G.R. No. 136422




SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 136422 July 7, 2004 BAYANI ALON and SEVERINA, REDILLA-VILLAMIL for herself, and representing the heirs of NORBERTO VILLAMIL, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JUANITO AGRAVIO on his behalf and attorney-in-fact of Eduardo Laserna, respondents. D E C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43838 dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Bayani Alon and the Spouses Norberto and Severina Redilla-Villamil. The Antecedents The Spouses Angel Aguilar and Encarnacion Agravio, were the owners of a parcel of land located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, identified as Lot No. 2162 of the Sta. Rosa Estate Subdivision, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7029 issued on January 12, 1954. The property was subdivided into two lots, Lot 2162-A and Lot 2162-B. Lot 2162-A was sold to the F.A. Amador & Sons, Inc., to which TCT No. 11545 covering the property was issued on March 19, 1970.2 Lot 828, which abutted Lot 2162-B on the southeast, was subdivided into Lots 828-A and Lot 828-B. The petitioners Bayani Alon, the Spouses Norberto Villamil and Severina Redilla, acquired Lot 828-A of Psd 41152, for which they were issued TCT No. 36405 by the Register of Deeds on January 16, 1974.3 On September 14, 1989, respondent Juanito Agravio, the nephew of Encarnacion, and his wife, respondent Josephine T. Borres, purchased Lot 2162-B and were issued TCT No. 196085.4 The Spouses Agravio constructed a house thereon. Subsequently, they sold Lot 2162-B and the improvements thereon to Eduardo Laserna. On March 25, 1990, the petitioners, through counsel, wrote respondent Juanito Agravio informing the latter that his house was encroaching on a portion of their property, Lot 828-A, and demanded that he vacate the premises.5 Respondent Juanito Agravio, through counsel, replied that his house was within the perimeter of his property, Lot 2162-B, covered by TCT 196085.6 The matter was referred to the barangay lupon, but no amicable settlement was forged by the parties. On November 8, 1990, respondent Agravio filed a complaint against the petitioners Alon and Sps. Villamil in the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3431, for the relocation of Lots 2162-B and 828-A with damages. Respondent Agravio alleged therein that the petitioners’ houses were constructed on a portion of his property, and despite demands, the latter refused to remove their property.7 Respondent Agravio, thereafter, filed an amended complaint, alleging that he had sold the property to Eduardo Laserna, who made a partial payment thereon, but refused to pay the balance of the purchase price until after the property and Lot 828-A were relocated, and the petitioners evicted therefrom; hence, respondent Agravio retained ownership and possession of the property. In their answer to the complaint, the petitioners asserted that Lot 2162-B claimed by respondent Agravio was a road lot. The parties agreed to have the two lots relocated by a government surveyor, and thereafter, to abide and be bound by the official report of the said surveyor.8 The parties further agreed that in order to abbreviate the proceedings, the parties would just submit their affidavits and those of their witnesses, on the basis of which the adverse party would conduct his cross-examination of the affiants. In compliance with the Order of the trial court dated July 15, 1991, the Regional Director of the Land Management Bureau, Region IV, designated Engr. Andres L. Valencia to conduct a relocation survey of the lots, in the presence of the parties and their respective counsels. Engr. Valencia conducted a survey on August 29, 1991 and on September 2, 1991 in the presence of the counsel for the petitioners. In the meantime, the petitioners’ counsel withdrew and Atty. Leodegario A.L. Barayang, Sr. entered his appearance as new counsel. On September 14, 1991, Engr. Valencia submitted his report, viz: 2. From these data we gathered, we found out that lot numbers 826, 827, 2162 and 940 adjoin each other based from the stated adjoining lots and descriptions of lines as per title. 3. That on September 2, 1991, we conducted the survey proper and we were able to relocate line 2-3 of Lot 828-A (LRC) Psd-41152 in the presence of Atty. Agapito Carait, the counsel of Bayani Alon, wherein corner 3 was marked by G.I. nail at concrete fence. Corner 2 of same lot which lies one meter from the concrete fence along the road towards the road was instead marked by G.I. nail at the intersection of line 3-2 to the said concrete fence to serve as witness. 4. That the concrete fence along line 4-1 at lot 828-A (LRC) Psd-41152 had been accepted as the boundary at lot 828-A and lot 828-B (LRC) Psd-41152. 5. That Juanito Agravio is amenable to the points we have set who is (sic) also present during our survey. 6. Common point used was corner 4 at lot 828-A (LRC) Psd-41152 which checks to corners 2 & 3 of lot 2, Block 6, (LRC) Psd-158389.9 Appended to the Report was a Special/Sketch Plan showing the location of the two lots. Respondent Agravio presented Engr. Valencia for direct and cross-examination, while the petitioners’ counsel cross-examined him during the hearing of May 26, 1993. However, in a Position Paper with Manifestation filed on July 28, 1993, the petitioners prayed that they be given a chance to adduce testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the report and testimony of Engr. Valencia.10 On October 11, 1995, Engr. Valencia was present for additional cross-examination by the counsel of the petitioners, but the said counsel failed to appear. The court then issued an order declaring the petitioners as having waived their right to further cross-examine Engr. Valencia.11 On January 11, 1996, the court rendered a summary judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows: 1. Ordering the defendants, their heirs and successors-in-interests to recognize the ownership and possession of plaintiff over Lot No. 2162-B, together with the improvements thereon, containing an area of 247 square meters, located at Barangay Tagapo, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, and covered by TCT No. T-196085; 2. Ordering the defendants, their heirs and successors-in-interests to vacate the premises being encroached by the houses erected by them on a portion of Lot No. 2162-B and to remove or demolish the said house or portion of defendant Bayani Alon’s house which encroaches on a portion of Lot No. 2162-B; 3. Ordering the defendants or their legal heirs to pay the plaintiff the amount of P25,000.00 as actual damages and litigation expenses and the amount of P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees plus the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED.12 On March 4, 1996, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision with an alternative prayer that they be allowed to adduce evidence. They alleged that they received a copy of the decision of the court in February 1996.13 The trial court issued an Order on July 5, 1996 denying the motion.14 The petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the said order on July 19, 1996, and thereafter filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of the court on July 23, 1996.15 On October 10, 1996, the trial court issued an Order rejecting the notice of appeal for having been filed beyond the period provided therefor.16 On motion of respondent Agravio, the court issued a writ of execution.17 The court also issued, on April 2, 1997, an Order granting the respondent’s motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition.18 On April 8, 1997, the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), with a plea for injunctive relief, for the reversal of the decision of the RTC and to compel the said court to receive the evidence on their behalf.19 The petitioners alleged the following in their petition: 1. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANTS (Civil Case No. B-3431, Ibid) AT LEAST TO PRESENT/ADDUCE EVIDENCE AT ALL. 2. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY RENDERING "SUMMARY JUDGMENT" DATED JANUARY 11, 1996 IN HASTE IF NOT AT ALL CONTRARY TO [THE] REPORT MADE BY GOVERNMENT ENGR. ANDRES VALENCIA DATED SEPTEMBER 4, 1991 (Ibid). 3. RESPONDENT JUDGE and/or CLERK OF COURT GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY ACCEPTED COMPLAINT/AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY PLAINTIFF WITHOUT THAT (sic) APPROVED PLAN/RELOCATED SURVEY-PLAN OF SUBJECT LOTS THEREOF. 4. RESPONDENT JUDGE’S GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS A RECTIFIABLE ERRORS (sic) CORRECTIBLE BY THIS PROCEEDINGS (sic).20 The petitioners asserted that the report of Engr. Valencia was erroneous, despite which the court rendered summary judgment based on the said report. Moreover, the petitioners averred that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it denied their motion to adduce testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the said report, rendered a summary judgment, and dismissed their appeal from the said decision.21 In his opposition to the petition, the public respondent claimed that, if at all, any error committed by the trial court in its summary judgment was merely an error of judgment, not correctible by a writ of certiorari. He insisted that by agreeing to be bound by the report of the surveyor, the petitioners waived their right to adduce evidence to controvert the findings of the said surveyor. It was then proper for the court to render judgment, considering that the petitioners agreed to be bound by the said findings. As such, no genuine issue was raised by the petitioners. He also posited that the surveyor was cross-examined by the petitioners’ counsel on his report. According to the public respondent, by their failure to appeal in due course from the decision of the trial court within the period therefor, the said decision had become final and executory. In the meantime, the Sheriff implemented the writ of demolition issued by the trial court, but stopped when the petitioners asked that they be allowed to remove that portion of their house which, according to the decision, encroached on the property of the respondent. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and even installed additional improvements on the property.22 On November 23, 1998, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the following grounds: (a) the petitioners had the right to appeal the decision of the trial court but lost their right when they failed to appeal within the period therefor; and (b) the errors, if any, committed by the trial court in its summary judgment were errors of judgment, not correctible by a cert writ. The Present Petition The petitioners forthwith filed their petition with this Court alleging as follows: 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND THAT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF JUDGE COSICO WAS ISSUED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL AGAINST PETITIONERS DESPITE THE PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF MISTAKE OR FRAUD ON THE PART OF ENGR. VALENCIA. 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE PROPRIETY OR CORRECTNESS OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THE CORRECT PROCEDURE TO RESOLVE THE COMPLAINT. 4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THAT JUDGE COSICO DENIED THE PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS WHEN HE ALLOWED RESPONDENT TO PRESENT HIS WITNESSES BUT DENIED PETITIONERS THE SAME OPPORTUNITY. 5. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD JUDGE COSICO’S RULING THAT THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE HONORABLE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE ANY FACTUAL BASIS FOR HIS RULING.23 The petitioners assert that there is no showing in the RTC records exactly when their counsel received a copy of the trial court’s decision. They allege that there was no factual basis for the finding of the trial court that their notice of appeal was filed beyond the period therefor, since the registry return card was not returned to the court. They contend that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in rejecting their notice of appeal and disallowing their appeal. They further assert that the action of the respondents did not involve the title to or possession of Lot 2162-B and Lot 828-A; hence, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in declaring the respondents as the lawful owners of the property and, thus, entitled to the possession thereof, and in ordering them to demolish their houses and pay the respondents damages and attorney’s fees. The petitioners further allege that (a) they were not estopped from assailing the report of Engr. Valencia despite their agreement to abide by the said report; (b) the report of Engr. Valencia contains glaring and vital errors, one of which is his statement therein that he conducted a survey of Lot 828-A instead of conducting a survey of Lot 828-B; (c) such report was not approved by the Land Management Bureau and, as such, was not a final report; and, (d) they submitted genuine, factual issues to the trial court, thus, precluding the rendition of a summary judgment. In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to appeal the trial court’s decision within the reglementary period. They assert that the petition for certiorari was not a substitute for the right of appeal which, by their negligence, the petitioners lost. The respondents further aver that the petition involves factual issues beyond the competence of the Court to delve into and resolve. The Issues The issues for resolution are (a) whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Order of the trial court rejecting their notice of appeal and dismissing their appeal; and, (b) if, in the affirmative, whether or not the errors, if any, of the trial court in its summary judgment are errors of judgment. On the first issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that, as the trial court held, the petitioners failed to appeal the summary judgment within the reglementary period therefor. It stated that, as shown by the records, the petitioners received the decision on February 9, 1996 and that their counsel received it on or about the same date, but filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision only on March 4, 1996 and thus failed to perfect their appeal within the period therefor. The petitioners contend that there is no showing in the records exactly when their counsel received a copy of the decision of the trial court. Hence, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in disallowing or dismissing their appeal. The Ruling of the Court We find the stance of the petitioners untenable. Under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129,24 the petitioners had fifteen (15) days within which to file their notice of appeal, from the time their counsel received notice or was served a copy of the trial court’s decision. The fifteen-day period provided therein is mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is a procedural remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and within the time frame provided by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. Failure of a party to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought to be appealed final and executory. As a result, no court could exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.25 After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party who has the right to enjoy the finality of the case.26 In this case, there is no showing in the records of the exact date when the counsel of the petitioners received his copy of the trial court’s decision. Indeed, the registry return card showing when the said counsel received such copy has not been returned to the trial court. Neither did the private respondents present a certification from the Postmaster of Manila, where the law office of Atty. Leodegario Barayang, Sr., the petitioners’ counsel, was located, when he received his copy of the decision. The trial court, likewise, failed to order the said counsel to inform the court when he received his copy of the decision before it rejected the petitioners’ notice of appeal and disallowed such appeal, on its belief that the latter’s counsel received his copy of the decision on the same date as the petitioners, or on February 9, 1996. Nevertheless, we sustain the trial court’s rejection of the notice of appeal filed by the petitioners, through counsel, on the ground that it was filed out of time. The records show that in the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, through counsel, on March 4, 1996, such counsel admitted that he received, through the mails, his copy of the decision in "February 1996," but failed to state the exact day of such receipt. The petitioners were burdened to show that their appeal was perfected on time, but failed to do so. The conclusion of the trial court, that the petitioners’ counsel could have received his copy of its decision on February 10, 1996 or ten days after the said copy was deposited in the mails on January 31, 1996 is not capricious. The records show that a copy of the Order dated July 5, 1996, denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was sent by registered mail to their counsel on July 9, 1996 and was received after ten days or on July 19, 1996.27 Although the petitioners received a copy of the order of the trial court granting the motion of the private respondent for a writ of execution, they did not file a motion for reconsideration thereof. In their opposition to the respondent’s motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, the petitioners never alleged that their appeal had already been perfected and, as such, the execution of the decision of the court and the demolition of their houses were premature. Even in their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners did not claim that their appeal from the decision of the trial court was made within the reglementary period therefor. The petitioners even failed to assail the order of the trial court rejecting their notice of appeal. They merely alleged in their petition that the trial court erred in rejecting their notice of appeal and thereby deprived them of a chance to controvert the report of Engr. Valencia. We note that even in their petition at bar, the petitioners failed to state the date when their counsel received his copy of the decision of the court a quo. The petitioners never explained why they failed to do so. We are convinced that the petitioners purposely concealed from the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court, as well as from the respondents, the exact date when their counsel received a copy of the decision of the trial court in order to prevent the discovery of the fact that they failed to perfect their appeal within the reglementary period and that, consequently, the decision of the trial court had become final and executory; hence, the Court of Appeals would have no jurisdiction to review, revise or reverse the said decision. The petitioners then resorted to filing their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the summary judgment of the trial court after failing, by their own negligence, to do so by appeal by writ of error. The well-entrenched rule is that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for the right of appeal lost by the party entitled to appeal especially if the right of appeal is lost through negligence.28 The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.29 The existence and the availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari.30 Moreover, the errors attributed by the petitioners to the trial court are mere errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction. Case law is that, as long as the trial court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal and not by a petition for certiorari.31 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The decision of the appellate court consistent with this Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with Associate Justices Jesus M. Elbinias and Marina L. Buzon, concurring. 2 Records, p. 102. 3 Id. at 8. 4 Id. at 5-6. 5 Id. at 12. 6 Id. at 13-14. 7 Id. at 3-4. 8 Id. at 63-65. 9 Id. at 73. 10 Id. at 206. 11 Id. at 228. 12 Id. at 231-232. 13 Id. at 239. 14 Id. at 242-243. 15 Id. at 244. 16 Id. at 246-247. 17 Id. at 254. 18 Id. at 264. 19 CA Rollo, pp. 12-13. 20 Id. at 7. 21 Id. at 11. 22 Records, p. 286. 23 Rollo, pp. 25-26. 24 The notice of appeal was filed before the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 25 Oro v. Diaz, 361 SCRA 108 (2001). 26 Ibid. 27 Records, p. 243 (Dorsal portion). 28 Obando vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 673 (2001). 29 Ibid. 30 People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004. 31 Ibid. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation