Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO CABLING, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Can the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), even without a complaint for illegal dismissal tiled before the labor arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining petitioner Philippine Airlines, inc. from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the private respondents to their previous positions?
This is the pivotal issue presented before us in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the nullification of the injunctive writ dated April 3, 1995 issued by the NLRC and the Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the said Orders were issued in excess of jurisdiction.
Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong.
Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition1 for injunction praying that:
I. Upon filing of this Petition, a temporary restraining order be issued, prohibiting respondents (petitioner herein) from effecting or enforcing the Decision dated Feb. 22, 1995, or to reinstate petitioners temporarily while a hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is being undertaken;
II. After hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering respondent to reinstate petitioners to their former positions pending the hearing of this case, or, prohibiting respondent from enforcing its Decision dated February 22, 1995 while this case is pending adjudication;
III. After hearing, that the writ of preliminary injunction as to the reliefs sought for be made permanent, that petitioners be awarded full backwages, moral damages of PHP 500,000.00 each and exemplary damages of PHP 500,000.00 each, attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of whatever amount is awarded, and the costs of suit.
On April 3, 1995, the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction 2 enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its February 22, 1995 Memorandum of dismissal. In granting the writ, the NLRC considered the following facts, to wit:
. . . that almost two (2) years ago, i.e. on April 15, 1993, the petitioners were instructed to attend an investigation by respondent's "Security and Fraud Prevention Sub-Department" regarding an April 3, 1993 incident in Hongkong at which Joseph Abaca, respondent's Avionics Mechanic in Hongkong "was intercepted by the Hongkong Airport Police at Gate 05 . . . the ramp area of the Kai Tak International Airport while . . . about to exit said gate carrying a . . . bag said to contain some 2.5 million pesos in Philippine Currencies. That at the Police Station. Mr. Abaca claimed that he just found said plastic bag at the Skybed Section of the arrival flight PR300/03 April 93," where petitioners served as flight stewards of said flight PR300; . . the petitioners sought "a more detailed account of what this HKG incident is all about"; but instead, the petitioners were administratively charged, "a hearing" on which "did
not push through" until almost two (2) years after, i.e, "on January 20, 1995 . . . where a confrontation between Mr. Abaca and petitioners herein was compulsorily arranged by the respondent's disciplinary board" at which hearing, Abaca was made to identify petitioners as co-conspirators; that despite the fact that the procedure of identification adopted by respondent's Disciplinary Board was anomalous "as there was no one else in the line-up (which could not be called one) but petitioners . . . Joseph Abaca still had difficulty in identifying petitioner Pineda as his co-conspirator, and as to petitioner Cabling, he was implicated and pointed by Abaca only after respondent's Atty. Cabatuando pressed the former to identify petitioner Cabling as co-conspirator"; that with the hearing reset to January 25, 1995, "Mr. Joseph Abaca finally gave exculpating statements to the board in that he cleared petitioners from any participation or from being the owners of the currencies, and at which hearing Mr. Joseph Abaca volunteered the information that the real owner of said money was one who frequented his headquarters in Hongkong to which information, the Disciplinary Board Chairman, Mr. Ismael Khan," opined "for the need for another hearing to go to the bottom of the incident"; that from said statement, it appeared "that Mr. Joseph Abaca was the courier, and had another mechanic in Manila who hid the currency at the plane's skybed for Abaca to retrieve in Hongkong, which findings of how the money was found was previously confirmed by Mr. Joseph Abaca himself when he was first investigated by the Hongkong authorities"; that just as petitioners "thought that they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received any summons/notices on the intended "additional hearings" mandated by the Disciplinary Board," they were surprised to receive "on February 23, 1995. . . a Memorandum dated February 22, 1995" terminating their services for alleged violation of respondent's Code of Discipline "effective immediately"; that sometime . . . first week of March, 1995, petitioner Pineda received another Memorandum from respondent Mr. Juan Paraiso, advising him of his termination effective February 3, 1995, likewise for violation of respondent's Code of Discipline; . . .
In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the NLRC adapted the view that: (1) private respondents cannot be validly dismissed on the strength of petitioner's Code of Discipline which was declared illegal by this Court in the ease at PAL, Inc. vs. NLRC, (G.R. No. 85985), promulgated August 13, 1993, for the reason that it was formulated by the petitioner without the participation of its employees as required in R.A. 6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code; (2) the whimsical, baseless and premature dismissals of private respondents which "caused them grave and irreparable injury" is enjoinable as private respondents are left "with no speedy and adequate remedy at law" except the issuance of a temporary mandatory injunction; (3) the NLRC is empowered under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code not only to restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts but also to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party; and (4) the temporary power of the NLRC was recognized by this Court in the case of Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. Employees Union, DFA, et. al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. [G.R. No. 107031, January 25, 1993].
On May 4, 1995, petitioner moved for reconsideration3 arguing that the NLRC erred:
1. . . . in granting a temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes;
2. . . . in granting a temporary injunction order when the termination of private respondents have long been carried out;
3. . . . in ordering the reinstatement of private respondents on the basis of their mere allegations, in violation of PAL's right to due process:
4. . . . in arrogating unto itself management prerogative to discipline its employees and divesting the labor arbiter of its original and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases;
5. . . . in suspending the effects of termination when such action is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor;
6. . . . in issuing the temporary injunction in the absence of any irreparable or substantial injury to both private respondents.
On May 31, 1995, the NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, ruling:
"The respondent (now petitioner), for one, cannot validly claim that we cannot exercise our injunctive power under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code on the pretext that what we have here is not a labor dispute as long as it concedes that as defined by law, a" (l) "Labor Dispute" includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment." If security of tenure, which has been breached by respondent and which, precisely, is sought to be protected by our temporary mandatory injunction (the core of controversy in this case) is not a "term or condition of employment", what then is?
x x x x x x x x x
Anent respondent's second argument . . . . Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code . . . empowered the Commission not only to issue a prohibitory injunction, but a mandatory ("to require the performance") one as well. Besides, as earlier discussed, we already exercised (on August 23, 1991) this temporary mandatory injunctive power in the case of "Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. Employees Union-DFA et. al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc., et. al." (supra) and effectively enjoined one (1) month old dismissals by Chemo-Technische and that our aforesaid mandatory exercise of injunctive power, when questioned through a petition for certiorari, was sustained by the Third Division of the Supreme court per its Resolution dated January 25, 1993.
x x x x x x x x x
Respondent's fourth argument that petitioner's remedy for their dismissals is "to file an illegal dismissal case against PAL which cases are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter' is ignorant. In requiring as a condition for the issuance of a "temporary or permanent injunction" — "(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law;" Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code clearly envisioned adequacy, and not plain availability of a remedy at law as an alternative bar to the issuance of an injunction. An illegal dismissal suit (which takes, on its expeditious side, three (3) years before it can be disposed of) while available as a remedy under Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code, is certainly not an "adequate; remedy at law, Ergo, it cannot as an alternative remedy, bar our exercise of that injunctive power given us by Article 218 (e) of the Code.
x x x x x x x x x
Thus, Article 218 (e), as earlier discussed [which empowers this Commission "to require the performance of a particular act" (such as our requiring respondent "to cease and desist from enforcing" its whimsical memoranda of dismissals and "instead to reinstate petitioners to their respective position held prior to their subject dismissals") in "any labor dispute which, if not . . . performed forthwith, may cause grave and irreparable damage to any party"] stands as the sole "adequate remedy at law" for petitioners here.
Finally, the respondent, in its sixth argument claims that even if its acts of dismissing petitioners "may be great, still the same is capable of compensation", and that consequently, "injunction need not be issued where adequate compensation at law could be obtained". Actually,
what respondent PAL argues here is that we need not interfere in its whimsical dismissals of petitioners as, after all, it can pay the latter its backwages. . . .
But just the same, we have to stress that Article 279 does not speak alone of backwages as an obtainable relief for illegal dismissal; that reinstatement as well is the concern of said law, enforceable when necessary, through Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code (without need of an illegal dismissal suit under Article 217 (a) of the Code) if such whimsical and capricious act of illegal dismissal will "cause grave or irreparable injury to a party". . . . .4
Hence, the present recourse.
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation.5 Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.6
In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC —
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party; . . ." (Emphasis Ours)
Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute. — A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
x x x x x x x x x
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strikes or lockout. 7 (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party."
The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing. maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees." 8
The term "controversy" is likewise defined as "a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute."9
A "justiciable controversy" is "one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue." 10
Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner.
The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition which prays for; reinstatement of private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees. As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice;
(2) Termination disputes;
(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer- employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. 11
The jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the labor arbiter is both original and exclusive, meaning, no other officer or tribunal can take cognizance of, hear and decide any of the cases therein enumerated. The only exceptions are where the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the NLRC exercises the power of compulsory arbitration, or the parties agree to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the pertinent portions of which reads:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.ℒαwρhi৷
On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the private respondents' petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes." 12
Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private respondents' petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.
The argument of the NLRC in its assailed Order that to file an illegal dismissal suit with the labor arbiter is not an "adequate" remedy since it takes three (3) years before it can be disposed of, is patently erroneous. An "adequate" remedy at law has been defined as one "that affords relief with reference to the matter in controversy, and which is appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case." 13 It is a remedy which is equally, beneficial, speedy and sufficient which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the acts complained of. 14
Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. 15 In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders. In Lamb vs. Phipps, 16 we ruled that if the remedy is specifically provided by law, it is presumed to be adequate. Moreover, the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by the private respondents in their petition before the NLRC can also be entertained by the labor arbiter who, as shown earlier, has the ancillary power to issue preliminary injunctions or restraining orders as an incident in the cases pending before him in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case. 17
Furthermore, an examination of private respondents' petition for injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which the private respondents might suffer. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, 18 or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages. 19
In the case at bar, the alleged injury which private respondents stand to suffer by reason of their alleged illegal dismissal can be adequately compensated and therefore, there exists no "irreparable injury," as defined above which would necessitate the issuance of the injunction sought for. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from employment shall be entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to the payment of full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
The ruling of the NLRC that the Supreme Court upheld its power to issue temporary mandatory injunction orders in the case of Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. Employees Union-DFA, et. al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. et. al., docketed as G.R. No. 107031, is misleading. As correctly argued by the petitioner, no such pronouncement was made by this Court in said case. On January 25, 1993, we issued a Minute Resolution in the subject case stating as follows:
Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari, as well as the comments of both public and private respondents thereon, and the reply of the petitioners to private respondent's motion to dismiss the petition, the Court Resolved to DENY the same for being premature.
It is clear from the above resolution that we did not in anyway sustain the action of the NLRC in issuing such temporary mandatory injunction but rather we dismissed the petition as the NLRC had yet to rule upon the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Thus, the minute resolution denying the petition for being prematurely filed.
Finally, an injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering that it generally has not proved to be an effective means of settling labor disputes. 20 It has been the policy of the State to encourage the parties to use the non-judicial process of negotiation and compromise, mediation and arbitration. 21 Thus, injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated April 3, 1995 and May 31, 1995, issued by the National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), in NLRC NCR IC No. 000563-95, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Annex "3", pp. 134-147, Rollo.
2 Annex "A", pp. 19-23, Rollo.
3 Annex "I", pp. 124-133, Rollo.
4 Annex "B", pp. 24-46, Rollo.
5 Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 152 [1996]
6 Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273 [1909]; Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, et. al., 29 Phil. 542 [1915]
7 See also Pondoc vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 262 SCRA 632, 638 [1996].
8 Article 212(1), Labor Code of the Philippines.
9 Federico B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1982 edition, p. 136.
10 Delumen vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 288, cited in Moreno, supra, p. 336.
11 Article 217 (a), Labor Code of the Philippines.
12 Pondoc vs. NLRC, supra.
13 Mt. Vermon vs. Borman, 100 Ohio St., 2, 75, 125 NE 116 [1919].
14 See Silvestre vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 885.
15 Article 217 (a) Labor Code of the Philippines.
16 22 Phil., 465.
17 Section 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. See also Pondoc vs. NLRC, supra.
18 Allundorff vs. Abrahanson, 38 Phil. 58 cited in Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. De los Angeles, 164 SCRA 555 [1988].
19 Phil. Law Dictionary, supra., p. 321.
20 48 Am. Jur. 2d, 2071, p. 437, cited in Azucena. The Labor Code, vol. 2, 1996 ed., p. 430.
21 Ibid., p. 35.
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