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First. Accused-appellant questions the credibility of Mario Seldera. It is unbelievable, he contends, that this witness observed even minute details, such as the length and color of the shirts worn by accused-appellant and his companion, the color of their slippers, and the type of firearm used by accused-appellant, considering that the shooting took place suddenly and unexpectedly.30 The contention has no merit. As the Solicitor General points out, Mario Seldera went through a harrowing experience. In fact, he suffered three gunshot wounds and was given up for dead by the assailant. The memory of the massacre was etched deeply in his memory. As this Court has many times held, the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to notice the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed.31 Indeed, Mario's statement that accused-appellant used a shotgun in shooting him and his companions on November 15, 1991 is confirmed by the fact that the wounds suffered by the victims were similar to those caused by a shotgun fired at close range. Rogelio Seldera, who was less than three meters away from accused-appellant, had his head practically blown off. On his neck and chest were nine wounds, probably caused by pellets from the blast. Mario, who was behind his father, sustained three vertical, relatively small wounds on the right side of his back. The wound on Rodolfo's head, on the other hand, although without an exit, is similar in size to that suffered by Rogelio Seldera on the head. It is argued that Mario could not have recognized accused-appellant because it was very dark on the night of November 15, 1991.32 This is not true. According to the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration, there was 60% illumination from the moon over Umingan, Pangasinan at 9:00 in the evening of November 15, 1991. In People v. Pueblas,33 we held that a moon disc 62% full provides sufficient illumination in sustaining the identification of the accused and convicting him of murder. In other cases, we held that the illumination from the moon34 and even from the stars35 is fair and sufficient to identify perpetrators of crimes. The Solicitor General observes that Mario had been walking under the light of the moon for sometime before the incident so that his eyes had sufficiently adjusted to the natural illumination, so as to enable him in identifying the accused-appellant.36 Indeed, if accused-appellant recognized his intended victims, there is no reason why the survivor from the ambush could not have also recognized him. In the alternative, it is contended that even if there was fair illumination from the moon on the night in question, nonetheless Mario Seldera could have mistaken accused-appellant for Rodrigo "Thunder" Lopez.37 Again the contention is without merit. Rodrigo "Thunder" Lopez may also be called "Amboy" Lopez in the barangay, but it was not by name that Mario made his identification. In fact, Rodrigo "Thunder" Lopez was not even a suspect in the ambush of Mario and the latter's companions. As already stated, Mario identified accused-appellant based on this witness' knowledge of accused-appellant. The latter was a frequent visitor in their house and this witness used to buy from accused-appellant's store. Moreover, Rodrigo Lopez is darker and shorter than accused-appellant. Indeed, Mario Seldera was very positive that it was accused-appellant who shot them. He identified accused-appellant as their assailant upon reaching Alfredo Padapat's house. He again pointed to accused-appellant as the person who shot them when his mother arrived and again when they reported the incident to the police that same night. The rule is that identification of the accused, when there is no improper motive for making it, should be given full faith and credence. In the case at bar, no reason has been shown why Mario should falsely implicate accused-appellant. Second. It is claimed that accused-appellant was in his uncle's house in Caurdanetaan at the time of the incident. The defense of alibi will be sustained where the evidence of the prosecution is weak.38 However, accused-appellant himself said that Caurdanetaan is just three kilometers from Nancalabasaan. On the other hand, his witnesses39 themselves testified that accused-appellant's house is less than two kilometers from the scene of the crime and that the distance could be negotiated in 30 minutes by foot and even less if one runs. For alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.40 Thus, assuming that he was indeed at the party in Asterio Sonaco's house, he could have easily slipped out of the party, come back to the group, and then be at home in time for the police to find him there. Moreover, as already stated, accused-appellant was positively identified by Mario as the triggerman. It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused by an eyewitness who has no improper motive to falsely testify.41 The Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of Mario's testimony who was only 11 when he witnessed the gruesome killing of his father and cousin and barely 13 when he took the stand. He could possibly have no other motive but to tell the truth about what he had observed. Accused-appellant's alibi is not only weak; it is also filled with inconsistencies. He said in his counter-affidavit that he went home at 8:00 in the evening of November 15, 1991, a full hour before the shooting occurred but, in his testimony in court, he said he went home at 11:00 in the evening. His witnesses, Daniel Fortunato and Mario Sonaco, said there were at least ten persons in the party at the house of Asterio Sonaco on November 15, 1991, but accused-appellant stated that there were only five. The Court is convinced that it was accused-appellant who shot Mario Seldera, Rogelio Seldera, and Rodolfo Padapat on November 15, 1991. It is immaterial that there is no proof of motive for the attack because this becomes significant only where the identity of the assailant is in serious doubt.42 But in this case, the accused has been positively identified. Third. The Information is formally defective as it charged more the one offense in violation of Rule 110, §13 of the Revised Rules of Court. However, because of his failure to file a motion to quash, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived objection based on the ground of duplicity.43 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision finds accused-appellant guilty of "Double Murder with Frustrated Murder," but sentences him for two separate counts of murder and one count of frustrated homicide. We hold that accused-appellant was guilty of two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. Under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex crime is committed only "when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." As the victims in this case were successively shot by accused-appellant with a shotgun, each shot necessarily constitutes one act. Accused-appellant should thus be held liable for three separate crimes. The lower court correctly appreciated treachery as having qualified the killing of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.44 Here, it was clearly established that the victims, when shot, were unarmed and were peacefully walking along a trail when accused-appellant suddenly opened fire on them. The swiftness of the shooting left them helpless to put up any form of defense. The lower court however erred in convicting accused-appellant of frustrated homicide for the injuries inflicted on Mario Seldera. Although it correctly appreciated the intent to kill, which can be inferred from the weapon used, the proximity of the assailants and the location of the injuries, it should have appreciated treachery in the attack. Treachery attended the shooting not only of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat but also of Mario Seldera. But, with respect to Mario Seldera, the crime was not frustrated, but only attempted murder. This is the gist of our rulings in several cases.45 For the injuries sustained by Mario Seldera were not life threatening. Dr. Santos, the attending physician, certified that Mario's injuries would heal in seven days.46 In fact, he was not confined at the hospital. He was referred to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital only for x-ray examination of his injuries. There is no evidence that he was given further medical attention by this hospital other than what Dr. Santos had requested. Fourth. Certain modification should also be made with respect to the award of damages. The lower court awarded P50,000.00 for compensatory damages and P30,000.00 for moral damages to each set of heirs of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat in addition to the P14,000.00 actual damages to be divided among them. The P50,000.00 should be treated as civil indemnity, which under prevailing jurisprudence,47 is fixed at P50,000.00, to be awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim. Further, in accordance with our rulings in other cases,48 the amount of moral damages should be increased to P50,000.00. With regard to the amount of actual damages, Leonida Seldera and Alfredo Padapat testified that they could not present any receipt for their funeral expenses because the funeral agency refused to issue one in view of an unpaid balance. They have likewise allegedly lost the receipts for their joint expenses for the wake. Under the Civil Code (Art. 2199), a party is entitled to compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. However, under Art. 2224, temperate damages may be recovered if it is shown that such party suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.49 As the heirs of the two victims clearly incurred funeral expenses, an award of P5,000.00 for each set of heirs by way of temperate damages should be awarded, to be divided equally by the heirs of Seldera and Padapat. For the injuries sustained by Mario Seldera, the court a quo awarded P10,000.00 moral damages, P20,000.00 exemplary damages and P300.00 actual damages for medical expenses. The first item should be disallowed for lack of evidence to support it. The second item should likewise be deleted as under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are awarded when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. There was no aggravating circumstance in this case other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As to the actual damages of P300.00, as the prosecution failed to present any documentary proof for such, its award is improper. However, the amount of P200.00 as temperate damages may be made in its place. Actual damages representing unearned income of Rogelio Seldera and Alfredo Padapat should also be awarded. Leonida Seldera testified that her husband was 43 years old when he was killed and that he earned P13,000.00 a year as a farmer.50 On the other hand, Alfredo Padapat testified that his son, Rodolfo, was then 25 years old when he died and that he was earning P5,000.00 a year also as a farmhand.51 The formula for the computation of unearned income is:52
(x) Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula —53 2/3 x [80 - age of the deceased] Accordingly, Rogelio Seldera's unearned income is:
Rodolfo Padapat's unearned income is:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 52) is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: 1. For the death of Rogelio Seldera, accused-appellant is found guilty of murder and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Seldera the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as temperate damages, and P160,355.00 as unearned income. 2. For the death of Rodolfo Padapat, accused-appellant is found guilty of murder and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased Rodolfo Padapat the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as temperate damages, and P91,675.00 as unearned income. 3. For the injuries of Mario Seldera, accused-appellant is found guilty of attempted murder and is sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay Mario Seldera P200.00 as temperate damages.1âwphi1.nęt SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Per Judge Pedro C. Cacho. 2 Records, p. 2. 3 TSN, pp. 5-8, 19, 18, 20-21, 29, June 2, 1993. 4 Id., pp. 8-12. 5 Id., pp. 12-15, 24. 6 TSN, pp. 3-6, June 17, 1993. 7 TSN, pp. 7-8, June 2, 1993. 8 Id., pp. 3-4, 23-24, 26, 28-29. 9 Records, p. 12; Exh. D. 10 Id., p. 11; Exh. C. 11 TSN, pp. 8-11, June 14, 1993. 12 Virgilio Dela Cruz, Ernesto Benitez, Bonifacio Valdez, and Rodrigo "Thunder/Amboy" Lopez. 13 TSN, pp. 5-8, March 23, 1994. 14 TSN, pp. 2-5, April 21, 1994. 15 Id., pp. 8, 19. 16 For the preliminary investigation. 17 TSN, pp. 16-18, 21-23; April 21, 1994. 18 He was only able to name Ernesto Benitez, Bonifacio Valdez, Virgilio dela Cruz, Mario and Pedro Sonaco and a certain Gacutan. 19 TSN, pp. 18-20, 33, Sept. 31, 1993. 20 Id., pp. 17, 27-28. 21 He was only able to name Daniel Fortunato, Gacutan, Ansel and Asterio Sonaco, Bonifacio Vadez, Ernesto Benitez and Rodrigo Lopez. 22 TSN, pp. 3-6, Aug. 15, 1993. 23 The father of accused-appellant is his first cousin. 24 TSN, pp. 12-13, Aug. 15, 1993. 25 TSN, pp. 3-6, Nov. 23, 1993. 26 Id., pp. 4 and 6. 27 TSN, pp. 3-5, 10, Aug. 31, 1993. 28 Rollo, p. 44; Decision, p. 21 (emphasis added). 29 Id., p. 76; Appellant's Brief, p. 4. 30 Ibid. 31 People v. Gomez, 251 SCRA 455 (1995); People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995); People v. Salazar, 248 SCRA 460 (1995); People v. Apawan, 235 SCRA 355 (1994); People v. Dolar, 231 SCRA 414 (1994). 32 Rollo, p. 76-A; Accused-Appellant's Brief, p. 5. 33 127 SCRA 746 (1984). 34 People v. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158 (1998) citing People v. Gamboa, 145 SCRA 289 (1986); See also People v. Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996). 35 People v. Vacal, 27 SCRA 24 (1969). 36 Rollo, pp. 105-106; Appellee's Brief, pp. 7-8. 37 Id., p. 76-A, Accused-appellant's Brief, p. 5. 38 People v. Dela Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997); People v. Manambit, 271 SCRA 344 (1997). 39 Mario Sonaco and Juanito Costales. 40 People v. Tabarangao, G.R. Nos. 116555-36, February 25, 1999; People v. Quinao, 269 SCRA 495 (1997). 41 People v. Piandiong, 268 SCRA 555 (1997). 42 People v. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 (1995) 43 Rule 117, §8. 44 People v. Oliano, supra; People v. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693 (1996). 45 People v. Balderas, 276 SCRA 970 (1997) citing People v. Maguikay, 237 SCRA 587 (1994) and People v. Tiu, 216 SCRA 140 (1992); People v. Cogonon, supra; People v. Gonzales, 99 SCRA 697 (1980); People v. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432 (1979); People v. Moreno, 85 SCRA 649 (1978). 46 Records, p. 13; Exh. E. 47 People v. Piamonte, G.R. No. 91999, February 25, 1999; People v. Panida, G.R. Nos. 127125 & 138952, July 6, 1999. 48 People v. Panida, supra; People v. Viovicente, 286 SCRA 1 (1998). 49 See People v. Oliano, supra; Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75 (1958). 50 TSN, p. 9, June 13, 1993. 51 TSN, p. 17, June 3, 1993. 52 People v. Panida, supra, citing People v. Gutierez, G.R. No. 116281, Feb. 8, 1999. 53 Villa-Rey Transit, Inc., v. CA, 31 SCRA 511 (1970). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation |