TERESITA C. GERALES, CESAR DELA FUENTE, MARCELA GOLDING, MARIA VERGARA and PERLITO TRIGERO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE E. PIMENTEL and LETICIA FIDELDIA, respondents.

Jose B. Daguna, Jr. for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 26, 1988 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 11811 entitled "Enrique E. Pimentel and Leticia T. Fideldia v. Hon. Ruben T. Reyes, as Regional Trial Court Judge, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan and Teresita C. Gerales, Cesar Dela Fuente, Marcela Gelding, Maria Vergara, and Perlito Trigero" dismissing Civil Case. No. 5210 and reversing the decision of the trial court and (2) the resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 15, 1988 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

On July 9, 1984, a car owned by Leticia Fideldia, then driven by Enrique E. Pimentel, hit another car, owned by Teresita Gerales then driven by Cesar Dela Fuente, with Marcela Golding, Maria Vergara and Perlito Trigero as passengers at San Jose, San Fernando, Pampanga.

On August 17, 1984, private respondent Enrique E. Pimentel was charged before the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga with the crime of Damage to Property with Multiple Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, docketed as Criminal Case No. 84-9302 (Rollo, p. 18, Annex "A", p. 1).

During the pendency of the criminal case, particularly on January 11, 1985, private offended parties (now petitioners) Maria Vergara, Perlito Trigero, Marcela del Rosario Golding, Cesar Dela Fuente, and Teresita Gerales filed a civil case for Damages in the total amount of P400,000.00 docketed as Civil Case No. 5210, in the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Enrique E. Pimentel and Leticia Fideldia. This civil case is based on the same incident for which private respondent, Enrique E. Pimentel was charged in Criminal Case No. 84-9302 (Rollo, p. 19, Annex "A", p. 2).

On April 23, 1985, or after the filing of Civil Case No. 5210 but before the service of summons upon the defendants (herein private respondents), the claims of the offended parties (plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5210) were amicably settled, to wit:

These offended parties (now petitioners), whose claims were amicably settled, individually executed and signed a "Release Of Claim," the contents of which substantially reads as follows:

A Motion to Dismiss the criminal case was filed by Atty. Jaime C. Bueza, counsel of the offended parties, with the conformity of the Prosecuting Fiscal, based on the Affidavits of Desistance executed by the offended parties.

On April 23, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch IV, acting on the Motion to Dismiss, accordingly dismissed Criminal Case No. 84-9302.

After the dismissal of the criminal charge against private respondent Enrique E. Pimentel, the latter and respondent Leticia Fideldia were served on July 30, 1985 with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5210 (Rollo, p. 19, Annex "A", p. 3).

On August 14, 1985, respondent Enrique E. Pimentel wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, which reads:

On August 21, 1985, or after receipt of respondent Pimentel's letter, the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan issued an order in Civil Case No. 5210, to wit:

On motion of petitioners, the trial court issued an order declaring respondents Enrique E. Pimentel and Leticia Fideldia in default and forthwith set the case for presentation of petitioners' evidence ex-parte on October 8, 1985. A copy of said order was received by private respondents on September 18, 1985.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners, ordering respondents Enrique E. Pimentel and Leticia T. Fideldia, to pay jointly and severally the following:

Copy of the said judgment was received by private respondents on February 12, 1986. On March 10, 1986, private respondents filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment. On February 20, 1987, the trial judge denied the Petition for Relief from Judgment. A writ of execution was issued on March 6, 1987 (Rollo, p. 20, Annex "A", p. 3). Private respondents received a copy of the order of denial on March 26, 1987 (Rollo, p. 20, Annex "A", p. 3).

Private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to set aside the aforementioned judgment and orders of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5210, alleging among others that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering a judgment by default against private respondents, in denying the petition for relief from judgment and in issuing a writ of execution.

The Court of Appeals, citing the case of Ledesma v. Avelino (82 SCRA 396 [1978]), reversed the decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution promulgated on November 15, 1988. (Rollo, p. 25, Annex "B", p. 2)

Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated March 1, 1989, this Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to file their respective memoranda.

Petitioners raise the issue of whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error in deciding private respondents' petition on the merits, thereby reversing the decision of the trial court and disregarding petitioners' evidence.

Petitioners claim that the respondent Court of Appeals should have denied and dismissed private respondents' petition for certiorari as there was no error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They insist that the court a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over the persons of the private respondents when the latter were duly served with summons on July 30, 1985. Hence, whatever error may have been committed in the case was not an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari. They claim that the respondent court, in dismissing the civil case for damages on the sole basis of the "releases of claims," had denied them procedural due process as they were not afforded the opportunity to refute, assail, and overcome their/probative value (Rollo, pp. 10-12).

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering their letter dated August 14, 1985 as their responsive pleading and in consequently declaring them in default; in denying in its order dated February 20, 1987 their petition for relief from judgment; and in issuing a writ of execution on March 6, 1987, even before they received a copy of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment.

An examination of the records of the case shows that the trial court, after taking judicial notice of the letter of private respondents informing the court that the parties have mutually settled the case, and that a Motion to Dismiss was even filed by petitioners' counsel in the related criminal case, altogether did not consider nor treat it as private respondents' responsive pleading to the complaint for damages. In fact, on motion of petitioners, the private respondents were declared in default and accordingly, a judgment by default was rendered against them (private respondents).

Under the factual setting of the case, the trial court ought to have considered the letter of respondent Enrique E. Pimentel as a responsive pleading even if it lacks the formalities required by law. Undoubtedly, the letter made mention of the fact that the parties mutually settled the case, which allegation may be deemed as an averment of an affirmative defense and if proven
in a preliminary hearing pursuant to Section 5, Rule l6, would constitute a meritorious defense of private respondents which would bar petitioners from recovering damages from the former as the claim or demand set forth in plaintiffs' (petitioners') pleading had been paid or extinguished.

Pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed in order that the litigant may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and possible denial of substantial justice, due to technicalities, may be avoided (Cabutin, et al. v. Amacio, 170 SCRA 750 [1989], citing Quibuyen v. CA, 9 SCRA 741 [1963]). Litigations should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicality (Fonseca v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 40 [1988], citing A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590, 594 [1980]). Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts (American Express International, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 209 [1988] citing Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910]), and because there is no vested right in technicalities, in meritorious crises, a liberal, not literal interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules, which is the proper and just determination of a litigation (Fonseca v. C.A., supra.).

In addition thereto, the trial court's denial of private respondents' petition for relief from judgment, inspite of the fact that they raise the meritorious defense of full settlement and/or payment of the claim is improper. The trial judge should have granted the aforesaid petition as it would ultimately afford both parties the opportunity to prove their respective claims by fully and fairly laying before the Court, the facts in issue and seek justice upon the merits thereof and that possible denial of justice due to legal technicalities may be avoided.

The courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgment is frowned upon, and unless it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay, it is best that the trial courts give both parties every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without resort to technicality (Zenith Insurance Corporation v. Hon. Fidel Purisima, 114 SCRA 62 [1982], citing Pineda v. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 229 [1975]).

In the light of the foregoing, it is evident that indeed the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring private respondents in default, and in denying their petition for relief from judgment. Consequently, the validity of the order of default and all the proceedings that transpired subsequent thereto cannot be sustained.

A petition for Certiorari lies when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court). It is the inadequacy — not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without/such writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari (Philippine National Bank v. Puno, 170 SCRA 229 [1989] citing Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., 113 SCRA 107 (1982]).

Undoubtedly, Certiorari is a more speedy and efficacious remedy to have the judgment by default be set aside as a nullity where a party has been illegally declared in default. It will be noted that the trial court had already issued a writ of execution even before respondents received a copy of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment (Rollo, p. 20). Clearly therefore even if appeal was available to private respondents, it was no longer speedy and adequate.

Petitioners contend that respondent Court of Appeals, in dismissing the complaint (Civil Case No. 5210) against private respondents on the basis solely of the releases of claims, had denied them their right to procedural due process. They claim that the settlements contained in the releases of claims were not true; that patent irregularities attended their execution as petitioners executed them because private respondents led them to believe that what they were receiving were partial settlements only; and that the said documents were more of a receipt rather than any document (Rollo, p. 12).

Conversely, private respondents contend that the releases of claims executed and signed by petitioners show that full settlements were received by the latter from private respondents and their insurer, F.E. Zuellig, Inc.; that when petitioners executed these documents, they were assisted by their very own counsel, Atty. Jaime C. Bueza; that the same was duly notarized and that petitioners cannot now impugn the veracity of the documents upon the self-serving argument that they were misled by their own counsel into believing that the settlements were but partial.

It should be borne in mind that the petitioners do not deny at all their having executed the releases of claims which are in the nature of quitclaims. Their allegation that the execution thereof was attended by false pretenses is self-serving. Contrary thereto, petitioners, in executing these releases of claims, were in fact assisted by their counsel, Atty. Bueza, and the document was even notarized.

A notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, although not absolute but rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary (Baranda v. Baranda, 150 SCRA 59 [1987], citing Antillon v. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148 [1917] and Mendezona v. Phil Sugar Estate Development Corporation. 41 Phil. 475 [1921]). A public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear and convincing more than merely preponderant (Collantes v. Capuno, 123 SCRA 652 [1983]).

Petitioners can not now question the validity and/or veracity of the releases of claims on the allegation that the same were executed on their belief that what they received were only partial settlements and that they could not have released them "forever from all actions arising from such vehicular accident." If they did not release their claims against, respondents forever, why did they cause the dismissal of the criminal case against Enrique Pimentel?

In essence, petitioners are varying the terms embodied in the releases of claims, which is proscribed by Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is a well-settled principle of law that proof of verbal agreements offered to vary the terms of written agreements is inadmissible under the Parol Evidence Rule (Continental Airlines Inc. v. Santiago, 172 SCRA 490 [1989]), and while Parol Evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake (Tupue v. Urgel, 161 SCRA 417 [1988] citing Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzalez, 29 Phil. 384 [1915]).

It is edgy to see that the exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case. The wordings of the "releases of claims" are clear, simple and unambiguous and there is no showing of any fraud, mistake or failure to express the true agreement of the parties. The second paragraph of the releases of claims executed by petitioners provides:

When petitioners executed the releases of claims on April 23, 1986, Civil Case No. 5210 for damages had already been filed on January 11, 1985 by petitioners as plaintiffs against private respondents as defendants. With the subsequent execution of the releases of claims by petitioners, all claims and demands of petitioners as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5210 which "had been filed in connection with the above (vehicular) accident," were fully and finally compromised, settled and forever released as stipulated in the releases of claims and agreed upon by petitioners.

There could have been no fraud or mistake in the execution of the "releases of claims" because the petitioners were assisted by their counsel in the execution thereof, who affixed his signature on each and every document as witness thereto, which documents ("releases of claims") were acknowledged before a notary public.

While strictly speaking, a remand of the case to the trial court to enable petitioners to present their evidence would be the normal course to follow before a decision is rendered, it has been held that such time-consuming procedure may be properly dispensed with for being unnecessary where the Supreme Court could resolve the dispute on the basis of the records before it (Quisumbing v. CA, SCRA 703 [1983]; Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 549 [1982]). The only defense of the private respondents is the "releases of claims" executed by the petitioners, the existence of which is beyond dispute and is sufficient basis for rendering a decision on the merits, i.e., the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground that the claim or demand of petitioners as plaintiffs had been paid or released.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages against private respondents is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., and Melo, JJ., concur.