Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24358 March 31, 1971
ELISEO GUEVARA, JESUS GUEVARA, ELENA GUEVARA, VERONICA GUEVARA, MARGARITA GUEVARA, PEREGRINO GUEVARA, MARIA GUEVARA, EUGELIA GUEVARA, PETRA EVANGELISTA, for herself and as Guardian Ad Litem of her minor children NENILA, PRISCILLA, ERNESTO, DELIA and CARMEN, all surnamed GUEVARA, and MAXIMA CANLAS, as Guardian Ad Litem of ESTER GUEVARA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PLACIDO C. RAMOS, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV-Quezon City, then presided over by the HON. JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, BERNABE FLORES, BERNABE CRUZ, ROSITA CRUZ, ABRAHAM CRUZ, ADELAIDA CRUZ, ADORACION CRUZ, LEONORA CRUZ, ROMULO CRUZ, FLORA CRUZ, CONRADO CRUZ and MAXIMO CALALANG, respondents.
Jose M. Castillo for petitioners.
Maximo Calalang for and in his own behalf.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
For the satisfaction of a final judgment for damages rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch 1V) in its Civil Case No. Q-2171 (Bernabe Flores, et al. vs. Petra Evangelista, et al.), the judgment creditors caused the levy on execution of a parcel of land more particularly described as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND, located at Rizal Street, Barrio of Bayanbayanan, Marikina, Rizal. Bounded on the North by property of Natalia Gregorio; on the South Callejon; on the East Rizal St., and on the West by Marikina River, with an area of 439.37 square meters, more or less, with an assessed value of P880.00 together with all the improvements thereon with an assessed value of P1,800.00, with a total assessed value of P2,680.00, covered by Tax Declaration No. 10252.
then declared for taxation purposes in the names of the judgment debtors, namely: Petra Evangelista and her children Nita, Priscilla, Ernesto, Amalia and Carmen, all surnamed Guevara. These judgment debtors are the widow and children, respectively, of the deceased David Guevara, whose negligence, as found by the trial court in civil case No. Q-2171, caused the death and injury of several persons.
The provincial sheriff of Rizal scheduled the auction sale of the property levied upon on February 25, 1963. But prior thereto the brothers and sisters of the deceased David Guevara, together with the judgment debtors, sought to prevent the sale at public auction by staking third-party claims, asserting rights of ownership by way of inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land levied upon and one-half of the value of the house situated thereon. On account, however, of an indemnity bond posted by Bernabe Flores, one of the judgment creditors the provincial sheriff of Rizal proceeded with the auction sale at which said Bernabe Flores was the successful bidder. Immediately thereafter Bernabe Flores assigned his right as such purchaser to Maximo Calalang, the judgment creditors' own counsel.
The judgment debtors in civil case No. Q-2171 having failed to redeem the property within the one-year period for redemption, the provincial sheriff of Rizal executed in favor of Bernabe Flores an "Officer's Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 4, 1965.lâwphî1.ñèt Thereafter Bernabe Flores moved in the court below for a writ of possession directing the judgment debtors "to vacate the above-described property or relinquish possession of the same to Bernabe Flores, his heirs, representatives and assigns." This was opposed by the judgment debtors, who pointed out that the parcel of land sold at the execution sale was owned and possessed by the third-party claimants who had filed their claim with the provincial sheriff and, in fact, had earlier brought the corresponding action in court (Civil Case No. 7720, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. X) to vindicate the same. The opposition was overruled; the court a quo granted the writ of possession prayed for and accordingly directed the provincial sheriff of Rizal to place Bernabe Flores and/or his representative in possession of the property. But the provincial sheriff of Rizal was unable to enforce the writ of possession due to the resistance of the third-party claimants, who had meanwhile taken possession by virtue of their claim of ownership over the same.
In an order dated March 23, 1965, the lower court served notice upon the third-party claimants to vacate the premises in question on or before March 31, 1965, on pain of being punished for contempt. Soon thereafter they and the judgment debtors came to this Court on the instant petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction principally to prevent enforcement of the aforementioned "writ of possession." On March 31, 1965 this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction asked for, enjoining respondents . . ." from enforcing the order of March 23, 1965, in Civil Case No. Q-2171 (Bernabe Flores, et al. vs. Petra Evangelists, et al.) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the purpose of preserving the rights of the parties to the case, until further orders from this Court."
The issue here is whether or not under the facts the third-party claimants' assertion of ownership over a portion of the land sold on execution may defeat the purchaser's right to have possession of the same after the expiration of the one-year redemption period allowed by law.
Section 35 of Rule 39 provides: "(I)f no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property (sold on execution); . . . "This, of course, is on the assumption that the property belonged to the judgment debtor or to one who claims under his as his successor after the execution.
... As the purchaser in the present case has ... already received the definitive deed of sale and become the owner of the property bought, he should be entitled to its possession and cannot be excluded therefrom by one, who, according to the same complaint, merely claims to be a "successor in interest of the judgment debtor", unless it is adjudged that this alleged successor has a better right to the property than the purchaser. Such adjudication, however, would at this stage of the proceedings be premature and without basis. (Belleza vs. Zandaga, et al., 98 Phil. 702)
Would such right to possession be defeated by the fact that a third party, not privy to the judgment debtor, claims to be the owner of the same property? It has been held that "where a parcel levied upon execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession" (Saavedra, et al. vs. Siari Valley Estates, Inc., et al., 106 Phil. 432, 436; see also Omaña vs. Gatulayao, 73 Phil. 66; Gozon vs. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 919; Santiago vs. Sheriff of Manila, 77 Phil. 740). Such a hearing, however, was not necessary in this case for two reasons: (1) The third party-claimants here were not in possession of the disputed land when it was sold at public auction on February 25, 1963, pursuant to the writ of execution. By the judgment-debtors' own admission in their opposition to the motion for a writ of possession, the third-party claimants occupied the said land only after they had commenced Civil Case No. 7720 on June 10, 1963. They were not in possession when they filed their third-party claim February 13, 1963. (2) When the land was levied upon and when it was sold on execution it was declared for taxation in the names of the judgment debtors, who were the ones then in possession. Quite obviously the third-party claimants' belated move to take possession was designed to defeat the purchaser's right to the same in accordance with the provision of Section 35 of Rule 39, by virtue of the definite deed of sale in his favor, which may be defeated and set aside only by an adverse final adjudication against him of the third parties' claim of ownership.
The said claim is not foreclosed by the writ of possession issued by the lower court, being precisely the subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 7720 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Since the issuance of such writ was proper, the court a quo acted within its jurisdiction when it poised the threat of contempt against any willful defiance thereof by the third-party claimants.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved. Costs against petitioners.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
My appraisal of the facts of this case and the provision of the Rules of Court applicable thereto, as heretofore interpreted by this Court leads to a conclusion different from that of the majority, hence I have no alternative but to dissent.
It is true that, as stated by the majority, "the issue here is whether or not under the facts the third-party claimants' assertion of ownership over a portion of the land sold on execution may defeat the purchaser's right to have possession of the same after the expiration of the one-year redemption period allowed by law." It is likewise true, as held by the majority, that under Section 35 of Rule 39, a purchaser in an execution sale is entitled to a conveyance and the possession of the property sold after the period of redemption expires, "on the assumption that the property belongs to the judgment debtor or to one who claims under him as his successor after the execution." Indeed, I am surprised why after laying down these premises the majority holds that respondent Bernabe Flores, the purchaser on execution, is entitled to the possession of the property in question as against the petitioners, when the material and pertinent facts, as found by Us, are as follows:
For the satisfaction of a final judgment for damages rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IV) in its Civil Case No. Q-2171 (Bernabe Flores, et a]. vs. Petra Evangelista, et al.), the judgment creditors caused the levy on execution of a parcel of land more particularly described as follows:
"A PARCEL OF LAND, located at Rizal Street, Barrio of Bayanbayanan, Marikina, Rizal. Bounded on the North by property of Natalia Gregorio; on the South Callejon; on the East Rizal St., and on the West by Marikina River, with an area of 439.37 square meters, more or less, with an assessed value of P880.00 together with all the improvements thereon with an assessed value of P1,800.00, with a total assessed value of P2,680.00, covered by Tax Declaration No. 10252."
then declared for taxation purposes in the names of the judgment debtors, namely: Petra Evangelista and her children Nita, Priscilla, Ernesto, Amalia and Carmen, all surnamed Guevara. These judgment debtors are the widow and children, respectively, of the deceased David Guevara, whose negligence, as found by the trial court in civil case No. Q-2171, caused the death and injury of several persons.
The provincial sheriff of Rizal scheduled the auction sale of the property levied upon on February 25, 1963. But prior thereto the brothers and sisters of the deceased David Guevara, together with the judgment debtors, sought to prevent the sale it public auction by staking third-party claims, asserting rights of ownership by way of inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land levied upon and one-half of the value of the house situated thereon. On account, however, of an indemnity bond posted by Bernabe Flores, one of the judgment creditors, the provincial sheriff of Rizal proceeded with the auction sale, at which said Bernabe Flores was the successful bidder. Immediately thereafter Bernabe Flores assigned his right as such purchaser to Maximo Calalang, the judgment creditors' own counsel.
The judgment debtors in civil case No. Q-2171 having failed to redeem the property within the one-year period for redemption, the provincial sheriff of Rizal executed in favor of Bernabe Flores an 'Officer's Deed of Absolute Sale' dated January 4, 1965.lâwphî1.ñèt Thereafter Bernabe Flores moved in the court below for a writ of possession directing the judgment debtors "to vacate the above-described property or relinquish possession of the same of Bernabe Flores, his heirs, representatives and assigns." This was opposed by the judgment debtors who pointed out that the parcel of land sold at the execution sale was owned and possessed by the third-party claimants who had filed their claim with the provincial sheriff and, in fact, had earlier brought the corresponding action in court (Civil Case No. 7720, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. X) to vindicate the same. The opposition was overruled; the court a quo granted the writ of possession prayed for and accordingly directed the provincial sheriff of Rizal to place Bernabe Flores and/or bis representative in possession of the property. But the provincial sheriff of Rizal was unable to enforce the writ of possession due to the resistance of the third-party claimants, who had meanwhile taken possession by virtue of their claim of ownership over the same.
I cannot see the logic nor the legal basis, under these facts, of holding respondent Bernabe Flores as better entitled to the possession of the property in question than the petitioners before Civil Case No. 7720 regarding the title over the same is finally terminated. It is admitted in the majority opinion that a purchaser on execution becomes entitled to the possession of the property sold to him only after the period for the legal redemption thereof has expired. As a matter of fact, any attempt on his part to take possession during the period of redemption would make him a trespasser liable in an action of forcible entry, even if he did not employ force. (Pabico vs. Ong Pauco, 43 Phil. 572) On the other hand, it is explicit in Section 35 of Rule 39 that possession "shall be given to the purchaser by the (Sheriff) unless a third-party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor." In Rivera vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and Rupac, 61 Phil. 201 and in Tan Soo Huat vs. Ongwico, 63 Phil. 746, this Court emphasized that it is only when it is the judgment debtor or his successors-in-interest who is in possession that the execution court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession to the purchaser, but not when third persons or the rights of third parties are involved. Indeed, the right of the third-party to hold on to the property even as against the purchaser is such that in Codesal and Ocampo vs. Ascue 38 Phil. 902, the implementation of the writ of possession issued by the execution court may be injoined by the Court in which the action for vindication of title has been filed by the third-party claimant. The very cases of Saavedra, Omaña Santiago, etc. cited by the majority, have ruled that "where a parcel levied upon execution is occupied by a third-party, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession." For these reasons, and it being undisputed that no such hearing has been held in the respondent court, I fail to see how We can sanction the enforcement of the writ of possession herein complained of.
The majority holds that such a hearing is not necessary because (1) petitioners were not in possession at 'the time when they filed their third-party claim as well as when the sale on execution was held and (2) when the land in question "was levied upon and when it was sold on execution, it was declared for taxation in the name of the judgment debtors, who were the ones in possession from which facts the conclusion is drawn that "Quite obviously the third-party claimants' belated move to take possession was designed to defeat the purchaser's right to the same in accordance with the provision of Section 35 of Rule 39, by virtue of the definite deed of sale in his favor, which may be defeated and set aside only by an adverse final adjudication against him of the third parties' claim of ownership."
I disagree. I do not believe that the proposition that "the purchaser's right to (take possession) in accordance with Sec. 35 of Rule 39, by virtue of the definite deed of sale in his favor — may be defeated and set aside only by an adverse final adjudication against him of the third-parties' claim of ownership," has sufficient legal basis, if what is meant is that possession must necessarily be given to the purchaser on the strength alone of the deed of conveyance executed by the sheriff, without resolving first in one way or another the feasibility of the third-party claim.
To start with, the sheriff's deed of conveyance in this case could not have been as "definite" as the majority seemingly implies. Section 28 of Rule 39 provides that when there is a pending third-party claim, the certificate of sale must make express mention thereof. It is true that this section refers to the certificate of sale, but inasmuch as even the conveyance executed after the period of redemption transfers to the purchaser no more than the rights, title and interests of the judgment debtor at the time of the levy, it follows that such transfer is subject to the results of the third-party claim. Secondly, the fact that petitioners were not in possession at the time their third-party claim was filed nor even at the time of the sale on execution has, to my mind, no bearing on the resolution of this case, unless it is assumed that petitioners' taking possession of the subject property after filing the complaint in Q-7720 is considered proof or indication, at least, that they are only successors in interest of the judgment debtor. That this assumption cannot be indulged in this case is obvious, because according to the facts stated in the majority opinion, petitioners are precisely claiming title adverse to that of the judgment debtor. The judgment debtors are the widow and children of the deceased David Guevara, while petitioners are brothers and sisters of said deceased who are "asserting rights of ownership by way of inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land levied upon and one-half of the value of the house situated thereon." As far as I can gather from the records, there is nothing to show that such assertion is baseless. In fact, no such indication is made in the majority opinion.
I see nothing wrong in petitioners' taking possession before the expiration of the period of redemption, even if it be admitted that it was done purposely to prevent respondent purchaser from taking possession himself. Human experience would readily tell us that while petitioners could have tolerated the possession by judgment debtors because of their close family relationship, it is but natural that as against a stranger, like the purchaser, they could not be expected to have the same attitude, hence their decision to take possession. In any event, the law favors them. I reiterate that Sec. 35 of Rule 39 invoked by respondents, recognizes the purchaser's right of possession only as against the judgment debtors and their successors-in-interest but not as against persons whose right of pos- session is adverse to the latter. (Rivera vs. CFI of Nueva Ecija and Tan Soo Huat vs. Pedro Ongwico, supra.) In fact as I have already intimated, Codesal, supra, authority the issuance of an injunction to protect their possession until their third-party claim is finally determined. Withal, under the second paragraph of Sec. 35, the purchaser acquires nothing more than "all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor at the time of the levy," why should there be any hurry to put him in possession before the nature of the right or title purchased by him has been properly decided as against the claim thereon of a third party? Any difficulty he may suffer is but a consequence of the principle of caveat emptor which governs purchases on execution. Anyway, under Sec. 36 of Rule 39, a purchaser who is unable to take possession is amply protected because in such a contingency, he is entitled at his option either to recover the price paid by him from the judgment creditor or to substitute and step into the shoes of the judgment creditor.
With reference to the cases of Saavedra, Santiago, etc., cited by the majority, this is textually what this Court held in them:
Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession. In the case of Omaña vs. Gatulayao (73 Phil. 66, 68), this Tribunal said:
"... Judgment rendered in actions in personam, as the instant case, are enforcible only between the parties and their successors in interests, but not against strangers thereto. (Sec. 306, par. 2, of Act No. 190, now Rule 39, see. 44 [b], Rules of Court.) There may be cases when the actual possessor may be claimed to be a privy to any of the parties to the action, or his bona fide possession may be disputed, or where it is alleged, as in the instant case, that such possession has been taken in connivance with the defeated litigant with a view to frustrating the judgment. In any of these events, the proper procedure would be to order a hearing on the matter of such possession and to deny or accede to the enforcement of a writ of possession as the finding shall warrant. ....'
The reason for this hearing where the adverse possessors are given an opportunity to present their evidence and justify their possession, is given by the Court in the case of Gozon vs. De la Rosa (77 Phil. 919, 922), thus:
"es necesario este procedimiento sumario para evitar que algunas personas, para frustrar los verdaderos fines de la ley invoquen sin razon alguna la teoria de sentencia in personam: que no han sido demandadas; que la orden de ejecucion no va contra ellas. Entonces habria que demandar a todas las personas que dependen del de mandado o que ocupan la casa por consentimiento solo del demandado. Una persona cualquiera podria ponerse en combinacion con el ejecutado y, entrando en la casa, invocar la defense de que no ha sido parte de la causa contra la orden de ejecucion ."
And in the case of Santiago vs. Sheriff of Manila (77 Phil. 740, 743-44), this Court said:
"La sentencia dictada en el presente asunto es in personam, y como tal solo es obligatoria para las partes y no para extraños (Art. 44, par. [b], Regla 39.) Si el recurrente Anacleto Santiago, que no fue parte en la causa por desahucio era poseedor de buena fe de la finca en cuestion, la sentencia dictada en dicha causa no podia ejecutarse validamente contra el. Se puede insistir, sin embargo, en la ejecucion de la sentencia si se prueba que el poseedor es simplemente in causahabiente o un huesped o un agente del ejecutado en el proposito fraudulento de frustrar la sentencia; en tal caso, debe haber un procedimiento en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia que expidio la orden de ejecucion para la dilucidacion del caracter de la posesion del ocupante extraño."
xxx xxx xxx
... Si en tal procedimiento el juzgado encuentra que el extrano no es mas que un mero causahabiente o agente a huesped del ejecutado, entonces se seguiria la orden de ejecucion contra el. Esto no es obice sin embargo para que el ocupante pueda valerse de cualquier otro remedio legal para la determinacion definitive del titulo o la posesion sobre la propiedad."
My understanding of these precedents is that they support my position rather than that of the majority. They constitute repeated and consistent authorities for the proposition that when somebody, not a part to the action, is in possession of property sold on execution at the time the sheriff is supposed to deliver the possession thereof to the purchaser, the sheriff cannot insist on enforcing the writ of possession until after a hearing has been held to determine if the possessor is merely a successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor or someone holding it somehow for him merely to defeat the judgment. According to Omaña, supra, it is only after such a hearing that the court may "deny or accede to the enforcement of the writ of possession as the finding may warrant." From these precedents, I also find that the principle behind such requirement of a hearing is that judgments in personam are binding only upon the parties thereto, hence it is but fair that one who claims a right, title or interest adverse to that of the judgment debtor and who has succeeded to take possession for himself before the judgment is enforced should be given a hearing, and, in the language of Santiago, supra, "si en tal procedimiento al juzgado encuentra que el extrano no es mas que un mero causahabiente o agente o huesped del ejecutado entonces se seguira la orden de ejecucion contra el." Indeed, it is such hearing and negative or adverse determination that is without prejudice or "no es obice . . . para que el ocupante pueda valerse de cualquier otro remedio legal para la determinacion definitiva del titulo o la posesion sobre la propiedad' (id.). I add this observation to answer the contention of the majority that the claim of petitioners is not anyway "foreclosed by the writ of possession issued by the lower court, being precisely the subject of litigation in Civil Case G.R. No. 7720 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal." In other words, it is only after the question of whether or not the possessor is a were successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor has been determined by the execution court in a proper proceeding and the on awarded as a result thereof that the party aggrieved by such result may resort to appropriate legal remedy for a definitive determination of the issue. Otherwise stated, my view is that possession is supposed to remain with the party in actual possession at the time the sheriff is supposed to deliver such possession to the purchaser by virtue of the execution sale until it is successfully shown that he is in one way or another a mere successor-in-interest or instrument of the judgment debtor. I do feel it is impractical to award possession to a party who, after all, purchased the property with knowledge of the existence of a third-party claim, before said claim has been decided, even at least preliminary after a hearing, only to return said possession to the third-party claimant should he win. Such a procedure is liable to give rise to more complication petitions than if the procedure laid down above were followed.
In closing, I reiterate that the mere fact that petitioners took possesion during the period of redemption already and not before the levy or, at the latest, before the sale on execution and that the property in question was then still registered for taxation purposes in the name of the judgment debtors, without more, cannot, in my opinion, suffice to justify the enforcement of the writ of possession against them. I maintain that said facts, standing by themselves alone, are not inconsistent with the of title of petitioners. As I have tried to point out, the requirement of the law or the rules and the repeated and consistent precedents on the matter is that petitioners must be shown not to be mere successors-in-interest of the judgment debtors. There is no such showing here, for the simple reason that no hearing has been ordered held for the purpose, contrary to the derisions I have cited above, which, curiously enough, are claimed to support the view of my brethren in the majority. I regret to say that I have not been able to find any precedent favoring their view.
For all these reasons, my vote is for the granting of the petition to prohibit the reinforcement of the writ of possession in question, without prejudice to the holding of a hearing by the court a quo pursuant to this opinion which is based on the rulings in the very cases cited by the majority, namely, Saavedra, Omaña, Santiago, etc. as I have discussed above.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
My appraisal of the facts of this case and the provision of the Rules of Court applicable thereto, as heretofore interpreted by this Court leads to a conclusion different from that of the majority, hence I have no alternative but to dissent.
It is true that, as stated by the majority, "the issue here is whether or not under the facts the third-party claimants' assertion of ownership over a portion of the land sold on execution may defeat the purchaser's right to have possession of the same after the expiration of the one-year redemption period allowed by law." It is likewise true, as held by the majority, that under Section 35 of Rule 39, a purchaser in an execution sale is entitled to a conveyance and the possession of the property sold after the period of redemption expires, "on the assumption that the property belongs to the judgment debtor or to one who claims under him as his successor after the execution." Indeed, I am surprised why after laying down these premises the majority holds that respondent Bernabe Flores, the purchaser on execution, is entitled to the possession of the property in question as against the petitioners, when the material and pertinent facts, as found by Us, are as follows:
For the satisfaction of a final judgment for damages rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IV) in its Civil Case No. Q-2171 (Bernabe Flores, et a]. vs. Petra Evangelista, et al.), the judgment creditors caused the levy on execution of a parcel of land more particularly described as follows:
"A PARCEL OF LAND, located at Rizal Street, Barrio of Bayanbayanan, Marikina, Rizal. Bounded on the North by property of Natalia Gregorio; on the South Callejon; on the East Rizal St., and on the West by Marikina River, with an area of 439.37 square meters, more or less, with an assessed value of P880.00 together with all the improvements thereon with an assessed value of P1,800.00, with a total assessed value of P2,680.00, covered by Tax Declaration No. 10252."
then declared for taxation purposes in the names of the judgment debtors, namely: Petra Evangelista and her children Nita, Priscilla, Ernesto, Amalia and Carmen, all surnamed Guevara. These judgment debtors are the widow and children, respectively, of the deceased David Guevara, whose negligence, as found by the trial court in civil case No. Q-2171, caused the death and injury of several persons.
The provincial sheriff of Rizal scheduled the auction sale of the property levied upon on February 25, 1963. But prior thereto the brothers and sisters of the deceased David Guevara, together with the judgment debtors, sought to prevent the sale it public auction by staking third-party claims, asserting rights of ownership by way of inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land levied upon and one-half of the value of the house situated thereon. On account, however, of an indemnity bond posted by Bernabe Flores, one of the judgment creditors, the provincial sheriff of Rizal proceeded with the auction sale, at which said Bernabe Flores was the successful bidder. Immediately thereafter Bernabe Flores assigned his right as such purchaser to Maximo Calalang, the judgment creditors' own counsel.
The judgment debtors in civil case No. Q-2171 having failed to redeem the property within the one-year period for redemption, the provincial sheriff of Rizal executed in favor of Bernabe Flores an 'Officer's Deed of Absolute Sale' dated January 4, 1965. Thereafter Bernabe Flores moved in the court below for a writ of possession directing the judgment debtors "to vacate the above-described property or relinquish possession of the same of Bernabe Flores, his heirs, representatives and assigns." This was opposed by the judgment debtors who pointed out that the parcel of land sold at the execution sale was owned and possessed by the third-party claimants who had filed their claim with the provincial sheriff and, in fact, had earlier brought the corresponding action in court (Civil Case No. 7720, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. X) to vindicate the same. The opposition was overruled; the court a quo granted the writ of possession prayed for and accordingly directed the provincial sheriff of Rizal to place Bernabe Flores and/or bis representative in possession of the property. But the provincial sheriff of Rizal was unable to enforce the writ of possession due to the resistance of the third-party claimants, who had meanwhile taken possession by virtue of their claim of ownership over the same.
I cannot see the logic nor the legal basis, under these facts, of holding respondent Bernabe Flores as better entitled to the possession of the property in question than the petitioners before Civil Case No. 7720 regarding the title over the same is finally terminated. It is admitted in the majority opinion that a purchaser on execution becomes entitled to the possession of the property sold to him only after the period for the legal redemption thereof has expired. As a matter of fact, any attempt on his part to take possession during the period of redemption would make him a trespasser liable in an action of forcible entry, even if he did not employ force. (Pabico vs. Ong Pauco, 43 Phil. 572) On the other hand, it is explicit in Section 35 of Rule 39 that possession "shall be given to the purchaser by the (Sheriff) unless a third-party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor." In Rivera vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and Rupac, 61 Phil. 201 and in Tan Soo Huat vs. Ongwico, 63 Phil. 746, this Court emphasized that it is only when it is the judgment debtor or his successors-in-interest who is in possession that the execution court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession to the purchaser, but not when third persons or the rights of third parties are involved. Indeed, the right of the third-party to hold on to the property even as against the purchaser is such that in Codesal and Ocampo vs. Ascue 38 Phil. 902, the implementation of the writ of possession issued by the execution court may be injoined by the Court in which the action for vindication of title has been filed by the third-party claimant. The very cases of Saavedra, Omaña Santiago, etc. cited by the majority, have ruled that "where a parcel levied upon execution is occupied by a third-party, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession." For these reasons, and it being undisputed that no such hearing has been held in the respondent court, I fail to see how We can sanction the enforcement of the writ of possession herein complained of.
The majority holds that such a hearing is not necessary because (1) petitioners were not in possession at 'the time when they filed their third-party claim as well as when the sale on execution was held and (2) when the land in question "was levied upon and when it was sold on execution, it was declared for taxation in the name of the judgment debtors, who were the ones in possession from which facts the conclusion is drawn that "Quite obviously the third-party claimants' belated move to take possession was designed to defeat the purchaser's right to the same in accordance with the provision of Section 35 of Rule 39, by virtue of the definite deed of sale in his favor, which may be defeated and set aside only by an adverse final adjudication against him of the third parties' claim of ownership."
I disagree. I do not believe that the proposition that "the purchaser's right to (take possession) in accordance with Sec. 35 of Rule 39, by virtue of the definite deed of sale in his favor — may be defeated and set aside only by an adverse final adjudication against him of the third-parties' claim of ownership," has sufficient legal basis, if what is meant is that possession must necessarily be given to the purchaser on the strength alone of the deed of conveyance executed by the sheriff, without resolving first in one way or another the feasibility of the third-party claim.
To start with, the sheriff's deed of conveyance in this case could not have been as "definite" as the majority seemingly implies. Section 28 of Rule 39 provides that when there is a pending third-party claim, the certificate of sale must make express mention thereof. It is true that this section refers to the certificate of sale, but inasmuch as even the conveyance executed after the period of redemption transfers to the purchaser no more than the rights, title and interests of the judgment debtor at the time of the levy, it follows that such transfer is subject to the results of the third-party claim. Secondly, the fact that petitioners were not in possession at the time their third-party claim was filed nor even at the time of the sale on execution has, to my mind, no bearing on the resolution of this case, unless it is assumed that petitioners' taking possession of the subject property after filing the complaint in Q-7720 is considered proof or indication, at least, that they are only successors in interest of the judgment debtor. That this assumption cannot be indulged in this case is obvious, because according to the facts stated in the majority opinion, petitioners are precisely claiming title adverse to that of the judgment debtor. The judgment debtors are the widow and children of the deceased David Guevara, while petitioners are brothers and sisters of said deceased who are "asserting rights of ownership by way of inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land levied upon and one-half of the value of the house situated thereon." As far as I can gather from the records, there is nothing to show that such assertion is baseless. In fact, no such indication is made in the majority opinion.
I see nothing wrong in petitioners' taking possession before the expiration of the period of redemption, even if it be admitted that it was done purposely to prevent respondent purchaser from taking possession himself. Human experience would readily tell us that while petitioners could have tolerated the possession by judgment debtors because of their close family relationship, it is but natural that as against a stranger, like the purchaser, they could not be expected to have the same attitude, hence their decision to take possession. In any event, the law favors them. I reiterate that Sec. 35 of Rule 39 invoked by respondents, recognizes the purchaser's right of possession only as against the judgment debtors and their successors-in-interest but not as against persons whose right of pos- session is adverse to the latter. (Rivera vs. CFI of Nueva Ecija and Tan Soo Huat vs. Pedro Ongwico, supra.) In fact as I have already intimated, Codesal, supra, authority the issuance of an injunction to protect their possession until their third-party claim is finally determined. Withal, under the second paragraph of Sec. 35, the purchaser acquires nothing more than "all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor at the time of the levy," why should there be any hurry to put him in possession before the nature of the right or title purchased by him has been properly decided as against the claim thereon of a third party? Any difficulty he may suffer is but a consequence of the principle of caveat emptor which governs purchases on execution. Anyway, under Sec. 36 of Rule 39, a purchaser who is unable to take possession is amply protected because in such a contingency, he is entitled at his option either to recover the price paid by him from the judgment creditor or to substitute and step into the shoes of the judgment creditor.
With reference to the cases of Saavedra, Santiago, etc., cited by the majority, this is textually what this Court held in them:
Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession. In the case of Omaña vs. Gatulayao (73 Phil. 66, 68), this Tribunal said:
"... Judgment rendered in actions in personam, as the instant case, are enforcible only between the parties and their successors in interests, but not against strangers thereto. (Sec. 306, par. 2, of Act No. 190, now Rule 39, see. 44 [b], Rules of Court.) There may be cases when the actual possessor may be claimed to be a privy to any of the parties to the action, or his bona fide possession may be disputed, or where it is alleged, as in the instant case, that such possession has been taken in connivance with the defeated litigant with a view to frustrating the judgment. In any of these events, the proper procedure would be to order a hearing on the matter of such possession and to deny or accede to the enforcement of a writ of possession as the finding shall warrant. ....'
The reason for this hearing where the adverse possessors are given an opportunity to present their evidence and justify their possession, is given by the Court in the case of Gozon vs. De la Rosa (77 Phil. 919, 922), thus:
"es necesario este procedimiento sumario para evitar que algunas personas, para frustrar los verdaderos fines de la ley invoquen sin razon alguna la teoria de sentencia in personam: que no han sido demandadas; que la orden de ejecucion no va contra ellas. Entonces habria que demandar a todas las personas que dependen del de mandado o que ocupan la casa por consentimiento solo del demandado. Una persona cualquiera podria ponerse en combinacion con el ejecutado y, entrando en la casa, invocar la defense de que no ha sido parte de la causa contra la orden de ejecucion ."
And in the case of Santiago vs. Sheriff of Manila (77 Phil. 740, 743-44), this Court said:
"La sentencia dictada en el presente asunto es in personam, y como tal solo es obligatoria para las partes y no para extraños (Art. 44, par. [b], Regla 39.) Si el recurrente Anacleto Santiago, que no fue parte en la causa por desahucio era poseedor de buena fe de la finca en cuestion, la sentencia dictada en dicha causa no podia ejecutarse validamente contra el. Se puede insistir, sin embargo, en la ejecucion de la sentencia si se prueba que el poseedor es simplemente in causahabiente o un huesped o un agente del ejecutado en el proposito fraudulento de frustrar la sentencia; en tal caso, debe haber un procedimiento en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia que expidio la orden de ejecucion para la dilucidacion del caracter de la posesion del ocupante extraño."
x x x x x x x x x
... Si en tal procedimiento el juzgado encuentra que el extrano no es mas que un mero causahabiente o agente a huesped del ejecutado, entonces se seguiria la orden de ejecucion contra el. Esto no es obice sin embargo para que el ocupante pueda valerse de cualquier otro remedio legal para la determinacion definitive del titulo o la posesion sobre la propiedad."
My understanding of these precedents is that they support my position rather than that of the majority. They constitute repeated and consistent authorities for the proposition that when somebody, not a part to the action, is in possession of property sold on execution at the time the sheriff is supposed to deliver the possession thereof to the purchaser, the sheriff cannot insist on enforcing the writ of possession until after a hearing has been held to determine if the possessor is merely a successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor or someone holding it somehow for him merely to defeat the judgment. According to Omaña, supra, it is only after such a hearing that the court may "deny or accede to the enforcement of the writ of possession as the finding may warrant." From these precedents, I also find that the principle behind such requirement of a hearing is that judgments in personam are binding only upon the parties thereto, hence it is but fair that one who claims a right, title or interest adverse to that of the judgment debtor and who has succeeded to take possession for himself before the judgment is enforced should be given a hearing, and, in the language of Santiago, supra, "si en tal procedimiento al juzgado encuentra que el extrano no es mas que un mero causahabiente o agente o huesped del ejecutado entonces se seguira la orden de ejecucion contra el." Indeed, it is such hearing and negative or adverse determination that is without prejudice or "no es obice . . . para que el ocupante pueda valerse de cualquier otro remedio legal para la determinacion definitiva del titulo o la posesion sobre la propiedad' (id.). I add this observation to answer the contention of the majority that the claim of petitioners is not anyway "foreclosed by the writ of possession issued by the lower court, being precisely the subject of litigation in Civil Case G.R. No. 7720 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal." In other words, it is only after the question of whether or not the possessor is a were successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor has been determined by the execution court in a proper proceeding and the on awarded as a result thereof that the party aggrieved by such result may resort to appropriate legal remedy for a definitive determination of the issue. Otherwise stated, my view is that possession is supposed to remain with the party in actual possession at the time the sheriff is supposed to deliver such possession to the purchaser by virtue of the execution sale until it is successfully shown that he is in one way or another a mere successor-in-interest or instrument of the judgment debtor. I do feel it is impractical to award possession to a party who, after all, purchased the property with knowledge of the existence of a third-party claim, before said claim has been decided, even at least preliminary after a hearing, only to return said possession to the third-party claimant should he win. Such a procedure is liable to give rise to more complication petitions than if the procedure laid down above were followed.
In closing, I reiterate that the mere fact that petitioners took possesion during the period of redemption already and not before the levy or, at the latest, before the sale on execution and that the property in question was then still registered for taxation purposes in the name of the judgment debtors, without more, cannot, in my opinion, suffice to justify the enforcement of the writ of possession against them. I maintain that said facts, standing by themselves alone, are not inconsistent with the of title of petitioners. As I have tried to point out, the requirement of the law or the rules and the repeated and consistent precedents on the matter is that petitioners must be shown not to be mere successors-in-interest of the judgment debtors.lâwphî1.ñèt There is no such showing here, for the simple reason that no hearing has been ordered held for the purpose, contrary to the derisions I have cited above, which, curiously enough, are claimed to support the view of my brethren in the majority. I regret to say that I have not been able to find any precedent favoring their view.
For all these reasons, my vote is for the granting of the petition to prohibit the reinforcement of the writ of possession in question, without prejudice to the holding of a hearing by the court a quo pursuant to this opinion which is based on the rulings in the very cases cited by the majority, namely, Saavedra, Omaña, Santiago, etc. as I have discussed above.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
|
