G.R. No. 125088




FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 125088 April 14, 2004 LAGRIMAS A. BOY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ISAGANI P. RAMOS and ERLINDA GASINGAN RAMOS, respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in an ejectment case, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38716, which reversed and set aside the decision¹ of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54,² and reinstated the decision³ of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14,⁴ ordering petitioner to vacate the disputed premises and to pay rent until the premises are vacated and possession is turned over to private respondents. The facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: On September 24, 1993, the spouses Isagani P. Ramos and Erlinda Gasingan Ramos, private respondents herein, filed an action for ejectment against Lagrimas A. Boy (Lagrimas), petitioner herein, with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. In their Complaint, the spouses Ramos alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 55.75 square meters, and the house existing thereon, situated at 1151 Florentino Torres St., Singalong, Manila. They acquired the said properties from Lagrimas who sold the same to them by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale,⁵ which was executed on June 4, 1986. However, Lagrimas requested for time to vacate the premises, and they agreed thereto, because they were not in immediate need of the premises. Time came when they needed the said house as they were only renting their own residence. They then demanded that Lagrimas vacate the subject premises, but she refused to do so. Hence, they initiated this action for ejectment against Lagrimas.⁶ In her Answer, Lagrimas alleged that sometime in September 1984, in order to accommodate her brother’s need for a placement fee to work abroad, she borrowed ₱15,000 from the spouses Ramos, who asked for the subject property as collateral. On June 4, 1986, the spouses Ramos caused her to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale purporting to show that she sold the property in question to them for the sum of ₱31,000. The balance of ₱16,000 was promised to be paid on that date, but the promise was never fulfilled. Sometime in May 1988, Erlinda Ramos and Lagrimas executed an agreement (Kasunduan)⁷ acknowledging that the subject parcel of land, together with the upper portion of the house thereon, had been sold by Lagrimas to the spouses Ramos for ₱31,000; that of the said price, the sum of ₱22,500 (representing ₱15,000 cash loan plus ₱7,500 as interest from September 1984 to May 1988) had been paid; that the balance of ₱8,500 would be paid on the last week of August 1988; and that possession of the property would be transferred to the spouses Ramos only upon full payment of the purchase price.⁸ Lagrimas admitted that the counsel of the spouses Ramos sent her a letter demanding that she vacate the premises. Lagrimas alleged that the demand for her to pay the sum of ₱6,000 per month has no legal basis. Lagrimas was summoned by the Punong Barangay for conciliation, but no settlement was reached.⁹ The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) noted the existence of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the spouses Ramos and Lagrimas on June 4, 1986. The Deed was duly acknowledged before a Notary Public and the parties therein did not deny its due execution. The MeTC observed that Lagrimas’ defense that the spouses Ramos still had to pay the amount of ₱16,000 to complete the full consideration of ₱31,000 was nowhere to be found in the Deed of Absolute Sale.¹⁰ The MeTC held that the Kasunduan, which Lagrimas attached to her Answer, cannot be given binding effect. The MeTC stated that while Erlinda Ramos admitted the existence of said document, she thought that Lagrimas was only asking for an additional amount. Erlinda Ramos claimed that after signing and reading the document, she realized that it did not contain the true facts of the situation since they had already purchased the subject property and were, therefore, the owners thereof. Erlinda Ramos, thereafter, refused to give her residence certificate and asked the notary public not to notarize the document. Said incident was attested to by way of affidavit by Lutgarda Reyes, the friend and companion of Lagrimas.¹¹ Moreover, the MeTC ruled that the continued occupation by Lagrimas of said property after the sale, without payment of rent, was by mere tolerance. It held that since the spouses Ramos, who were staying in a rented place, were asked to vacate the same, they were in need to take possession of their own property.¹² The MeTC thus rendered judgment in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [herein private respondents] and against the defendant [herein petitioner], ordering the latter and the persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises known as 1151 Florentino [Torres] Street, Singalong, Manila. The defendant is likewise ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱1,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises from the filing of this complaint until the premises is vacated and possession is turned over to the plaintiffs; the further sum of ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus the costs of the suit. Defendant’s counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.¹³ Petitioner appealed said decision to the Regional Trial Court, which rendered judgment in her favor, thus: In view of the foregoing, this Court hereby reverses the assailed Decision and dismisses the complaint. Costs against the appellee. The order previously issued granting execution pending appeal is accordingly recalled. SO ORDERED.¹⁴ The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the Kasunduan was binding between the parties and was the true agreement between them. It ruled that pending the determination of the question of ownership, it cannot deprive the party in actual possession of the right to continue peacefully with said possession. Since the question of ownership was inextricably woven with that of possession, the RTC held that the MeTC should have dismissed the case because jurisdiction pertains to another tribunal.¹⁵ Private respondents filed a petition for review of the decision of the RTC with the Court of Appeals. They faulted the respondent Judge for giving credence to the Kasunduan and holding that it prevailed over the Deed of Absolute Sale. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondents, thus: WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge herein appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.¹⁶ The Court of Appeals found, thus: A review of the records discloses that the private respondent [herein petitioner Lagrimas] acquired the subject property from one Marianita C. Valera by virtue of two instruments. The first one is a Deed of Sale dated September 27, 1984, in which the vendor Marianita C. Valera sold a house of light wooden materials and her rights as a bonafide tenant of the land on which it stands, to the vendee Lagrimas A. Boy for ₱31,000.00 (Annex 1 to the Affidavit of Lagrimas A. Boy, p. 67, Record). The second one is a deed of absolute sale and assignment of rights dated March 18, 1985, in which the vendor Ma. Nita C. Valera sold a residential house and her rights and interests over a parcel of land in which it is located, to vendee Lagrimas A. Boy, for the price of ₱31,000.00 (Annex 2, Affidavit of Lagrimas A. Boy, pp. 68-69, Record). It appears from the foregoing that Marianita C. Valera was originally one of the tenants/residents of 669 square meters of land owned by the PNB. She constructed a house on a 55.75 square meter portion of the said land. In 1984, she sold the house and only her rights as tenant of the land to private respondent, because the PNB had not yet sold the land to the residents. In 1985, the sale of the land to the residents had already been accomplished. Hence, she sold the house and her rights and interests to the land to the private respondent. Significantly, these contracts coincide with certain events in the relationship between the petitioners [herein private respondents spouses Ramos] and private respondent. According to the Answer of private respondent, sometime in September, 1984, she borrowed the sum of ₱15,000.00 from the petitioners to accommodate her brother’s placement fee to work abroad (par. 7, Answer, p. 19, Record). And on March 19, 1985, the private respondent executed a deed of real estate mortgage (Annex a to the Affidavit of Erlinda C. Ramos, pp. 54-55, Record), in which she mortgaged the properties she has acquired from Marianita C. Valera to the petitioners, to secure a loan in the amount of ₱26,200.00, payable within three months. One year later, on June 4, 1986, the private respondent executed a deed of absolute sale in which she sold the same property acquired from Marianita C. Valera to the petitioners, for the price of ₱31,000.00.¹⁷ Considering that petitioner borrowed ₱26,200 from private respondents, which loan was covered by a real estate mortgage of the subject house and lot, and the subsequent sale of the property to private respondents for ₱31,000 after non-payment of the loan, the Court of Appeals did not give credence to the statement in the Kasunduan that private respondents paid only ₱22,500 to petitioner since her indebtedness already reached ₱26,200. The Court of Appeals gave weight to the argument of private respondents that Erlinda Ramos was merely tricked into signing the Kasunduan. It gave credence to the version of private respondents on how the Kasunduan came to be executed but not notarized, thus: x x x Erlinda G. Ramos alleged in her affidavit that sometime in May, 1988, the exact date of which she cannot recall, Lagrimas Boy went to their residence and pleaded that even if they have already fully paid the subject house and lot, she was asking for an additional amount because she needed the money and there was no one for her to approach (walang ibang matatakbuhan). She [Erlinda Ramos] claimed she committed a mistake because she agreed to give an additional amount and went with [Lagrimas] to Atty. Estacio at the City Hall. [Lagrimas] arrive[d] ahead [of] Atty. Estacio in company with her friend Lutgarda Bayas. Atty. Estacio told her [Erlinda Ramos] that she will give an additional amount and she agreed without the knowledge of her husband. Atty. Estacio handed to her a piece of paper and she was made to sign and she acceded and signed it without reading. After [Lagrimas] and her witnesses including her companion Lutgarda Bayas signed the paper, she [Erlinda Ramos] go[t] it and read it. It was at that point that she discovered that what were written thereon were not in accordance with the true and real fact and situation that the subject house and lot already belongs to them because they have purchased it already and {Lagrimas} only requested for an addition. She [Erlinda Ramos] told Atty. Estacio to change (baguhin) the statement because she was not agreeable and she did not give her residence certificate (Cedula). Notary Public Estacio said that he cannot notarize the document (purported Kasunduan) because she [Erlinda Ramos] refused saying she was "Pumapalag." He said that Erlinda Ramos and [Lagrimas] should talk to each other again. She [Erlinda Ramos] committed another mistake because she left the place leaving the piece of paper -- purported "Kasunduan" without knowing that [Lagrimas] kept it. Erlinda Ramos innocently failed to demand the said piece of paper which [Lagrimas] is now using. She returned to Atty. Estacio to get the piece of paper but he answered her saying naibasura na and she trusted him but this time, it turned out that [Lagrimas] kept it which she is using now in this case.¹⁸ The Court of Appeals stated that the fact that petitioner has remained in possession of the property sold, and paid its real estate taxes, would have made out a case for equitable mortgage. However, it noted that petitioner did not raise this defense, but admitted having sold the property to private respondents, alleging only that they have not paid the purchase price in full. It, therefore, ruled that the preponderance of evidence is against petitioner. Hence, this petition, with the following assigned errors: I THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT INTERPRETING THAT THE "KASUNDUAN" EXECUTED BY AND BETWEEN PETITIONER (DEFENDANT) AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT (PLAINTIFF) SUPERSEDES THE DEED OF SALE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN CONSUMMATED. II THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MISINTERPRETING AND DISREGARDING THE "KASUNDUAN" AS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. III THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING AND DISMISSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND [IN REINSTATING] THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO.¹⁹ Petitioner contends that, as ruled by the RTC, since the question of ownership in this case is interwoven with that of possession, the MeTC should have dismissed the case because jurisdiction pertains to another tribunal. The contention is without merit. The only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.²⁰ Prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the jurisdiction of inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence of ownership in order to determine only the nature and extent of possession, by reason of which such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became apparent that the issue of possession was interwoven with that of ownership.²¹ With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior courts were granted jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership provisionally in order to determine the issue of possession, thus: Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Section 16, Rule 70 (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer) of the Rules of Court, as amended, similarly provides: Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.—When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Thus, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the inferior courts have the undoubted competence provisionally to resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.²² The MeTC, therefore, did not err in taking cognizance of the instant case. Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred by misinterpreting and disregarding the Kasunduan, which is binding between the parties and expressed their true intent. Petitioner asserts that the Kasunduan supersedes the Deed of Absolute Sale, which is actually a contract to sell. In effect, petitioner is asking this Court to review the factual finding of Court of Appeals on the true nature of the Kasunduan. As a rule, the findings of the fact of the Court of Appeals are final and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court, provided they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence.²³ After reviewing the records herein, this Court finds no ground to change the factual finding of the Court of Appeals on the Kasunduan, with the resulting holding that it is not binding on the parties. The remaining issue is whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that private respondents have a right of material possession over the disputed property. It has been established that petitioner sold the subject property to private respondents for the price of ₱31,000, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale,²⁴ the due execution of which was not controverted by petitioner. The contract is absolute in nature, without any provision that title to the property is reserved in the vendor until full payment of the purchase price.²⁵ By the contract of sale,²⁶ petitioner (as vendor), obligated herself to transfer the ownership of, and to deliver, the subject property to private respondents (as vendees) after they paid the price of ₱31,000. Under Article 1477 of the Civil Code, the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. In addition, Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public instrument, as in this case, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. In this case, the Deed of Absolute Sale does not contain any stipulation against the constructive delivery of the property to private respondents. In the absence of stipulation to the contrary, the ownership of the property sold passes to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.²⁷ The Deed of Absolute Sale, therefore, supports private respondents’ right of material possession over the subject property. The finding of the MeTC, sustained by the Court of Appeals, is that the continued occupation by petitioner of said property after the sale, without payment of rent, was by mere tolerance. Private respondents claimed that petitioner requested for time to vacate the premises and they agreed thereto because they did not need the property at that time. However, when private respondents were asked to vacate their rented residence, they demanded that petitioner vacate the subject property, but petitioner refused to do so. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.²⁸ WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 38716, which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court, and reinstated the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur. Footnotes ¹ CA Rollo, p. 23. ² In Civil Case No. 95-73140. ³ CA Rollo, p. 28. ⁴ In Civil Case No. 142623 CV. ⁵ CA Rollo, pp. 33-34. ⁶ Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 25-26. ⁷ CA Rollo, p. 35. ⁸ Rollo, p. 26. ⁹ CA Rollo, p. 29. ¹⁰ Ibid. ¹¹ CA Rollo, p. 30. ¹² Ibid. ¹³ CA Rollo, p. 30. ¹⁴ CA Rollo, pp. 26-27. ¹⁵ Ibid. ¹⁶ Rollo, p. 31. ¹⁷ Rollo, pp. 29-30. ¹⁸ Rollo, pp. 27-28. ¹⁹ Rollo, pp. 13-14. ²⁰ Anicete, et al. v. Balanon, G.R. Nos. 150820-21, April 30, 2003. ²¹ Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 347, 362 (1996). ²² Anicete v. Balanon, supra, note 20; Refugia v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 21. ²³ Bantingal v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 60, 66 (2001) ²⁴ Annex "F," CA Rollo, p. 33. ²⁵ Dignos v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 375, 382 (1988). ²⁶ Civil Code, Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional. ²⁷ Dignos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 25, at 383; Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al., 12 SCRA 276, 285 (1964). ²⁸ Rivera v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154203, July 8, 2003.; Refugia v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 21, at 370. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation