SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 144117 February 27, 2003
MILAGROS B. NAYVE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ACRE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of: (a) the Resolution1 dated April 17, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58205, which dismissed outright petitioner’s petition, for non-compliance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (b) the Resolution2 dated July 12, 2000, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Before the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner had sought to set aside the Orders dated August 5, 19993 and March 17, 20004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 99-94059. Said Orders granted herein private respondent’s motion for execution pending appeal of the decision in an ejectment suit rendered in its favor by the RTC of Manila.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
On January 31, 1997, private respondent Acre Development Corporation (ACRE) filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Damages against petitioner Milagros Nayve, with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 7, docketed as Civil Case No. 154426. Private respondent alleged that on August 26, 1996, it entered into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over a property in Sampaloc, Manila with a monthly rental of p15,000.00 for the period September 1, 1996 to September 1, 1997. As part of the agreement, petitioner issued twelve (12) postdated checks equivalent to one (1) year rentals to ACRE. Said checks were subsequently dishonored by the bank by reason of "ACCOUNT CLOSED". Despite demands made by ACRE for the payment of the arrears in rental payments, Nayve refused to pay, thus constraining ACRE to file said ejectment suit.
In her Answer, petitioner Nayve denied the material averments in the Complaint. She claimed that the Complaint stated no cause of action as the property in question, which is their family’s house and lot, was the subject of a private arrangement between her and Congressman Manolet Lavides, the president of ACRE. Nayve stated that she obtained a loan from Lavides, putting up said property as her collateral. She executed a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase, which was subsequently registered in the name of ACRE, but with the understanding that the same shall remain her property. Later, petitioner was compelled to sign a Lease Contract with the understanding that the postdated checks she would issue would serve to guarantee the unpaid loan she had previously obtained from Lavides.
For failure of Nayve and her counsel to attend the pre-trial conference despite due notice, ACRE moved to submit Civil Case No. 154426 for decision. The lower court granted said motion and accordingly decided the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate Apt. No. 314 Valencia St., Nagtahan, Sampaloc, Manila and to surrender possession of the same to the plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of p75,000.00 representing her rental arrearages from September, 1996 up to January, 1997 and the amount of P15,000.00 a month representing her monthly rentals from February, 1997 and every month thereafter as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of said premises plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5
Nayve seasonably appealed the foregoing decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 22, which docketed the appeal as Civil Case No. 99-94059.
During the pendency of the appeal, ACRE filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal claiming that Nayve had not deposited with the RTC the monthly rentals of P15,000.00 as adjudged by the MTC thus making the decision immediately executory, pursuant to Section 19, Rule 706 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In an Order dated August 5, 1999, the RTC granted ACRE’s motion for execution pending appeal, thus:
Acting on plaintiff’s motion for execution (pending appeal) the Court, after considering the allegations thereof and it appearing that defendant, in violation of the decision of the trial court and of the provision of Rule 70, Sec. 19 of the 1997 Rule[s] of Civil Procedure, failed to deposit the monthly rentals of P15,000, as adjudged by the trial court since March 1999, when the appeal was perfected, up to the present, and there being no opposition to the motion despite receipt thereof by defendant’s counsel, resolves to grant the same.
WHEREFORE, let the appropriate writ issue.
SO ORDERED.7
As a result, on August 12, 1999, a Notice to Vacate was issued by Sheriff Elmer G. Muyot of the RTC, which gave petitioner five (5) days to voluntarily vacate the disputed premises.
On August 16, 1999, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 5, 1999 claiming that ACRE’s motion had no factual or legal basis under Section 19, Rule 70. Nayve alleged that she had filed a sufficient supersedeas bond to stay the execution.
On August 31, 1999, Nayve filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Omnibus Motion with prayer for injunctive reliefs citing the lack of good reasons to warrant execution pending appeal. ACRE filed an Opposition asserting that the supersedeas bond cannot answer for the required periodic deposit. Petitioner then filed a Supplemental Motion, alleging that the jurisdiction of the RTC over execution pending appeal was discretionary.
On March 17, 2000, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Motions. On the same date, ACRE filed a Motion to Break-Open Subject Premises.
On April 5, 2000, Sheriff Muyot issued a Final Notice to Vacate, giving petitioner three (3) days from notice thereof to surrender the premises to ACRE.
On April 10, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special action for certiorari seeking the annulment of the RTC Orders dated August 5, 1999 and March 17, 2000, respectively. The action was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58205. Nayve likewise assailed in the same action the Sheriff’s Notice to Vacate and the Second and Final Notice to Vacate issued on August 12, 1999 and April 5, 2000, respectively.
The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition outright, on several technical grounds, thus:
Upon perusal of the present petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive reliefs, We note that the same suffers from the following infirmities, to wit:
1. There is no express allegation therein that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his Order dated August 5, 1999 granting execution pending appeal;
2. Absence of several material dates (when petitioner received copy of the August 5, 1999 Order, when she filed her motion for reconsideration thereto, and when she received the Order dated March 17, 2000 denying her motion for reconsideration) thus precluding this Court from determining if the petition was timely filed;1awphi1.nét
3. The affidavit of service does not include the mandatory written explanation why respondents had to be furnished with copies of the petition by way of registered mail rather than thru the preferred personal service (Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended);
4. The petitioner failed to attach as annexes thereto copies of "all" pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, such as but not limited to a copy of the MTC decision which was appealed to respondent Court, private respondent’s motion for execution pending appeal, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to the August 5, 1999 Order. Moreover, the annexes to the petition were not marked or identified by petitioner’s counsel for the benefit of the Court; and
5. The affidavit/certification of non-forum shopping is not in the proper prescribed form laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 46, supra;
and for which, We RESOLVED to DISMISS this petition outright.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner then moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated July 12, 2000. In the interim, petitioner filed urgent motions and manifestations for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order, all of which were similarly denied in the same Resolution.1a\^/phi1.net
Hence, this petition where petitioner submits that:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING OUTRIGHT PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BASED MERELY ON TECHNICALITIES, THUS APPLYING STRICTLY TO PETITIONER THE PROCEDURAL RULES, THUS RESULTING IN A GRAVE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
II
THE SEEMING APATHY AND UNCONCERN BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO THE PETITIONER AS EVIDENCED BY ITS FAILURE TO IMMEDIATELY ACT ON VARIOUS URGENT, REPEATED AND VERY INSISTENT MOTIONS FOR ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT WHICH RAISED VALID AND MERITORIOUS GROUNDS, HAS UNDULY RESULTED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, HAS LED TO THE TRIAL COURT’S ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER ORDERING THE DEPUTY SHERIFF TO PROCEED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION, AND, WORSE, RESULTED IN THE EVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FROM THE PREMISES.
III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND DENYING PETITIONER’S PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION THUS IN EFFECT AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS GRANTING EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, DIRECTING THE SHERIFF TO PROCEED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION, AS WELL AS THE SHERIFF’S NOTICE TO VACATE, AND THE EVICTION OF PETITIONER FROM THE PREMISES - DESPITE HER STEADFAST AND INSISTENT CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PREMISES AND THE NULLITY AND INVALIDITY OF THE ALLEGED CONTRACT OF LEASE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND THE PRESIDENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORPORATION, CONGRESSMAN MANOLET LAVIDES, WHICH ISSUES ARE STILL TO BE RESOLVED ON THE MERITS BEFORE THE RTC-MANILA, BRANCH 22, AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THAT THE APPEAL OF PETITIONERS BEFORE THE RTC-MANILA, BRANCH 22, IS NOT DILATORY BUT PATENTLY MERITORIOUS.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER, WHO WAS EVICTED FROM THE PREMISES, AS WELL AS THE POSSESSION THEREOF, COULD BE RESTORED BACK TO THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THE PREMATURE, ARBITRARY, WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS AND UNJUSTIFIED EVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FROM THE SAID PREMISES.9
We find the focal issue to be: Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in dismissing outright CA-G.R. SP No. 58205 for petitioner’s failure to comply with the requirements of Section 1, Rule 65?
Petitioner asks for a liberal construction and application of the Rules of Court and submits that the foregoing infirmities cited by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition are mere procedural lapses arising from urgency of filing and rush in the preparation of petition and should not impair her right to appeal as provided by law and the rules. Petitioner also claims that by dismissing the petition on mere technicalities, the Court of Appeals missed the opportunity to pass upon the merits of the trial court’s order granting execution pending appeal and the subsequent order implementing the Final Notice to Vacate.
Petitioner’s submissions are far from convincing. In exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, we have disregarded procedural defects in order to correct a patent injustice. To our mind, however, petitioner has not shown any compelling and exceptional reason in this case for us to relax the requirements set forth under Rule 65. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.10 Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Failing that, the petition will not prosper.
1a\^/phi1.net
The records show that on October 27, 2000, while this petition is pending before us, the RTC rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 99-94059, affirming the appealed decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 154426, which ordered petitioner to surrender the possession of the subject property and to pay ACRE the rental arrearages. Said judgment of the RTC is now pending before the Court of Appeals by virtue of a petition for review filed by petitioner on July 2, 2001, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65149.11 Note that under Section 21, Rule 70,12 the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 99-94059 against Nayve shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to her having filed CA-G.R. SP No. 65149. As we emphasized in Uy vs. Santiago, 336 SCRA 680, 685 (2000):
From the foregoing, it is clear that it is only execution of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts’ judgment pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand, once the Regional Trial Court has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court.
Given the circumstances, including the latest development aforecited, in this case, we see no plausible reason to grant the plea of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the appellate court, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58205 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., no part.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 91-92. Per Villarama, Jr., J., with Garcia and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurring.
2 Id. at 147-148.
3 Id. at 75.
4 Id. at 84-87.
5 Id. at 70.
6 SEC. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay the same. -If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depository bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
7 Supra, note 5 at 75.
8 Rollo, pp. 91-92.
9 Id. at 19-20.
10 Nunal v. Commission on Audit, 169 SCRA 356, 363 (1989). See also Comsavings Bank v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 307, 309 (1996).
11 Rollo, p. 242. Per Petitioner’s allegations in her Memorandum.
12 SEC. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
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