EN BANC
G.R. No. 141767 April 2, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HILARION TEVES y CANTOR, accused-appellant.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9620-B convicting the appellant, Hilarion C. Teves, of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.1âwphi1.nęt
The lifeless body of Teresita Teves y Capuchino was found by a group of barangay tanods in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna in the late evening of August 25, 1996. The body of the victim bore strangulation marks around the neck and a stab wound just below the left armpit. During the investigation of the case, the husband of the victim, herein appellant, Hilarion C. Teves, was identified as the driver of the passenger jeep that was allegedly met by the barangay tanods shortly before they chanced upon the dead body of the victim on that fateful evening of August 25, 1996. It was also gathered by the police that the spouses purportedly had misunderstanding prior to the incident.
On December 3, 1996, Hilarion Teves y Cantor was charged with the crime of parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal, Code, as amended, in an Information2 that reads:
That on or about August 25, 1996, in the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HILARION TEVES y CANTOR, while conveniently armed with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill his wife TERESA CAPUCHINO y TEVES (sic) with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and strangle the said TERESA CAPUCHINO TEVES with the aforesaid deadly weapon, stabbing the latter on the left side of her chest causing her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned on January 13, 1997, herein appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the charge as contained in the Information. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that on August 25, 1996 at around 10:30 o'clock in the evening four (4) barangay tanods, namely: Milagros Tayawa, Jerry Pantilla, Angel Lapitan and Jose Bello, were patrolling on board a barangay patrol vehicle in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna. Milagros was behind the steering wheel. From the old national highway, they entered the NIA road which was an isolated dirt road seldom used by commuters due to its narrow width, There were no houses and streetlights along the immediate vicinity as the road was bound by an irrigation canal on one side and a stretch of rice field on the other. Subsequently, they met a passenger jeep that was coming from the opposite direction. Milagros had to maneuver backward to accommodate the other vehicle.3
As the patrol vehicle advanced, the barangay tanods saw a body of a woman lying on the left side of the NIA road. The woman's white polo shirt was raised above the chest exposing her right breast and a small wound just below her armpit; while her black pants were lowered down to her knees. Upon ascertaining that the woman was dead, Milagros and her companions immediately informed their chief before proceeding to the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station to report the incident.4 The police examined the cadaver, and then took the sworn statement5 of Milagros Tayawa on the same evening of August 25, 1996.
Dr. Erwin Escal, medico-legal officer, conducted the autopsy on the body of Teresa Teves upon the request of PO2 Tony Gangano. Dr, Escal identified in court the Autopsy Report6 which shows the following findings:
Post Mortem Examination:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished female cadaver in rigor mortem with post mortem lividity at the dependent portion of the body. Palpabral conjunctive are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic.
There are petechial hemorrhages on the face and neck and subconjunctival hemorrhage on the left lateral conthal region.
Head, Neck, Trunk and Extremeties:
1. Hematoma 0.5 x 0.5 cm. mid-pariento occipital area left.
2. Hematoma 0.5 x 0.5 cm. parieto occipital area right.
3. Contusion hematoma right lateral neck, measuring 6 cm; x 0.1 cm.
4. Punctured wound triangular in shape at the mid-axillary line, left pectoralis region measuring 1 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm., non- penetrating.
5. Contusion hematoma 12 x 4 cm. right lateral abdominal region.
6. Abrasion 4 x 2 cm. right lumbar region.
7. Area of contusion hematoma with abrasion right buttocks measuring 7 x 6 cm.
On opening up: The scalp was deflicted to expose the skull and was sawing it off coronally. No skull fracture noted and the brain was grossly normal.
Conclusion:
The cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation.
According to Dr. Escal, the victim could have been strangled ("binigti") with the use of a constricting material which may be a wire, a rope or a nylon cord and that the victim may have been dead for not less than thirty-six (36) hours when it was brought to him for autopsy examination at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on August 26, 1996.7
On August 29, 1996 Milagros was invited to the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station by the PNP Provincial Director, Supt. Arthur Castillo, to identify a certain person and a passenger jeep in connection with the incident on August 25, 1996. She remembered the person, who turned out to be the husband of the victim, herein appellant Hilarion C. Teves, as the driver of the passenger jeep that they met on the NIA road in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna shortly before they chanced upon the body of a dead woman later identified as Teresa C. Teves. She recognized the appellant when their respective vehicles momentarily stopped facing each other with their headlights switched on. She had also seen the appellant while the latter was sitting on a bench at the back of " the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station when she came to verify the status of the case on August 27, 1996.
Milagros likewise recognized the passenger jeep8 as the same vehicle being driven by the appellant when they met on the NIA road in the late evening of August 25, 1996. Milagros explained that she instructed her fellow barangay tanods to train their flashlight on its direction after the passenger jeep speed away and she read partly the plate number at the back as "DJN 6" which she wrote on a cigarette foil9 ("palara"). She also noted the distinguishing features of the passenger jeep such as: a) the maroon paint on the bumper; b) the small lights attached to the bumper; and c) the green reflectorized paints on the bumper. After identifying the appellant and the passenger jeep, Milagros executed another sworn statement10 before the police.
Upon his detention on the same date of August 29, 1996, the appellant allegedly requested the aunt of the victim, Maria Alulod, who was present at the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station, to send his Tata Enteng (Vicente Alulod) to the police station and to bring money for a certain barangay tanod of Barangay Macabling so that his sentence for the commission of the crime would be reduced.11 Vicente, turned down the request as he noted during the wake of Teresa that Hilarion was not actually sorry for his wife's death although he appeared worried ("balisa").12
It also appears that before her untimely demise, Teresa was able to confide with an aunt, Paula Beato Dia, that she had a marital problem. Paula counseled her that it was natural for any husband and wife to have occasional problems. She even suggested to Teresa to seek the advice of her Tata Felix.13
In July 1996 Teresa approached her uncle, Felix Padua, to seek the, latter's advice concerning her marital problem. Apparently, her husband, herein appellant Hilarion Teves, proposed that they live separately. He also wanted to secure an arrangement regarding the custody of their children and his wife's consent regarding the disposition of their house and lot. Teresa could not recall any serious reason for her husband's behavior but she surmised that the appellant resented her comment that his peers were all "dalaga" and "binata". Since Felix was busy at that time, he advised Teresa to visit him on another occasion so that they could discuss her problem thoroughly.14
In the same month of July, Teresa and the appellant went to the house of Felix Padua in Santa Rosa, Laguna. When asked about their problem, the appellant disclosed that he could no longer put up with Teresa's jealousy that often caused him embarrassment before his friends. Felix tried to explain that it was common between any husband and wife to get jealous and that appellant should realize that his wife simply loved him very much. However, the appellant would not listen and even imputed that his wife had a bad character.15
On July 20, 1996 Paula Beato Dia learned from Teresa that the couple had finally decided to live separately after conferring with their Tata Felix. On July 30, 1996 Teresa informed Paula that the appellant became violent ("nagwala") over her refusal to sell their properties. Paula then advised her niece to bring the matter to the barangay officials.16
The evidence of the defense shows that the appellant stayed in their house during the day on August 25, 1996. He helped his wife, Teresa, washed their clothes. In the afternoon, he watched basketball game on the television and also helped his children with their school assignments. He started to ply the Binan-Cabuyao route with his passenger jeep at 6:30 o'clock in the evening, as it was his usual schedule. Before leaving however, he told his wife that he would spend the night in the house of his uncle Caloy in Barangay Tagapo, Santa Rosa, Laguna.17 It appears that the daughter of his uncle Caloy celebrated her debut which the appellant and his children attended on August 24, 1996. When the party ended, he was requested by the family to help in returning some of the borrowed equipment on the following day.
Teresa also left the house at about 8:30 o'clock in the evening on the same day allegedly to confer with somebody. She instructed her daughter, Leizel, not to lock the door when they go to sleep. Leizel saw her mother board a tricycle behind the driver, inasmuch as there were already two passengers in its sidecar.18 Teresa was also seen by another tricycle driver, a certain Edwin Carapatan, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening while she was on board a tricycle behind the driver which was bound for the town proper. Both even greeted each other.19
Meanwhile due to heavy traffic, the appellant managed to ply his route 2 ˝ times only after which he proceeded to the house of his Tiyo Caloy in Barangay Tagapo, Santa Rosa, Laguna. Upon arrival at exactly 8:30 o'clock in the evening, the appellant ate his supper. Thereafter, they arranged the things for him to bring home on the following day. Before going to sleep, the appellant joined the family in watching basketball game on the television until the game was over at 10:00 o'clock in the evening.20
When the appellant arrived home in Barangay Sinalhan, Santa Rosa, Laguna on August 26, 1996, he was informed by his youngest child that his wife was not around. According to appellant, he thought that his wife left early on that day to look for a job. He learned that his wife left the house at 8:30 o'clock in the previous evening upon arrival of his second eldest daughter, Lalaine, from school at 12:00 o'clock noon.21
The appellant and his neighbors searched for Teresita in the entire afternoon but in vain. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard of talks that a body of a dead woman was found in Barangay Balibago, Santa Rosa, Laguna. He went to Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station together with a certain Lebong Dia and was instructed by the police to proceed to Funeraria Lim after hearing his description of his wife. At 11:30 in the evening, he saw the dead body of his " wife at the funeral parlor which he brought home after midnight.22
On August 27, 1996, the appellant went back to the police station in Santa Rosa, Laguna where he was initially informed by a certain police officer Laurel that his wife might be a victim of gang rape. However, he learned later that he was a suspect in the killing of his wife when he was investigated by the police.
On August 29, 1996, he returned to the police station in Santa Rosa, Laguna upon being informed that Supt. Arthur Castillo would investigate the case. Three (3) barangay tanods, namely: Angel Lapitan, Milagros Tayawa and Gerry Pantilla were present in the police station. Castillo requested them to identify the appellant; however, none of the three (3) was able to recognize him. The appellant was asked to sit behind the steering wheel of his passenger jeep and was even ordered to wave his hand while pictures of him were being taken. Subsequently, Castillo urged the three (3) barangay tanods to take a good look at the appellant to refresh their memory after which he asked: "Ano sa tingin niyo?" When no response from the tanods was forthcoming, Castillo again asked: "Hindi pa ba ninyo nakikilala yan?" After putting his hand on the shoulder of Barangay Tanod Milagros Tayawa, the latter remarked: "Parang kahawig niya." Thereafter, Col. Castillo ordered the appellant's arrest.23
On December 7, 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Hilarion Teves y Cantor, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, restored in R. A. No. 7659, Imposing Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, and there being present the aggravating circumstances the herein accused killed his wife (a) during nighttime; (b) in an uninhabited place; and (c) with the use of a motor vehicle (jeepney), hereby imposes upon him the DEATH PENALTY and orders him to indemnify the heirs of Teresa Teves the sum of P100,000.00, as moral damages. .
The Provincial Jail Warden of Santa Rosa, Laguna is hereby ordered to transfer accused Hilarion Teves y Cantor to the National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the decision, Hilarion C. Teves appealed to this Court raising the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE AS CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9620-B DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE INCOHERENCE, INCREDIBILITY AND INADEQUACY IN WEIGHT AND VALUE OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RELIED UPON.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF MILAGROS TAYAWA AND MARIA ALULOD WHICH ARE INCREDIBLE BASED ON COMMON OBSERVATION AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE EQUIVOCAL TESTIMONY OF DR. EDWIN ESCAL IN FAVOR OF GUlLT AND AGAINST THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
In his brief,24 the appellant contends, in essence, that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Under the factual milieu of the case, Milagros could not have recognized the vehicle and its driver which she allegedly met on August 25, 1996. He also contends that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Felix Padua and Paula Beato Dia to the effect that the appellant and his wife had a misunderstanding were basically anchored on mere suspicion. Moreover, the alleged implied admission by the appellant of his alleged guilt before Maria Alulod, who is an aunt of the victim is incredible as it contradicts common human experience. Lastly, the testimony of Dr. Edwin Escal suggests that several malefactors may be responsible for the killing of the victim.
The facts of this case clearly show that nobody had actually witnessed the killing of the victim, Teresita Teves, in the evening of August 25, 1996. To prove its case of parricide against the appellant, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence. In order to convict an accused based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.25 In other words, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction where the multiple circumstances are proven and are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is innocent as well as incompatible with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the accused.26
In convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide based on circumstantial evidence, the trial court found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were credible and sufficient. It is well-settled rule that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses' testimonies is accorded great respect on appeal.27 Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial courts since the latter are in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.28
After thorough review, however, we find sufficient basis to warrant the reversal of the assailed judgment of conviction. The trial court relied on the identification made by Milagros Tayawa during the trial of this case in finding that the appellant was the person driving the passenger jeep that was allegedly met by the four (4) barangay tanods along the NIA road in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna in the late evening of August 25, 1996 shortly before they accidentally found the dead body of Teresita Teves. We note, however, the irregular manner by which the pre-trial identification of the appellant and his passenger jeep during the custodial investigation on August 29, 1996 was made by Milagros. At that time, the appellant, who was already a suspect in his wife's murder, was alone inside the investigation room of the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station and without his counsel. He was also ordered by Supt. Castillo to board his passenger jeep, extend part of his body outside of the vehicle while waving his hand, as if doing some kind of a re-enactment, to be observed by Milagros and two (2) other barangay tanods namely: Jerry Pantilla and Angel Lapitan.
We agree with the Solicitor General's observation that the pre-trial identification in which the prosecution witness was made to identify the suspect (herein appellant) in a one-on-one confrontation, was pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination and, all told, subverted the identification of the appellant by the witness. This method of identification is as tainted as an uncounseled confession and thus, falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection.29
Besides, there is reason to doubt the reliability of the said testimony of Milagros Tayawa. Milagros allegedly recognized the appellant when their respective vehicles momentarily stopped facing each other while their headlights were switched on. In the ocular inspection conducted during the trial on July 2, 1997, it was demonstrated that the two (2) vehicles were initially twenty and one-half (20 1/2) feet apart when they stopped facing each other. When the barangay patrol vehicle backed off to accommodate the passenger jeep, the two (2) vehicles were thirty-six and one-half (36 1/2) feet apart, at which distance the trial court made the observation that the man behind the steering wheel was not cognizable in broad daylight.30
If the man on the driver's seat was not cognizable in broad daylight, this court is not convinced that an accurate identification of the driver of the passenger jeep, who was allegedly met by the barangay tanods at around 10:30 o'clock in the evening on August 25, 1996, can be made even from a distance of twenty and one-half (20 1/2) feet by the prosecution witness. It must be pointed out that the two (2) vehicles were then passing along an isolated dirt road where there were no houses and streetlights in the immediate vicinity. Under the circumstances, clear visibility was practically improbable, if not impossible, from a distance.
There is more reason to doubt the reliability of the testimony of Milagros Tayawa upon consideration of the sworn statement31 that she gave before the police authorities during the investigation of this case. Her sworn statement contains a narration of the circumstances leading to the discovery of Teresita's dead body. Significantly, no mention was made therein that she had seen the driver of the passenger jeep that they allegedly met in the late evening of August 25, 1996 on the NIA road, much less described his face or his other physical features.
It is absurd to believe that Milagros forgot or the police investigators had been so negligent as to overlook this omission in her affidavit. In the first place, the purpose of the investigation was to elicit basic information about the killing, such as the identity of the perpetrator thereof. It was only during the custodial investigation on August 29, 1996 that Milagros claimed in her subsequent affidavit32 that she had seen the driver of the same passenger jeep after the irregular one-on-one confrontation with the appellant and after unwarranted suggestions had been made to the said witness by the police officer.
Notably, the prosecution failed to present the testimony of the other barangay tanods who were likewise present during the incident on August 25, 1996 to corroborate the testimony of Milagros. This is not difficult to understand considering that the statements elicited from Angel Lapitan during the investigation of the case run counter to the testimony that she gave during the trial, to wit:
Tanong: Nakilala ba ninyo ang nagmamaneho at nakuha ba ninyo ang plaka nito?
Sagot : Hindi namin nakilala ang driver dahil patay ang kanyang ilaw sa loob at ng aming ilawan ang kanyang likuran ay walang plaka.33
Due to the above statement of Angel Lapitan before the police investigator, even the testimony of Milagros Tayawa that she recognized the passenger jeep of the appellant as the same vehicle that they met along the NIA road shortly before having accidentally discovered the dead body of the victim, was also rendered doubtful. Besides, the passenger jeep of the appellant had been impounded at the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station since August 27, 1996 or two (2) days before the pre-trial identification of the said vehicle.34
We also doubt the testimony of Maria Alulod for being contrary to common human experience. It would be highly unlikely and contrary to common sense for the appellant to admit his guilt before this witness, who is an aunt of the victim, while vehemently denying to the police authorities any participation for the death of his wife. It is well-settled rule that evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself.35
The motive that allegedly drove the appellant to kill his wife, as testified by prosecution witnesses Felix Padua and Paula Dia, is not convincing. Both prosecution witnesses simply stated in general terms that the appellant and his wife were having a family problem out of the latter's jealous attitude and that they decided to separate. These prosecution witnesses failed to furnish any specific incident to the effect that Teresita had actually feared for her life or that appellant had become so desperate as to will the death of his wife. At the most, their testimonies simply manifest a suspicion of appellant's responsibility for the crime. Needless to state, however, suspicion no matter how strong can not sway judgment.36
On the other hand, the victim's daughter, Leizel Teves, testified that her family was a normal and happy family. Leizel's testimony was corroborated by the victim's cousin, Minerva Diaz, who testified that the Teves family was a harmonious and happy family.37 Additionally, Rosita Barreto, a friend of the Teves family and a neighbor for over seventeen (17) years, attested that the relations of the appellant and his wife were generally smooth.38
Even if we would assume that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true, it can not be reasonably inferred therefrom that the appellant is responsible for killing his wife in the absence of any other circumstance that could link him to the said killing. To be sure, motive is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be adduced that the accused was the malefactor.39
In view of the foregoing, we cannot sustain the appealed judgment of the trial court in the case at bar. The prosecution miserably failed to establish the circumstantial evidence to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, we need not pass upon the merits of his defense of alibi.40 It is well-entrenched rule in criminal law that the conviction of an accused must be based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence of the defense.41
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision in Criminal Case No. 9620-B is reversed and set aside. The appellant Hilarion Teves y Cantor is acquitted of the crime of parricide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Unless convicted for any other crime or detained for some lawful reason, appellant Hilarion Teves y Cantor is ordered released immediately.1âwphi1.nęt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez. JJ:., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Hilario F. Corcuera, Rollo, pp. 33-99.
2 Rollo, p. 8.
3 TSN dated May 28, 1997, pp, 2-19.
4 TSN dated May 28, 1997, pp. 20-25.
5 Exhibit "C"
6 Exhibit "E"
7 TSN dated June 18, 1997, pp. 9-10.
8 Exhibits "A"; "A-l".
9 Exhibit "B".
10 Exhibit "D". .
11 TSN dated September 3, 1997, p. 22.
12 TSN dated August 12,1997, p. 20.
13 TSN dated July 2, 1997, pp. 23-26.
14 TSN dated July 2, 1997, pp. 23-26.
15 TSN dated July 2,1997, pp. 29-32.
16 TSN dated August 12, 1997, pp. 6-8.
17 TSN dated October 12, 1998, pp. 20-29.
18 TSN dated May 26, 1998, pp. 18-21.
19 TSN dated August 31,1998, pp. 7-9.
20 TSN dated October 12,1998, pp. 31-38.
21 TSN dated October 20, 1998, pp. 5-8.
22 Id., pp. 9-18.
23 TSN dated December 7,1998, pp.14-37.
24 Rollo, pp. 111-187.
25 Rule 134, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
26 People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675, 685 (1993); People v. Alabaso, 204 SCRA 458,463 (1991); People v. Maravilla, Jr., 167 SCRA 645,652 (1988).
27 People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64,72 (1993); ; People v. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263, 267 (1991 ).
28 People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535, 552 (1991); People v. Alburo, 184 SCRA 655, 662 (1990).
29 People v. Hilssan, 157 RA 261,271-272 (1988); People v. Cruz, 32 SCRA 181,186 (1970).
30 TSN dated July 2, 1997, pp. 9-14.
31 Exhibit "C".
32 Exhibit "D".
33 Exhibit "4".
34 TSN dated October 20, 1998, pp. 30-32.
35 People v. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, 459 (1967); People v. Macso, 64 SCRA 659, 665 (1975); People v. Peruelo, 105 SCRA 226,235 (1981).
36 People v. Balderas, 276 SCRA 470,484 (1997).
37 TSN dated April 21, 1998, pp. 2, 16.
38 TSN dated May 5, 1998, pp. 3, 5.
39 People v. Manambit, 271 SCRA 344,368 (1997).
40 Id., p. 381.
41 See Note No.36, supra, p.480.
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