Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 94994-95 May 14, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LILIBETH CACO y PALMARIO and TEODORO CACO y LAPADA, accused.
LILIBETH CACO y PALMARIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Mariano L. Ordoñez III for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.: Accused spouses Teodoro and Lilibeth Caco were charged with the violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, in an Information filed on 27 February 1990 with Branch 172 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The accusatory portion thereof reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of February 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction oof this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, dispatch in transit and transport ten (10) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, which is a prohibited
drug.1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90.
On the same date, another information for the violation of Section 27, Article IV of the said Act was filed with the same court against Mercia Bayonito, Rosemarie Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Annabelle Castillo and Linda Caco. The said persons allegedly smoked marijuana while gathered as a group in the house of the spouses Teodoro and Lilibeth Caco. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10106-V-90.2
Both cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
After all of the accused had entered a plea of not guilty during their arraignment, trial on the merits ensued. The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Pat. Wilfredo Quillan, Pat. Rafael Tamayo and Constancia Franco. The witnesses for the defense were the accused Mercia Bayonito and Corazon de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10106-V-90, accused Lilibeth Caco in Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90, and Barangay Captain Ruperto Sabile, Jr.
On 13 August 1990, the trial court promulgated a joint decision3
in the above cases acquitting all the accused in Criminal Case No. 10106-V-90 and the accused Teodoro Caco in Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90 but convicting the accused Lilibeth Caco in the latter. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court in Criminal Case No. 10106-V-90 finds all the accused namely Mercia Bayonito y Biazon, Rosemarie Reyes y Sabayan, Corazon de la Cruz y Cruz, Annabelle Castillo y Cruz and Linda Caco y Lapada not guilty of the crime charged on ground of reasonable doubt. In Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90, the Court finds Teodoro Caco not guilty of the crime charged because of reasonable doubt. The Court finds Lilibeth Caco y Palmario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and a fine of Twenty Thousand without subsidiary imprisonment in case of inslovency, and to pay the costs. The bail bonds posted by all the accused in Civil (sic) Case No. 10106-V-90 are hereby ordered cancelled. The Jail Warden of Valenzuela is hereby ordered to release Teodoro Caco from confinement unless held for any lawful cause. All the sticks of marijuana are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.4
Said conviction is based on the following findings and conclusion of the trial court:
Anent Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90 the Court has found the following facts and arrived at the following conclusions:
The Court heard the testimonies of both police officers and saw their demeanor, and read the contents of their joint affidavit that Lilibeth Caco received from Pat. Wilfredo Quillan the P20.00, went inside the house and when she came out she gave to Pat. Wilfredo Quillan 10 sticks of marijuana, which were proven by the prosecution to be marijuana. The testimony and written allegations of Pat. Rafael Tamayo that he peeped through the hole and saw Lilibeth hand to Teodoro Caco the money and the latter "may kinuha sa kaning kuarto" cannot be taken against Teodoro Caco because as stated above said hole was not proven to exist and it is not categorically proven as to what Teodoro Caco hand (sic) to Lilibeth inside the house. It was Lilibeth who was proven to have received the money and who was proven to have handed to poseur buyer Pat. Quillan the 10 sticks. Teodoro Caco was not proven successfully by the prosecution to have participated in the sale.
The Court noted the recent jailbreak of prisoners of the Valenzuela Jail. The accused Teodoro Caco was one of them (sic) who bolted but he surrendered thereafter before the authorities gave chase, he, alleging that he was threatened to be killed if he declined to join the jailbreak. The Court takes this gesture of his in surrendering to the authority and returning to jail while this case pends, as an indication of an innocent person.
Since Lilibeth Caco was apprehended during the illegal act of selling marijuana the confiscation from her house of the 89 sticks of marijuana even without search warrant is legal, and said evidence cannot be taken against him (sic), as pursuant to a legal arrest.
It has been held in our jurisprudence that possession of a large quantity of such prohibited drug without evidence showing that the accused is a user, bolsters the charge that he/she is a pusher.
Overwhelming evidence that prove (sic) the guilt of the accused Lilibeth Caco but innocense (sic) of Teodoro Caco in Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90 has been presented by the accused (sic). The weak defense of Lilibeth Caco cannot really prevail over said prosecution evidence. 5
The pertinent facts as established by the prosecution are succinctly and more lucidly stated by the People in the Brief for the Appellee6 as follows:
On February 23, 1990, at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Patrolman Wilfredo Quillan received information from a civilian informant that appellant and her husband were selling marijuana in their house at Tanke Street, Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila (pp. 2-3, tsn, March 23, 1990).
Patrolman Quillan relayed the information to Sergeant Loreto Rodriguez, head of the Anti-Narcotics Unit. Sgt. Rodriguez formed a team to conduct a "buy-bust" operation. He designated Patrolman Quillan to act as "poseur buyer," giving him a marked P20.00 bill forthe purpose (p. 3, ibid.).
The group composed of Patrolman Quillan, Federico Patag, Jose Villaseñor, Rafael Tamayo and Crisanto Zuriaga proceeded to Tanke Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The civilian informant showed them the house of appellant (p. 4, ibid.).
Patrolman Quillan and Tamayo went to the house of appellant and called for her. When appellant came out, they asked if her husband, Boy Andeng, was there. They then told her that they wanted to buy marijuana worth P20.00 (ibid.).
Appellant got the money and went inside. When she returned, she handed to them ten sticks of marijuana. Thereupon, Patrolman Quillan and Tamayo introduced themselves as police officers and signaled their companions to approach (p. 5, ibid.).
The police went inside the house and found two rouches (sic) of marijuana on the floor. Appellant's husband, Teodoro Caco, surrendered eighty nine (89) more sticks of marijuana (p. 6, ibid.).
Patrolman Quillan identified the ten sticks of marijuana appellant sold to him (Exhibits I-1 to E-10) through his initials (p. 2, tsn, May 23, 1990). He likewise identified the 89 sticks of marijuana (Exhibit I-11 to I-99) found inside the house of appellant through his initials on the plastic bag (ibid.).
Exhibits I-1 to I-99 were confirmed to be marijuana through chemical tests conducted by Constancia Salonga, Supervising Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (pp. 2-4, tsn, May 4,
1990).7
Accused Lilibeth Caco, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant, seasonably appealed from the decision and in the Resolution of 29 April 1991, this Court accepted the appeal. 8
On 28 August 1991, the appellant filed through her new lawyer, Atty. Mariano Ordoñez II, a seven-page Appeal Brief for Accused 9 wherein she presents and discusses the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WITHOUT GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, ESPECIALLY INCONSISTENCIES EVIDENT.
II.
THE LOWER COURT HAS NOT PROVEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The formulation of the assigned errors leaves much to be desired and it is obvious that it was done with undue haste. As worded, the first suffers from ambiguity with a shade of self-contradiction while the second proposes a novel rule of evidence by shifting to the trial court the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. This Court, however, will resolve the issues not on the basis of the formulation of the assignment of errors but on the merits of the arguments proferred in support thereof.
In seeking the reversal of the decision, the appellant points out in the first assigned errors what she perceives to be inconsistencies between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Quillan and Tamayo which the trial court allegedly failed to notice. According to her, although Tamayo testified that he and Quillan introduced themselves to the appellant when the latter went inside the house, and that the five (5) women (accused in Criminal Case No. 10106-V-90) were just sitting down, Quillan declared that the introduction was made before he went inside the house after the sale was made and that the five (5) women were dancing. She then concludes that these disparities, taken in the light of the further declaration of Tamayo that he was only one (1) meter away from Quillan, show that Tamayo was not within the area of the appellant's house, but somewhere else. Appellant further claims that the trial court erred in not verifying whether there was a legitimate buy-bust operation and whether the apprehending policemen entered the house of the appellant with a search warrant in compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.10
Appellant opens her discussion of the second assigned error with a reiteration of her quaint theory that "the court was not able to prove accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt," hence, it committed an error in convincing her. She submits that there are doubts on the "reasonableness of the search made on accused's house," and on the "existence of the buy-bust operation for the lower court failed to prove that the front door of the accused's house was either open or close."11 As to the latter, she observes that the prosecution's evidence tends to establish that the door was closed because the policeman had to knock while the defense was able to prove that it was wide open.12 Finally, she raises "a question of admissibility in evidence" of the eighty- nine (89) sticks of marijuana allegedly voluntarily surrendered by Teodoro Caco because there was no search warrant issued therefor, and describes the alleged surrender thereof as beyond comprehension because she and her husband had questioned the authority of the policemen to search their house and had demanded for a search warrant.13
In its Brief,14 the Appellee refutes in detail the assigned errors by showing that: (1) the buy-bust operation was fully established in evidence, (2) the testimonies of Quillan and Tamayo regarding it are consistent on major points, (3) the inconsistencies pointed out refer to non-crucial details which do not detract from their overall credibility,15 and (4) the search and seizure in this case were made as an incident to a lawful arrest; hence, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 in relation to Section 5(1), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, no warrant was required.16
A thorough examination and evaluation of the records and the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not sustain the appellant's position. Her appeal is clearly unmeritorious.
The claimed inconsistencies in the testimonies of Quillan and Tamayo concern minor, if not trivial, matters. It is doctrinally settled that minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses' honesty.17 Such inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.18 The test is whether the testimonies agree on the essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole.19 Appellant does not even attempt to dispute the factual infrastructure of the successful buy-bust operation as established by the evidence for the prosecution, viz., that she received the P20.00 buy-bust money in consideration of which she delivered to the poseur-buyer, Pat. Quillan, ten (10) sticks of marijuana. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that these facts were whittled down or depreciated by the alleged inconsistencies. The "reasonable doubt" she raised regarding the buy-bust operation is wholly unacceptable for it is based on the paradoxical statement that "the lower court failed to prove that the front door of the accused's house was either open or close.20 It is not, of course, the duty of the trial court to prove the guilt of the accused. That is the burden of the prosecution. The court's duty is to weigh the evidence and determine if the quantum of proof required for conviction — proof beyond reasonable doubt — is met.21 Besides, the condition of the door in the instantcase is entirely irrelevant to the issue of whether there was in fact a buy-bust operation.
With respect to the legality and validity of the search and seizure conducted by the policemen, this Court notes that no specific assignment of error is devoted to it and that the appellant merely makes a passing reference to it in her second assigned error. Such a paramount issue involving a sacred constitutional right certainly deserves more than just a fleeting mention or a passing interest if indeed the appellant had a valid grievance. The records of this case yield nothing to support such a plaint. On the contrary, the legality and validity of the search and seizure is beyond dispute. Appellant was caught in flagrante selling marijuana to the poseur-buyer. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, she could be, as in fact she was, lawfully arrested without a warrant because she was then committing or has just committed a crime in the presence of the policemen. Said section provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. . . . 22
As an incident to the lawful arrest, the appellant could be, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, "searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
In People vs.Paco,23 this Court ruled:
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. And since appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was also valid. [Rule 126, Sec. 12, Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 (1946); People vs. Claudio, G.R. No. 72564, April 15, 1988].
Being the product of a lawful search, the eighty-nine (89) sticks of marijuana are, therefore, admissible in evidence.
In Our jurisdiction, a buy-bust operation is a recognized means of entrapping drug pushers.24 Entrapment is an operation sanctioned by the Revised Penal Code.25
The decision appealed from must perforce be affirmed as it is fully supported by the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence.
We end, however, with a note that We are not exactly happy at seeing a married woman suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for drug pushing while her husband was acquitted of the same charge. She would, thus, leave a family deprived of maternal love and a husband divested of consortium. However, she committed an offense whose consequences go beyond her immediate victims and in open defiance of the continuing and relentless campaign of the Government to rid society of the drug menace and its disastrously harmful social, economic, and even spiritual effects. It has broken the lives, shattered the hopes and destroyed the future of thousands of our young citizens.26 Let her and others of her ilk know that purveyors of drugs are agents of destruction; they deserve no less than the maximum penalty.27
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant LILIBETH CACO y PALMARIO.
# Footnotes
1 Original Records (OR), Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90, 1-2; Rollo, 4-5.
2 Rollo, 2-3.
3 OR, 136-146; Id., 22-32.
4 OR, 145-146; Rollo, 31-32.
5 Rollo, 30-31.
6 Id., 78, et seq.
7 Brief for Appellee, 3-6.
8 Rollo, 36.
9 Id., 43, et seq.
10 Appeal Brief for Accused, 5.
11 Id.
12 Appeal Brief for Accused, 5.
13 Id., 6.
14 Brief for Appellee, 78, et seq.
15 People vs. Sagun, Jr., 185 SCRA 405 [1990].
16 Citing People vs. De la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416 [1990]; People vs. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751 [1990]; People vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988].
17 People vs. Bernardino, 193 SCRA 448 [1991]; People vs. Madriaga, 211 SCRA 698 [1992].
18 People vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401 [1988]; People vs. Cabato, 160 SCRA 98 [1988]; People vs. Custodio, 197 SCRA 538 [1991].
19 People vs. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 407 [1990]: People vs. Gadiana, 195 SCRA 211 [1991].
20 Appeal Brief for Accused, 5.
21 Section 2, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.
22 See People vs. Claudio, supra; People vs. Rodriguez, 172 SCRA 742 [1989]; People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990]; People vs. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 644 [1991]; People vs. Madriaga, supra.
23 170 SCRA 681 [1989]. See also People vs. Bati, 189 SCRA 97 [1990]; People vs. de la Cruz, 191 SCRA 160 [1990].
24 People vs. Gatong-o, 168 SCRA 716 [1988]; People vs. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376 [1990]; People vs. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991].
25 People vs. Payumo, 187 SCRA 64 [1990].
26 People vs. Tantiado, G.R. Nos. 92795-96, 2 September 1992
27 People vs. Garcia, 198 SCRA 603 [1991].
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