G.R. No. 144422




EN BANC G.R. No. 144422 February 28, 2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALDRIN LICAYAN y SUCANO (At Large), accused-appellant. D E C I S I O N PER CURIAM: Five-year old Rowena C. Bangcong, the only girl among her siblings, was beaten, raped and killed. Her bruised and battered body which was flung into a nipa swamp was discovered the following morning after a massive search. For the brutal rape-slay of Rowena, herein accused Aldrin Licaya y Sucano was charged with Rape with Homicide in an Information1 which alleges – That on the 25th day of June 1999 at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less at Barangay Inobulan, Municipality of Salay, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) a five year old Rowena C. Bangcong against her will and consent and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and struck (sic) the different parts of the victim’s body with the use of a hard object, which accused previously provided himself, thus causing lacerated wounds, abrasions hematomas and submerging the victim in water at the nipa swamp which caused her death. CONTRARY TO and in violation of Section II, Chapter III, paragraph 5 of Article 266-B of R.A. 8353. Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.2 The case thereafter proceeded to trial. However, after the prosecution had rested its case and formally offered its evidence, accused escaped detention on April 26, 2000 by scaling the perimeter fence of the Provincial Jail.3 He has remained at large to date despite efforts to apprehend him. Counsel for the defense submitted the case for decision without presenting evidence in behalf of the accused. Thereafter, the court a quo rendered judgment4 on June 14, 2000 imposing upon the accused the extreme penalty of death thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by the Court sentencing accused to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of Rowena Bangcong in the sum of P75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. Since accused is at large after he escaped detention while the case was still pending but after the prosecution had presented its evidence, let a warrant for his arrest, or alias warrant of his arrest issue. Once arrested let his custodian ship his person to the National Penitentiary without delay as provided by law, there to await the result of the review of this case by the Highest Tribunal of the land. SO ORDERED. On automatic review, accused-appellant faults the trial court with a lone assignment of error, to wit: THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE THEREBY SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE DEATH PENALTY DESPITE THE GLARING INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.5 On the other hand, the Solicitor General recommends affirmance of the appealed Decision in toto. The prosecution’s version of the incident is summarized thus in the People’s brief: Appellant Aldrin Licayan and Bernard Agcopra were friends from way back. On June 25, 1999, after years of absence, appellant went to Agcopra who had a machine shop in Barangay Inobulan, Salay, Misamis Oriental, to apply for work as a grinder of engine valves. On this occasion, they drank rum to celebrate their reunion. Romeo Bangcong, who was also Agcopra’s friend, joined them later in their drinking bout. They finished drinking in Agcropa’s shop at 5:00 p.m. The group continued drinking in the house of Wenny Rajal also in Barangay Inobulan, Salay, Misamis Oriental. After consuming two bottles of Beer Grande, they bought a case of the same drink, which they brought to the house of Romeo. When they arrived, Romeo’s wife Rosalinda and his children, Rey Oriente, Raymundo and five-year old Rowena were there. Agcopra did not stay long and did not drink beer anymore. He went with Romeo to the barangay captain leaving appellant in Romeo’s house. When Romeo returned to his house, appellant was embracing and kissing Rowena, justifying it by saying that he missed his daughter. Appellant kept on embracing Rowena. At 6:00 p.m., more or less, Rowena asked that she be allowed to watch television at neighbor Dorbit’s house fifteen meters away. An hour later, Romeo told Rey Oriente to fetch Rowena. Thereafter, appellant also left, saying that he would look for Agcopra. When the boy reached Dorbit’s house, he saw appellant there with Rowena. Appellant told Rowena: "Day, come here because your father asked you to go home so you can eat your supper." Appellant then held the hand of Rowena and dragged her into a dark area. Rey Oriente, however, did not go with appellant and his sister, thinking that they were heading for the Bangcong house. When Romeo got tired of waiting for Rowena, he went to the Dorbit house to inquire about her. Rey Oriente told him what happened, which caused him to cry. Neighbors were alerted and immediately formed a posse to look for the girl. While searching for Rowena, they spotted appellant when they trained a flashlight to him. Appellant ran towards the ricefield. The posse chased him, but failed to catch him when he jumped into the deep Inobulan River. When appellant passed by a group of men who offered him a drink, his clothes were wet and his body was muddy. He had no slippers. That same night, appellant was arrested by the police. The following morning, the dead and naked body of Rowena was found at the swamps, where appellant told Rogelio Dahilan, Jr., one of the searchers, she would be. Photographs were taken of the girl. A postmortem examination of the girl revealed that she had hematomas, lacerations, abrasions all over her body, as well as a deep incomplete hymenal laceration at the 6:00 o’clock position. The cause of death was asphyxia by submersion in water. Rowena died a painful death.6 As stated earlier, after the prosecution had rested its case and formally offered its evidence, accused-appellant escaped detention and has remained at large despite efforts to apprehend him. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court.7 Accused-appellant’s escape should be considered a waiver of his right to be present at the trial and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent the court from continuing with the trial because the escapee is deemed to have received notice.8 The fact of escape made accused-appellant’s failure to attend unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale and protection of the law. This being so, the trial against the fugitive should be brought to the ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitive’s appearance or re-arrest,9 for the State as much as the accused has an interest in and is entitled to a speedy trial and disposition of the case. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.10 The rules on evidence11 and case law sustain the conviction of the accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: 1.] there must be more than one circumstance; 2.] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3.] the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.12 In assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence, four basic guidelines must be observed: 1) it should be acted upon with caution; 2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; 3) the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and 4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense.13 The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing towards the conclusion the accused is the author of the crime.14 The following circumstances pointed out by the trial court lead to the inevitable conclusion that the accused-appellant perpetrated the crime: First, before 1:00 A.M. of June 25, 1999, accused drank rhum with Bernard Agcopra, an automotive mechanic with whom he applied for work. June 26th was anti-vesperas of the fiesta of Inobulan, Salay, Mis. Or. Having consumed the rhum, the duo decided to take a motorbike to Bernard Agcopra’s shop in order to test accused’s skill in grinding engine vale[s]. At Agcopra’ shop, they drank some more rhum where they were joined by Romeo Bangcong. At 5:00 P.M., the three proceeded to the house of the owner of the overhauled engine. While there, Agcopra ordered two bottles of beer grande, and after consuming these the group bought one case of the same beer grande. The 3 brought this to the house of Romeo Bangcong which is not far away. Second, the three, accused, Bernard Agcopra and Romeo Bangcong, reached Romeo’s house. In the house then were Romeo’s wife and children, Rosalina and Rowena, 5 years old. Accused was drunk. But no sooner than they arrived that accused and Romeo started drinking the case of beer grande that they had brought. Bernard Agcopra begged off. He went home. When Rey Oriente Bangcong, one of Romeo’s children and elder brother of Rowena, arrived from school that afternoon of June 25th, which was Friday, he saw accused drinking with his father and while so doing he kissed and embraced Rowena, justifying it by saying that he missed his daughter. This happened in the presence of the Bangcong family. At about 6:00 o’clock, Rowena asked her father’s permission to view t.v. at the nearby house of Dorbit, to which Romeo gave his permission. About an hour after that Romeo told Rey Oriente to fetch his sister at Dorbit’s Third, arriving at Dorbit’s house, Rey saw accused telling Rowena "Day come here because your father asked you to go home so that you can eat your supper." Accused was holding the hand of Rowena and was dragging her. Soon Romeo Bangcong also arrived at Dorbit’s house looking for Rowena. Fourth, the Bangcong’s neighbors organized a search party. One group spotted accused 20 meters away. He ran toward the direction of the rice field. They chased him but they failed to overtake him as he jumped into the Inobulan River which is 5 arms length wise but deep. The searchers lost him. Fifth, at about 4:00 o’clock of June 26th accused told Jun-jun Dahilan who in turn told the searchers the location of the body of Rowena. Referring to the place they found the dead and naked body of the victim there. Sixth, with muddy pants, wet and without slippers accused emerged at the place where Wilson Salvaña and companions were drinking at about 9:30 P.M. of June 25th. He wore [a] stripe[d] blue shirt. He accepted the offer to drink and then proceeded away from them. Seventh, accused was the last person with whom Rowena was last seen.15 Accused-appellant, however, insists that the foregoing circumstances are insufficient to prove his guilt. He argues that: 1.] the first three (3) circumstances do not point to accused-appellant’s guilt; 2.] prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano who was among those who organized the search party, is not credible because he did not shout upon finding accused-appellant; 3.] the witnesses could not have seen accused-appellant in the darkness; 4.] the witnesses could have seen somebody else; 5.] assuming that accused-appellant was the one seen by the posse, he was not committing any wrong by running away; 6.] the claim of prosecution witnesses that Jun-jun Dahilan told them where Rowena’s body could be found based on accused-appellant’s admission is hearsay; 7.] granting that accused-appellant revealed where Rowena’s lifeless body could be found, he never admitted having raped and killed her; 8.] the admission made by accused-appellant to Dahilan, Jr. is inadmissible; 9.] the circumstance that accused-appellant was seen with wet pants, muddy body and without slippers lacks probative value; and 10.] there were no tell-tale signs that accused-appellant was dragging Rowena to the swamp. We disagree. The series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but together. Like strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.16 The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like weaving a tapestry of events that will culminate in a clear picture that will reveal a convincing scenario pointing towards the accused as the author of the crime.17 The credibility of prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano cannot be impeached by the mere fact that he failed to rouse other members of the search party when he found the accused-appellant. Suffice it to state that different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.18 The contention that accused-appellant could not have been identified from a distance of about twenty (20) meters in the dark is untenable, considering that illumination produced by a flashlight or kerosene lamp is sufficient to allow the identification of persons.19 In this regard, we have held that: Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitnesses could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.20 Accused-appellant’s argument that he did not commit any wrong in running away upon being espied by the search party likewise deserves scant consideration. Courts go by the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion."21 Accused-appellant has not satisfactorily explained why he fled upon being spotted by the posse. In *People v. Templo,22 we held that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. One type of act that can be given in evidence against him is flight. In criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of the accused person may as a general rule be taken as evidence having tendency to establish his guilt." In short, flight is an indication of guilt.23 What makes flight particularly damaging for accused-appellant is that he fled twice, i.e. first, upon being spotted by the search party and second, by scaling the perimeter fence of the Provincial Jail while he was in the custody of the law and undergoing trial. Accused-appellant cannot validly claim that the statement made by Rogelio "Jun-jun" Dahilan, Jr. as to the location of the victim’s body is hearsay. Any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was never presented on the witness stand,24 because it is the opportunity to cross-examine* which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.25 In the instant case, Rogelio Dahilan, Jr. testified that accused-appellant indeed told him where the victim’s body can be found. What is more, the victim’s body was actually recovered at the location pointed by accused-appellant. Accused-appellant’s objection to the admissibility of his statement as to where he dumped the body of the victim, which allegedly partakes of an extra-judicial confession, is just as tenuous. The impugned extra-judicial statement, as testified to by Dahilan, is as follows: Q While you were there and Aldrin Licayan was also there did you have a chance to talk to him? A Yes, Ma’am. Q What did you talk about? A I asked him Brod, as if I was guessing, where did you leave the child? Q What was his answer to your question? A He told me "Did you remember the place where we were drinking?" Q What was your answer? A I told him, Yes, at the place of Wennie Rajal. Q What more? A He said, "Yes in the place of Wennie Rajal. From his place there was a curve[d] road or junction. And in that junction the side of it is a ricefield. After the ricefield there is a nipa swamp. Try to see there maybe I left the child there!" Q After getting that information from Aldrin Licayan what did you do? A Me and my companions went outside the Municipal Hall and proceeded to the place where Aldrin Licayan told us. Q Did you reach the area described by Aldrin Licayan? A Yes, Ma’am. Q What did you see when you arrived in that place described by Aldrin? A It is where we found the child.26 The foregoing is not an extra-judicial confession, but merely an extra-judicial admission. Sections 2627 and 33,28 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly delineates their distinction. In *People v. Agustin,29 we elucidated on the difference between the two in this wise: A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. The records show that Rogelio "Jun-jun" Dahilan was neither a law enforcement nor a public officer conducting a custodial interrogation of accused-appellant. He was merely a jeepney driver and an acquaintance of accused-appellant who asked the whereabouts of the missing child of his kumpadre* because the victim was last seen with the latter.30 In fact, there is no showing that Dahilan colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither was he instructed by the police to extract information from accused-appellant on the details of the crime. In *People v. Andan,31 the accused’s spontaneous and voluntary verbal confession made in a private meeting with the municipal mayor was admitted in evidence because the same was not covered by the requisites of Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. ...Constitutional procedure on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime…32 Even assuming arguendo* that accused-appellant’s admissions indeed partake of an extra-judicial confession, the same would still be admissible not only on account of the foregoing considerations but also because it is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court,33 an extra-judicial confession shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, which is defined as the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, means a crime has actually been committed.34 Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.35 In this case, aside from the admission made by accused-appellant, the bruised and battered body of the victim herself recovered at the exact spot described by accused-appellant conclusively established the corroborating evidence of corpus delicti. Furthermore, the admission is replete with details on the whereabouts of the victim who at that time had not yet been found, thereby ruling out the probability that it was involuntarily made. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its it integrity, it being replete with details - which could only be supplied by the accused - reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary.36 Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim, he was in fact seen grabbing and dragging the struggling victim from the house where she was watching television by Rey Oriente, the victim’s elder brother.37 While accused-appellant indeed did not admit to anyone that he raped and killed Rowena, the prevailing circumstances overwhelmingly point to his guilt. As stated earlier, direct evidence is not always necessary to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. A witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, hut he may nevertheless identify the accused as the assailant as when the latter is the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime,38 as in this case. In sum, the foregoing circumstances when viewed in their entirety are as convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negate the innocence of the accused-appellant.39 In other words, the circumstantial evidence against accused-appellant fully justifies the finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the felony committed.40 We, therefore, find no compelling reason to reverse the ruling of the trial court insofar as accused-appellant’s guilt is concerned. The crime of Rape with Homicide is defined and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The definition of the felony was later expanded and the same was reclassified as a crime against persons and incorporated as Articles 266-A41 and 266-B42 in Title Eight, Chapter Three thereof.1âwphi1 The penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.43 Death being a single indivisible penalty, the same shall be imposed "regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime."44 Indeed, the penalty of death must be mandatorily imposed under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: Art. 47. In what cases death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of death penalty cases. - The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide is now P100,000.00.45 On the other hand, the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 given to the victim’s heirs is proper taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the victim’s family46 brought about by her death.47 WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19 in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-696 finding accused Aldrin Licayan y Sucano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Rowena Bangcong, P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let a certified true copy of the record of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of clemency and pardoning power. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Record, p. 1. 2 Ibid., p. 28. 3 Id, p. 254. 4 Id, pp. 264-274. 5 Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 1; Rollo, p. 52. 6 Brief for the Appellee, pp. 3-6; Rollo, pp. 95-98. 7 People v. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364 [1991]. 8 Herrera O.M., Remedial Law, 2001 ed., Vol. IV, p. 449. 9 People v. Tabag, 268 SCRA 115 [1997], citing People v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1, 5-7 [1988]. 10 People v. Elmer Fegidero y Cordova, 337 SCRA 274, 282 [2000], citing People v Botona, 304 SCRA 712, 728-729 [1999]. 11 Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court. 12 People v Carlo Ellasos y Mauricio @ "Rommel" & Sonny Obillo y Ganayo, G.R. No. 139323, 6 June 2001, citing People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, 380-381 [1991]; People v. Alcantara, 163 SCRA 783, 786 [1988] and Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court; People v. Larry Lavapie, et al., G.R. No. 130209, 14 March 2001; People v. Hermoso, 343 SCRA 567, 577 [2000], citing People v. Naag, 322 SCRA 716 [2000]; People v. Madriaga IV, 171 SCRA 103 [1989]; People v. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47 [1989]; see also People v. Casingal, 337 SCRA 100, 110 [2000], citing People v. Dacibar, et al., 325 SCRA 725 [2000], citing People v. Solis, 291 SCRA 529, 539 [1998]. 13 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Vol. II, p. 1643. 14 People v. Orcula, Sr., 335 SCRA 129 [2000], citing People v. Locsin Fabon @ "Loklok", 328 SCRA 302 [2000]. 15 Record, pp. 271-273. 16 People v. Comesario, 306 SCRA 400, 404 [1999], citing People v. Geron, 281 SCRA 36, 37 [1997]. 17 People v. Sirad, 335 SCRA 114, 124 [2000]. 18 People v. Espero, 346 SCRA 617, 624 [2000], citing People v. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487, 491 [1998]; People v. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210, 220 [1998]. 19 People v. Bromo, 318 SCRA 760, 777 [1999], citing People v. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 [1992] & People v. Loste, 210 SCRA 614 [1992]. 20 People v. Biñas, 320 SCRA 22, 53 [1999], citing People v. Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1 [1999], citing People v. Villaruel, 330 Phil. 79 [1996]; Italics supplied. 21 People v. Cañedo, 335 SCRA 81, 97 [2000]. 22 346 SCRA 626, 643 [2000]. 23 People v. Alo, 348 SCRA 702, 711 [2000]; People v. Samolde, 336 SCRA 632, 652 [2000], citing People v. Padlan, 290 SCRA 338 [1998]. 24 People v. Cui, 314 SCRA 153 [1999]. 25 People v. Martinez, 274 SCRA 259 [1997]. 26 TSN, 11 November 1999, p. 6; 13-14, italics supplied. 27 SEC. 26. Admission of a party - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. 28 SEC. 33. Confession. - The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. 29 240 SCRA 541, 553-554 [1995]; citing 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 337 (12th ed. 1955). 30 TSN, 11 November 1999, pp. 4-6, 11. 31 269 SCRA 95 [1997]. 32 People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199, 211 [1998]. 33 Section 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. - an extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. 34 People v. Mantung, 310 SCRA 819 [1999]. 35 People v. Robles, 333 SCRA 107, 119 [2000], citing People v. Mantung, supra. 36 Santos v. Sandiganbayan, 347 SCRA 386, 414-415 [2000], citing People v. Villanueva, 266 SCRA 356, 362 [1997]. 37 TSN, 23 September 1999, pp. 9, 17-18, 29. 38 People v. Albacin, 340 SCRA 249, 263 [2000], citing People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835 [2000]. 39 People v. Guarin, 317 SCRA 234 [1999]; People v. Sanchez, 308 SCRA 264 [1999]. 40 People v. Tabarangao, 303 SCRA 623 [1999]. 41 ART 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. -Rape is committed - 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: x x x x x x x x x d] When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though some none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2.) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. 42 ART. 266-B. Penalties. - x x x When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. 43 Three justices of the court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar. 44 Article 63, Revised Penal Code, as amended. 45 People v. Robles, 305 SCRA 273, 283 [1999]. 46 People v. Agueda T. Alba, et al., G.R. Nos. 130627 & 139477-78, 31 May 2001, citing People v. Ereneo, supra. 47 People v. Reynaldo Langit, 337 SCRA 323 [2000]: People v. Mindanao, supra. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation