G.R. No. 84818




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner. Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz. REGALADO, J.: This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it involves the public utility services of the petitioner Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one rendering such services in the Philippines. The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law. The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are not in dispute. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the following activities and established the following installations: 1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth station in Pinugay, Rizal. 2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I) was established. Pinugay I provided direct satellite communication links with the Pacific Ocean Region (the United States, Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand, China [PROC], New Zealand and Brunei) thru the Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite. 3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A" antenna(Pinugay III) was established. Pinugay II provided links with the Indian Ocean Region (major cities in Europe, Middle East, Africa, and other Asia Pacific countries operating within the region) thru the Indian Ocean INTELSAT satellite. 4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna (Pinugay III) was established to temporarily assume the functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while they were being refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or reserved antenna for possible contingencies. 5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a standard "B" antenna at Clark Air Field, Pampanga as a television receive-only earth station which provides the U.S. Military bases with a 24-hour television service. 6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a third standard "A" earth station (Pinugay IV) to take over the links in Pinugay I due to obsolescence. 3 By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to: 1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company; 2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.; 3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.; 4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and 5. Capitol Wireless, Inc. or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. 5 When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988. The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on the following ground: The Commission in its on-going review of present service rates takes note that after an initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers Authorization Department of the financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject to further reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in its further evaluation that more reduction should be effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization or in the final consideration of the case. 6 PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the following reasons: 1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC; 2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally conferred, the same was exercised in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the questioned order violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process. I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body. Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect questioning the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred. We hold otherwise. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7 It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof. Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process. Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged. We find merit in petitioner's contention. In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission,9 we made a categorical classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus: Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. 10 to wit: It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. 11 The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order. At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides: Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: xxx xxx xxx (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service; ... There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12 While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert. Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case. 13 An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process. III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business. On the other hand, respondents assert that since petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at any time without necessarily violating any vested property right of herein petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of such privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary, but it must be fair and reasonable. There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires. 14 Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common good. The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. 15 Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. 16 What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business judgment based upon the evidence 17 it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. 18 In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility. Competition is also a very important factor in determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet competition. 19 A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of information without, however, divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any elucidation on what implications and conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from said statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the financial statements influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction. On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent detriment to the public service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be unreasonable and improvident. The business in which petitioner is engaged is unique in that its machinery and equipment have always to be taken in relation to the equipment on the other end of the transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation, or refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major adjustment or innovation on the business of petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any change in the sending end abroad has to be matched with the corresponding change in the receiving end in the Philippines. Conversely, any in the receiving end abroad has to be matched with the corresponding change in the sending end in the Philippines. An inability on the part of petitioner to meet the variegations demanded be technology could result in a deterioration or total failure of the service of satellite communications. At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating, and renewing its machinery and equipment in order to keep up with the continuing charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a competitive level with the technological advances abroad. There projected undertakings were formulated on the premise that rates are maintained at their present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof may practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we concede the primacy of the public interest in an adequate and efficient service, the same is not necessarily to be equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and the consumer. Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore have done, with the hearing and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity and in which proceeding the subject of rates involved in the present controversy, as well as other matter involved in said application, be duly adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due observance of our pronouncements herein. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued under our resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically directed against the aforesaid order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: I concur in the ponencia of Justice Regalado and join him in the erudite and thorough discussion of the respondent's authority. However, I have reservations about our continuing to abide by the dictum that in the exercise of quasi-legislative power, notice and hearing are not required. I believe that this doctrine is ripe for re- examination. Senators and Congressmen are directly elected by the people. Administrative officials are not. If the members of an administrative body are, as is so often the case, appointed not on the basis of competence and qualifications but out of political or personal considerations, it is not only the sense of personal responsibility to the electorate affected by legislation which is missing. The expertise and experience needed for the issuance of sound rules and regulations would also be sorely lacking. Congress never passes truly important legislation without holding public hearings. Yet, administrative officials who are not directly attuned to the public pulse see no need for hearings. They issue rules and circulars with far reaching effects on our economy and our nation's future on the assumption that the head of an agency knows best what is good for the people. I believe that in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, administrative agencies, much, much more than Congress, should hold hearings and should be given guidelines as to when notices and hearings are essential even in quasi-legislation. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: I concur in the ponencia of Justice Regalado and join him in the erudite and thorough discussion of the respondent's authority. However, I have reservations about our continuing to abide by the dictum that in the exercise of quasi-legislative power, notice and hearing are not required. I believe that this doctrine is ripe for re- examination. Senators and Congressmen are directly elected by the people. Administrative officials are not. If the members of an administrative body are, as is so often the case, appointed not on the basis of competence and qualifications but out of political or personal considerations, it is not only the sense of personal responsibility to the electorate affected by legislation which is missing. The expertise and experience needed for the issuance of sound rules and regulations would also be sorely lacking. Congress never passes truly important legislation without holding public hearings. Yet, administrative officials who are not directly attuned to the public pulse see no need for hearings. They issue rules and circulars with far reaching effects on our economy and our nation's future on the assumption that the head of an agency knows best what is good for the people. I believe that in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, administrative agencies, much, much more than Congress, should hold hearings and should be given guidelines as to when notices and hearings are essential even in quasi-legislation. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: I concur in the ponencia of Justice Regalado and join him in the erudite and thorough discussion of the respondent's authority. However, I have reservations about our continuing to abide by the dictum that in the exercise of quasi-legislative power, notice and hearing are not required. I believe that this doctrine is ripe for re- examination. Senators and Congressmen are directly elected by the people. Administrative officials are not. If the members of an administrative body are, as is so often the case, appointed not on the basis of competence and qualifications but out of political or personal considerations, it is not only the sense of personal responsibility to the electorate affected by legislation which is missing. The expertise and experience needed for the issuance of sound rules and regulations would also be sorely lacking. Congress never passes truly important legislation without holding public hearings. Yet, administrative officials who are not directly attuned to the public pulse see no need for hearings. They issue rules and circulars with far reaching effects on our economy and our nation's future on the assumption that the head of an agency knows best what is good for the people. I believe that in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, administrative agencies, much, much more than Congress, should hold hearings and should be given guidelines as to when notices and hearings are essential even in quasi-legislation. Footnotes 1 Annex A, Petition: Rollo, 37. 2 Rollo, 6-11, 137-139, 148-150. 3 Ibid., 149. 4 Annex C, Petition; Rollo, 48. 5 Annex B, Id., Ibid., 41. 6 Rollo, 37. 7 42 Am. Jur. 357-358. 8 Memorandum for Private Respondents, 9-10; Rollo, 181- 182. 9 SCRA 46 (1964). 10 44 SCRA 30-7 (1972). 11 Citing Albert vs. Public Service Commission, 120 A. 2d. 346, 350-351. 12 Rollo, 44. 13 William A. Predergast, et. al. vs. New York Tel. Co., 67 L. Ed. 853, 858. 14 Sec. 11. Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. 15 73 C.J.S 1005. 16 Op. cit., 1010. 17 State Public Utilities Commission ex. rel. City of Springfield vs. Springfield Gas & Electric Co., 125 N.E. 891. 18 73 C.J.S. 1010. 19 Manila Railroad Co. vs. A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., 48 Phil. 900 (1926). 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