Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 114105 January 16, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAMES ATAD y CUIZON, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a conviction be upheld on appeal even where the uncorroborated testimony of the arresting police officer is contradicted by the poseur-buyer in a drug buy-bust operation?
Notably, the poseur-buyer in this case denied that accused-appellant James Atad sold marijuana to him on that fateful day of March 24, 1993.
Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, in an Information dated March 26, 1993 filed by City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, which reads as follows:
The undersigned City Prosecutor of Iligan City accuses JAMES ATAD Y CUIZON of the crime of VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, committed as follows:
That on or about March 25, 1993, in the City of Iligan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, transport, deliver and have in his possession the following, to wit:
— six (6) pcs. of marijuana joints/sticks
— One-half (1/2) consumed marijuana joint/stick.
without being authorized by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425.
City of Iligan, March 26, 1993.1
After his arraignment wherein he pleaded not guilty and the ensuing trial, the court a quo2 rendered its Decision dated December 20, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states —
The court, therefore, finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4 of Art. II of Republic Act 6425, particularly of selling marijuana, a prohibited drug, and hereby him (sic) SENTENCES to a penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P20,000.00.3
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented two witnesses: the forensic chemist who conducted the examination of the six and one-half pieces of marijuana sticks submitted by the NARCOM which were purportedly confiscated from accused-appellant, and the NARCOM agent who allegedly saw accused-appellant in the act of selling marijuana joints and who caused his arrest.
Bernabe Aringa,4 after stating his qualifications as a forensic chemist, testified that on March 30, 1993, his clerk received a transparent plastic bag containing specimens delivered to his office by a certain SPO4 Renato Salazar with a letter-request for examination to determine whether they were dangerous drugs. After personally conducting microscopic, chemical and chromatographic examinations on the specimens consisting of six pieces of cigarettes and one partly consumed stick, he found all to be positive for marijuana.5
SPO4 Renato Salazar, NARCOM Chief of the Lanao del Norte District Field Office in Iligan City, testified that prior to the incident leading to the arrest of accused-appellant, several reports of marijuana peddling at Purok 1 and 3 in Tambacan, Iligan were received by the NARCOM prompting them to conduct a surveillance to verify the reports and to identify the persons involved. Their surveillance yielded names which included those of accused-appellant James Atad, and others whom he identified merely as Lito, Hermes, Bobby and Misoy. To effect their arrest, a buy-bust operation team was organized comprised of himself, SPO1 Englatierra, Jake Duhaylunsod, a civilian employee named Jacobo Cainglit and the poseur-buyer, Arnesto Geronggay. They had the amount of Thirty Pesos (P30.00) consisting of a P20.00 bill and a P10.00 bill first machine-copied (xeroxed) and authenticated by the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte. Then the money was handed over to the poseur-buyer to be used in buying marijuana from the suspects. At around five o'clock in the afternoon of March 25, 1993, the team led by Salazar proceeded to Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City and posted themselves across the street fronting the house of accused-appellant.6 Asked by the prosecutor to describe his exact position, Salazar stated:
Well, from my position I posted myself fronting the residence, there was a fence but I could see through the fence because it is only made of bamboo sticks and there are slots. The slots are big enough and a person staying in the house of James Atad has a direct view from our place.7
Salazar testified further that their poseur-buyer went directly to the house of James Atad where he was met by the latter at the yard in front of the house. A conversation ensued between the two. Then the poseur-buyer handed the bills to the accused-appellant, after which the latter left and later returned and handed over several sticks of marijuana to the poseur-buyer. Thereupon, Geronggay went directly to Salazar and turned over six (6) sticks of marijuana. Salazar then signaled the rest of the team who all approached the accused-appellant and announced his arrest. They searched his body and confiscated a half-consumed marijuana joint. They were, however, not able to retrieve the marked money.8
Thereafter, they brought accused-appellant to the NARCOM headquarters where the latter was made to sign a receipt for the property seized from him. A booking sheet and arrest report were prepared. Salazar also wrote a request for the laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana joints which he delivered together with said substances to the NBI, Region 10 office.9
Although he denied conducting a custodial investigation, Salazar, on cross-examination, admitted interviewing said accused and making him sign a receipt in the presence of four other NARCOM agents, without the accused being represented by counsel. Neither was his interview reduced to writing.10
Version of the Defense
The defense, on the other hand, presented four witnesses, including the accused-appellant himself, and the poseur-buyer Arnesto Geronggay.
Arnesto Geronggay's testimony was a maze of contradictory statements and confused answers. He testified that at around 5:00 P.M. of March 25, 1993, he was ordered by Sgt. Salazar of NARCOM, PNP, Iligan City to buy marijuana from a certain Tito and Hermes, and that he together with a certain Loloy did buy the prohibited drug from Hermes. He added that in the morning of the same day, he also bought marijuana from Hermes which he gave to Sgt. Salazar. Later, he was told by Sgt. Salazar to go to the house of James Atad. While on his way home, he met the accused-appellant who was feeding pigs. While they were conversing, Sgt. Salazar arrived and apprehended the accused-appellant although he was not the drug peddler they were after.11
As to the partly consumed marijuana stick, he claimed that he and Loloy were instructed by Sgt. Salazar to smoke the same. He also stated that he had been helping the NARCOM agents since March 10 (1993).12
On cross-examination, he admitted that he and the accused-appellant were friends and would sometimes see each other at the plaza during their rest days from their respective jobs and would drink liquor together if they had money. He admitted having been convicted of simple theft for which he was serving his sentence at the same City Jail where the accused was being detained. Inquired as to how he came to be at the house of accused-appellant when the latter was arrested, he gave contradictory answers: first, he supposedly drove in his Minica; later, it was a certain Edgar of the NARCOM who drove his vehicle; still later, he claimed to have been walking when he met James Atad.13
Continuing, Geronggay this time related that it was about nine o'clock in the morning of March 25, 1993 when he met Sgt. Salazar and other NARCOM people at the Maria Cristina Hotel after which he later proceeded with Loloy to buy marijuana from Hermes upon the instruction of Sgt. Salazar. Then they went back to the NARCOM office at past twelve o'clock noon where they were later supposedly instructed by Salazar to go back again to Hermes. And it was on their way back after buying marijuana that they happened to pass by the house of appellant Atad.14
He added that the accused's wife, mother and neighbor requested him to testify but that he was not promised "anything."15
The two other witnesses, Rosalinda Dimacaling and Victoria Orellano, neighbors of accused-appellant, testified that they saw the actual apprehension of the accused from their respective houses which were very near the accused-appellant's. Dimacaling further testified that she saw the accused being searched and that nothing was taken from him. 16 The trial court, however, deemed their testimonies of no material importance.
Lastly, accused-appellant himself testified that on March 25, 1993, at around four o'clock in the afternoon, he fed the hogs and chicken of his neighbors, Mr.ℒαwρhi৷ and Mrs. Dimacali (should be Dimacaling). After he finished feeding and placing them inside the fence, Geronggay, together with a certain Loloy, arrived. While they were talking, Loloy left to buy kinilaw. Thereafter, a PU Minica and a stainless jeep arrived with some people who headed towards them. One of them was Sgt. Salazar of NARCOM. The men pointed their firearms at accused-appellant who was told not to move as he was under arrest. Scared, the accused raised his hands and Salazar and his companions searched him. Salazar took accused-appellant's wallet, then got something from his own left pocket, which he accused the appellant of owning. Because the accused refused to go alone with them, the government agents also brought his wife and child to the NARCOM office. He was questioned as to when he started being a pusher. However, he denied the accusation altogether. He was then allegedly threatened with death by the NARCOM men if he did not confess. He was presented a typewritten document which he was to told to sign and when he refused, the lawmen allegedly pointed a gun at his daughter and threatened to shoot the child. Thus he was compelled to sign the paper without being allowed to read its contents.17
On cross examination, accused-appellant admitted that he met Sgt. Salazar and his companions for the first time only when he was arrested, and that he knew of no grudge or other ill motive they may have had against him. He admitted to meeting Geronggay everyday in the City Jail premises where they were both detained. The latter often went to the movies at a cinema where he used to be a security guard. However, he denied that they went out together. Part of his livelihood came from feeding the fighting cocks and pigs of his neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Dimacaling. His family occupied a small room at the house of his aunt which was very close to the Dimacaling's, separated only by a fence. He affirmed his earlier testimony as to his conversation with Geronggay, the subsequent arrival of the group of Salazar and his apprehension. He claimed having uttered to Geronggay, "Dong, what is this, why am I arrested (sic)?" after realizing he was the "subject of a foul play." He did not explain though how he came to this realization but only said that Geronggay talked to him about his allegedly wrongful arrest when both of them were already in jail.
Asked where Geronggay was situated when he (accused) was apprehended, the accused answered that the former was talking to the person left inside the Minica. And while at the NARCOM headquarters, he did not notice if Geronggay said anything to Salazar or anyone thereat regarding his arrest.18
On re-direct, however, he insisted that Geronggay had told Salazar at the NARCOM headquarters, "He is not the one, he is my friend."19
Issues
In this appeal, the accused-appellant submits the following issues20 for resolution:
1. Whether or not the testimony of the lone and uncorroborated witness of the prosecution should be given credence at all when the poseur-buyer in fact refuted the said testimony.
2. Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant for violation of section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, particularly of selling marijuana, beyond reasonable doubt, when receipt of the marijuana joints allegedly seized from the accused-appellant was not admitted in evidence by the court a quo.
In fine, the issues really boil down to a question of credibility of witnesses.
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Credibility of the Lone Prosecution Witness
After a careful and thorough scrutiny of the records of the case, particularly the evidence for the prosecution and the defense, we find no substantial reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the trial court. As rightly reasoned by the said court:
Observing the demeanor of Sgt. Renato Salazar on the witness stand and considering the facts testified by him, the Court finds no reason to doubt his testimony. There appears to be no motive for Sgt. Renato Salazar to go to elaborate means of authenticating the money to be used in the entrapment and employing his team to get the accused if the latter was really innocent. Even as admitted by the accused, he does not know any motive on the part of Sgt. Renato Salazar in charging him of this offense. . .21
On the other hand, the testimony of Arnesto Geronggay, the poseur-buyer, was, as earlier mentioned, discredited by the trial court for being "full of inconsistencies on material points". The court a quo elaborated thus:
. . . Although he had testified that when Sgt. Renato Salazar and his team arrived, he was with the accused, in another part of his testimony he said that when James Atad was arrested, he was driving his vehicle (tsn P. 9, Aug. 2, 1993) and much later he also testified that it was a certain Edgar of the NARCOM who was driving his vehicle (tsn. P. 10, Aug. 2, 1993).
He had also testified that he bought marijuana from a certain Hermes at 11:00 A.M. (tsn. P. 14, 1993 (sic)) and on the way back, he met the accused at 9:00 A.M. (tsn P. 15, Aug. 2, 1993) which could not be possible in point of time.
There was also his testimony that since his arrest for simple theft on March 4, 1993 he has been detained in jail up to the time he testified in Court on August 2, 1993 (tsn P. 17, Aug. 2, 1993).
If that were true, how could he be in Tambacan if he was detained in jail. And while the accused testified that he never went out with Arnesto Geronggay (tsn P. 9, Aug. 9, 1993), the latter testified that they were going out once a week (tsn P. 8, Aug. 2, 1993) and drinking liquor if they had money.22
True, in numerous decisions of this Court, it has been invariably held that inconsistencies and discrepancies of the testimony of a witness on minor details serve to strengthen the credibility of the witness. 23 However, even a cursory reading of the transcript of the testimony of Geronggay reveals not just minor inconsistencies as to details but several inconsistencies affecting significant matters as enumerated by the trial court. Moreover, as to the time he supposedly purchased marijuana, he gave different accounts. During his direct examination:
Q On March 25 from whom did you buy marijuana?
A From Hermes
Q What time was that when you bought marijuana from Hermes?
A About 7:00 o'clock.
Q In the morning or afternoon?
A Morning.24
But in the early part of his cross-examination:
Q What time did you buy marijuana?
A About 11:00 o'clock.25
Later, stating that he met the accused after having bought marijuana from Hermes, he said:
Q What time did you talk with James Atad?
A At 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
Q And then what happen (sic)?
A They apprehended James Atad when in fact he was not the one they are looking for.
Q Did you not say you bought marijuana at 11:00 o'clock per instruction of Sgt. Salazar at (sic) Hermes?
A Yes, sir.26
When asked to clarify his statements, he could no longer give a coherent answer.
In stark contrast to the above, the accused-appellant, relating his meeting with Geronggay, testified:
Q What time did you finish feeding (the pigs and chickens)?
A 4:30, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A After I fed the chickens, I place them inside the fence and after that Ernesto (sic) Gerongay (sic) arrived.27
Geronggay likewise gave contradictory answers as to how he got to the scene of the crime:
Q You said you rode in your vehicle in going to the house of James Atad, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And you were driving that vehicle, were you not?
A Yes.
Q But in another testimony of yours you were already in the house of James Atad when Sgt. Salazar and group arrived, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Can you explain the discrepancy in your testimony(?) How can this be when you are suppose (sic) to drive in going to the place of James Atad?
A Another person was driving the vehicle of Sgt. Salazar.28
In the latter portion of his cross examination, he claimed he was walking when he saw accused-appellant:
Q Then what did you do?
A We bought marijuana while we were walking along we saw James Atad.
Q Why were you walking?
A We were walking while passing his house.
Q Where was your vehicle?
A We left our vehicle (sic) at the Maria Cristina Hotel.29
He presented other incoherent, unresponsive and confused answers. Yet, he testified barely four months after the buy-bust incident that led to this case. No considerable period of time has lapsed as to justify or excuse a cluttered and confused version of the incident. There is nothing in the records to suggest that he is feeble-minded or senile.
With respect to his allegedly having received instructions from Sgt. Salazar to buy marijuana from Hermes twice in the same day, 30 we find it rather strange and unbelievable that a police officer and team leader of a buy-bust operation would give orders to the poseur-buyer to buy a prohibited drug from a suspected peddler twice in the same day, without any good reason given, and yet not be present himself, with the other members of the buy-bust team, for the purpose of entrapment.
Entrapment has been held to be a lawful police tactic for trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the very act of executing their criminal plan. In buy-bust operations, the policemen execute a plan to catch a drug dealer in the act of plying his nefarious trade.31 If there is truth in Geronggay's claim that he was instructed to buy marijuana twice from Hermes who was also a suspected dealer, it perplexes us no end to note that Sgt. Salazar and the rest of the buy-bust team were not even physically present. They did not even try to effect an arrest on either occasion. The question thus arises as to the truthfulness of Geronggay's statements.
Furthermore, if indeed accused-appellant was not the person they were after at the time of his arrest, why did Geronggay not immediately protest the apprehension of the accused who was his friend and occasional drinking buddy? He could have there and then confronted and clarified with Sgt. Salazar the supposed mistaken arrest of James Atad. And if it is true that Geronggay later informed Sgt. Salazar of this when accused was brought to their office, nothing on record shows why the NARCOM agents would still persist in holding the accused-appellant and in charging him in court. Other than their bare statements of mistaken identity, neither the accused-appellant nor Geronggay offered any explanation or imputed ill motive for such purportedly irregular and wrongful act of the police officers.
The story of Geronggay and the accused-appellant is full of flaws which makes it altogether unbelievable. Obviously, it was simply concocted to simulate a defense. To be credible, testimonial evidence should come not only from the mouth of a credible witness but it should also be credible, reasonable and in accord with human experience.32
Finally, well-entrenched is the rule that findings of trial courts on credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect.33 Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the court a quo was in a better position to determine the issue of credibility and thus its findings will not be disturbed during appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the appellants. 34
Thus, we find no reason to change the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of Sgt. Renato Salazar, on one hand, and the non-reliability of Arnesto Geronggay, on the other. Sgt. Salazar, having no ill motive or reason to falsely impute a serious crime against the accused-appellant, cannot be considered other than a credible witness. Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers. The law grants them the presumption of regularly performing their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.35
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
(despite inadmissibility of the receipt for the marijuana)
The receipt evidencing that the marijuana sticks submitted for laboratory examination were sold by/confiscated from accused-appellant was correctly not admitted in evidence since the signature therein of accused-appellant was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights while under custodial investigation. Sgt. Salazar admitted that there was no counsel present when the accused-appellant was made to sign said receipt nor was the latter priorly apprised of his right to counsel.36
Nevertheless, accused-appellant cannot be acquitted because his criminal act of selling/delivering marijuana has been sufficiently proven by other evidence. Sgt. Salazar witnessed with his very own eyes the accused-appellant handing over the marijuana joints to the poseur-buyer after the latter gave him the marked money. Salazar testified:
Q After James Atad or after your buyer handed the money to James Atad, what followed next?
A James Atad left and I went to the back portion of his residence.
Q What happened next?
A Later on, I saw him handed (sic) over several joints of marijuana to our pusher (sic) buyer.
Q And you are sure that you have seen with your two eyes that Marijuana joints were really handed by James Atad, the accused, to your pusher (sic) buyer?
A Yes, sir.37
Sgt. Salazar did not falter during cross-examination:
Q Where were you and your group posted when you conducted the alleged buy-bust operation?
A As I have said(,) along the side of the road fronting the residence of James Atad. There are other houses in (sic) the other side of the road.
Q You did not actually see or witness the alleged selling transaction?
A I have seen the transaction.38
The objects of the transaction were unmistakably identified as marijuana after being subjected to three types of laboratory examinations conducted by a well-qualified forensic chemist. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction 39 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.40
With the foregoing discussion, we hold that the conviction of accused-appellant was correct and consequently affirm it. However, in view of the amendment of Republic Act No. 6425 by Republic Act No. 7659 and our ruling in People vs. Simon,41 we find that the penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced. Considering that the six marijuana sticks proven to have been sold by accused-appellant and the half-consumed stick seized from his possession at the time of his arrest had a combined total weight of only 1.92 grams42 and there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty imposable upon accused-appellant is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant's sentence is hereby reduced to imprisonment for a term ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum.43
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 04, is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the fine of P20,000.00 imposed upon accused-appellant is DELETED, and that accused-appellant shall serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 8; Record, p. 1.
2 Branch 04, 12th Judicial Region, Iligan City, presided by Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr.
3 Rollo, p. 22.
4 The appealed Decision spells his name as "Arenga" but the TSN consistently spelled it as "Aringa".
5 TSN, July 13, 1993, pp. 9, 13-15.
6 TSN, July 14, 1993, pp. 3-7.
7 Ibid., p. 8.
8 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
9 Ibid., pp. 12-16.
10 TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 5.
11 TSN, August 2, 1993, pp. 2-6.
12 Ibid., p. 6.
13 Ibid., pp. 8-10, 14.
14 Ibid., pp. 13-15.
15 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
16 Ibid., pp. 20-22, 26-27.
17 TSN, August 9, 1993, pp. 3-7.
18 Ibid., pp. 13, 15, 18.
19 Ibid., p. 20.
20 Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 5; Rollo, p. 43.
21 Rollo, p. 20.
22 Ibid., p. 21.
23 People vs. Panayo, 235 SCRA 226, August 10, 1994, citing People vs. Buka, 205 SCRA 567, January 30, 1992; People vs. Cajambab, 240 SCRA 643, January 26, 1995, People vs. Prado, 251 SCRA 690, December 29, 1995.
24 TSN, August 2, 1993, p. 4.
25 Ibid., p. 14.
26 Ibid., p. 15.
27 TSN, August 9, 1993, pp. 3-4.
28 TSN, August 2, 1993, p. 10.
29 Ibid., p. 14.
30 Ibid., pp. 2-4.
31 People vs. Balidiata, 222 SCRA 409, May 21, 1993.
32 People vs. Uson, 224 SCRA 425, July 5, 1993; People vs. Obzunar, G.R. No. 92153, December 16, 1996.
33 People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, January 18, 1995; People vs. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 67, February 1, 1995.
34 People vs. Gabris, G.R. No. 116221, July 1, 1996; People vs. Polangco, 251 SCRA 503, December 26, 1995; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718, February 24, 1995; People vs. Nicolas, supra.
35 People vs. Segwaben, 194 SCRA 238, February 19, 1991, citing People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237, June 22, 1989, People vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646, April 15, 1988, People vs. Khan, 161 SCRA 406, May 23, 1988.
36 TSN, July 15, 1993, pp. 5-6. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. . .
In Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 79543, October 16, 1996), the ruling in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (121 SCRA 538, April 26, 1983) in regard to custodial investigations, was reiterated:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be in admissible in evidence.
37 TSN, July 14, 1993, p. 9.
38 TSN, July 15, 1993, pp. 3-4.
39 People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, July 29, 1994, citing People vs. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194, August 5, 1991.
40 Ibid. citing People vs. Sibug, 229 SCRA 489, January 24, 1994.
41 Ibid., pp. 569-587; In the 1994 Annual Report of the Supreme Court of the Philippines (pages 27-28), the ruling in People vs. Simon with respect to the effect of R.A. 7659, amending R.A. 6425 on the imposition of penalties thereunder, was summarized thus:
. . . the Supreme Court:
(a) gave retroactive effect to R.A. 7659, amending R.A. 6425, to entitle Simon to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, stating that although R.A. 6425 was enacted as a special law, it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws;
(b) reconciled R.A. 7659's overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. To harmonize the conflicting provisions, the Court held that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph of Section 20 shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. Said penalty constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, i.e., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. Each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period. In other words, where the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to he imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to 749 grams, reclusion temporal.
(c) recognized the suppletory effect on R.A. 7659 of the Revised Penal Code on the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances in fixing the penalty. Since Section 20 of R.A. 7659 mandates that the penalty shall depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transactions, each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity of drug involved, and the modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty. However, mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits. In no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
(d) applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), and clarified that the minimum penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense in accordance with the first part of Section 1 of the ISL, because R.A. 6425, as now amended by R.A. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence, with their technical signification and effects.
42 Record, p. 35.
43 Reynaldo Garcia, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110983, March 8, 1996; Jesusa Cruz vs. Correctional Institute for Women, G.R. No. 125672, September 27, 1996.
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