EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 148712-15 January 21, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DOMINADOR CACHOLA y SALAZAR, ERNESTO AMAY y PASCUA, NESTOR MARQUEZ y MANUEL, BENJAMIN LAEGEN y CAMADO, RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ, RODEMIR GUERZO y LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO y SALVADOR, and NELSON C. ECHABARIA, appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
In just an instant, 12-year-old Jessie E. Barnachea lost his mother, an elder brother, an uncle, and a cousin as a result of the carnage that took place at around 6:00 p.m. of 28 December 1999 right inside their house in Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union. Their horrible death was attributed to herein appellants, who, however, pleaded not guilty to the four separate informations for murder.
At the trial before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, the prosecution presented as witnesses Jessie and his brother and neighbors, as well as several police officers. Their testimonies disclose as follows:
Jessie was about to leave their house to watch cartoons in his uncle’s house next door when two armed men suddenly entered the front door of their house. The two ordered Jessie to drop to the floor, and then hit him in the back with the butt of a long gun. Without much ado, the intruders shot to death Jessie’s uncle, Victorino V. Lolarga, who was then in the living room. Jessie forthwith crawled and hid under a bed, from where he saw the feet of a third man who had also entered the house. The men entered the kitchen and continued shooting. When the rampage was over and after the malefactors had already departed, Jessie came out of his hiding place and proceeded to the kitchen. There he saw his mother, Carmelita Barnachea; his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr.; and his cousin Rubenson Abance - all slaughtered.1
Meanwhile, Jessie’s eldest brother, Robert E. Barnachea, was in his uncle’s house watching television with his aunt and young cousins when he sensed a commotion outside. When Robert went out to see what was transpiring, he saw armed men running towards their house. One of them turned and pointed a gun at him, prompting him to scamper away and hide at the back of his uncle’s house. From where he was hiding, he noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and marking "fruits and vegetables dealer," parked in front of the fence of their house. Standing behind the jeep were three armed men wearing bonnets, with only their nose and eyes exposed. In the next instant, he heard gunshots and then saw men running from his house. The men hurriedly boarded the jeep and left the place.2
The jeep did not go unnoticed by the neighbors. Russel Tamba was with some friends in front of Roda’s Store, around 100 meters away from the Barnachea residence, when the jeep passed by very slowly going towards the Barnachea residence. According to him, the jeep had a marking "El Shaddai" in front, aside from the marking "fruits and vegetables dealer" on the sides.3 Francisco Andrada was also talking with some people in front of the Calumbaya Barangay Hall, only five meters away from Roda’s Store, when he noticed that jeep, with the "El Shaddai" marking, pass by.4 Not long after, both heard gunshots and later saw the jeep pass by again, this time running very fast.5
The incident was immediately reported to the police, and the description of the "El Shaddai" jeep used by the malefactors was relayed through radio to the police stations in the province of La Union.6 At around 7:45 p.m., the jeep was intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by the police force in Aringay, La Union. On board were the eight appellants. No firearms were found in the vehicle. The jeep and the eight appellants were thereafter brought to the Aringay police station and then turned over to the Bauang police.7
When the Chief of Police of Bauang Benjamin M. Lusad was informed of the apprehension of the eight appellants, he went to the Barnachea residence, where he came to know that Jessie was an eyewitness. He invited Jessie to ride with him to pick up the suspects. While Lusad was supervising the boarding of the suspects into the vehicle, Jessie was in another police vehicle with PO3 Juan Casern, Jr., to see whether he could recognize any one of the eight men. Jessie pointed to Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay as the two armed men who entered his house and killed his relatives. During the police line-up at the Bauang Police Station, Jessie again identified Cachola and Amay as the assailants.8 The next day, when the police conducted the third confirmatory investigation, which was to present Jessie with photographs of the suspects, Jessie identified the two for the third time.
The eight appellants were thereafter subjected to paraffin test. But only the right hands of Cachola and Amay yielded positive results for gunpowder nitrates.9
The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome and merciless killings. Carmelita sustained one gunshot wound on her head and three on her body;10 Felix, Jr., two gunshot wounds on his head and on his body, and stab wounds on his chest and arms;11 Victorino, two gunshot wounds on his head, three on his body, and with his penis excised;12 Rubenson, one gunshot wound on his head and a stab wound that lacerated his liver.13
The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses were dispensed with upon the stipulation by the public prosecutor and the counsels for the appellants that the nature of their testimonies would be that (1) PO3 Juan Casern, Jr., was inside the police car with Jessie when the latter recognized appellants Cachola and Amay; (2) Mark Garcia would corroborate the testimony of Felix Andrada regarding the description of the jeep; (3) Felix Barnachea, Sr., suffered actual damages amounting to P177,000 as a result of the death of his wife Carmelita and son Felix, Jr.; (4) a police officer of Aringay, La Union, flagged down the jeep at the checkpoint and saw the appellants on board; and (5) a police officer of Bauang, La Union, would identify the pictures taken at the crime scene.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense counsels orally asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The trial court denied the motion outright and set the schedule for the presentation of the evidence for the defense.14 Instead of presenting their evidence, however, the appellants, through their respective counsels, filed a Demurrer to Evidence15 even without leave of court.
On 26 September 2000, the trial court rendered a decision16 (1) convicting (a) Cachola and Amay, as principals, of four counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer four counts of the supreme penalty of death; and (b) Marquez, Laegen, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio, and Echabaria, as accomplices, of four counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer four counts of the indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) ordering all of them to pay the heirs of the victims a total of P300,000 as death indemnity; P200,000 as moral damages; and P177,000 as actual or compensatory damages.
Before us on automatic review, appellants Cachola, Sagun, Ignacio, and Marquez contend that the trial court erred (1) in finding conspiracy among them and their co-appellants; (2) in finding proof beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) in not dismissing the informations outright despite a motion before arraignment, there having been a clear illegal arrest and denial of due process.
As for appellants Amay, Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria, they assert that the trial court erred (1) in finding appellant Amay guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of murder; and (2) in not acquitting appellants Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria for insufficiency of evidence and on reasonable doubt.
In its Consolidated Reply Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommends the affirmance of the conviction for murder of appellants Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the other appellants for failure of the prosecution to establish their identity and participation beyond reasonable doubt.
We agree with the recommendation of the OSG to acquit appellants Sagun, Ignacio, Marquez, Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria. Upon a thorough review of the records of the case, we found nothing that would show their participation in the commission of the crimes. Not one of the prosecution witnesses identified them as among the malefactors who were at the Barnachea residence on that fateful day. Surprisingly, even as the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to establish the actual participation of the other appellants in the commission of the crime, it found that "they cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts."17 It appears, however, that the only reason why they were implicated was that they were with Cachola and Amay on board the jeep that was intercepted in Aringay, La Union, almost two hours after the killings. What constitute previous or simultaneous acts that would make them liable as accomplices are not found in the decision or in any evidence on record.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.18 In the present case, neither element was proved. The mere presence of the six appellants in the company of appellants Cachola and Amay on board a jeep is not evidence of their knowledge of, or assent to, the criminal design to perpetuate the massacre.19 That they were found to be with appellants Cachola and Amay almost two hours after the commission of the crime does not constitute previous or simultaneous act. Absent a link between the crime and their presence in the jeep two hours later, we cannot consider their participation even as accessories to the crime.
It is a basic evidentiary rule in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.20 If the prosecution fails to discharge that burden, the accused need not present any evidence.21 Thus, for utter lack of evidence against the six appellants, their acquittal is in order.
However, as regards appellants Cachola and Amay, we concur with the trial court and the OSG that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The credible testimony of, and positive identification by, Jessie Barnachea, which are corroborated by forensic evidence, i.e., the positive results of the paraffin test on the right hands of Cachola and Amay, constitute sufficient evidence to sustain their conviction.
As to the credibility of Jessie Barnachea, the trial court made the following observations:
The Court observed the demeanor of Jessie Barnachea on the witness stand and ... did not observe any indication of falsehood in his narration. He showed obvious readiness to answer questions propounded to him. His reactions and answers to the questions displayed evident respect for truth. He remained consistent on cross-examination. He positively identified accused Amay and Cachola as the one who shot and killed his family. The Court did not observe any hesitancy or indication of uncertainty - and his recital of the events appeared spontaneous.22
There is nothing on record that gives this Court cause to interfere with the trial court’s determination of the credibility of Jessie. Indeed, his testimony was unwavering despite attempts of the defense counsels to confuse or trap him. The alleged inconsistency between Jessie’s sworn statement and testimony on the number of malefactors, if at all, does not detract from his credibility. That Jessie saw two armed men enter his house is clear. While the defense claims ambiguity as to the presence of a third man, Jessie’s statement easily reveals that the third man was not immediately mentioned because he (the third man) only followed the two and Jessie did not see his face.
It is also pointed out that Jessie’s identification of Cachola and Amay runs counter to Robert’s testimony that the armed men were wearing bonnets. Again, from their testimonies, it is apparent that the brothers saw different men. Besides, Robert also stated that one of the men did not have his head covered. As to the alleged improbability of the lookouts wearing bonnets while the principal shooters were unmasked, or of the malefactors sparing Jessie, suffice it to say that such circumstances are not so incredible as to cast reasonable doubt on the truth of the narrated events.
In sum, none of the alleged inconsistencies, minor as they are, could leave us with doubt that Jessie was present in his house and saw armed men shoot his relatives. Barely two hours had passed since he witnessed the gruesome murders when Jessie identified appellants Cachola and Amay as the malefactors. Reasonably, the memory of their faces was still fresh on his mind. Moreover, Jessie identified the two appellants two times more at the police station and once in open court, and he never faltered in his identification.
Significantly, the appellants have not imputed any ill motive to Jessie for testifying against Cachola and Amay. Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy and should be accorded full faith and credit.23
In all, there does not appear on record to be "some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has overlooked or the significance of which it has misapprehended or misinterpreted. "24 We rely, therefore, on the competence of the trial court to decide the question of credibility of the witnesses, having heard them and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial."25
The reliance by appellant Cachola on People v. Teehankee26 is misplaced. In that case the negative result of the paraffin test did not preclude a finding of guilt by the trial court, the reason being that the accused was tested for the presence of nitrates only after more than 72 hours had lapsed from the time of the shooting. In the present case, the paraffin test was conducted on the same night the shooting incident occurred; hence, the lapse of only a few hours increases its reliability. While the presence of nitrates on accused’s hand is not conclusive of guilt, it bolsters the testimony of an eyewitness that the accused fired a gun.
As to whether the trial court erred in not allowing the appellants to present evidence after filing their demurrer to evidence without leave of court, then Section 15, Rules 119 of the Rules of Court27 is clear on the matter, thus:
SEC. 15. - Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Underscoring supplied).
The filing by the appellants of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave of court was a clear waiver of their right to present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had been denied due process because the evidence they belatedly sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to allow them to "wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience."28 Furthermore, it cannot be said that the waiver was not clear. The trial court postponed the hearings on the motion for demurrer, even after leave of court had been denied, and then granted extensions to Amay until he finally adopted the position of his co-appellants. At no time other than in this automatic review was there any attempt that is contrary to the waiver of the presentation of evidence.
Neither can the question of the legality of the warrantless arrest of the appellants be raised for the first time before this Court. As arrests fall into the question of the exercise by the trial court of its jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the question should have been raised prior to their arraignment. That the appellants objected to the arrests prior to the arraignment29 is unsubstantiated. Their claim that they requested an extension of time to file a motion to quash the information or to dismiss the case,30 which the trial court allegedly denied, cannot save the day for them. The fact remains that before arraignment, no such motion was filed. Even assuming that their arrest was illegal, their act of entering a plea during their arraignment constituted a waiver of their right to question their arrest.31
We now discuss the circumstances that attended the commission of the crimes.
The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. There is no doubt that the killings were done with treachery, considering that the assailants suddenly barged in and immediately went on a shooting rampage. We have time and again ruled that when the attack is sudden and unexpected, there is treachery.32 The presence of even this single qualifying circumstance is sufficient to qualify the killing to murder.33
As to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, we find the same lacking, for there is no evidence of planning or preparation to kill, much less of the time when the plot was conceived.34
It may not be amiss to mention that the death certificate of Victorino Lolarga reveals that his penis was excised. One may wonder whether such circumstance amounted to ignominy that can aggravate the offense.
For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the victim’s moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused.35 In this case, the information states that Victorino’s sexual organ was severed after he was shot and there is no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider ignominy as an aggravating circumstance.
However, as regards Carmelita and Felix, Jr., we appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, since it was alleged in the information and proved during the trial that they were killed inside their house. Appellants Cachola and Amay, therefore, violated the sanctity of the said victims’ home.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In conjunction, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be imposed when in the commission of the deed, there is present one aggravating circumstance. In the cases of Carmelita and Felix Jr., in Criminal Cases Nos. 2324 and 2325, there is one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance to offset it; hence, the higher penalty of death imposed by the trial court stands.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray36 that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
But in the cases of Victorino and Rubenson, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2323 and 2326, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua, which is the lower of the two indivisible penalties prescribed by law.
As regards the civil liability of appellants Cachola and Amay, we hold them jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of each of the victims death indemnity and moral damages each in the amount of P50,000, or a total of P400,000. They are further ordered to pay the respective heirs of Carmelita and Felix Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000, or a total of P50,000, in view of the presence of one aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime against the said victims. As to the claim for damages by Felix Barnachea Sr. in the amount of P177,000, we sustain the same even if only a list of expenses,37 not official receipts, was submitted because such amount was admitted by the defense during the trial.38 Moreover, although there is no evidence as to the amount spent as a result of the death of Victorino and Rubenson, their respective heirs shall be awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000, since they clearly incurred funeral expenses.39
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated 26 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as DOMINADOR CACHOLA y SALAZAR and ERNESTO AMAY y PASCUA are found GUILTY of four counts of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 2323-26 and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Cases Nos. 2324 and 2325. The said decision is, however, MODIFIED in that they are (1) sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of death, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2323 and 2326; and (2) ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following damages:
a. P50,000 as death indemnity in favor of the heirs of each victim, or a total of P200,000;
b. P50,000 as moral damages in favor of the heirs of each victim, or a total of P200,000;
c. P25,000 as exemplary damages in favor of the respective heirs of Carmelita Barnachea and Felix Barnachea Jr., or a total of P50,000;
d. P177,000 as actual damages in favor of the heirs of Carmelita Barnachea and Felix Barnachea Jr.; and
e. P25,000 as temperate damages in favor of the respective heirs of Rubenson Abance and Victorino Lolarga, or a total of P50,000.
The assailed decision is REVERSED insofar as appellants NESTOR MARQUEZ y MANUEL, BENJAMIN LAEGEN y CAMADO, RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ, RODEMIR GUERZO y LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO y SALVADOR, and NELSON C. ECHABARIA are concerned, and another one is hereby rendered (1) acquitting them of the crimes charged for insufficiency of evidence; (2) ordering their immediate release from confinement unless their further detention is warranted by virtue of any lawful cause; and (3) directing the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to submit a report on their release within five days from notice hereof.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 TSN, 7 March 2000, 4-8, 12, 16-17.
2 TSN, 15 March 2000, 3-4, 7, 16-17, 23.
3 TSN, 21 March 2000, 4, 13, 20.
4 TSN, 31 May 2000, 4-5, 18.
5 TSN, 21 March 2000, 14; TSN, 31 May 2000, 6.
6 TSN, 12 April 2000, 7, 10-11.
7 TSN, 17 May 2000, 19-20, 30, 34.
8 TSN, 10 May 2000, 29, 32.
9 Exhibit "N", OR vol. 2, 43; TSN, 28 July 2000, 5.
10 Exhs. "G" and "G-1," OR vol. 1, 13-15.
11 Exhs. "J" and "J-1," OR vol. 1, 25-27.
12 Exhs. "I" and "I-1," OR vol. 1, 21-23.
13 Exhs. "H" and "H-1," OR vol. 1, 17-19.
14 OR, vol. 1, 185.
15 OR, vol. 1, 167-174, 203, 206-207.
16 Per Judge Jose G. Paneda. OR, vol. 1, 473-507; Rollo, 33-72.
17 OR, vol. 1, 505.
18 People v. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, 18 August 1999, 312 SCRA 640.
19 See People v. Sayaboc, G.R. No. 147201, 15 January 2004.
20 People v. Batidor, G. R. No. 126027, 18 February 1999, 303 SCRA 335; People v. Olivarez, Jr., G.R. No. 77865, 4 December 1998, 299 SCRA 635.
21 People v. Tadepa, G.R. No. 100354, 26 May 1995, 244 SCRA 339.
22 OR, vol. 1, 503.
23 People v. Barnuevo, G.R. No. 134928, 28 September 2001, 366 SCRA 243; People v. Fernandez, G. R. No. 137647, 1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 80;
24 People v. Julian-Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 143850-53, 18 December 2001, 372 SCRA 608.
25 Id.
26 G.R. Nos. 111206-08, 6 October 1995, 249 SCRA 54.
27 Now Section 23, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended (which became effective on 1 December 2000).
28 People v. Turingan, 347 Phil. 97 (1997).
29 Rollo, 110.
30 Id.
31 People v. Liwanag, G.R. No. 120468, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 62; People v. Calimlim, G.R. No. 123980, 30 August 2001, 364 SCRA 45.
32 People v. Cachola, G.R. No. 135047, 16 March 2001, 354 SCRA 577; People v. Bolivar, G.R. No. 130597, 21 February 2001, 352 SCRA 438.
33 People v. Dueno, G.R. No. L-31102, 5 May 1979, 90 SCRA 23.
34 People v. Nazareno, supra, note 32.
35 1 LUIS B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE 451 (1993), citing People v. Ferrera, No. L-66965, 18 June 1987, 151 SCRA 113, 140; and People v. Carmina, G.R. No. 81404, 28 January 1991, 193 SCRA 429, 436.
36 335 Phil. 343 (1997).
37 Exh. "L,"OR, 162.
38 TSN, 7 June 2000, 6; Section 4, Rule 129, Rules on Evidence.
39 People v. Baño, G.R. No. 147810, 15 June 2004.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
