma, 2.5 x 3.0 cm., left superior anterior neck; hematoma 9.0 x 4.0 cm., right inguinal area; hematoma 9.0 x 5.0 cm., left inguinal area; superficial hymenal laceration 0.5 cm., at 12 o’clock position, with clot formation at intuitus; abrasion 5.5 x 4.0 cm., left superior gluteal area; abrasion 5.0 x 3.0 cm., right superior gluteal area; abrasion 6.0 x 2.0 cm., right inferior lateral gluteal area; vaginal smear showing absence of sperm cells except pus cells and epithelial cells. Cause of death: asphyxia secondary to strangulation.3 The examining physician concluded that Virginia must have been raped and strangled to death. Appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that on July 22, 1995, he left his house at 6:30 in the morning and went to his work place at Uy King Poe warehouse in San Carlos City, arriving there at about 7:00 in the morning. At 5:00 in the afternoon, he left the warehouse and passed by the market to buy fish. He reached his house at 8:00 in the evening. No other witness for the defense was presented. On October 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Branch 59, rendered a decision,4 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds and so holds the accused PAULINO SEVILLENO y VILLANUEVA (detained) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 as an indemnity for the death of the victim; P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The accused is further ordered to be immediately committed to the National Penitentiary for service of sentence. The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately forward the records of this case to the Supreme Court for automatic review. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED. The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review, pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief, appellant submits that: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION EXECUTED BY HEREIN APPELLANT IS VALID AND BINDING. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Appellant argues that the voluntariness and due execution of his extra-judicial confession was not sufficiently established, considering that only his thumbprint was affixed on said document. He alleges that he customarily affixes his signature on all his documents. Appellant likewise argues that at the time his extra-judicial confession was taken, he was assisted by Atty. Vicente J. Agravante who was admonished by this Court for being remiss in his duties.5 Appellant’s contention is misleading. The March 29, 1999 Resolution referred to Atty. Agravante’s participation during appellant’s arraignment and not during his custodial investigation. In fact, it was stated therein that "Atty. Vic Agravante assisted the accused during the arraignment only."6 Besides, the rule is that once the prosecution has shown compliance with the constitutional requirements on custodial investigations, a confession is presumed voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of destroying this presumption. The confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency.7 Appellant failed to show that his confession in this case was given under any of the above circumstances. As correctly found by the trial court: Atty. Agravante knows the accused Paulino Sevillano because the latter was his previous client in a case for qualified theft and was also the previous counsel of the accused in the present case, The accused happened to be his client way back in July 24, 1995 when he was called up by Patrolman Ramon Bartulin through a telephone that the accused wanted his services, so he responded to the police station, and on his arrival at the police station, he talked and inquired with the accused as to the incident and the latter answered that he (accused) was charged with the crime of rape then the accused voluntarily confessed his guilt to him (Atty. Agravante) then when asked the accused what was the latter’s opinion, the accused replied that he (accused) will accept his guilt on the case charged against him and so the extra-judicial confession was executed by the accused while he (Atty. Agravante) was present all the time until the end of the investigation. In fact, he was with the accused and the investigator who went with them to the Prosecutor’s Office and he (Atty. Agravante) also affixed his signature in the extra-judicial confession. x x x x x x x x x During cross-examination, witness Atty. Agravante further testified that before the accused was investigated, the accused was informed of his constitutional rights and the accused requested him to translate the question in visayan or the local vernacular, and he was certain that the accused understood his plea for which in fact the accused had already confessed to him twice. That when the accused pleaded guilty during the arraignment he was also the one who assisted the accused, however, the case was remanded by the Supreme Court. . . .8 Also, we agree with the Solicitor General’s observation that appellant trusted Atty. Agravante considering that he had previously hired the said lawyer’s legal services in a theft case and engaged him again in this rape charge.9 Moreover, appellant failed to present evidence that his constitutional rights was violated when he executed his extra-judicial confession. His claim that his extra-judicial confession bears only his thumbmark is not an indication that his confession was irregular considering that it was executed in the presence of his lawyer. Also, he never denied that Atty. Agravante was not his personally chosen counsel. Neither was there evidence to prove that his extra-judicial confession was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or made upon a promise of reward or leniency. Significantly, appellant’s conviction was not based solely on his extra-judicial confession but on other pieces of evidence established by the prosecution to the satisfaction of the court. In the second assigned error, appellant submits that the circumstances relied upon by the trial court as bases for his conviction did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime. The trial court convicted appellant based on the following circumstances: 1. Prior to the commission of the crime the victim and her sister were seen in the company of the appellant. (TSN-Alcantara, Jan. 31, 2001, p. 8) 2. Appellant invited the victim to watch a "beta-show" in Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe. (TSN-Alcantara, Jan. 31, 2001, p. 8) 3. Norma Bakia saw the victim and the appellant proceed to a sugarcane field in Campo 9, Hacienda San Antonio, the place where the corpse of the victim was found. (TSN-Alcantara, Jan. 31, 2001, p. 8) 4. Maria Lariosa, saw the appellant together with the victim at noon time of July 22, 1995 pass by the back of their house en route to Camp 9, Hacienda San Antonio. (TSN-Alcantara, Feb. 28, 2001, p. 16) 5. Maria Lariosa saw the appellant emerge from the sugarcane field alone and without the victim, with fresh scratches on his face, neck and both arms. (TSN-Alcantara, Feb. 28, 2001, p. 8) 6. When the appellant went to the residence of the victim in the morning of July 23, 1995, witness Norma Bakia observed that the right portion of his face and neck have scratch marks on it. (TSN-Alcantara, Jan. 31, 2001, pp. 10-11). 7. The body of the victim was found in the same sugarcane field at Camp 9, the same place where the appellant and the victim were seen by the witnesses go inside. (TSN-Alcantara, Feb. 28, 2001, pp. 8-9) 8. The multiple scratches suffered by the appellant on the right side of his face and ears were all caused by human fingernails. (TSN-Mondragon, Dec. 13, 2000, p. 3) 9. The appellant was the last person seen in the company of the victim before the commission of the crime and was positively identified as such by the witnesses; and 10. The victim suffered hymenal laceration, contusions, abrasions and hematoma on different parts of her body and was strangled resulting to her death which indicated that there was a struggle and the victim vigorously put up a fight against her attacker.10 Appellant argues that the scratches on his face do not prove that they were inflicted by Virginia, much less that he committed the crime. Indeed, the scratches on appellant’s face, by itself, may not prove that he committed the crime. Nonetheless, he explained that the scratches were caused by a galvanized sheet which hit his face.11 This claim, however, was contradicted by three prosecution witnesses. SPO4 Romeo S. Leyte testified that appellant admitted to him that the scratches were inflicted by the victim Virginia.12 Eugenio Tiongson testified that appellant admitted to him that they were caused by his girlfriend.13 Finally, Dr. Diosdado G. Sarabia testified that when he examined appellant on July 23, 1995, he admitted that the scratches were inflicted by Virginia.14 Appellant claims that if he was indeed guilty, he would not have gone to the victim’s residence in the early morning of July 23, 1995. We are not persuaded. Appellant’s act of going to the house of the victim may not be consistent with ordinary human behavior, but is nevertheless possible. While an appellant’s post-incident behavior is never proof of guilt, neither is it of innocence.15 The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence require the presence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.16 To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the appellant.17 Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.18 These, the prosecution were able to establish. It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.19 While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.20 In People v. Corfin,21 which is similar to this case, we upheld the conviction of the accused based on the following circumstances: (1) the accused was the last person seen with the victim; (2) said accused and the victim were seen together near the dry creek; (3) the accused was seen leaving said place alone; and (4) the body of the victim was found in the dry creek. Likewise, it did not help that appellant can only raise the defenses of denial and alibi. Denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. Otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and without merit.22 In the case at bar, appellant’s workplace and the crime scene in Camp 9 are both in San Carlos City. On the other hand, an alibi, to be believed, must receive credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses.23 Appellant failed to present his employer or any co-worker to corroborate his alibi or a logbook that would prove his presence at his workplace at the time of the commission of the crime. Neither was there any evidence to show that it was impossible for the appellant to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. In the end, the rule is settled that where the culpability or innocence of the accused hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, the findings of trial courts are given the highest degree of respect. Hence, their findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, unless some fact or circumstance of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.24 We find no circumstance of weight or substance that was overlooked by the trial court. Appellant was thus correctly convicted by the trial court of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. 7659, which provides that when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.25 The trial court awarded damages in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Current judicial policy authorizes the mandatory award of P50,000.00 in case of death, and P50,000.00 upon the finding of rape. Thus, if homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape, indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 is fully justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said complex crime.26 We therefore award P100,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim. As to moral damages, jurisprudence allows that the amount of P75,000.00 be awarded in cases of rape with homicide. Thus, the P50,000.00 award given by the court below as moral damages should likewise be increased to P75,000.00.27 The P25,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the trial court is deleted for lack of legal basis. Article 2230 of the New Civil Code provides that in criminal cases, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. There is none in this case. WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 16, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 59, in Criminal Case No. RTC-1285 finding Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva a.k.a. "Tamayo Sevilleno" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, and imposing upon him the penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is ordered to pay the heirs of Virginia Bakia the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of legal basis. Upon the finality of this decision, and pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur. Puno, J., on leave. Panganiban, J., on official leave. Footnotes 1 Records, p. 1. 2 TSN, November 21, 1995, p. 11. 3 Exhibit "A," Records, p. 11. 4 Penned by Judge Renato D. Muñez, Records, p. 616. 5 People v. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, 29 March 1999, 305 SCRA 519. 6 Id., p. 525. 7 Belonghilot v. RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 7, Judge Jesus O. Angeles, G.R. No. 128512 and People v. Belonghilot, G.R. No. 128963, 30 April 2003. 8 Decision, Records, pp. 634-640. 9 Appellee’s Brief, Rollo, p. 150. 10 Decision, Records, pp. 90-91. 11 TSN, June 6, 2001, p. 9. 12 TSN, March 7, 2001, p. 14. 13 TSN, February 14, 2001, p. 9. 14 TSN, December 13, 2000, pp. 3-6. 15 People v. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, 29 January 2002, 375 SCRA 15, 48. 16 People v. Guihama, G.R. No. 126113, 25 June 2003. 17 Belonghilot v. RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 7, Judge Jesus O. Angeles, G.R. No. 128512 and People v. Belonghilot, supra. 18 People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 132218, 24 July 2003. 19 People v. Guihama, supra. 20 People v. Navarro, supra. 21 G.R. No. 131478, 11 April 2002, 380 SCRA 504, 513. 22 Belonghilot v. RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 7, Judge Jesus O. Angeles, G.R. No. 128512 and People v. Belonghilot, supra. 23 Supra. 24 People v. Guihama, supra. 25 People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 132218, 24 July 2003. 26 People v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 136299, 29 August 2003. 27 People v. Magallanes, supra. 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