G.R. No. 109778 December 8, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIOMEDES ADOFINA y ALCANTARA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
On December 17, 1990, Julio San Marcos y Pontipedra, a security guard of the Laguna State Polytechnic College at Siniloan, Laguna, was gunned down inside the campus of the college. On April 4, 1991, an information for murder,1 allegedly committed with treachery and evident premeditation, was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. S-1237 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, at Siniloan, Laguna against herein accused-appellant Diomedes Adofina y Alcantara, likewise a security guard of the same college.
Appellant had theretofore been admitted to bail pursuant to an order2 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Siniloan-Famy, Laguna which declared that "the evidence herein (is) circumstantial, hence, is not strong," and had been released on provisional liberty under a property bail bond of P50,000.00. At his arraignment on May 8, 1991, appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.3
Thereafter, the trial commenced on June 4, 1991 and ended on June 18, 1992.4
On November 20, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment5 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and further ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P20,000.00 as reimbursement of expenses incurred for the interment of the deceased, and P50,000.00 as compensation for the loss of earning capacity of the victim, with costs.6
Appellant interposed the present appeal, alleging by way of assignment of errors that the court a quo gravely blundered (1) in basing its findings on very weak circumstantial evidence, and (2) in not appreciating that the evidence of the prosecution in its totality does not overcome the constitutional right of appellant to be presumed innocent.7
Testifying in the lower court, prosecution witness Mercedita San Marcos, the widow of the deceased, averred that her husband, during his lifetime, served as a security guard of the Laguna State Polytechnic College since 1984, the same item occupied by appellant in the same institution. Although not an eyewitness to the fatal incident, she expressed her belief that appellant had an axe to grind against her husband due to the following circumstances, viz: (1) Her husband was the only witness in a case of qualified theft filed against appellant who was the main suspect in the poisoning and theft of fish committed in the school fishpond; (2) On December 8, 1990, as she was about to enter the school premises, she saw appellant at the guardhouse talking with a resident of the college compound, one Sgt. Alfredo Raymundo ** who was carrying a bag, and another security guard, Ponciano Arriola, and when she was about two meters away, she heard Raymundo say, "Where is that Julio San Marcos, I will blow (sic, explode) what I am carrying," whereupon appellant laughed at Raymundo's remark; (3) Sometime in December, 1990, her husband told her that Ponciano Arriola had told him to be careful of appellant; and (4) She believes that Sgt. Raymundo and appellant are the best of friends and that whatever Raymundo orders, appellant follows. She further asserted that the two conspired in the poisoning at the school fishpond.8
On that fateful day of December 17, 1990, she claimed that she was sleeping with her children in their residence at Ulilang Kawayan Cottages, located in the school's compound, when all of a sudden she heard four shots. She did not mind them although she felt nervous. Thereafter, Serafin Salazar arrived and informed her that her husband had been shot. They proceeded to the house of her parents-in-law and there she saw the lifeless body of her husband.9
She declared that her husband was receiving a monthly salary of P2,100.00 as security guard and that their family was spending around P80.00 for their daily needs. She incurred P20,000.00 in expenses for the death of her husband, although she was able to produce only a receipt for P10,000.00 as payment for the coffin of her husband because the other receipts were filed with the Government Service Insurance System. 10
Pablo Hebres, Jr., another security guard of the same college, stated that on December 17, 1990, he was on duty from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon up to 12:00 o'clock midnight. Between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock of that evening, he was in the Administration Building when he heard three shots. He presumed that the shots came from the Homemaking Building which is more or less 30 meters away, so he proceeded thereto. While nearing the Homemaking Building, he heard a noise and a man screaming. He headed for the place where the screams came from and found San Marcos, wounded and sitting on the cement floor of the Student Laborers' Room of the Homemaking Building, while holding a .38 caliber handgun. He inquired from the victim as to who shot him, but the latter failed to identify his assailant. 11
Hebres then went out of the building and proceeded to the house of a certain Jesus Fajardo to ask for help. After a while, Fajardo arrived with his two sons, German and Jun, on board a vehicle. They loaded the victim thereon and, shortly thereafter, a vehicle of the Mobile Patrol of Siniloan, Laguna arrived. Patrolman Masacupan joined them and they brought the victim to the hospital. Hebres and Masacupan asked the victim regarding the identity of his assailant but the victim only moaned. When they reached the hospital, the victim was pronounced dead on arrival. 12
Hebres claimed that he saw appellant inside the school compound at around 7:00 o'clock that evening, riding on his bicycle and proceeding on his way home. 13 He also declared that appellant and the deceased had been avoiding each other since the latter was a witness against the former in a case involving the poisoning of the fish at the school pond. 14
Ricardo S. Crucido, the Director of Security Services and chief of the security guards of the school at the time of the incident, testified that there were then four security guards at the school, namely, the late Julio San Marcos, Ponciano Arriola, Pablo Hebres, and herein appellant. At around 9:00 P.M. on December 17, 1990, he was in the house of the school driver, Lito Palad, which was located just inside the school compound, when he heard four shots. He did not mind them at first, thinking that those were firecrackers since it was already December and the New Year was approaching. At 10:30 P.M., Rey Alcala and Gil Serrano informed him that San Marcos was dead. From the house of Lito Palad, he passed by the residence of Mr. Agelion, the board chairman of the school, to report the matter. When they went to the place of the incident, the deceased was no longer there. 15
He conducted an investigation on the matter, and he was able to interview several witnesses. He reluctantly divulged that the most significant report he allegedly received was that of Alicia Urrera, a teacher in the same school, who told him that after the four shots were heard, three men ran to the house of Sgt. Raymundo who was her neighbor. Upon reaching the house of the latter, one of them, whom she identified as appellant, left and ran away. 16
He also recounted that at 4:00 or 5:00 A.M. on December 18, 1990, Sgt. Raymundo and one Manding Belda, another instructor at the same school, were seen in the house of Dr. Ildefonso Buenaceda. At 12:00 o'clock noon of the same day, Raymundo and his wife, on board a Ford Fiera, went to the house of a certain Sgt. Efren Plana, while German Fajardo was left inside the vehicle. 17
He further declared that on October 11, 1990, the deceased arrived in his house and reported that while he was on his way home at around 9:00 P.M. of that date, he was blocked by appellant who was with an unidentified companion wearing a jacket. Prior to that, appellant had test-fired his gun in front of the Central Elementary School of Siniloan. This report was recorded in his personal logbook which he presented in court. He also stated that before he proceeded to the house of Lito Palad on the night of the incident, he saw appellant near the school gate at around 7:00 P.M., apparently roaming around. 18
Lt. Mary Jean Geronimo, a chemist at the Crime Laboratory Service of the Philippine National Police at Camp Vicente Lim, conducted an examination on the person of appellant on December 19, 1990 for the purpose of determining the presence of gunpowder on his hands. Her examination revealed that appellant was positive for powder burns, and it was possible that he could have fired a gun either on December 17, 1990 or on the very day before he was examined. 19 Dr. Rex Villavicencio, a military physician at Villamor Air Base, performed the post-mortem examination on the body of the deceased and his autopsy report disclosed that the cause of death was intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to gunshot wound. 20
Appellant Diomedes Adofina steadfastly denied the adverse allegations of the prosecution witnesses and declared that on December 17, 1990, he was on duty from 8:00 A.M. until 4:00 P.M., after having relieved the deceased whose guard duty was from 12:00 midnight in the preceding evening until 8:00 A.M. of that day. When the killing happened, at around 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock that evening, he was already off duty and was sleeping in his house. At around 11:00 P.M., he was awakened when Pat. Arturo Rellosa arrived at his house and asked him if he had any knowledge of the shooting of the victim. Upon his giving a negative answer, he was invited to the police station for investigation. When they arrived there, the station commander was out, so he was asked to wait until morning of the following day. The next day, the station commander arrived and appellant was thereafter subjected to a paraffin test. 21
Appellant testified that as a security guard of the school, he was not provided with a handgun and, on the particular night in question, he was only carrying a night stick. He further claimed that, shortly prior to the shooting incident, he had played with a toy gun. This toy gun, when filled with powder called "perminante" and by means of a piece of wire inserted inside which acted as a hammer when propelled forward by a rubber band, would fire when so operated. He fired this toy gun three or four times since he wanted to make the same toy gun for his 7-year old son. 22
On the day of the incident, after his shift from 8:00 A.M. to 4:00 p.m., he was asked to render extra service by joining the second shift of Pablo Hebres for the evening class. 23 He rendered that overtime service up to 7:00 o'clock that evening, then left the college compound and went home. He admitted that he had been charged with qualified theft by the school for the poisoning and theft of fish at the school pond. 24
Vitaliano Adofina, a brother of appellant, attested that on December 17, 1990, he went home at 6:00 P.M., while appellant arrived home at past 7:00 P.M. He knew the time of appellant's arrival because his house and that of appellant, which is located behind the former, have a common door, the only one in fact, which is used for both ingress and egress by them. He was sure that after his arrival, appellant did not leave the house anymore because he did not see him pass through that common passage which was the only way out of the house. At about 11:00 P.M., he was awakened by Pat. Rellosa who asked for appellant, so he went to appellant's house and woke him up. Rellosa then invited appellant to the Siniloan police station for investigation. This witness accordingly accompanied appellant to the station and left him there upon being told that the latter had to be interrogated first by the station commander. 25
The court a quo, after conceding that there was no eyewitness to the incident, based its judgment of conviction on what it considered as circumstantial evidence and which it summarized as follows:
1) That the accused Diomedes Adofina harbored resentment against Julio San Marcos because he had executed an (sic) statement, pointing to accused to be the principal suspect in the poisoning and stealing of the fish in the LSPC fishpond, and will testify in that case for Qualified Theft filed before this Court against him (accused) on September 11, 1990. He (San Marcos) was the lone eyewitness of the prosecution in said case;
2) That when Julio San Marcos was shot on December 17, 1990 at around 9:00 o'clock P.M. at the LSPC compound, accused was seen roaming around the LSPC compound;
3) That after the fishpond incident on May 1, 1990, accused had threatened Julio San Marcos; and
4) That accused was invited to the Police Station of Siniloan, Laguna immediately after the incident, and the following day he was subjected to a paraffin test. His both hands (sic) were found positive of gun powder. 26
After a meticulous study and judicious evaluation of the evidence on record, we are constrained to uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence in appellant's favor. We are convinced that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt with the moral certitude mandated by reglementary standards derived from a constitutional foundation. We do not believe that the judicial conscience can rest easy upon a conviction anchored upon intrinsically flawed evidence collated through a labored correlation.
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
At this juncture, we wish to stress that the rule on circumstantial evidence necessarily requires that each circumstance must be positively established with the requisite quantum of evidence, in the same manner that the catena that binds them together and conduces to a conclusion of guilt must survive the test of reason and satisfy the required evidentiary weight. It must not be overlooked that, whether in law or physics, a chain can only be as strong as its weakest link.
We have further held that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, that is, the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 27
We are reasonably persuaded that the People's so-called string of circumstances presented in evidence is insufficient to produce that total moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind which can overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in appellant's favor. Moreover, much of the prosecution's evidence presented in court were either hearsay or based on speculations and were consequently inadmissible in evidence. It is elementary law that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, 28 save in certain instances which, however, do not obtain or are inapplicable in the instant case. Furthermore, the testimonies of some prosecution witnesses, far from bearing down on appellant's putative guilt, even bolster his innocence. We shall, therefore, analyze those supposed inculpatory circumstances seriatim, but not necessarily in the order of the enumeration thereof by the court below.
That appellant was allegedly roaming inside the campus at the time of the incident is definitely not an established fact. Prosecution witness Ricardo S. Crucido, in his ex parte sworn statement, was initially positive that at the time of the incident appellant was roaming inside the school compound supposedly to monitor the actions of the deceased. 29 How he could divine the alleged purpose of appellant is neither explained nor explicable. At any rate, he subsequently vacillated the backtracked on his original assertion when he testified in court that he really saw appellant only at around 7:00 P.M. and that at 9:00 o'clock P.M., when the gunshots were heard, he was actually at the house of Lito Palad and, as he admitted, he could not have seen or observed appellant then. Moreover he likewise affirmed that it was not he but "somebody" else who supposedly saw appellant inside the campus when the killing took place. 30 This supposed eyewitness, however, was never identified nor presented in court to corroborate his claim.
As heretofore narrated, appellant duly explained that although he was supposed to render overtime guard duty with the second shift, whose tour of duty was up to 9:30 o'clock that evening, he stayed only up to and was permitted to leave the campus at around 7:00 P.M. 31 This clarification was corroborated without contradiction by prosecution witness Pablo Hebres himself, the security guard for that second shift, who attested having seen appellant leaving the campus at 7:00 o'clock that evening and proceeding on his way home.32
Crucido likewise told the lower court that, based on his investigation, Alicia Urrera saw appellant run towards the house of Sgt. Raymundo and that he fled afterwards. Unfortunately for the prosecution, this assertion of Crucido is completely devoid of evidentiary weight as, in fact, it should have been admitted only as part of his narration of the dubious investigations he allegedly conducted. It bears revealing that on August 5, 1991, the prosecution requested that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to Urrera. 33 However, despite such subpoena to secure her appearance, 34 the prosecution found it no longer necessary to present her, but offered no plausible explanation for her non-presentation in court. 35 Considering that Urrera is a very material witness in light of the surrounding circumstances and of the prosecution's theory, her non-presentation gives rise to the unrebutted presumption that her testimony would have been adverse if produced, 36 and engenders the suspicion that what Crucido alleged as results of his investigation were either exaggerated or face-saving, if not totally baseless and unfounded.
The widow's testimony on the threat to the life of the deceased allegedly made by appellant sometime in November of 1990, and supposedly relayed to the deceased during his lifetime by Ponciano Arriola 37 suffers from the same evidential defect. Without any explanation or justification by the prosecution, Arriola was never presented in court to formally substantiate that attribution, much less to be cross-examined thereon.
The reputed entry in Crucido's personal logbook regarding the October 11, 1990 incident, when appellant was supposed to have blocked the way of the deceased while the latter was going home, is not entitled to any evidentiary credit since even assuming there was a basis therefor, the same was unilateral and untested, hence it is self-serving. At most, granting the authenticity and regularity thereof, the entry can only prove that a report was made to Crucido but not the truth of the facts stated therein. Moreover, as appellant argues, it is significant that Crucido, being the school's Director of Security Services at that time, did not even lift a finger to investigate that serious incident considering that appellant and the deceased were his subordinates and that misdemeanors of the school's security guards were among his principal concerns. 38 To that, we may add the curious fact that Crucido never caused the supposed incident to be entered either in the school's logbook or in the police blotter.
The alleged utterance of Sgt. Raymundo to the effect that he would "blow" or "explode" what he was carrying in his bag against the deceased is of highly dubious credibility and, even assuming its truth, the same cannot be taken against appellant. In the first place, the victim's widow who testified thereto admittedly did not even see or know what was supposedly inside Raymundo's bag which could pose threat to her husband's life. 39 Secondly, it is hard to believe that Raymundo would be so naive as to utter his "threats" within the hearing distance of said witness who could readily relay the same to her husband. Thirdly, neither of the spouses took any action to avert any untoward incident that may arise from or was indicated by said utterance, despite its gravity, such as having the matter investigated by or made of record with the school or police authorities. Finally, assuming arguendo that Raymundo did utter those threatening remarks, the same cannot be taken against appellant who was neither a participant in the cause thereof 40 nor privy thereto, but only happened to be in the group listening to the same.
From the tenor of her narration, witness Mercedita San Marcos seems to imply that appellant had something to do with those remarks since he and Raymundo are close friends, such that whatever the latter orders, appellant follows. 41 She claims that, according to her deceased husband, the two were in cahoots with each other in the poisoning of the fish in the school pond. 42 Moreover, she said that according to the residents at the school compound, the two were often together in drinking sessions. 43 Other than these clearly hearsay testimonies, however, this witness could not come up with any acceptable evidence to support her insinuations. It is noteworthy that neither appellant's guilt nor his complicity with Raymundo in the case for poisoning and theft of fish has ever been proven and the fact that they were seen drinking together could not by any stretch of reason show that one is the puppet of the other.
On this score, the court below harps on the fact that the victim was the sole witness in that case involving the college fishpond. The implication is that appellant had a motive for seeking or causing the elimination of the victim. That may be a possibility but it need not necessarily warp our perspective. For, by the same token, such fact, which was of public knowledge, could also be a strong deterrent against appellant's seeking to harm the victim, knowing as he must that the finger of suspicion would readily point to him as the culprit.
The testimony of Pablo Hebres that appellant and the deceased had been avoiding each other does not, of course, prove that appellant planned to kill the deceased. As correctly stated by appellant, it is but a natural human behavior for persons involved in an adversarial situation in court to avoid each other. 44 Thus, the availment by the prosecution of said witness' testimony to sustain such a far-fetched proposition strikes us as a somewhat desperate mode of argumentation.
Finally, the chemist herself who examined appellant and found him positive for gunpowder nitrates, testified that the results of her examination do not conclusively show that appellant had indeed fired a gun. 45 Thus it must be, for it should be taken only as an indication of possibility or even of probability but not of infallibility, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder. 46 Besides, her opinion only constitutes at most one circumstance which should not be taken out of context from the required evidentiary chain of which it is merely a single link. As already demonstrated, the other circumstances in the prosecution's professed catenation of events are, in truth, flawed and unworthy of credit as constituents of the supposed factum probans leading to a finding of guilt.
Accordingly, appellant's alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating his criminal liability in view of the weakness of the prosecution's cause and the corroborative testimony of appellant's brother who has established the appellant's alibi was not a mere concoction but a reality. His alibi should be considered in light of other evidence in this case for there are times where an accused has not other possible defense but alibi, as that could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the time in question, and it may even tilt the scales of justice in his favor. 47 For that matter, we consider it concordant with ordinary experience that appellant would be resting at his residence after a whole day of guard duty, instead of his being elsewhere just to comply with the distance generally considered by dicta for the defense of alibi.
We deem it opportune to rule once again that the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged lies upon the prosecution, and that burden must be discharged on the strength of its own evidence and not upon the weakness of the evidence submitted by the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is indispensably necessary if the constitutional presumption of innocence is to be overturned in any given case and the evidence must produce moral certainty on the part of the court, or that certainty which convinces and satisfies the reasoning and conscience of those who are to act upon the instance that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. 48
On the other hand, we do not even find it necessary to document the decisional axiom, long since evolved and enshrined by consistency, that when the circumstances shown to exist yield two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other or others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the accused, for then the evidence does not thereby fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused-appellant Diomedes Adofina y Alcantara of the felony charged, with costs de oficio. His immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless for some other lawful cause his further detention is warranted.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Original Record, 31.
2 Ibid., 16.
3 Ibid., 33.
4 Ibid., 115.
5 Per Judge Venancio M. Tarriela.
6 Original Record, 143-144.
7 Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 1; Rollo, 138.
** His surname is spelled "Reymundo" in some parts of the record.
8 TSN, July 8, 1991, 2-7; 13.
9 Ibid., id., 8-9.
10 Ibid., id., 9-11.
11 Ibid., July 22, 1991, 2-6.
12 Ibid., id., 6-8.
13 Ibid., id., 9.
14 Ibid., id., 10.
15 Ibid., August 5, 1991, 4-8.
16 Ibid., id., 8-9.
17 Ibid., id., 24-25; 28.
18 Ibid., id., 11-12; 17.
19 Ibid., September 11, 1991, 3, 8-9.
20 Ibid., November 5, 1991, 5, 7, 12.
21 Ibid., April 6, 1992, 3-6.
22 Ibid., id., 6-8.
23 Ibid., id., 9.
24 Ibid., April 20, 1992, 14.
25 Ibid., June 10, 1992, 3-8.
26 Original Record, 141-142.
27 People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, February 8, 1994, 229 SCRA 754.
28 Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
29 TSN, August 5, 1991, 17.
30 Ibid., id., 19-21.
31 Ibid., April 6, 1992, 10.
32 Ibid., July 22, 1991, 9.
33 Ibid., August 5, 1991, 31-32.
34 Original Record, 50.
35 Ibid., 47; see Appellant's Brief, 17-18; Rollo, 154-155.
36 Sec. 5, Rule 131, Rules of Court.
37 TSN, July 8, 1991, 13.
38 Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 14-15; Rollo, 151-152.
39 TSN, July 8, 1991, 20.
40 Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 12-13; Rollo, 149-150.
41 TSN, July 8, 1991, 6.
42 Ibid., id., 16.
43 Ibid., id., 14-16.
44 Appellant's Brief, 16; Rollo, 153.
45 TSN, September 11, 1991, 22-23.
46 Ibid., id., 15-16.
47 People vs. Jalon, G.R. No. 93729, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 680.
48 People vs. Fider, G.R. No. 105285, June 3, 1993, 223 SCRA 117.
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