SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146513 July 30, 2004
LUCIA G. MIRANDA, petitioner,
vs.
ESPERANZA B. BESA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53979 which substantially affirmed the respective decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, and the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion in Capas, Tarlac, ordering the petitioner, inter alia, to vacate the lot subject of the unlawful detainer case.
Macaria Capuno was the owner of a property located in Capas, Tarlac, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 11 of plan Psu-127058-Amd with an area of 5,081 square meters and Lot 18 of plan Psu-127058-Amd-2, with an area of 72,114 square meters. On March 31, 1953, she executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Spouses Alejandro Miranda and Feliza Garcia over a portion of the property with an area of 254.03 square meters, with the following boundaries:
Bounded on the N. by premises of Capas Elem. School (school site); on the E. by property of Macaria Capuno; on the S. by property acquired by H. Mallari, et al. from Macaria Capuno; and on the W. by Real Street.2
The Spouses Miranda had the property surveyed on July 14, 1957, with the following technical descriptions:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot as shown on plan Psu-162708), situated in the Barrio of Sto. Domingo, Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac.
Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2, by property of Macario (sic) Capuno; on the SW., along line 2-3, by property of Macario (sic) Capuno; and along line 3-4, by property of Agapito Balagtas, et al.; on the NW., along line 4-5, by property of Macaria Capuno; and on the NE., along line 4-1, by property of the Municipal Gov't. of Capas.
Beginning at a point marked '1' on plan, being N. 24 deg. 49' E., 267.64 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Capas, Tarlac;
thence S. 29 deg. 49' W., 12.55 m. to point "2"
thence N. 65 deg. 11' W., 2.19 m. to point "3"
thence N. 65 deg. 06' W., 18.95 m. to point "4"
thence N. 24 deg. 18' E., 14.02 m. to point "5"
thence S. 61 deg. 12' E., 22.42 m. to the point of
beginning, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE (289) SQUARE METERS.3
Sometime in 1960, Macaria Capuno, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Tomas Besa, filed an application with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac for the registration of the two lots under her name docketed as Land Registration Case N-234, LRC Record No. 18166. The Spouses Miranda did not file any opposition to the application.
On November 26, 1960, the CFI rendered judgment granting the application and declaring the applicant Capuno to be the absolute owner thereof in fee simple.4 On February 17, 1961, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1278 was issued by the Register of Deeds on the basis of Decree No. N-81499 following the said decision.5 On March 6, 1967, Capuno executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 18 in favor of Atty. Tomas Besa on the basis of which he was issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 66990 over the said property.6 The property was subdivided into Lots 18-A, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F. The latter was subdivided into four (4) lots covered by TCT Nos. 69926, 69923, 69924 and 69925 issued by the Register of Deeds to and under the name of Tomas Besa.
Sometime in October 1968, Macaria Capuno filed a complaint with the CFI of Tarlac against Spouses Tomas and Esperanza Besa for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale executed by her in favor of the Spouses Besa. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4453. A notice of lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 66990. On October 22, 1968, the CFI dismissed the complaint. Capuno appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 03700. On January 31, 1986, the IAC rendered a decision affirming the decision of the CFI.7
In the meantime, Atty. Tomas Besa sold Lots 18-F-3-B-2 and 18-F-3-B-2-B in favor of Circle Drug Corporation to which TCT Nos. 209129 and 292231 were issued by the Register of Deeds on January 21, 1988 and April 22, 1997, respectively.8 TCT No. 292231 covering Lot No. 18-F-3-B-2-B was cancelled by TCT No. 292299 in the name of respondent Esperanza B. Besa on April 22, 1997. On May 15, 1997, TCT No. 292299 was cancelled by TCT No. 292806 under the name of the owner, Esperanza B. Besa.9
Respondent Besa had the property subdivided into two sublots per Psd-03-086097 on May 6, 1997. One of the sublots, Lot 18-F-3-B-2-B-1 had an area of 253 square meters. A sketch plan was prepared for the said lot. She discovered that the house of petitioner Lucia Miranda, the daughter of the Spouses Miranda, occupied a portion of the said lot.10
On September 3, 1997, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case No. 1998. She alleged, inter alia, that she was the owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 292806; the petitioner was occupying a portion of her (the respondent's) property without her permission as owner; on June 16, 1997, she sent a notice to the petitioner for the latter to vacate the property within fifteen days from notice thereof; despite the said notice, the petitioner refused to vacate the property. She prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Hon. Court that pendente lite, a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued placing plaintiff in possession of the property by ousting the defendant [petitioner] and/or her agents or any person occupying the same in her names/behalfs and/or by virtue of any authority by her, and that plaintiff [respondent] is more than willing to comply to (sic) any condition that this Hon. Court may impose or put up a bond for granting of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and which plaintiff hereby prays to be fixed.
1. After trial, judgment be issued making permanent the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued;
2. After trial, ordering the defendant [petitioner], her agents, successors-in-interest, members of her family or any person allowed by her access to the property to vacate the premises, remove their respective houses/improvements thereon and to restore possession thereof to plaintiff [respondent];
3. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay P200.00 per month from the unlawful detention until possession is fully restored to the plaintiff [respondent];
4. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay the amount of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, P10,000.00 as acceptance fees, plus P1,000.00 per hearing, P5,000.00 as cost for the preparation of the complaint and this is only for the case before the Municipal Trial Court and if an appeal is taken to the Regional Trial Court, a different fees (sic) will be stipulated upon, and an additional amount of P20,000.00 as litigation expenses;
5. And granting such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises.11
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the property was conveyed to her parents, the Spouses Miranda, by Macaria Capuno on March 31, 1953; she and her six siblings were born on the said property and had been residing thereat since their births. The petitioner appended a copy of the deed of sale executed by Macaria Capuno in favor of her deceased parents, the Spouses Miranda.12
On October 23, 1998, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendant [petitioner], her agents, successors-in-interest and members of her family or any persons allowed by her access to the property to vacate the premises and improvements thereof and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff [respondent];
2. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay P200.00 per month from the unlawful detention until possession is fully restored to plaintiff [respondent].
3. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,000.00 per hearing;
4. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay the cost of this suit.13
The petitioner appealed to the RTC which rendered judgment affirming the decision of the court a quo.14
The petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53979 which rendered judgment on December 15, 2000 affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partly GRANTED. The award of attorney's fees is hereby deleted. The questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66) of Tarlac dated June 16, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects without prejudice to the filing by either party regarding the ownership of the property involved. Petitioner, her agents, successors-in-interest and members of her family or any person(s) allowed by her access to the property are directed to turn over possession of the property to respondent and to remove any improvements thereof.
SO ORDERED.15
The petitioner now comes to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari, contending that:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE OR FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS BEREFT OF ANY RIGHT TO EJECT PETITIONER FROM THE PREMISES OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY BECAUSE OF THE UNCONTESTED SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO PETITIONER'S PARENTS BY RESPONDENT'S PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT POSSESSES NO RIGHT TO EJECT PETITIONER FROM THE DISPUTED PROPERTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE UNDISPUTED BONA FIDE AND ACTUAL OCCUPATION BY PETITIONER AND HER PARENTS OF THE LAND ON WHICH THEIR ANCESTRAL HOUSE STOOD FOR THE LAST FIFTY (50) YEARS IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNERS THEREOF.
D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES AND IS BARRED FROM CLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY BY REASON OF RES JUDICATA.
E.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT IS DEFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE NECESSARY PARTIES WHO ARE ALSO PHYSICALLY IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY.16
The petitioner avers that she has a better right over the subject lot as it was acquired by her parents from Macaria Capuno in good faith and for consideration way back in 1953. On the other hand, the respondent and her husband, Atty. Tomas Besa, acquired the same on March 6, 1976 through fraud. The petitioner, likewise, contends that her family had been in adverse, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for the last fifty years; hence, they had already acquired ownership over the same by prescription. The court a quo had no jurisdiction over the action of the respondent because the petitioner interposed the defense of ownership over the property.
The petition is denied.
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that she raised the issue of ownership in her answer did not deprive the court a quo of jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment filed by the respondent. In ejectment cases, the defendant, the petitioner in this case, cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction by the simple expedient of claiming ownership of the property involved.17 Precisely with the aim of preventing a possible anomaly, the provisions of the Rules of Court governing unlawful detainer and forcible entry were revised.18 When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of physical possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the same (ownership issue) shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.19 Should the lower court make any determination on the issue of ownership, the same shall not be conclusive and shall be without prejudice to the right of the parties to ventilate before the proper court their claims of ownership over the same land.20 This is exactly the gist of the ruling of the assailed decision of the appellate court.
The CA, affirming the factual findings of both the court a quo and the RTC regarding the existence of a title over the subject lot in the name of the respondent and her deceased husband, correctly relied thereon to uphold the respondent's right to possession of the subject lot. As the registered owner, the respondent had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership.21 The petitioner's contention that the respondent's husband obtained their title to the subject lot through fraud is a collateral attack thereon, which is not allowed. Likewise, the defense of acquisitive prescription22 raised by the petitioner, as it already goes into the issue of ownership, has to be ventilated in the proper proceedings. This is so because the respondent's title can only be challenged in a direct action, for it is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.23
Further, the determination of whether the petitioner's occupancy of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the respondent involves a question of fact. On this matter, the court a quo, the RTC and the appellate court unanimously ruled in the affirmative. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the appellate court, especially when it affirmed those of the court a quo and of the RTC as in this case, are generally conclusive on this Court which is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.24
Finally, the petitioner's contention that the complaint was defective as it failed to implead her husband and siblings, who are allegedly indispensable parties, is untenable. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, indispensable parties are parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.25 A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties, and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties.26 In this light, the ruling of the appellate court is apropos:
Clearly, this case is one of ejectment and respondent is ejecting petitioner from the portion of the property being unlawfully withheld by her. Obviously, the failure to implead her brother and sister did not bar the lower court from making a final adjudication against her considering that her brother and sister are also occupying another portion of the disputed land.27
Anent the non-joinder of the petitioner's husband, suffice it to state that such omission is not fatal, the same being merely a formal requirement.28 As pointed out by the appellate court, the petitioner's husband is necessarily bound by the decision of the RTC and that of the court a quo as the latter clearly states in the decretal portion thereof that the petitioner, her agents, successors-in-interest and members of her family, are ordered to vacate the premises and restore possession thereof to the respondent.29
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53979 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurring.
2 Records, p. 18; Annex "1-A."
3 Id. at 106; Annex "3-A."
4 Id. at 453-456.
5 Id. at 107.
6 Id. at 108.
7 Id. at 135-146.
8 Id. at 117-118.
9 Id. at 121.
10 Id. at 86-88.
11 Id. at 5.
12 Id. at 18-19.
13 Id. at 183.
14 Id. at 257-266.
15 Rollo, p. 62.
16 Id. at 20-21.
17 Balanon-Anicete v. Balanon, 402 SCRA 514 (2003).
18 Perez v. Cruz, 404 SCRA 487 (2003).
19 Ibid.
20 Id.
21 Balanon-Anicete v. Balanon, supra.
22 Article 1117 of the CIVIL CODE reads:
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary and extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
23 Balanon-Anicete v. Balanon, supra.
24 Ibid.
25 Coronel v. Constantino, 397 SCRA 128 (2003).
26 China Banking Corporation v. Oliver, 390 SCRA 263 (2002).
27 Rollo, p. 61.
28 See Uy, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 275 (1990).
29 Rollo, p. 61.
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