EN BANC
G.R. No. 130488 June 8, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
LINO CLORES, JR., appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 7810 convicting the appellant Lino Clores, Jr. of rape, sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death and ordering him to pay damages to the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
On July 31, 1995, an Information was filed charging Lino Clores, Jr. with rape. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 4th day of May 1995, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Quezon, Municipality of Uson, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Eden Bandol y Castillo, a girl of 15 years old, against the latter’s will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial, thereafter, ensued.
The Evidence for the Prosecution
The Spouses Eduardo and Norma Bandol and their seven children, including Eden, resided in Barangay Quezon, Uson, Masbate. Their son, James, lived with his family in the same barangay, about a kilometer away. At around 7:00 p.m. on May 4, 1995, Eden, one of the couple’s children, was sent by her father to bring some cooking oil to her elder brother James. Eden, who was then wearing a pair of shorts, passed by the house of her friend, Eleanor Buhay, and asked the latter to accompany her to her brother’s house. Eleanor replied that they should first wait for her mother so that she could ask for permission. However, Eleanor’s mother did not allow
Eleanor to leave the house when she arrived some thirty minutes later. By that time, it was starting to get dark.
Eden proceeded to her brother’s house by her lonesome. There were no houses along the way. Momentarily, Eden noticed that the appellant was close by, at a distance of about five (5) meters, and seemed to be following her. Nevertheless, she walked on. The appellant then overtook Eden, grabbed her by her shoulders and covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. He kissed her and dragged her to the nearby riverbank. Eden punched and kicked the appellant, but her efforts proved futile. The cooking oil she was carrying spilled from its container. Upon reaching the river bank, the accused pushed her to the ground and removed her shorts and panty. The appellant stepped on Eden’s forearms and removed his jogging pants and underwear. He then mounted her. He told Eden that whatever happens, he would marry her. Eden kept on punching and kicking the appellant until she weakened and lost consciousness. The appellant then had sexual intercourse with her. When she came to her senses, the appellant was gone.
Eden was able to get up and proceeded to her brother’s house. It was already late in the evening. When she arrived at the house, she saw her sister-in-law, Suhita, and spontaneously told the latter that she was not able to arrive early as she was sexually abused along the way by the appellant. The next day, Suhita accompanied Eden back to their house and reported the incident to her parents. Upon instructions of Eduardo, Norma accompanied Eden to the police station and reported the incident. Eden and her mother then proceeded to the Moises R. Espinosa, Sr. Memorial Municipal Hospital at Dimasalang, Masbate, where she was examined by Dr. Levi B. Osea, Jr. who prepared a Medico-Legal Report which contained the following findings:
1) + Linear Erythematous Skin 7 cm. (R) shoulder area.
2) + Erythematous Skin:
a) 5 mm x 1 cm (R) lateral neck.
b) 5 mm x 1 cm Mid-upper neck.
c) 5 mm x 1 cm Mid lower neck.
d) 5 mm x 1 cm (L) lateral neck.
3) + Linear Erythematous Skin 8 cm D/3rd lateral aspect (L) forearm.
4) + Linear Erythematous Skin 5 cm D/3rd dorsum (R) forearm.
5) + Shallow punctured wound 1 mm x 1 mm hypogastric area.
6) Perineal Examination:
External: Negative Finding
Internal: (+) small fresh hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position.3
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant was born on November 3, 1979. He denied raping Eden. He testified that he was at the house of his Lolo Seloy in the evening of May 4, 1995. He opined that Eden filed the rape case against him probably because she liked him. He added that the parents and brothers of Eden wanted him to marry the latter, but he refused, saying that she was ugly. Because of such refusal on his part, Eden and her family pushed through with the filing of the rape case against him.
Numeriano Villacorta testified that at 4:30 p.m. on May 4, 1995, he was at the house of the appellant’s grandfather, Marcelo (Seloy) Clores. At around 6:00 p.m., Villacorta had supper together with the occupants of the house, including the appellant. After dinner, Villacorta spent the night at the said house and slept beside the appellant. He stated that the appellant never left his side during the night and both of them woke up at around 5:00 a.m. the next day.
Jose Monterde testified that he was at the house of Marcelo Clores on May 4, 1995. He had supper with the appellant and other people who were also present therein. He spent the night in the copra dryer which was adjacent to the house of Marcelo.
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty of rape and sentenced him to death. It also suspended further proceedings, on its finding that the appellant was a youthful offender. The court, likewise, ordered the commitment of the appellant to the care and custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The decretal portion of the decision reads:
All told, the court finds the accused Lino Clores, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape which is punishable by death. The court also finds the accused civilly liable to the victim, Eden Bandol in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
Lino Clores, Jr. is a youthful offender at the time of the commission of the offense as defined under Presidential Decree No. 603 otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Lino was then fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and one (1) day old, having been born on November 3, 1979.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603, the court hereby suspends all further proceedings in this case and hereby commits the accused, Lino Clores, Jr. to the care and custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development through Miss Perseverancia Rey or any other responsible person in coordination with Miss Rey until the accused reaches the age of twenty-one years.
Lino Clores, Jr. shall be subject to visitation and supervision by Miss Rey or any of her duly authorized representative if Lino’s care and custody is entrusted to other responsible individual and in any event, he or she under whose care Lino Clores, Jr. is committed shall submit to the court every four (4) months a written report on the conduct of Lino Clores, Jr. as well as the intellectual, physical, moral, social and emotional progress made by him.
IT IS SO ORDERED.4
The Present Appeal
The appellant, avers that the trial court erred as follows:
1. In convicting the accused-appellant without sufficient evidence to warrant such conviction;
2. In not acquitting the accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt; and
3. In imposing upon the accused-appellant the penalty of death instead of reclusion temporal.
Anent the first and second assigned errors, the appellant asserts that it was impossible for him to have raped Eden because he was at the house of his grandfather, Marcelo Clores, at the time the rape was supposed to have occurred. He contends that the testimony of Eden is weak, because she did not even shout when she was raped and did not even try to escape. He asserts that Eden agreed to have sexual intercourse with him because he had promised to marry her. He argues that since the evidence of the prosecution is weak, the trial court should have found his defenses of denial and alibi meritorious. He should, thus, have been acquitted of the crime charged.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the contention of the appellant to be bereft of merit.
Eden narrated to the trial court, when she testified, how the appellant succeeded in raping her. The testimony reads:
Q And what happened when the accused dragged you out at the bank of the river?
A He kissed me and when I could not do anything he abused me.
Q In what way were you abused?
A He turned (sic) my short and my panty.
Q Did he successfully turned (sic) your short and panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And were you naked completely (sic) after your short and panty were taken up (sic)?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And what did the accused do when you were already naked?
A He abused me.
Q In what way you were (sic) abused?
A He placed (sic) on top of me.
Q And while he was lying on top of you, what happened?
A He abused me and after succeeding his abuse (sic) he went home.
Q Can you tell the court what is meant by you were abused by the accused?
PROS. ALFORTE
manifesting)
I move that the persons present inside the court be ordered to go outside the courtroom.
COURT
All persons inside the courtroom are hereby ordered to go outside except the accused.
PROS. ALFORTE
continuing)
Q Please tell the court in what way were you abused by the accused?
A He sexually abused me.5
Eden’s testimony is corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Levi B. Osea, Jr. that when he examined Eden on May 5, 1995, barely a day after she was raped by the appellant, he found a "fresh laceration in the hymen at 5 o’clock position."6 It is settled that when the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.7
When the victim in this case stated that she was sexually abused, there can be no other conclusion than that she was raped. In People v. Mabunga,8 this Court has declared that what is important is the victim’s testimony that the appellant had sexually abused her. The Court has consistently held that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.9 The rationale therefor is that no woman would weave a tale of sexual assaults to her person, open herself to the examination of her private parts and later be subjected to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her.10
Eden wanted to shout for help but the appellant covered her mouth and dragged her to the riverbank:
Q Now, what did you do when you were dragged by the accused to the bank of the river?
A I wanted myself to free (sic) from his hold and he held (sic) my mouth so that I could not shout.
Q Did the accused successfully able to (sic) drag you to the bank of the river?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And in what manner (sic) you desisted from the accused for you to set free?
A I boxed and kicked him.11
Eden tenaciously resisted and tried to extricate herself from the appellant’s hold by kicking him, but the appellant succeeded in raping her after she weakened because of her tenacious resistance:
Q Now, did you not resist when the accused was sexually abusing you?
A I resisted.
Q And in what way you tried (sic) to resist?
A I kept on kicking him.
Q Now, when you kept on kicking him, how come that (sic) he was able to abuse you?
A Because I lose (sic) strength.
Q Do you mean that you were also helpless and lose our (sic) sight when you were sexually abuse (sic) by the accused?
A Yes, Sir.12
That Eden sustained injuries as she resisted the appellant is evidenced by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Osea, Jr., thus:
Findings:
1) + Linear Erythematous Skin 7 cm. (R) shoulder area.
2) + Erythematous Skin:
a) 5 mm x 1 cm (R) lateral neck.
b) 5 mm x 1 cm Mid-upper neck.
c) 5 mm x 1 cm Mid lower neck.
d) 5 mm x 1 cm (L) lateral neck.
3) + Linear Erythematous Skin 8 cm D/3rd lateral aspect (L) forearm.
4) + Linear Erythematous Skin 5 cm D/3rd dorsum (R) forearm.13
In People v. Corral,14 it was declared that as between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. We have unfailingly held that alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.15 In the present recourse, the victim categorically identified the appellant as the one who raped her.16
Moreover, the appellant failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence that it was impossible for him to be at the place where Eden was raped, which was approximated to be less than a kilometer away from his grandfather’s house, where he alleged he was staying at the time. Such failure renders the appellant’s defense of alibi incredible.
The appellant cannot rely on the testimony of Numeriano Villacorta and Jose Monterde, two of his grandfather’s friends, to prove his alibi. Even the trial court disbelieved the testimonies of Villacorta and Monterde, thus:
The testimony of the defense witnesses Numeriano Villacorta and Jose Monterde deserved scant consideration. Their testimony apart from being inconsistent with what Lino testified in court like their eating together in the evening of the incident, they were also not in harmony as to the companions of Lino when he slept that fateful evening.17
In this jurisdiction, it is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.18
The presiding judge of the trial court19 manifested his gross and deplorable ignorance of the law when he ruled as follows: (a) sentenced the appellant, who was a minor when he committed the crime, to suffer the death penalty; (b) suspended further proceedings under P.D. No. 602, as amended, despite the death sentence meted on the appellant, and without the latter’s filing a motion for the suspension of the sentence and the proceedings, and moving for his commitment to the DSWD; and, (c) gave due course to the appeal of the appellant and ordered the records to be elevated to this Court, despite his Order suspending further proceedings.
Since the appellant was a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, the judge is proscribed under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code from imposing the death penalty. He should have applied Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code instead of sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. Section 2 of P.D. No. 602, as amended, reads:
ART. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. - If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the government training institution or responsible persons under whose care he has been committed.
Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the court may require the Department of Social Welfare and Development to prepare and submit to the court a social case study report over the offender and his family.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or government training institution as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. (As amended by P.D. Nos. 1179 and 1210, October 11, 1978.)
It is clear and plain as day that the suspension of sentence of the accused, as well as the proceedings, and his commitment to the DSWD shall be proper only if he has not been sentenced to life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua, or death. Furthermore, the accused must file with the trial court an application for suspension of sentence so as to put into operation the benevolent provisions of P.D. No. 603.20 In this case, the appellant did not make such application, and instead appealed the decision.21
We are not impervious of Section 5, Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts Act, which took effect on November 23, 1997. It provides that the sentence of the youthful offender shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to P.D. No. 603:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor, if found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code;"…
As a general rule, the said provision may be applied retroactively, considering that it is favorable to the accused. However, we can no longer do so because the appellant is by now, more than twenty-four (24) years old. In People v. Ga,22 we held that:
Regarding the penultimate assigned error on the entitlement of the appellant to the benefits under Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, suffice it to say that, in any event, recourse to the benefit of a suspended sentence as a youthful offender in accordance with said law has become moot and academic inasmuch as appellant is now above 21 years of age, and the rule is that if an accused reaches the age of majority during appeal, he is no longer entitled to a suspended sentence.23
We agree with the trial court that the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishable by reclusion perpetua. When the appellant committed the crime, he was only sixteen (16) years old, having been born on November 3, 1979. Under Article 13, paragraph 2,24 in relation to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, minority is a privileged mitigating circumstance:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.—When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempt from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
Since the appellant was a minor when he committed the crime, reclusion perpetua should be reduced by one degree, namely, reclusion temporal, in its full range. In the absence of any other modifying circumstances, the maximum period of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from reclusion temporal, in its medium period. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal has to be reduced by one degree, which is prision mayor. From the full range of prision mayor shall be taken the minimum period of the indeterminate penalty. Consequently, the appellant may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.
In its decision, the trial court awarded the amount of ₱50,000.00 to the victim as civil indemnity, but failed to award moral damages. The award of ₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity is correct.25 Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the victim is also entitled to ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.26
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 7810 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The appellant Lino Clores, Jr. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum. The said appellant is ORDERED to pay the offended party, Eden Bandol, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Felimon C. Abelita III.
2 Records, p. 1.
3 Exhibit "B," Records, p. 49.
4 Records, pp. 67-68.
5 TSN, 16 October 1996, p. 10-11.
6 Exhibit "B," supra.
7 People v. Montemayor, 396 SCRA 159 (2003).
8 215 SCRA 694 (1992).
9 People v. Perez, 397 SCRA 12 (2003); People v. Dulay, 381 SCRA 346 (2002).
10 People v. Sarazan, 395 SCRA 611 (2003).
11 TSN, 16 October 1996, p. 10.
12 Id. at 11.
13 Exhibit "B", supra.
14 398 SCRA 494 (2003).
15 People v. Bragas, 315 SCRA 216 (1999).
16 TSN, 16 October 1996, p. 11.
17 Records, p. 67.
18 People v. Invencion, 398 SCRA 592 (2003).
19 Judge Felipe Abelita III was dismissed from the service per the Court’s decision in Lao v. Hon. Felimon Abelita III, 295 SCRA 267 (1998).
20 People v. Del Rosario, 282 SCRA 178 (1997).
21 Under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, the review by the Supreme Court of the decision of the trial court is automatic and mandatory when the accused is sentenced to death.
22 186 SCRA 790 (1990).
23 Id. at 803.
24 Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances:
…
2. That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of a minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80.
…
25 People v. Invencion, supra.
26 People v. Cultura, 397 SCRA 368 (2003).
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