THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140647 December 18, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ANSOWAS y AMPATIN, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Before us on appeal is the decision1 dated September 6, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-80475 finding herein appellant Antonio Ansowas y Ampatin guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P50,000 as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000 as actual damages.
On January 20, 1999, the appellant was charged with the murder of Teodoro Lacambra in an information that reads:
That on or about the 10th day of January, 1999, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of TEODORO LACAMBRA y DUCIAS by then and there stabbing the latter with the use of bladed weapon hitting him at the back potion of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Teodoro Lacambra y Ducias.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment on February 11, 1999, the appellant, assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty and the trial ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that, on January 10, 1999 at seven o’ clock in the evening, appellant Antonio Ansowas killed Teodoro Lacambra by stabbing the latter at the back.
Prosecution witness Allan Viñas, a nephew of the victim, testified that, on the night of the incident, he was conversing with his friends at a store located at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City, when he saw herein appellant Antonio Ansowas come out of his house holding an orange kitchen knife.3 The appellant approached and swung his knife at the victim who was then sitting inside a bakery. However, the victim was able to parry the thrust with his hand. The victim ran away but the appellant chased him. The appellant was able to catch up with the victim when the latter unfortunately bumped into a parked tricycle. The appellant took this opportunity to stab the victim at the back, which prosecution witness Viñas saw at a distance of more or less four meters. Thereafter, the victim was still able to stand up but he fell to the ground. Viñas carried the victim, called for a tricycle and boarded it. However, the tricycle driver got scared and ran away. Viñas’ uncle arrived and proclaimed that the victim was already dead. They then called for police assistance.4
SPO2 Alex Bisenio testified that, at about 7:15 in the evening on that fateful night, he was at home when a barangay tanod came to his house to ask for assistance regarding a fight along Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. Upon reaching the crime scene, he saw the victim lying on the ground and the appellant, who was about to escape5, holding a knife. Allan Viñas shouted and identified the appellant as the assailant.6 SPO2 Bisenio immediately approached herein appellant Ansowas who in turn voluntarily surrendered the knife without saying a word to the police officer. SPO2 Bisenio brought the appellant to the police station.7
When Dr. Teodoro Suguitan was presented as a witness, the parties admitted that he was an expert witness; that he conducted the autopsy on the victim to determine the cause of his death; that his findings were stated in Medico-Legal Report No. M-0037-99; that he made sketches of the human body8 and the head9 which indicated the locations of the victim’s wounds; and that he prepared the death certificate of the deceased victim.10
Dr. Suguitan explained that there were five wounds found on the victim’s corpse. Wound nos. 1, 2 and 3 were abrasions found on the right side of the forehead, over the right cheekbone and at the right side of the area between the upper lip near the nose, respectively. They could have been caused by scraping against a hard object. Wound no. 4 was a stab wound located at the left side of the back. It could have been caused by thrusting into the said part of the back a sharp-edged and pointed instrument. In his internal examination of wound no. 4, Dr. Suguitan found out that the eleventh rib was fractured, while the left lobe of the diaphragm, the inferior vena, the ascending aorta and the right atrium of the heart were pierced. Last, wound no. 5 was an incised wound caused by a sharp instrument and located at the distal portion of the left forearm. According to Dr. Suguitan, the victim died of hemorrhage as a result of wound no. 4 which was possibly inflicted while the assailant was at the back of the victim.11
On cross-examination, Dr. Suguitan testified that wound nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 could be classified as defense wounds that were inflicted before the victim sustained fatal wound no. 4. It was also possible that wound nos. 1, 2 and 3 were sustained when the victim fell down after being stabbed.12
The defense presented herein appellant Antonio Ansowas who claimed self-defense in inflicting the stab wound at the back of the victim.
According to the appellant, on January 10, 1999, at about seven o’clock in the evening, he was cooking inside his house at 114 Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City when he heard a shout coming from outside where several persons were drinking liquor. He immediately went down upon seeing his son-in-law, Romeo Macabente, being beaten up by the victim, Teodoro Lacambra. Macabente ran toward the house of the appellant who waited for him downstairs. There, the victim punched the appellant. The appellant and the victim engaged in a fist fight which stopped after their neighbors pacified them.13
Appellant Antonio Ansowas went back inside his house while the victim left. For thirty minutes, the appellant pondered on what happened. Then, he asked permission from his wife to buy cigarettes at the bakery which was less than half a meter from his house. On his way to the bakery, the victim, who was holding a knife, met him. When the victim tried to stab the appellant, the latter parried the thrust causing the victim to fall to the ground. The appellant faced the victim and grappled with him for the possession of the knife. The appellant was able to take the knife from the victim by twisting the victim’s arm. Then, the appellant stabbed him. The appellant stepped backwards while the victim fell to the ground for the second time.14
Appellant Antonio Ansowas further testified that, prior to the incident, he did not have any misunderstanding with the victim who happened to be his neighbor. They came from the same province, Sta. Rita, Western Samar, where the victim had a criminal record. According to the appellant, the victim stabbed somebody in the province and came to Manila to hide.15
On cross-examination, the appellant narrated that the stabbing incident happened near the bakery and just in front of the house of the victim which was more or less twenty meters from his house. He saw the victim drinking liquor with a certain Margarita Igana near the bakery. He was not able to buy cigarettes inasmuch as the victim approached him and drew the knife that was tucked in his waistline. As the victim approached him, he just stood by and told the victim "Tama na yan at dahil naayos na." At a distance of five meters, the appellant already saw the knife but he did not run away.16 The victim tried to stab the appellant at the front portion of the body but he was able to evade it by moving his body a little backward. This caused the victim who was then drunk to fall to the ground. When the victim fell, the appellant immediately grabbed his right arm and wrestled the knife from the victim and stabbed him. After being stabbed, the victim immediately stood up.17 The appellant claimed that he stabbed the victim while they were facing each other. He demonstrated how he stabbed the victim by stretching his right arm, putting it backward and swaying it in a circular manner. He hit the right side of the victim’s body.18
The appellant admitted that, immediately after stabbing the victim, he did not let go of the knife and even walked toward the victim. Meanwhile, the victim tried to escape by stepping backward but unfortunately bumped into a parked tricycle and fell down.19 After he stabbed the victim, the appellant immediately went to the policeman’s house and did not think of helping the victim due to fear of retaliation from the relatives of the victim.20 The appellant likewise claimed that the victim tried to walk from the place of the incident to the house of the policeman (150 meters away, as admitted by the parties) but collapsed about two houses away from the residence of the police officer. The victim walked backwards for 150 meters while the appellant followed him.21
After weighing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Antonio Ansowas y Ampatin, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and the amount of P50,000.00, as actual damages.
The accused is ordered to pay the costs.
The period within which the accused was detained at the City Jail of Quezon City shall be credited to him in full in his favor as long as he agrees in writing to abide by and follow strictly the rules and regulations of the said institution.
IT IS SO ORDERED.22
The trial court held that the absence of unlawful aggression negates the appellant’s claim of self-defense. The stab wound at the back, according to the trial court, disproved the appellant’s claim that he and the victim were confronting each other when he took the knife away and stabbed the victim with it.23 Although the trial court did not appreciate the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength for lack of proof, it found treachery to be present in the case at bar:
The evidence, however, clearly show (sic) that the attack on the accused was sudden and unexpected. The victim, Teodoro Lacambra, was seated with his friends when, without a word, he was stabbed by the accused without any means of defense and risk to himself. Worse, when the victim was able to run from the initial attack, the accused chased and stabbed the back of the victim that resulted to (sic) his death.
x x x x x x x x x
The act of the victim in parrying the stabbing thrusts of the accused while the victim was still seated during the initial attack, should not be interpreted to mean that the victim was not treacherously stabbed. As long as the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim was not placed on guard, treachery is still present. Treachery may still be appreciated for even when the victim was warned of danger to his person, what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible to defend for himself or to retaliate.24
Hence, this appeal based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR MURDER NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE ATTENDANCE OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.25
That the appellant killed the victim is not disputed. However, the appellant invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Consequently, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense and it is the duty of the latter to prove the alleged self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. The defense must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if that were weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the appellant himself has admitted killing the victim.26
The three elements of self-defense are provided under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 11. Justifying Circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
x x x x x x x x x
There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon.27 It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.28
We agree with the trial court that the victim did not commit unlawful aggression on the appellant, thereby negating the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
This Court has ruled in a long line of cases that the trial court is in the best position to determine facts and to assess the credibility of witnesses as it is in a unique position to observe the witnesses’ deportment while testifying. This is an opportunity not available to the appellate court. This Court will respect the findings and conclusions of the trial court provided they are supported by substantial evidence on record.29
The trial court gave more credence to the eyewitness account of Allan Viñas who saw the appellant attack the victim while the latter was seated. The victim parried the attacks with his hand and was able to run. However, he slammed into a parked tricycle causing him to fall. While the victim was down, the appellant stabbed him at the back. This testimony is bolstered by the undisputed findings of Dr. Suguitan, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy, who found that the stab wound at the back caused the death of the victim. We likewise find that the cut in his forearm corroborates Viñas’ testimony that prior to the stabbing, the victim parried with his hands the initial attacks of the appellant.
Although the appellant discredits the testimony of Viñas on account of self-serving motives, there is nothing in the records to show that, during the trial, his credibility as a prosecution witness was impeached. Also, the fact that Viñas was the nephew of the victim does not necessarily taint his testimony. We have held that the blood relationship between a witness and the victim does not, by itself, impair the former’s credibility. On the contrary, relationship may strengthen credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprit.30
Moreover, the appellant was not able to discharge the burden of proving that the murder he perpetrated was justified by self-defense. First, according to the appellant, the victim fell to the ground when he evaded the victim’s assault. The appellant then grabbed the victim’s arm and managed to take the knife from him. This Court finds it difficult to believe that the appellant would still scuffle for possession of the knife after the victim, who was dead drunk at that moment, already fell. There was an interruption in the alleged aggression that gave appellant the time and opportunity to escape, especially because the incident happened in an open area like a street. Second, the appellant testified that he continued to move towards the victim although he already saw the said victim brandishing a knife. Despite the opportunity to flee, the appellant’s bold conduct to face the armed menacing victim meant he accepted the victim’s challenge to fight. Third, he failed to explain how the victim acquired the cut in his forearm. If the only injury appellant inflicted with the knife was the stab wound at the back, how did the victim sustain a cut in his forearm? Obviously, the appellant thrust the knife at least twice at the intoxicated victim. This weakens his claim that he swung the knife only to defend himself. Fourth, the appellant claims that, after inflicting the stab wound at the back of the victim, he followed the victim who managed to stand up and walk backwards for about 150 meters. We refer to the testimony of Dr. Suguitan to belie the said allegation. Dr. Suguitan testified that, with such a back injury, the victim could "still stand up and raise his hand but not for long."31 We do not believe that the fatally injured and intoxicated victim could still manage to walk backward for 150 meters. The appellant’s act of following the fleeing victim, while still holding the knife, even suggests that he might have been contemplating to inflict more harm on the injured victim. We therefore find the appellant’s factual disposition to be an unconvincing version of the events that transpired during that fateful night.
We also agree with the trial court’s finding that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.32 The elements of treachery are: (1) the means of execution employed gives the person no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.33
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The accused suddenly attacked the unsuspecting victim who was sitting inside a bakery. The victim was initially able to parry the attack and run. But the accused caught up with him after the latter slammed into a parked tricycle. While getting up, the victim was stabbed at the back by the appellant. The victim’s act of parrying and running away from the initial assault does not negate treachery. To quote from the trial court’s ruling, "(a)s long as the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim was not placed on guard, treachery (was) still present. Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of the danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate."34
Since treachery was proven beyond reasonable doubt, the crime committed was murder. Article 248 (1) of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Art. 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
The appellant claims voluntary surrender to mitigate his liability. He allegedly turned over the knife to SPO2 Bisenio when the latter arrived at the crime scene. Even if true, the attendance of said mitigating circumstance would only merit the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the provision of Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that:
Article 63. Rules of application of indivisible penalties.-
x x x x x x x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
x x x x x x x x x
2. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
x x x x x x x x x
Considering that the crime of murder is punishable by two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death) and that no aggravating circumstance was present in the instant case, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua.
With respect to the appellant’s civil liabilities, the parties admitted that the heirs of the victim spent P42,000 for the wake, funeral and burial expenses.35 We therefore decrease the trial court’s award for actual damages from P50,000 to P42,000. The trial court’s award of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 6, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, finding herein appellant Antonio Ansowas y Ampatin GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages is reduced from P50,000 to P42,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Diosdado M. Peralta; Rollo, pp. 11-19.
2 Rollo, p. 4.
3 Exhibit "B".
4 TSN, April 13, 1999, pp. 1-7.
5 TSN, April 13, 1999, p. 22.
6 TSN, April 13, 1999, pp. 18-21.
7 TSN, April 13, 1999, pp. 21-22.
8 Exhibit "I".
9 Exhibit "H".
10 TSN, April 19, 1999, pp. 2-4.
11 TSN, April 19, 1999, pp. 5-9.
12 TSN, April 19, 1999, p. 10.
13 TSN, May 11, 1999, pp. 2-4.
14 TSN, May 11, 1999, pp. 4-5.
15 TSN, May 11, 1999, pp. 5-6.
16 TSN, May 11, 1999, pp. 9-11.
17 TSN, May 11, 1999, p. 15.
18 TSN, May 11, 1999, p. 7-8
19 TSN, May 11, 1999, pp. 7-8.
20 TSN, May 11, 1999, p. 12.
21 TSN, May 11, 1999, p. 14.
22 Rollo, p. 19.
23 Rollo, pp. 16-17.
24 Rollo, pp. 18-19.
25 Rollo, p. 36.
26 People vs. Silang Cruz, 53 Phil 635, (1929); People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil 772, (1946); People vs. Clemente, 21, SCRA 261, (1967); People vs. Talaboc, Jr., 30 SCRA 87 (1969); People vs. Montejo, 167 SCRA 506 (1988); People vs. Corecor, 159 SCRA 84, 87(1988).
27 People vs. Crisostomo, 108 SCRA 288, 298 (1981).
28 People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700, 704 (1990); People vs. Bayocot, 174 SCRA 285, 291 (1989).
29 People vs. Juan, 322 SCRA 598, (2000).
30 People vs. Ayupan, G.R. No. 140550, February 13, 2002, p. 14.
31 TSN, April 11, 1999, p. 11; italics supplied.
32 People vs. Macucha, 310 SCRA 14, 23-24 (1999).
33 People vs. Atrejenio, 310 SCRA 229, 244 (1999).
34 People vs. Landicho, 258 SCRA 1 (1996); Rollo, pp. 18-19.
35 TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 1-2.
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