G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159




SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159 January 16, 2004 TERESITA S. DAVID, BENJAMIN S. DAVID,PACIFICO S. DAVID, NEMESIO S. DAVID, CELINE S. DAVID, CRISTINA S. DAVID, PAULINA S. DAVID, and LEONIE S. DAVID-DE LEON, Petitioners, vs. AGUSTIN RIVERA, Respondent. D E C I S I O N TINGA, J.: Claiming to be the owner of an eighteen thousand (18,000)-square meter portion (hereafter, "subject land") of Lot No. 38-B,1 a five (5)-hectare lot situated at MacArthur Highway, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, herein respondent Agustin Rivera filed on May 10, 1994 a Complaint 2 for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction" before the Provincial Adjudication Board (PARAB) of San Fernando, Pampanga against petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino and Consolacion David.3 The respondent averred that the petitioners had been harassing him for the purpose of making him vacate the subject land although it had already been given to him sometime in 1957 by the parents of the petitioners as "disturbance compensation", in consideration of his renunciation of his tenurial rights over the original eighteen (18)-hectare farmholding. For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint4 for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the respondent was occupying the subject land without paying rentals therefor. The petitioners also averred that they need the subject land for their personal use but the respondent refused to vacate it despite repeated demands. In his Answer5 to the ejectment complaint, the respondent asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the tenancy relationship between him and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners, as evidenced by the Certification 6 issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Mabalacat, Pampanga. He likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over the subject land and informed the court of the complaint he had earlier filed before the PARAB. On January 31, 1995, or during the pendency of the ejectment case, the PARAB rendered its Decision7 declaring the respondent as tenant of the land and ordering that his peaceful possession thereof be maintained. Expectedly, the petitioners appealed the PARAB Decision to the Department of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). On September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered its Decision8 ordering the respondent to vacate the subject land. The court found that there was a dearth of evidence supportive of the respondent’s claim that the land is agricultural or that it is devoted to agricultural production. Further, it ruled that the petitioners as the registered owners have a better right to possession of the subject land. The decretal portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein plaintiffs and against herein defendant and any one claiming rights under him by ordering the latter to: (1) Vacate the subject premises and to peacefully turn over possession of the same to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representatives; (2) To pay the plaintiffs the amount of ₱720,000.00 as reasonable rentals in arrears as of July, 1994 and to pay monthly rentals of ₱12,000.00 from August, 1994 up to the time he (defendant) finally vacates the premises; (3) To pay the plaintiffs the amount of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of the suit; (4) Defendant(’s) counterclaim is hereby DENIED for lack of proof. SO ORDERED. Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within the period to appeal, the respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City a Petition9 for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the nullification of the MCTC Decision. The thrust of the petition was that the MCTC had no jurisdiction as the issue before it was agrarian in nature. On October 30, 1995, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order10 enjoining the petitioners from enforcing the MCTC Decision. Thereafter, it proceeded to hear the respondent’s application for preliminary injunction. On November 29, 1995, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction upon the posting of bond in the amount of ₱500,000.00.11 On January 30, 1996, the petitioners filed their Answer12 to the Petition for prohibition in which they asserted that the MCTC could not be divested of its jurisdiction by simply interposing the defense of tenancy. The petitioners also disputed the respondent’s claim that he acquired the subject property by way of disturbance compensation for the reason that in 1956, when the property was allegedly given, the law providing for the payment of disturbance compensation was not yet in effect. Moreover, the petitioners contended, no proof had been adduced evidencing the conveyance of the property in favor of the respondent. The case went to trial with the respondent as petitioner presenting his evidence in chief. However, after the respondent had rested his case, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss13 raising as grounds, inter alia: (1) that the extraordinary remedy of prohibition could not be made a substitute for the available and speedy recourse of appeal; (2) the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Mabalacat, Pampanga was legally vested, determined as it was by the averments of the complaint in conformity with Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; hence, the decision of the ejectment court was a legitimate and valid exercise of its jurisdiction. On February 25, 1998, the RTC issued an Order14 denying the motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the motion, which was filed after the presentation of the plaintiff’s evidence, partakes of a demurrer to evidence which under Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, 15 may be granted only upon a showing that the plaintiff has shown no right to the relief prayed for. Noting that "the evidence presented by the petitioner establishes an issue which is addressed to [the] court for resolution. . . whether or not the respondent court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filed before it", the RTC ruled that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper. The petitioners moved for reconsideration16 but was denied in an Order17 dated June 23, 1998. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari18 in the Court of Appeals. On September 3, 1999, the appellate court rendered a Decision,19 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion for reconsideration of its order. The appellate court ratiocinated that the order of denial is merely interlocutory and hence cannot be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In addition, it held that issues raised in the petition for prohibition were genuine and substantial, necessitating the presentation of evidence by both parties. The petitioners now come before us, seeking the nullification of the decision of the Court of Appeals. At the crux of the petition is the issue of whether the denial of the motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted with grave abuse of discretion. In the Resolution of October 4, 1999,20 we denied the petition for failure of the petitioners to accompany the same with a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision. The petitioners filed a new petition primarily on the basis of Philippine Airlines v. Confesor,21 where this Court held that a petition dismissed under Circular No. 1-8822 may be filed again as a new petition as long as it is done within the reglementary period. In the Resolution23 of March 8, 2000, we allowed the re-filing of the petition and required the respondent to comment thereon. In his Comment,24 the respondent counters that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss inasmuch as the MCTC had no jurisdiction to render the assailed judgment. He points out that the PARAB had already declared him the owner of the land and that the PARAB decision was affirmed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in its Decision25 dated March 6, 2000. We deny the petition. At the outset, it may be well to point out that certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the form of a demurrer to evidence filed after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case. Being interlocutory, an order denying a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. After such denial, the petitioners should present their evidence and if the decision of the trial judge would be adverse to them, they could raise on appeal the same issues raised in the demurrer.26 However, it is also settled that the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.27 Thus, the petitioners submit that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer. They insist that appeal, not prohibition, is the proper remedy to question the judgment of the MCTC and that the question of jurisdiction is one of law which may be ruled upon without the evidence of the parties. We are not convinced. We uphold the Court of Appeals. It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to correct what he perceived was an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC. Indeed, the propriety of the recourse to the RTC for a writ of prohibition is beyond cavil in view of the following considerations: First. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, where two tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the same subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimately rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for prohibition. The MCTC manifestly took cognizance of the case for ejectment pursuant to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,28 as amended. On the other hand, the ratiocination of the DARAB, which the respondent echoes, is that the case falls squarely within its jurisdiction as it arose out of, or was connected with, agrarian relations. The respondent also points out that his right to possess the land, as a registered tenant, was submitted for determination before the PARAB prior to the filing of the case for ejectment. Indeed, Section 50 of R.A. 665729 confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters.30 In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A31 created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.32 Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases falling within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, which is quoted hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar: Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act no. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following: a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws; . . . g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree No. 815. It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987. Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an "agrarian dispute." Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.33 Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled: Indeed, section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant — at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute otherwise springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . .34 As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR, through the DARAB. With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court,35 or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained."36 The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.37 Second. While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from proceeding further on the ground that it heard and decided the case without jurisdiction.38 Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate.39 To say, as the petitioners argue, that the MCTC Decision has already attained finality because the respondent opted to file a petition for prohibition instead of an appeal is to sacrifice needlessly respondent’s right at the altar of technicalities. Should tenancy relationship be duly proven, the respondent as a tenant should be protected in keeping with the social justice precept enshrined in the Constitution.40 Also noteworthy is the fact that the petition for prohibition was filed within the reglementary period to appeal; hence, it cannot be claimed that the same was used as substitute for a lost appeal. At this point, let it be stressed that we are not passing upon the propriety of the issuance of a writ of prohibition in favor of the respondent. As we have earlier pointed out, adjudication on this matter is best left to the RTC, where the case for prohibition pends, after the reception of the evidence of both parties. Third. We cannot also sustain the petitioners’ assertion that jurisdiction is a question of law; hence, the RTC could have ruled on the matter without the reception of the parties’ evidence. The very issue determinative of the question of jurisdiction is the real relationship existing between the parties. It is necessary that evidence thereon be first presented by the parties before the question of jurisdiction may be passed upon by the court. It should be pointed out that the petitioners elevated to the appellate court the Order of the RTC denying their motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one party to the adequacy of the evidence of his adversary to make out a case. Otherwise stated, the party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict.41 In this case, the trial court ruled that respondent’s evidence in support of his application for a writ of prohibition was sufficient to require the presentation of petitioners’ contravening proof. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in so ruling. The Court of Appeals is therefore correct in upholding the lower court’s denial of the petitioners’ motion to dismiss. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Austria-Martinez, J., no part. Footnotes 1 Covered by TCT No. 47588-R, Rollo, p. 37. 2 Docketed as DARAB Case No. 664 P’94. 3 Nemecio, Teresita, Benjamin, Celine, Pacifico,, Cristina, Paulina, Marcelo, and Leonie, all surnamed David. 4 Docketed as Civil Case No. 1106, Rollo, pp. 48-54. 5 Id., at pp. 55-58. 6 Rollo, p. 39. The pertinent portion of the Certification reads: This is to certify that Mr. Agustin Rivera is one of the original and registered tenant(s) of the late Cristino David et.al. cultivating an area of ten (10) hectares of rice land more or less, situated at Gasdam, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. This is to certify further that he is presently occupying and possessing 1.8 hectares of agricultural land allegedly given by the owner as his disturbance compensation which he developed, fence(d), shifted to piggery and hollow blocks making, located at Gasdam, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. 7 Rollo, pp. 502-510. 8 Rollo, pp. 307-310. 9 Rollo, pp. 381-392. 10 Id., at p. 96. 11 Id., at pp. 98-101. 12 Id., at pp. 150-155. 13 Id., at pp. 108-115. 14 Id., at p. 117. 15 Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. 16 See Motion for Reconsideration, Rollo, pp119-120. 17 Rollo, p. 121. 18 Id., at pp. 122-135. 19 Id., at pp. 136-145, Per Dacudao, R., J., with Austria-Martinez, A. and Valdez, Jr., S., JJ., concurring. 20 Rollo, p. 148. 21 G.R. No. 111480, March 10, 1994, 231 SCRA 41. 22 Circular on Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and Complementing Administrative Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988 on Expeditious Disposition of Cases Pending in the Supreme Court. 23 Rollo, p. 150. 24 Id., at pp. 347-377. 25 Id., at pp. 513-518. 26 See Cruz v. People, 228 Phil. 652 (1986); People v. Court of Appeals, 204 Phil. 511 (1982); Joseph v. Villaluz, G.R. Nos. L-46329-30, April 10, 1979, 89 SCRA 324; People v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 453; Mercado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44001, June 10, 1988, 162 SCRA 75; Bautista v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-45137, September 23, 1985, 138 SCRA 587, 594; Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378; De Vera v. Pineda, G.R.No. 96333, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 434; Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 71771-73, March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA 579. 27 See Ong v. People, G.R. No. 140904, 342 SCRA 372, October 9, 2000; Gutib v. CA, 371 Phil. (1999). 28 Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: . . . (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases for forcible entry and unlawful detainer x x x . 29 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. 30 Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, x x x 31 Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for Other Purposes. 32 Section 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. There is hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. x x x The Board shall assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. 33 Sec. 3 (d), Republic Act 6657. 34 Basilio v. De Guzman, et.al., 105 Phil. 1276 (1959). 35 See Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 98310, October 24, 1996, 263 SCRA 490. 36 See Magallanes v. Sarita, 129 Phil. 1158 (1966); Commissioner of Immigration v. Go Tieng, 138 Phil. 247 (1969). 37 See Vergara v. Ruque, G.R. No. L-32984, August 26, 1977, 78 SCRA 312; Strong v. Castro, G.R. No. L-63658, June 29, 1985, 137 SCRA 322. 38 See Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, 354 Phil. 211 (1998). 39 See Provident International Resources v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119328, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 510. 40 Const. article XIII, sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. x x x 41 Gutib v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131209. August 13, 1999, 312 SCRA 365. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation