SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 126210 March 9, 2000
CRISTINA PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HAGONOY RURAL BANK, INC., and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which annulled and set aside an Order 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos Bulacan. The assailed Order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. of an order allowing the amendment of the information in Criminal Case No. 1604-M-94 3 to exclude petitioner Cristina Perez as one of the accused therein.
The following facts are undisputed:
Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which employed petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Officer-in-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as Bookkeeper, and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field Managers.
For the period starting August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audit of the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop. The auditing firm found anomalies in more or less twenty-eight (28) savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the subsidiary ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the possession of the depositors. Although these withdrawals were supported by withdrawal slips, the signatures appearing thereon were noticeably different from the sample signatures written by the bona fide depositors in their specimen signature cards and/or in the subsidiary ledgers. The audit also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits were recorded in the money shop's subsidiary ledgers whenever the remaining balance in a particular saving account was depleted below the amount of legitimate withdrawals made by a depositor. All in all, the anomalous withdrawals amounted to P879,727.08. 4
The anomalies unearthed by the auditing firm prompted the private respondent to file an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the aforementioned employees of the money shop and two outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas. 5 On February 18, 1994, Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang (hereinafter "prosecutor"), issued a resolution finding prima facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-employees, Alberto Fabian, Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, and recommending the filing of the corresponding information against them with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however, dismissed. 6
Aggrieved by the said resolution, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the dismissal of the charges against her. On the other hand, private respondent moved for a reconsideration of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the complaint against Susan Jordan. 7
In a resolution dated April 19, 1994, the prosecutor granted private respondent's motion for reconsideration. 8 Hence, on April 27, 1994, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was filed against herein petitioner, Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina Medina and Susan Jordan, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1604-M-94 in Branch 9 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. 9
On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution No. 696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information against herein petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence. 10 The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion, however, was denied with finality by the latter. 11
Meanwhile, pursuant to the said directive of the Secretary of Justice, the prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1604-M-94. 12 On January 13, 1995, presiding Judge O. Roy A. Masadao of the said court granted the said motion. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against the petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC. However, the trial court denied the said motion in an Order dated February 21, 1995 after finding that the private respondent, as private complainant, had no legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges against the petitioner. 13
Alleging that Judge Masadao had issued the said order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. On February 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the assailed Order of February 21, 1995 and directing Judge Masadao to resolve with dispatch the private respondent's motion for reconsideration on the basis of its merit or lack thereof. 14
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO SQUARELY RULE UPON THE MERITS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT BANK'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE FEBRUARY 21, 1995 ORDER OF THE TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION WHICH EXCLUDED THE HEREIN PETITIONER FROM THE SAID INFORMATION [WAS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION], THUS OVERLOOKING AMPLE JURISPRUDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE ORDER.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO RULE ON THE MERITS OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN OFFENDED PARTY OF THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ORDER ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION AFTER FINDING THAT THE SAID OFFENDED PARTY HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE SUCH MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ON PETITION FOR REVIEW TO ORDER THE PROSECUTOR TO CAUSE THE DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION IN COURT AGAINST THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHICH IN EFFECT ALLOWED THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION EXCLUDING THE ACCUSED FROM THE INFORMATION.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE DISPOSED OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT BANKS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN A CAVALIER FASHION.
5. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED FROM THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION. 15
Succinctly put, the issues in the instant case are: first, whether or not Judge Masadao, presiding judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner without an independent assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter; second, whether or not the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has the legal personality to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor; and third, whether or not the dismissal of the charges against the petitioner is warranted by the evidence at hand.
First. Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
In moving for the dismissal of the case against the petitioner, the prosecutor averred:
1. That on October 18, 1994 (sic) he was in receipt of a resolution dated September 23, 1994 from the Secretary of Justice, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
WHEREFORE. Your resolution is partly reversed. You are directed to cause the dismissal of the information if any, filed against respondent Cristina Perez in the above-entitled case and report on the action taken therein within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
2. That pursuant to the said resolution, an amended information is (sic) hereto attached excluding Cristina Perez is well in order and copy of said amended information is hereto attached.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the case insofar as respondent Cristina Perez be dismissed and the amended information be admitted. 16
The Order granting the above quoted motion states in its entirety that:
O R D E R
Finding no legal impediment to the same, the motion filed by Public Prosecutor Jesus Y Manarang seeking the amendment of the Information is hereby GRANTED, and the Amended Information attached thereto is hereby ADMITTED to form part of the record of the above-entitled case.
By the foregoing token, the warrant of arrest already issued is hereby recalled and rendered ineffective with respect only to accused CRISTINA PEREZ.
SO ORDERED. 17
The above quoted Order allowing the amendment of the information to exclude petitioner therefrom effectively dismissed the criminal case against the latter. That the trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case is apparent from the foregoing order. Judge Masadao's reliance on the prosecutor's averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against the petitioner was, to say the least, an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of this Court's pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul 18 as reiterated in the later case of Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 19 to wit:
In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the judge's own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul. 20
Petitioner contends that the doctrine laid down by this Court in Martinez v. Court of Appeals 21 is not applicable to the instant case for several reasons. First, in the Martinez case, the private offended party was deprived of due process as he was not furnished with a copy of the prosecution's motion to dismiss, whereas in this case, not only was the private respondent furnished a copy of the motion to dismiss, it was also given an opportunity to file its comment thereon. Second, in the case at bar, the Solicitor General adopts the view that the trial judge acted correctly in granting the motion to dismiss while in Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 22 the Solicitor General recommended the setting aside of the order granting the motion to dismiss. Finally, the dismissal of the criminal case against the accused in Martinez v. Court of Appeals 23 was based solely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice. On the other hand, at the time Judge Masadao granted the motion to dismiss the criminal case against the petitioner, he already had before him the affidavit-complaint of private respondent, the resolution of the prosecutor finding probable cause against the employees of the money shop, the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the case against the petitioner, the private respondent's comment and supplemental comment to the latter, and the position papers of the petitioner and the private respondent. 24
Petitioner's arguments are not convincing.
A perusal of the Martinez case reveals that the opinion of this Court finding the dismissal of the case against the accused erroneous was not predicated on the violation of the private offended party's right to due process nor on the recommendation of the Solicitor General. In fact, we categorically stated therein that the "fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in its failure to observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and judiciously." 25 The first part refers to the fact that the private offended party was not afforded his day in court while the latter pertains to the failure of the judge to make an independent assessment of the evidence or lack thereof against the accused. Otherwise stated, the first is not the rationale behind the latter declaration.
Furthermore, petitioner's asseveration that as the records of the case were already before Judge Masadao, it can be safely assumed that he had studied them and thereafter agreed with the prosecution that he evidence did not support the earlier finding of probable cause against the petitioner. This is non sequitur and is simply belied by the order that nonchalantly granted the motion to dismiss. Moreover, Judge Masadao categorically declined to pass upon the merits of the private respondent's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner, and chose to summarily deny the same on the ground of the private respondent's lack of personality to revive the criminal charges against the petitioner. 26
Second. The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 27 we held that:
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant. 28
Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, 29 the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law.
Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals 30 allowing the private offended party to file a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge granting the motion to dismiss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. We held therein that although the correct procedure would have been to appeal the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the Office of the President, the said remedy was unavailable to the private offended party as the penalty involved was neither reclusion perpetua nor death. 31 Hence, as no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to the private offended party, filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was proper. 32
It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a special civil action for certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against the petitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors. 33
In support of her position, petitioner invokes our ruling in Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court 34 which, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, is not applicable to the case at bar. We quote with approval the Court of Appeals' incisive opinion on this matter:
For one, Caes is a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms and marijuana, conviction for which would not entail any civil liability on the part of the accused. Here, the very nature of the offense charged, to wit: estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, immediately connotes damages for which the accused may be held civilly liable in case of conviction. . . . .
For another there is no immediate and direct offended party in Caes. It was a simple case of violation of special laws where no particular person or individual stands as a victim of the offense charged. Such is not the situation in the case at bench. For here, the anomalous abstraction of funds in the petitioner's money shop directly and immediately inflicts financial damage to the petitioner.
Then, too, in Caes, at stake is the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. There, accused Joel B. Caes was a detention prisoner but the trial could not proceed because the prosecution witnesses repeatedly failed to appear, resulting in numerous postponements and resettings which lasted for more than one year. After the case was provisionally dismissed on motion of the prosecution, a prosecution witness whose non-appearance in court was the very cause for the dismissal, filed a motion to revive, which was granted by the trial judge. In vitiating the order of the revival, the Supreme Court did rule, among other things, that said witness has no personality to file the motion as only the prosecuting fiscal could. At the same time, however, the High Court stressed the right of the accused to a speedy trial and ruled as permanent the prior dismissal of the case even as the lower court termed is as merely "provisional" . . . .
x x x x x x x x x
Finally, it must be emphasized herein that unlike in Caes where the prosecution witness who filed the motion to revive could have easily asked the public prosecutor himself to file said motion, here, such an alternative is simply unthinkable for the simple reason that the public prosecutor, albeit originally for the inclusion of the herein private respondent in the information, was the very one who filed the amended information upon the direction of his superior, the Secretary of Justice. In short, while there does not exist a conflict of position between the prosecution witness and the public prosecutor in Caes, the present case presents the sad spectacle of an offended party very much anxious to prosecute an accused but the public prosecutor who must have shared the same interest, had to move for the exclusion of said accused because he was ordered by his boss. 35
Third, This Court cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the petitioner.
As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court.1âwphi1 Our duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. 36 There are, however, exceptions 37 to this rule, none of which are obtaining in the case now before us.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36742 is hereby AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nęt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 26, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36742 entitled "HAGONOY RURAL BANK, INC. versus HON. D. ROY A. MASADAO, JR., Judge, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9; HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR JESUS Y. MANARANG, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CRISTINA PEREZ."
2 Issued by Judge D. Roy A. Masadao of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos Bulacan.
3 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus CRISTINA PEREZ, CRISTINA MEDINA, ALBERTO FABIAN, MILAGROS MARTIN and SUSAN JORDAN.
4 ANNEX "A" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 42-43.
5 Id., p. 3, Rollo, p. 44.
6 ANNEX "D" of the Petition, p. 17, Rollo, p. 95.
7 Supra, see note 4, p. 10, Rollo, p. 50.
8 ANNEX "E" of the Petition, p. 3, Rollo, p. 98.
9 Supra, see note 7.
10 ANNEX "G" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 99.
11 ANNEX "I" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 108.
12 ANNEX "H" of the Petition, p. 1, Rollo, p. 104.
13 ANNEX "K" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 110-111.
14 Supra, see note 4, p. 23, Rollo, p. 63.
15 Petition, pp. 11-12, Rollo, pp. 19-20.
16 ANNEX "H" of the Petition, Rollo, p 104.
17 ANNEX "J" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 109.
18 151 SCRA 462 (1987).
19 237 SCRA 575 (1994).
20 Id., pp. 585-586. See also Dee vs. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 254, 265 (1994); Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307, 333-334 (1996).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 11-12, Rollo, pp. 174-175.
25 See note 19, supra at p. 584.
26 O R D E R
x x x x x x x x x
The Court declines to pass upon the merits, or lack of it, of the aforementioned motion for reconsideration. Suffice it to be said that the Court holds the view that the private prosecutor has no legal personality to file such motion for reconsideration in the light of the ruling in Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54, 58-59: "It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control. This is true even if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the examination of the witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling of the case. . . . they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not even parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action. Their only function is to testify. In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or one acting under his authority, and by no one else."
x x x x x x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration and Immediate Suspension of the Implementation of the Assailed Order filed by offended party Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. thru a private prosecutor is hereby DENIED due course.
x x x x x x x x x
SO ORDERED.
27 253 SCRA 499 (1996).
28 Id., p. 507; People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143, 153 (1989).
29 Memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General, p. 16, Rollo. p. 211.
30 238 SCRA 254 (1994).
31 Memorandum Circular No. 1266, in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 1294 dated Nov. 4, 1993:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice and in order to avoid undue and unnecessary involvement of the Presidency in adversary suits before the courts, the following guidelines are hereby prescribed in appeals/reviews of resolutions in preliminary investigations of criminal cases.
When complainants and/or respondents petition for an appeal/review by the President of investigations conducted by Provincial/City Fiscals and resolved on appeal by the Ministry of Justice, the petition shall not be given due course and shall be forthwith denied, except that in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death wherein new and material issues are raised which were not previously presented before the Ministry of Justice and were nor ruled upon in the subject resolution by the Ministry of Justice, the President may order the Ministry of Justice to reopen/review the case provided that the prescription of the offense is not due to lapse within six (6) months from notice of the questioned resolution, and provided further that the petitioner for appeal/review is filed within thirty (30) days from such notice. Cited in Dee vs. Court of Appeals, see note 30, supra at p. 262.
32 See note 30, supra at pp. 261-262.
33 Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 602, 611 (1998) citing Lasco vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources, 241 SCRA 681, 684 (1995).
34 179 SCRA 54 (1989).
35 See note 4, supra at pp. 15-16, Rollo, pp. 55-56.
36 Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, see note 20, supra at p. 345
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional right of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez. 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano supra; Fortun vs. Labang,. et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981; 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub-judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the act of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo CA-G R No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L. J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R. October 8, 1962. Cf. Guingona, et al., vs. City Fiscal, L-60033: April 4, 1984 128 SCRA 577), and
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985 134 SCRA 438) Cited in Roberts vs. Dee, supra at p. 345.
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