G.R. No. L-26584




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-26584 July 31, 1969 MARA, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ACE LUMBER CO., INC., respondents. Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for petitioner. Remelito J. Toledo and Manuel V. Roxas for respondent Ace Lumber Company, Inc. REYES, J.B.L., J.: This review of a decision of the Court of Appeals involves the vexed question whether a party who files a motion to reconsider on the last day of the period allotted by the Rules may still validly take further steps to protect his interest the day after receiving the notice of denial of his motion. Ace Lumber Co., Inc., had resorted to the Court of Appeals against an adverse decision of the court of first instance. Its appeal (docketed as CA-G.R. No. 3637-R) was dismissed by the appellate court for failure to submit its printed record on appeal in due time. The resolution of dismissal, dated 9 March 1966, was received by the appellant on 22 March 1966. Fifteen days later, on 6 April 1966, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it by a resolution received by movant on 9 April. The very next day, appellant filed a second motion for reconsideration with leave of the court, and the latter, after considering the motion, granted it and reinstated the appeal. The appellee, Mara, Inc., contending that the second motion had been filed on the sixteenth day, asked the court to declare the original dismissal of the appeal to have become final and executory. The Court of Appeals declined to do so, and the appellee, unsuccessful in its attempts to induce said court to alter its position, came to US on certiorari, charging abuse of discretion. The question at issue had been considered and decided by this Supreme Court in the case of Lloren vs. De Veyra, 4 SCRA 637, promulgated on 28 March 1962. There, an appeal was rejected as out of time on the ground that counting the total time elapsed between notice of the decision and the filing of the appeal notice, record and bond, less the time when the motion of new trial had been pending, the difference showed that the appeal was late by one day. The appellant, on the other hand, contended that since he filed the motion to reconsider on the fifteenth day, 1 the latter should not be counted, because it had not fully elapsed; hence, appellant argued he was entitled to one more day to perfect his appeal. This Court then ruled: After a mature deliberation, where the members of the Court delved once more into the methods of computation discussed in the cases mentioned by counsel for respondent, the Court resolved not to follow the ruling in either of them and to adhere strictly to the rule of computation embodied in Rule 28 of our rules. The idea that prevailed is that since petitioner Lloren filed his motion for reconsideration on the 15th day of the period within which he may perfect his appeal, that day should be excluded so that when he received copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration he had still 1 day within which to perfect his appeal. This period of one day should be computed again in accordance with the rule above cited by excluding the day of receipt and including the next day, which in this case is 17 April 1958. Hence, the Court concluded that the appeal interposed by petitioner Lloren was still within the reglementary period. The above ruling was embodied in the second paragraph of section 3, Rule 41, of the Revised Rules of 1964, that reads: SEC. 3. How appeal is taken .... But where such a motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion. Petitioner argues that the Lloren doctrine and section 3 of Rule 41 apply only to the computation of periods for appeal, and not to the fixing of the finality of other orders of dismissal. Nothing would be gained, however, by changing the rule, and much confusion would be avoided by applying a uniform method of computing periods under circumstances similar to the Lloren case, where motions that stop the running of peremptory period are filed on the last day thereof. After all, in both the Lloren case and the one before us, the question posed is the same: whether the judgment, or the order dismissing the appeal, had acquired finality. Petitioner points out that by section 1, Rule 54, of the old Rules of Court, regarding motions for rehearing or reconsideration, the appellate court was expressly granted (in the last clause of said section) discretion to admit second motions for reconsideration if filed "within two days from notice of the order denying the first motion"; and that the Revised Rule 52 on the same subject eliminated such saving proviso. We attach no importance to this feature, for the provision quoted had to be eliminated as plainly incompatible with the doctrine of the Lloren case that had been incorporated in Revised Rule 41. The suppression, therefore, did not import a departure from the basic doctrine. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Costs against petitioner Mara, Inc.1äwphï1.ñët Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur. Zaldivar, J., took no part. Footnotes ¹The appeal was from a municipal court decision, appealable within 15 days only. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation