G.R. No. 84719




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 84719 August 10, 1989 YONG CHAN KIM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. EDGAR D. GUSTILO Presiding Judge, RTC, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 28 Iloilo City and COURT OF APPEALS (13th Division), SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC), respondents. Remedios C. Balbin for petitioner. Hector P. Teodosio for respondent SEAFDEC-AQD PADILLA, J.: This is a motion for reconsideration of the Court's Resolution, dated 29 May 1989, which denied the petition for review on certiorari dated 5 October 1988 for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in issuing the questioned judgment of 29 April 1988 and resolution of 19 August 1988 in CA-G.R. No. 05035. In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner prays that the abovesaid resolution of 29 May 1989 be reconsidered on the ground that the petition for review dated 5 October 1988 did not limit itself to the issues upon which the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 April 1988 and its resolution dated 19 August 1988 were based, namely, strict interpretation of the rules of procedure and technicality, but rather the petition presented the substance and merits of the case so that this Court may fully appreciate the petition. The Court has taken a second look at the facts of the case and the various arguments propounded by the parties. The Court grants the motion for reconsideration. The facts and events, as alleged in the petition for review, are as follows: Petitioner, a naturalized Filipino citizen of Korean descent, is employed as a researcher in the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC) with head station at Tigbauan, Province of Iloilo. SEAFDEC is a multinational entity established by a number of states in Southeast Asia, designed to promote fisheries development in the region through training of various technicians in fisheries. Because of the nature of his work, petitioner has to travel from the head station at Tigbauan, Iloilo, to different parts of the country to conduct surveys where there are potentials for prawn culture. On 15 June 1982, he was issued Travel Order No. 2222 which covered his travels to different places in Luzon for a period of 35 days from 16 June to 21 July 1982. The travel order itself is an itinerary of travel covering various places, with the corresponding days, where the petitioner proposed to travel. Petitioner was given a cash advance of P6,438.00 to defray expenses during his travels, which amount he received on 15 June 1982 at the head office in Tigbauan, Iloilo. Within the same period, petitioner was issued another travel order, Travel Order No. 2268, covering his travel from the head station to Roxas City for a period of five (5) days from 30 June to 4 July 1982. Based on Travel Order No. 2222, petitioner left his station in Tigbauan, Iloilo, and proceeded to Manila and other places covered by his itinerary. However, he returned to the head station on 17 July 1982, or four (4) days short of the period covered by his itinerary under Travel Order No. 2222. From Tigbauan, Iloilo, he proceeded to Roxas City on 30 June 1982 pursuant to Travel Order No. 2268. On 14 January 1983, petitioner presented both travel orders for liquidation, submitting Travel Expense Reports to the Accounting Section. He refunded P 173.00 after deducting his expenses during his travels covered by the two (2) travel orders. The travel expense reports were checked by the Chief Accountant. Then, the reports were referred to the Auditing Section for post audit. It was during post audit that alleged irregularities were discovered. He was found short in his travels under Travel Order No. 2222 by four (4) days. In sum, the total amount in the form of per diems and allowances charged and collected by petitioner under Travel Order No. 2222, where he did not actually and physically travel as represented by his liquidation papers, was Pl,230.00. In September 1983, complaints for Estafa were filed against petitioner before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court at Guimbal, Iloilo, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 628 & 631. After trial, in Criminal Case No. 628, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from four (4) months as minimum to one (1) year and six (6) months as maximum in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and to reimburse SEAFDEC the amount of Pl,230.00.1 Criminal Case No. 631 was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Petitioner appealed the above stated decision in Criminal Case No. 628 to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXVIII, 6th Judicial Region, at Iloilo City, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 20958. In its decision, dated 30 July 1987, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision, dated 3 September 1986, rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. 2 On 10 August 1987, petitioner received the RTC decision of 30 July 1987. On 11 August 1987, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Pursuant to the said notice, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated 12 August 1987 ordering the elevation of the records of the case to title Court of Appeals. The records were received by the appellate court on 8 October 1987 and docketed as CA G.R. No. 05035. On 30 October 1987, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals in the same case a petition for review. On 29 April 1988, acting on the complainant's motion to dismiss appeal, dated 27 October 1987, and motion to strike out petition for review, dated 24 November 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner. Pertinent portions of the CA decision in CA G.R. No. 05035 read as follows: We agree with complainant's position. Petitioner admittedly received copy of the Regional Trial Court decision on August 10, 1987 (first paragraph, Petition for Review). Section 6, Rule 1221985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, reads: Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel.' Note that only a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration of the Regional Trial Court decision effectively suspends the running of the 15-day period of appealing. The filing of petitioner's 'Notice of Appeal' before the Regional Trial Court did not, therefore, toll the running of the period of appeal. Petitioner and his counsel may not pretend ignorance of the law. B.P. Blg. 129 took effect on August 14,1981. Furthermore, the governing law is a mere reiteration of the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6031, effective August 4, 1969, amending Sec. 45 of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, and implemented by the then Court of Appeals in its Resolution en banc of August 12,1971, published in Vol. 12 of the Court of Appeals Reports, page VII and also mentioned in the second paragraph of Sec. 22, No. (b), Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. As aforesaid, petitioner received a copy of the Regional Trial Court decision on August 10, 1987. Reckoned from October 8, 1987, when the records of the case were received by the Court and the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. C.R. No. 05035, the filing of the petition for review on October 30, 1987 was out of time, making the said Regional Trial Court decision final and executory. WHEREFORE, complainant's motions are granted and the petition is dismissed, Let the records of Criminal Case No. 20958 of Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, be remanded to the courts below for execution of the judgment. Costs against petitioner in this instance. 3 The motion for reconsideration flied by petitioner was denied by the appellate court for lack of merit. Thereafter, petitioner filed with this Court his aforestated petition for review on certiorari, where he raised two (2) issues, namely: I. whether or not the decisions 'of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and the RTC are supported by the facts and evidence or contrary to law and that the two courts a quo have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. II. whether or not the decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals is contrary to law, established jurisdiction, equity and due process. Petitioner argues that his liability, if any, is only civil and not criminal. He contends that he received the money in the form of cash advance with the obligation to liquidate the same. Failure on his part to liquidate the said amount or part thereof automatically vests authority on SEAFDEC to deduct liquidated but unreturned amount from the salary or other benefits due him from SEAFDEC. As a matter of fact, he argues, pursuant to the recommendation of the Internal Audit Section of SEAFDEC, there was an actual deduction from his salary equivalent to the questioned amount. Petitioner asserts that cash advances partake of the nature of a loan where the relationship of debtor and creditor is clearly established. The money received is in the form of loan which is known as mutuum It is a loan for consumption and the ownership of the thing loaned passes to the borrower. He was not under obligation to return the same money that he received, so petitioner contends. Petitioner further asserts that the real reason the criminal complaints were filed against him was to discriminate against him on the part of the previous SEAFDEC Management under Dr. Quiterio Miravite and Dr. Alfredo Santiago, who both wanted to get rid of petitioner as they suspected him of being the source of newspaper publications exposing financial corruption and looting of SEAFDEC funds by top management officials during the administration of Dr. Quiterio Miravite; that after the change of administration, the new management found it unnecessary, impractical, worthless and unjust to proceed with the other case (Criminal Case No. 631).lâwphî1.ñèt Hence, the dismissal of the said other case. Petitioner then points out that he was reinstated to his position by virtue of a decision dated 16 June 1986 of the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the National Labor Relations Commission, after he filed a case for illegal dismissal and moral damages before the NLRC, his cause of action being founded on unjust charges by as employer SEAFDEC of dishonesty arising from the same travel funds involved in the estafa cases filed against him. The NLRC, according to petitioner, affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision and the case is now on appeal before the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari filed by SEAFDEC, docketed as G.R. No. 84719. On the second issue, petitioner contends that all actions taken by him to protect his rights were done in good faith or in honest mistake and were never designed to disregard duly established criminal procedures. His petition for review should have been considered by the Court of Appeals as a substitution or rectification of the Notice of Appeal and not as a separate pleading. This is so because, according to petitioner, as early as 8 October 1987, the records of the case were already with the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. Petitioner cites the following cases in support of his arguments: .....it would be unfair to deprive parties of their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by law or the Rules. (Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs. Japson 142 SCRA 208) .....the rule is always in favor of its liberality in construction so that the real matter may be submitted to the judgment of the Court. Interpretations of forms and technicalities of procedure should be disregarded unless substantial rights would otherwise be prejudiced. (Cloro Co vs. Director of Patents, 20 SCRA 965, cited in Monreal vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 8.)" Overriding all the foregoing technical considerations is the trend of the rulings of this court to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause freed from the constraints of technicalities. (Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 262; cited in Abad vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 416.) Lastly, petitioner contends that "the underlying principle in the administration of justice and application of the rules is substantial justice and due process, the latter being the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play. (Lim vs. Bautista, 00837-SP Oct. 31, 1972)" Only strong consideration of equity, . . . will lead this court to allow an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice. More compelling is the policy that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. The dismissal of an appeal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon by this court, especially considering in the case at bar, the merit of respondent employees' clarification of the delay for which they should not be faulted. (Lamsan Trading, Inc. vs. Leogardo, Jr., 144 SCRA 571). The Solicitor General insists that for failure of petitioner to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals as provided by Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129; Interim Rules and Guidelines, paragraph 22 (b); See. 3, Rule 122 (b) of the 1985 Rules of Court, the petition should be dismissed. The Solicitor General likewise cites the cases of Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 311, F.J.R Garments Industries vs. Court ofAappeals, 130 SCRA 216, and Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 487, to further support his prayer for dismissal of the case for lack of merit. In the Comment (should be Reply) of counsel for petitioner,4 said counsel submits that the above cases cited by the Solicitor General do not apply squarely to the instant case. In the Pamantasan case, petitioner avers that this Court was apparently persuaded to dismiss the case by its conclusion that a contrary ruling allowing due course to review would not have helped the petitioner anyway because the case was not meritorious, which is not true in the instant case. In the F.J.R Garments, case, aside from the procedural error committed by petitioner therein, this Court took into account other circumstances. Moreover, while the petitioner had still two (2) days left within which to correct itself by filing an appeal bond and paying a docket fee, it filed a petition for relief. Finally, in the Patalinghug case, the Court found that the reglementary period for filing a petition for review lapsed while petitioner was going through the motions of his erroneous procedure. In other words, the cases cited by the Solicitor General find no application to the present case, according to petitioner. The Court notes that the petitioner received on 10 August 1987 the RTC decision dated 30 July 1987. The following day, 11 August 1987, he filed his Notice of Appeal. On order of the trial court, dated 12 August 1987, the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals which received them on 8 October 1987. Petitioner argues that "while the Notice of Appeal may be considered a procedural faux pas as a mode of elevating the decision of the trial court," the petition for review which he subsequently filed on 30 October 1987 in the Court of Appeals was meant to cure the said procedural defect which the appellate court should have favorably considered. In several cases decided by this Court, it had set aside technicalities in the Rules in order to give way to justice and equity. In the present case, we note that the petitioner, in filing his Notice of Appeal the very next day after receiving the decision of the court a quo, lost no time in showing his intention to appeal, although the procedure taken was not correct. The Court can overlook the wrong pleading filed, if strict compliance with the rules would mean sacrificing justice to technicality. The imminence of a person being deprived unjustly of his liberty due to procedural lapse of counsel is a strong and compelling reason to warrant suspension of the Rules. Hence, we shall consider the petition for review filed in the Court of Appeals as a Supplement to the Notice of Appeal. As the Court declared in a recent decision,5 ". . .there is nothing sacred about the procedure of pleadings. This Court may go beyond the pleadings when the interest of justice so warrants. It has the prerogative to suspend its rules for the same purpose. x x x Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. [Alonzo v. Villamor, et al., 16 Phil. 315] Conscience cannot rest in allowing a man to go straight to jail, closing the door to his every entreaty for a full opportunity to be heard, even as he has made a prima facie showing of a meritorious cause, simply because he had chosen an appeal route, to be sure, recognized by law but made inapplicable to his case, under altered rules of procedure. While the Court of Appeals can not be faulted and, in fact, it has to be lauded for correctly applying the rules of procedure in appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, yet, this Court, as the ultimate bulwark of human rights and individual liberty, will not allow substantial justice to be sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigor. Besides, no substantial injury to any party will result from this decision to accord petitioner full opportunity to be heard, The private complainant, SEAFDEC, stands to recover, if it has not already recovered, the questioned amount of Pl,230.00 from the petitioner through salary deduction. As to the State, the acquittal of the innocent should be as much its concern as the conviction of the guilty. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolves (a) to SET ASIDE the Resolution of 29 May 1989, (b) to reinstate the petition dated 5 October 1988 and give DUE COURSE to the same. Parties are hereby required to file their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice, after which, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Rollo, p. 50. 2 Id., P. 55. 3 Id., p. 61. 4 Id., p. 138. 5 American Express International Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 70766, Nov. 9, 1988. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation