G.R. No. L-42893




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-42893 September 30, 1976 LEOPOLDO AYUSO, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and WHITE WAYS, INC., respondents. Alejandro S. Bonifacio for petitioner. Esperanza Doroja for private respondent. Ernesto H. Cruz & Emilia E. Andres for respondent Commission. MARTIN, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£ Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission denying the claim of petitioner Leopoldo Ayuso (now deceased) for compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. On May 16, 1973. Leopoldo Ayuso filed a claim for compensation benefits with the Acting Referee of the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, Manila. While waiting for the decision on his claim, Leopoldo Ayuso died in August 15, 1975. Accordingly pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, 1 his wife, Apolonia Bautista was substituted for her decreased husband in the present petition. It appears that the deceased Leopoldo Ayuso was employed by private respondent White Ways, Inc. as a laborer from 1970 until August 31, 1972 with a salary of P9.00 a day. As a he was assigned to lo menial work like cleaning toilets and medicine contains and making repairs in the Comfort Rooms of private respondent. Before he was employed by Iii ate t respondent, he worked from 1965 to 1970 with the "Better Buildings," a sister company belonging to the owners of White Ways, Inc. While still working with the "Better Building's" he was already suffering from coronary disease. As a matter of fact in 1967 and 1968 he was confined in the Philippine General Hospital. On November 12, 1972 when he was already employed with the private respondent, he was confined again in the Philippine ' General Hospital where his illness was diagnosed as pulmonable, secondary to primary lung deceased with minimal PTB by Dr. Mediadora Claudio. He was also found to have an enlarged heart. Another doctor, Dr. Bravo, also of the same hospital has the same diagnosis of petitioner's illness. Both doctors were of the opinion that his lung ailment was aggravated by his work and certified that petitioner was not fit to do any strenuous work as it would only make his ailment worse. The Physician's Report of Sickness or Injury and Claim for Compensation 2 signed by Dr. Claudio shows that the deceased was suffering from a total responsibility . In denying the claim of petitioner, respondent Commission ruled that the latter failed to establish that he contracted his illness while still employed by the private respondent and that granting that he got his illness during the course of his employment, the deceased was not able to establish b substantial evidence that his illness incapacitated him for labor before his situation from the service and that his separation was due to the closing of the business of the private respondent and not because of his illness. The records show that before the deceased was employed by private respondent he had worked with a sister company of the latter from 1965 to 1970. At that time ha has been confined in the Philippine General Hospital twice — once in 1967 and then in 1968. In 1970, he was already complaining of persistent cough. The confinement of the deceased in the Philippine general Hospital in 1967 and 1968 for lung ailment while he was still working with the "Better Buildings" should have forwarded private respondent about his physical condition. So when private respondent about his physical condition. So when private respondent allowed him to work with the White Ways, Inc., it has assumed the risk of answering for the further aggravation of his illness. With the foregoing, it cannot be denied therefore that the illness of the deceased supervened in the course of his employment with private respondent. As this Court held in a long line of decisions, once it is shown that the illness supervened in the course of employment, there is the rebuttable presumption 3 that said illness arose out of or was aggravated in the course of his employment 4 and with the presumption, the burden shifts to the employer and the employee is relieved of the burden to show causation. 5 Private respondent has not offered any proof to rebut the evidence of the deceased that his illness was aggravated by the nature of his employment. All that it tried to show is that the illness of the deceased did not incapacitate him for work before his separation from the service. However, the Physician's Report of Sickness or Injury clearly states that the disability of deceased was "total" and that the deceased was not fit to do any strenuous work. If the deceased was constrained to do the same kind of job with private respondent, it could be because he wanted to earn something to meet the needs of his family. Knowing of his physical condition, private respondent could have assigned him to a less strenuous work. Besides, it is not the fact that one can still work, although forcing himself to do so, but whether his physical condition would permit him to do normally the job assigned to him, which in this case consists of cleaning toilets, making repairs in the comfort rooms and of medicine containers. If, according to the Physician's Report of Sickness or Injury, his incapacity was total, then pursuant to Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 6 he should be entitled to compensation benefits of P6,000.00 It is further contended by private respondent that the deceased had to be separated from this employment because its license to operate the business had already expired. This will not excuse private respondent from the liability to give compensation benefits to its employee who became ill during the course of his employment. The closing of the business of private respondent cannot prejudice the rights of the employees to recover what is due to them under the law. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Commission is hereby set aside and a new decision rendered ordering the private respondent to pay the petitioner compensation benefits for his permanent and total disability in the amount of P6,00.00, plus attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount that the petitioner is entitled to recover as herein indicated. With pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët Footnotesñé+.£ªwph!1 1 Sec. 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court. Death of party.—Alter a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. 2 Exhibit B. 3 SEC. 44. Workmen's Compensation Act. Presumption. — In any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under this Act, it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary — 1 That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act; 2 That sufficient notice thereof was given; 3 That the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another; 4 That the injury did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; and 5 That the contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are correct. 4 Talip vs. WCC, G.R. No. L-42510, May 31, 1976; Reynaldo vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-43108, June 30, 1976; Mercado vs. WCC, et al., G.R. No. L-12451, July 30, 1976. 5 Abana vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. L-21849, March 27, 1968. 6 SEC. 14. Total disability. — In case the injury or sickness causes temporary total disability for labor, the employer shall, during such disability, pay to the injured employee a weekly compensation equivalent to sixty per centrum of his average weekly wage but not less than fourteen pesos per week, except in the case provided for in the next following paragraph. No compensation shall be allowed for the first three calendar days of incapacity resulting from an injury except the benefits provided for in the preceding section; but if the incapacity extends beyond that period, compensation shall be allowed from the first day of such incapacity. Such weekly payments shall in no case continue after the disability has ceased, nor shall the aggregate sum paid as compensation exceed in any case six thousand pesos. But no award of permanent disability shall take effect until after two weeks have elapsed from the date of injury. In the case of an employee whose average weekly wages are less than fourteen pesos per week, the weekly compensation shall be the entire amount of such average weekly wages; but if the disability is permanent, the compensation shall be fourteen pesos in such case. In the event that the total disability begins after a period of partial disability, the amount of compensation due for the latter and for any other disability shall not exceed the maximum amount of six thousand pesos. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation