G.R. No. 84750




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 84750 May 16, 1989 BULIG-BULIG KITA KAMAG-ANAK ASSOCIATION, ET AL, petitioner, vs. SULPICIO LINES, INC. and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ETC., respondents. U N S I G N E D R E S O L U T I O N The petitioners seek the issuance by this Court of the writ of certiorari for the nullification of the Order of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 1988, rendered in Civil Case No. 88-43718, which, on the avowed authority of this Court's Resolution dated March 3, 1988 in Administrative Matter No. 88-1-646-0, ruled (1) that said petitioners could not maintain a class action in accordance with Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court — although they could joi9n together in one suit pursuant to the joinder of parties rule in Section 6 of the same Rule 3, and (2) requiring them within thirty days "to comply with the filing fee or paupers litigants requirements provided for under Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court." After deliberating on the facts alleged, issues raised and arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari in relation to those in the comments of both private and public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No grave abuse of discretion is imputable to the respondent Court in the rendition of the challenged order. The claim that this Court's Resolution dated March 3, 1988 in Administrative Matter No. 88-1-646-0, being "in response to a mere 'request' or 'solicitation' by the plaintiffs in ... (a) case, 1 is purely "advisory" and "has no valid, legal or binding effect," is untenable. A reading of the resolution will at once make clear that it dealt, not with an abstract, hypothetical question, but with a concrete issue of substance arising in an actual litigation pending before a competent court which, albeit brought up to this Court through a mode somewhat less than formal 2 was ripe for adjudication and needed to be authoritatively settled to govern the subsequent course of the litigation and prevent unwarranted delay in its disposition. There can thus be no doubt that the ruling and principles set out in that resolution constitute binding precedent. Also specious is the claim that the Resolution of March 3, 1988 compels the plaintiffs to file individual, separate suits, with the result that such individual suits "will cause a tremendous flood of litigation — thousands of cases in different courtrooms throughout the country ..." While the resolution plainly declares that the circumstances of the case do not warrant the institution of a class action in accordance with Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it does not direct that the numerous plaintiffs litigate their individual claims separately and in different courts; for the resolution just as plainly declares that the plaintiffs may join in one proceeding under the principle of permissive joinder of parties in Section 6 of the same Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners' ingenious theory that they should first be allowed to bring a class suit to determine the single, general question of the defendants' liability for negligence — and afterwards, and on the assumption that the defendants be indeed adjudged negligent, to litigate individually and separately — in order this time to fix the amount of damages payable to each of the plaintiffs or their heirs, is not only proscribed by procedural rules, as the Solicitor General points out, but would eventually cause the very mischief — "a tremendous flood of litigation" — that the petitioners themselves advert to in support of their basic thesis. The petitioners' obsession with a class action in-preference to one in which there is joinder of parties, which the Resolution of March 3, 1988 suggested as the proper alternative — is difficult to understand. The reason cannot be to avoid what would be the rather extensive paper work involved in drawing up the complaint and, perhaps, subsequent pleadings: for, as far as that is concerned, there cannot be any significant difference in content or volume between what has to be alleged in a class action and what ought to be pleaded where there is a joinder- of-parties plaintiff. The complaint in a, class suit would obviously have to specify the personal circumstances and condition of each individual claimant to precisely the same extent that it would in an action brought by multiple plaintiffs under the joinder of parties rule, since it is not to be supposed that each of the thousands of claimants involved is so identically situated as each of the others as to justify precisely the same amount of recovery for each and every one of them. Indeed, acknowledgment of the differences in condition and state among the claimants is implicit in the proposal of the petitioners themselves, i.e., first obtain a general declaration of liability against the carrier in the class suit, and then, allow each claimant to institute a separate action to prove and recover on his own claim. The proposal does disclose that neither is it the desire to avoid payment of filing fees in respect of all litigants, whether pauper or not, that is at the root of the petition at bar, for it is obvious that the proposed mode of recourse of itself offers no prospect of any relief from the payment of filing fees, since every individual litigant who prosecutes his own action following the speculated favorable outcome of the class suit would have to pay such fees based on the amount of his claim, unless, of course, he is allowed to litigate as a pauper. Nor, for obvious reasons, would there be any variance in the filing fees to be paid. As pointed out in the Resolution of March 3, 1988, whether the multitudinous claims be joined in a class action or in accordance with the joinder of parties rule, the filing fees would be same, it being the totality of the amounts claimed that would be determinative thereof. While petitioners are correct in asserting that the means by which pauperage is required to be shown for purposes of obtaining authority to sue or defend as a pauper litigant under Section 22 of Rule 3, viz.: affidavits, treasurer's certificate, or otherwise, are alternative, not cumulative, it nonetheless appears that of the twelve would-be plaintiffs, besides the Bulig-Bulig Kita, etc. Association, only four in fact submitted sworn statements of lack of means or real property. Since, by their own declaration, the Rule is so easy to comply with, there is no reason to exempt those of them who cannot honestly state that they have not the means to maintain an action from paying the legal fees and other expenses incident to a suit. At all events, a class suit is out of the question for the reasons already made clear in the Resolution of March 3, 1988. The petitioners would be well advised to consider seriously joining in a common suit, or in several common suits in different venues, under the provisions of Section 6 of Rule 3, Rules of Court. From another aspect, the simplificatory alternatives offered by the rule on consolidation of actions (Section 1, Rule 31, Rules of Court) should also in great part relieve petitioners' apprehensions about the difficulties and complications attendant upon hundreds of individual cases being brought in numerous courts throughout the country. As held in Salazar v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 64 Phil. 785, 791-792: There are three ways of consolidating actions or special proceedings where the questions at issue and the parties in interest are the same. The first consists in recasting the cases already constituted, conducting only one hearing and rendering only one decision; the second takes place when the existing cases are consolidated, only one hearing held and only one decision rendered; and the third takes place when, without recasting or consolidating the cases, the principal one is heard, the hearing on the others being suspended until judgment has been rendered in the first case. The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may adopt any of these three forms of consolidation whenever in its opinion the proceeding is beneficial to and convenient for the parties. The power so exercised is discretionary. ... Clearly, it is not only within the power of the litigants to seek, but also within the competence of the courts involved to adopt motu proprio, any of the three indicated modes of consolidating the trial and disposition of the actions, howsoever numerous, brought within each particular venue for the recovery of damages in consequence of a single event, in this case the Doña Paz maritime disaster. Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., are on leave. Footnotes 1 Then pending in the sala of Hon. Judge B.D. Chingcuangco. 2 As the Resolution points out, the Court acted "on the letter request of Atty. Pablito M. Rojas dated January 5, 1988, the comments thereon of Quezon City Executive Judge B. D. Chingcuangco and of counsel for Sulpicio Lines, et al., and the reply to said comments." The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation