Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 127022 September 2, 1999
FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Spouses CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG KENG, Spouses CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG, Spouses SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA and LETICIA NOCOM CHAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI of Rizal) and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, METRO MANILA, respondents, ALEJANDRO B. REY, petitioner-intervenor.
G.R. No. 127245 September 2, 1999
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR, LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA A. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC., THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI) of RIZAL, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, METRO MANILA, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
These consolidated cases originated from the decision 1 rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36280 entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director, Land Management Bureau, petitioner, against Lorenzo J. Gana, Patrocinio E. Margolles, Alice E. Sotto, Virginia E. Villongco, Edgardo C. Espinosa, Lucia A. Laperal, Norma C. Espinosa, Teresita E. Casal, Peltran Development, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, respondents, an action for annulment of judgment of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in LRC Case No. 672, GLRO Record No. 30406.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows 2:
The parcel of land involved in this case is located in Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, with an area of 996,175 square meters, more or less, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4216.
Alleged, among others, in the petition are that:
5. The Municipality of Las Piñas, Rizal, now Metro Manila, was originally classified as a forest land and out of 2,556 hectares comprising it, 1,200 hectares were declared A and D lands in 1928 under LC Map No. 766, Project 13. The rest of the municipality was declassified as forest land and declared A and D lands only on January 3, 1968 under LC Map No. 2623, Project 13-A, pursuant to FAO No. 4-1141.
6. It appears that on March 26, 1929, the spouses Lorenzo J. Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos obtained a certificate of title over 996,175 square meters of land located in Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, under OCT No. 4216.
7. The land "covered by said title was purportedly surveyed on November 17, 1925 under plan Psu-49273, approved on May 12, 1926; that in 1927, they filed an application for registration of said land; that the case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 672, Record No. 30406; and that allegedly on the basis of the decision rendered therein (see Certification re unavailability of copy of decision, Annex B), Decree No. 351823, OCT No. 4216 was issued on March 26, 1929 to the aforesaid spouses.1âwphi1.nęt
8. On the basis of investigations conducted by the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, it was found that the property covered by OCT No. 4216 was, at the time of its issuance on March 26, 1929, still formed part of the forest zone and, hence, incapable of registration as private property.
8.1. Thus, it was only on January 3, 1968 when that portion of the Municipality of Las Piñas, which includes the property embraced by OCT No. 4216, was declassified from its category as forest land and declared A and D land under LC Map No. 2623, Project 13-A, pursuant to FAO No. 4-1141.
8.2. Even assuming, however, that the same property was included in the area declared as A and D land in 1928 under LC Map No. 766, Project 13, still it could not be the subject of registration since possession thereof prior to 1928, when it was still within the forest zone, could not ripen into private ownership.
Private respondent Virginia E. Villongco, in behalf of the other private respondents filed a "MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO DISMISS" alleging that the issue raised in this petition which is the validity of OCT No. 4216 has already been passed upon by the Supreme Court in two cases: G.R. No. 109490 entitled "Patricinio E. Margolles, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al." decided in their favor on February 14, 1994 and G.R. No. 112036 entitled "Golden Rod, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. wherein the petition which questions the validity of OCT No. 4216 was denied.
Private respondent PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that:
I
THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OR NATURE OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
THE VENUE OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT IS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT.
III
THE PRESENT ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT IS BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT AND/OR BY STARE DECISIS.
In the private respondent's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss an additional reason for the dismissal of the petition is that:
failure to attach to the petition a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled is a fatal defect for the Court has no basis on which to rule that the alleged judgment is null and void.
The petitioner claims that the said judgment is fatally defective in that it ordered the registration of forest land in the name of the Gana spouses.
Indeed, such claim may be a mere conjecture as there is no copy of the questioned decision which this Court could examine in order to determine why such judgment is null and void. As pointed out by the private respondents, what if the decision stated that the land is alienable and disposable public land, or that the Director of Land and Director of Forestry did oppose the Gana spouses' aforesaid application for registration but failed to prove that it was forest land or that the Gana spouses submitted a valid title under the Spanish regime or that they were already owners of the said parcel of land upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States of America.
Before this Court in the present proceedings, was filed a motion for leave to intervene by Firestone Ceramics, Inc., Boomtown Development Corporation, Spouses Cynthia Ching and Ching Tiong Keng, Spouses Carmen Soco and Lorenzo Ong Eng Chong, Spouses Soledad Yu and Yu Sy Chia and Leticia Nocom Chan. They claim that they have a direct and material interest in the property under litigation because they own 18.8 hectares more or less thereof, covered by various titles in their names derived from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal dated July 22, 1969 in Land Registration Case No. N-6625 in which OCT No. A-S-47 was issued, and the said portion of 18.8 hectares within OCT No. 4216 must be excluded from the area to be reverted to the government, and if the position of the government is upheld, and OCT No. 4216 is nullified, their titles "become the only title to the 188,254 square meters in litigation."
Private respondents opposed the aforesaid motion for intervention on the ground that the movants' said titles, derived from OCT No. A-S-47, were nullified in the decision of the Supreme, Court in G.R. No. 109490 entitled "Patrocinio Margolles, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (230 SCRA 97) which decision is final and in view of such finality, the titles of the movants can no longer be revived.
A motion for leave to admit attached complaint in intervention was also filed by intervenor Alejandro Rey adopting the government's petition seeking the nullification of private respondents' title based on OCT No. 4216, without prejudice to his free patent application over a portion of the land covered by the private respondents' titles.
Private respondents also opposed the complaint for intervention of Alejandro Rey for the reason that there is a pending case filed by him against private respondents in Civil Case No. LP-8852-P before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and having chosen such forum to ventilate his complaint he should not be allowed to participate in this case.
On June 28, 1996, the respondent Court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: 3
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION OF FIRESTONE CERAMICS INC., ET AL. AND THE COMPLAINT FOR INTERVENTION OF ALEJANDRO REY, ARE LIKEWISE DENIED. NO PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS.
Motions for reconsideration were filed by petitioner, movant-intervenor Firestone Ceramics, et al. and movant-intervenor Alejandro Q. Rey, however, the respondent Court denied for lack of merit all the motions in a Resolution dated October 28, 1996. 4
Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., and petitioner-intervenor Alejandro Q. Rey, filed their respective petitions for review from the decision of the respondent Court which were docketed as G.R. No. 127022. Petitioner Republic also filed its petition for review with this Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 127245. Petitioner Republic's motion for the consolidation of these two (2) cases on the ground that the two cases involve interrelated issues and a common set of facts was granted in our Resolution dated July 9, 1997.
G.R. No. 127022:
In G.R. No. 127022, Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., filed their petition for review assailing the decision of the respondent Court dated June 28, 1976 in CA-G.R. CV No. 36280 denying petitioners' motion for leave to intervene and the resolution dated October 28, 1996, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., support the petition filed by the government through the Office of the Solicitor General for the annulment of OCT No. 4216, recovery of possession and reversion alleging that it is reasonable and logical to defend the government's case because it is upon the success thereof where their fate and fortune depended; that although petitioners as defeated parties in G.R. No. 109490 (Margolles case) are bound to comply with the said decision, they should be allowed to intervene because they still have a direct and material interest in the outcome of the instant case since in the event that the government succeeds in annulling the title of the respondents, petitioners' titles, which emanated from OCT A-S-47 issued by virtue of the decision in Land Registration Case No. 6625, after the declassification of subject land from its category as forest land and its declaration as alienable and disposable land, would be valid, and their titles become the only titles to the extent of 188,424 square meters portion of the subject land which should be excluded from the total portion of the property to be reverted to the government.
Alejandro Q. Rey also filed his petition for review in intervention from the respondent Court's decision denying his complaint for intervention. Alejandro Rey alleges that he has a legal interest in the instant case filed by the government against private respondents because the cancellation of the latter's titles would pave the way for his free patent application, thus he has to intervene and join the government in seeking the cancellation of private respondents' titles. Petitioner-intervenor Rey also alleges that the complaint he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City seeking the annulment of the titles of private respondents is not a bar to his intervention in this case because no incompatibility exists between the two cases; that petitioners found it imperative to intervene in this instant case not only to protect his interest but in order not to be deemed to have waived his rights in his pending application for free patent if and when the government succeeds in reverting the subject tract of land for the state.
We find both petitions of Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al. and Alejandro Rey to be devoid of merit.
In denying the motion to intervene by petitioner Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., the respondent Court said: 5
As regards the motion for intervention, as previously discussed, the decision in G.R. No. 109490 is final. This means that the movants' titles, adverse to OCT No. 4216, have been nullified. Such titles having been nullified, the same could no longer be revived. Intervention in this proceeding will not reinstate or revive the movant's titles derived from OCT No. A-S-47. They, therefore, no longer have any legal interest in the subject matter of this suit to justify their intervention in this case.
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the Courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. 6 Under Section 1 Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of direct and immediate character not merely contingent or expectant so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. 7 Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., failed to show such interest considering the decision in the Margolles case (G.R. No. 109490) where petitioners Firestone Ceramics Inc., et al were the plaintiffs, in which case, this Court upheld the validity of OCT No. 4216, declaring petitioners' (Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al) titles adverse to OCT No. 4216 as null and void. With the declaration of petitioners' titles as void they have no more legal interest in the matter in litigation, since their titles may no longer be revived regardless of the outcome of the main petition of the petitioner Republic.
As to the petition in intervention of Alejandro B. Rey, the respondent Court denied the same in this wise: 8
As to Alejandro Rey, his filing of an earlier suit against the private respondents bars him from intervening in this case. He has chosen his forum and cannot litigate his claims in another forum. Since he has not shown any right or interest in the subject property he cannot have a legal interest therein to warrant his intervention. Assuming that the government were to prevail in this case it does not necessarily follow that his application for free patent would be approved.
Petitioner Rey's intervention in the present proceedings was anchored on his legal interest arising from his pending application for a free patent of a portion of the subject land. A mere collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation cannot justify intervention. 9 Petitioner Rey admitted that he had instituted a substantially similar case against the private respondents herein (Peltan Development Corporation, et al) with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. LP-8852-P and notably, this case had reached this Court by way of a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117029, entitled Peltan Development, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., where Alejandro Rey was a private respondent. A decision was promulgated on March 19, 1997 where this Court categorically ruled that private respondents therein (including herein Petitioner Alejandro Rey) had no cause of action to assail the validity of O.C.T. No. 4216 in view of the ruling in Margolles (supra) upholding the validity of said title. Additionally, this Court also held in Peltan that Alejandro Rey, et al. are not the real parties-in-interest to assail the validity of the titles of herein private respondents, whose titles were derived from said O.C.T. 4216, the validity of which in turn was upheld in the Margolles case.
Clearly, the present petitions have the same purpose of seeking the invalidation of the titles of herein private respondents albeit by alleged "intervention" in the government's petition for reversion. Hence, said petitions are barred by the decisions in Margolles and Peltan.
G.R. No. 127245:
In G.R. No. 127245, petitioner Republic raised two assignment of errors:
A: PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RES JUDICATA APPLIES TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AND CANCELLATION OF TITLES AND REVERSION;
B: PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THE GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT.
The principal and crucial issue to be resolved in the Republic's petition is the applicability of this Court's decision in the Margolles case 10 to the case now before us.
Petitioner argues that the Margolles case could not be applied to it since petitioner Republic of the Philippines was not a party in that case and did not have the chance to assert its claim over the subject land, thus, it is not precluded from filing this case; that the two letters of former Solicitors-General Estelito Mendoza and Francisco Chavez rejecting the request of the Director of the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) for the filing of a government suit to annul OCT No. 4216 which were considered by this Court in the Margolles case could not serve as bases for concluding that the government had been a party thereto, or had an involvement therein since those letters merely stated that there was no sufficient evidence at that time to file a petition for reversion/cancellation proceedings; that considering that the Director of Lands subsequently found sufficient evidence for the cancellation of OCT No. 4216 he then wrote a letter dated October 26, 1994 requesting the Solicitor-General to file an action for annulment of judgment of CFI Rizal in LRC Case No. 672, GLRO Record No. 30406; that the Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds were named as parties-defendants in the Margolles case as nominal parties in order that respondent Firestone Ceramics, Inc., could obtain complete relief, however, said government officials did not actively participate in that proceedings since their functions were merely ministerial, i.e., to issue cancel titles and other entries upon the directive of the Court. Petitioner maintains that it is not covered by the principle of "privity of interest" since it was not a successor-in-interest of any of the parties in the Margolles case, nor was it a representative, trustee or executor of any of the parties therein nor did petitioner actually control or participate in the Margolles case. Petitioner further contends that the cause of action in the Margolles case and the instant case are not identical, since in the former, private respondents therein sought the cancellation of OCT No. 4216 in order to assert their alleged private rights on the subject land while in this case, the Republic is seeking the annulment of judgment awarding the land to spouses Gana, cancellation of titles and the reversion of the subject land to the public domain, hence the elements of the doctrine of res-judicata are not present in this case; that principle of res judicata should be disregarded if the application would involve sacrificing of justice to technicality specially since petitioner Republic has a legitimate cause which is of paramount interest considering that land at present times is a prime commodity.
Moreover, petitioner further argues that OCT No. 4216 in the name of the Gana spouses was not regularly issued and that the defunct CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction over the subject land. Petitioner shows that Las Piñas was originally classified as a forest land forming part of the public domain and the municipality has a total area of 2,556 hectares, out of which 1,200 hectares were declared A & D lands in 1928 under LC Map No. 766 Proj. 13, while the rest of the municipality was declared alienable and disposable (A & D) only on January 3, 1968 under LC Map No. 2623, Project 13-A pursuant to FAO No. 4-114. Petitioner tries to show that the survey of the land and the approval thereof by the Bureau of Lands was made in 1926 and the Gana Spouses' application docketed as LRC Case No. 672, (GLRO Record No. 30406) was instituted in the then CFI of Rizal in 1927 and the decree for the registration of the land (No. 351823) in favor of the Gana spouses was issued on March 26, 1929, thus, the Gana spouses' application as well as the decision of the defunct CFI of Rizal were both issued when the land was still not alienable; that Land Registration Courts, at the time the Ganas filed their application, neither had the power nor authority to determine whether the land applied for is forest or agricultural land subject of registration since the authority to classify lands was then vested on the Director of Lands as provided in Act No. 926 (1903) and 2874 (1919); that the land registration court of Rizal could not have altered the inalienable public nature of the lands under OCT No. 4216 as it had no legal authority to classify public forest or forest reservation into agricultural as to make it susceptible to the private ownership; that since forest land is not registrable, its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the torrens system, nullifies the title; that contrary to the questioned decision of respondent Court, the validity of the alleged issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929 cannot be sustained by reason of impossible compliance by the spouses Gana, with respect to the 30 year possession requirement for registration under Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141.
We do not find merit in the petition in G.R. No. 127245.
Under the rule of res judicata, also known as "bar by prior judgment," a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a Court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and their successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. 11 The requisites essential for the application of the principle are: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (b) said judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) the Court rendering the same must have jurisdiction on the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be between the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. 12
Petitioner, in their petition for annulment, cancellation of titles and reversion raises the issue of the validity of OCT No. 4216 alleging that OCT No. 4216 issued in favor of the Gana spouses is invalid considering that when the said title was issued in 1929, the subject land was still unclassified public lands, that is forest land; thus the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the property in question to the Gana spouses.
Significantly, this same issue was squarely passed upon by this Court in the Margolles case and this case was taken cognizance of by the respondent Court when it quoted pertinent portions of the Margolles ruling in its assailed decision, to wit: 13
A perusal of the decision dated February 14, 1994 of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 109490 entitled "Patrocinio E. Margolles, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al." discloses that the matter regarding the alleged invalidity of OCT No. 4216 in relation to LC Map No. 2623 (Project 13-A) and FAO No. 4-1141 had been passed upon by the Supreme Court in this wise:
The private respondents maintain, nonetheless, that OCT No. 4216, issued in favor of the spouses Gana and Carlos, is invalid, so covering, as it supposedly did, unclassified public lands. Here, the private respondents base their claim on Forestry Administration Order (FAO) No. 4-1141-(1968), implementing LC Map No. 2623, Project No. 13-A. According to them, Las Piñas comprises 2,556 hectares, out of which 1,200 hectares have been declared alienable and disposable public lands in 1928, under LC Map No. 766, Project 13, and that "Tindig na Mangga" has not been covered thereby until the reclassification in 1968. As such, they submit, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the property in question to the petitioner's predecessors-in-interest.
No cogent proof, however, has been given to support the above contention. To the contrary, in fact, is the letter, dated 27 April 1988, of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, which in part, reads:
Thirdly, it is also alleged that the title is null and void because it allegedly covers land within the forest zone. There is no clear-cut proof to that effect. The certification of Mr. Rogelio dela Rosa of the Timber Management Division, Bureau of Forest Development, dated July 31, 1979, simply states "that the tract of land situated in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Metro Manila containing an area of 197.525 square meters as shown and described on this plan Psu-04-006417 . . . was found to be within the Alienable or Disposable Block of LC Project 13-A of Las Piñas, Rizal certified as such on January 3, 1968 per BFD Map LC-2623." The certification refers to land with an area of only 19.7525 hectares. It does not state the relationship of said land with the land covered by OCT No. 4216 which has an area of 99.6157 hectares.
xxx xxx xxx
Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the cancellation of OCT No. 4216 is premised mainly on the allegation that the land is within the forest zone, having been allegedly released as A & D land only 1968. But the recommendation is based on the same certification of Mr. Dela Rosa of the Bureau of Forest Development which, as earlier observed, does not make any clear reference to the land covered by OCT No. 4216 and is, therefore, vague and inconclusive.
Unfortunately, for all concerned, no authentic copy of LC Map No. 766, Project 13, could be presented, albeit understandably, considering that even the records of the National Mapping and Resource Authority (NAMREA) have apparently been lost or destroyed during the second World War.
In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (a case to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court), the Republic sought to prove that, at the time an original certificate of title was issued, the land covered thereby was still within the forest zone. It offered as evidence a land classification map prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961. The Court ruled:
. . . . When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps failed to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These . . . are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity. . ..
Furthermore, FAO No. 4-1141, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., on 03 January 1968, provides:
1. Pursuants to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code, I hereby declare as alienable or disposable and place the same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for administration and disposition in accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to the private rights, if any there be and to the conditions herein specified, the portions of the public domain situated in the Municipalities of . . . Las Piñas, . . . Province of Rizal . . . which are designated and described as alienable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968.
The issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929, conferring a private right, is then amply protected by FAO No. 4-1141; otherwise certificates of title issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified.
Clearly, this Court had already made a declaration on the genuineness and validity of OCT No. 4216 and the titles derived therefrom by private respondents in the Margolles case promulgated in 1994. In fact, two (2) petitions for review filed separately which involved the legality of OCT No. 4216 were dismissed by this Court, 14 invoking the Margolles ruling. Well-settled is the rule enunciated in Church Assistance Program, Inc. vs. Sibulo, 15 that —
When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law estate.
The Margolles case had long become final, thus the validity of OCT No. 4216 should no longer be disturbed and should be applied in the instant case based on the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. The less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or which were necessarily included therein. 16
Petitioner contends that it was not a party in the Margolles case where the validity of OCT No. 4216 was upheld, thus, res judicata is not applicable. We find such argument untenable. Granting that there is no absolute identity of parties, what is required, however, for the application of the principle of res judicata is not absolute, but only substantial identity of parties. 17 Although petitioner was not a party in the Margolles case, its claim in the instant case and that of the losing parties in the Margolles case raised exactly the same argument or reason in trying to invalidate OCT No. 4216, namely, that it supposedly covers, unclassified public land (forest land) so that the CFI of Rizal, sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject property to the original applicants, the Gana spouses. Petitioner and the other losing parties in the Margolles shared an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sough, namely, to declare the nullity of OCT No. 4216. Such identity of interest is sufficient to make them privy-in-law, one to the other 18 and meets the requisite of substantial identity of parties. We held in Republic vs. Planas: 19
. . . where the one who is offering a judgment as an estoppel and the party against whom it is being offered were both parties to the action, in which such judgment was rendered, it is no objection that the action included some additional parties who are joined in the second case. Conversely, the operation of the final judgment or order in a previous case is not altered by the fact that somebody who was not a party in that first action has been impleaded in the second case.
Significantly, this Court in upholding the validity of OCT No. 4216 in the Margolles case took into account the letters of former Solicitors-General Estelito Mendoza and Francisco Chavez stating that the information and documents submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General by the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission were not sufficient to support an action for cancellation or OCT No. 4216 and the derivative titles thereof. 20 Petitioner does not allege that it has new evidence or documents which would support their present case for annulment that was not considered in the earlier case. Petitioner's case rests basically on the same declaration in FAO No. 4-1141 declassifying the property embraced by OCT 4216 in 1968. Thus, the fact that petitioner was not a party in the Margolles case would not bar the operation of the principle of res judicata.
Petitioner further alleges that there is no identity of causes of action between the Margolles case and the instant case. One test of identify of causes of action is whether or not the judgment sought in a subsequent case will be inconsistent with the prior judgment. If no inconsistency will result, the prior judgment cannot be held to be a bar. 21 The validity of OCT No. 4216 was already upheld in the Margolles case, and if affirmative relief is granted to petitioner in this case, i.e. by the annulment of OCT No. 4216, this result will necessarily be inconsistent with the prior judgment in the first case, which resolved the validity of OCT No. 4216 and the various titles derived therefrom. We do not doubt that substantial identity of causes of action is present.
The firmly entrenched rule is that a party cannot evade the principle of bar by prior judgment by simply varying the form of the action or by adopting a different mode of presenting its case. 22 The final judgment rendered in the Margolles case is deemed to have settled the status of the subject land under OCT No. 4216, and any claim over it not noted thereon by other parties is therefore deemed barred under the principle of res judicata. Once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. 23
Allowing repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT No. 4216 like the present case, will bring to naught the principle of indefensibility of titles issued under the Torrens system of land registration. 24 As this Court pointed out in one
case —
We need not emphasize the fact that the Supreme Court by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is. It is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. Consequently, we cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by the Highest Tribunal. It is only proper to allow the case to take its rest. 25
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions filed by the Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General in G.R. No. 127245, and of Firestone Ceramics, Inc. et al, and Alejandro B. Rey in G.R. No. 127022 are DENIED for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nęt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Gloria C. Paras, concurred in by Justices Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez and Bernardo Ll. Salas.
2 Rollo, pp. 474-478.
3 Rollo, p. 483.
4 Rollo, 485-486.
5 Rollo, p. 482.
6 Gibson vs. Revilla, 92 SCRA 219.
7 Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil 279; Gibson vs. Revilla, supra.
8 Rollo, p. 482.
9 Batama Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. vs. Rosal, 42 SCRA 408.
10 PATROCINIA E. MARGOLLES, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDUARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SPOUSES CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG KENG, SPOUSES CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG, SPOUSES SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA, and LETICIA NOCON CHAN, respondents., G.R. No. 109490, February 14, 1994, 230 SCRA 97.
11 Sec. 47(b) Rule 39, Rules of Court.
12 Yusingco, et al. vs. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589; Daeng vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 250.
13 Rollo, pp. 478-481.
14 PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL and ALICE E. SOTTO, PETITIONERS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO Q. REY and JUAN B. ARAUJO, respondents, G.R. No. 117029, promulgated on March 19, 1997; 270 SCRA 83. GOLDENROID INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., G.R. No. 112038, promulgated on March 19, 1997.
15 171 SCRA 408 (1989).
16 Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 208 SCRA 215; De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 165.
17 Valencia vs. RTC of Quezon City, Br. 90, 184 SCRA 80.
18 Esperanza Development Corp. vs CA, 218 SCRA 401; Valencia vs. RTC of Quezon City, Br. 90, supra, Comilang vs. Buendia, 21 SCRA 486.
19 18 SCRA 132, 140 (1966).
20 Margolles vs. CA, 230 SCRA 107.
21 Swan vs. CA, 212 SCRA 114; Valencia vs. RTC of Quezon City, supra.
22 Widows and Orphans Association Inc. vs CA, 212 SCRA 360.
23 Tay Chun Suy vs. CA, 229 SCRA 151.
24 Peltran Development Inc., et al., vs. Alejandro Rey, et al.
25 Church Assistance Program, Inc. vs. Sibulo, supra.
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