Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25460 March 13, 1968
INOCENCIO TAN Y CONCEPCION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellee.
Ramon A. Gonzales for plaintiff-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendant-appellee.
BENGZON J.P., J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Inocencio Tan and one Antonio Conejero were accused of estafa committed by means of false pretenses in an information filed on October 10, 1958 in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI, docketed as Criminal Case No. 45905. After due proceedings, the trial court, on October 27, 1959, acquitted Antonio Conejero but convicted plaintiff-appellant for consummated estafa.
Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1963, the judgment of Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila was modified, the appellate court convicting plaintiff-appellant of attempted estafa only. The latter still endeavoured to have the Supreme Court totally reverse the modified judgment but his petition for review was not given due course since the issues raised were factual and there was no merit in the petition.1
On August 31, 1964, plaintiff-appellant instituted Civil Case No. 58158 before Branch XXI of the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the judgment of conviction rendered in the criminal proceedings. His ground was that the information therein was so totally defective that criminal jurisdiction did not attach, thereby vitiating the resulting judgment of conviction.
Meanwhile in the criminal proceedings, plaintiff-appellant was able to have the promulgation of the judgment of conviction for attempted estafa suspended pending the outcome of the civil case.
On December 1, 1964, the State filed its answer in the civil case. The issues having been joined, and after a pre-trial resulting in a stipulation of the facts as stated above, the lower court rendered judgment on August 31, 1965 which dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff-appellant now comes again to this Court on a pure question of law.
Basically, what plaintiff-appellant seeks is to have Branch XXI of the Court of First Instance of Manila annul a judgment originating from Branch VI the same court as modified, with finality, by the appellate courts. This simply cannot be done. Just very recently,2 We reaffirmed the rule that ". . . the jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First Instance belongs solely to the very same branch which rendered the judgment." For the lower court to have acceded to plaintiff appellant's prayer would have been for it to have exceeded its jurisdiction or to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. For this reason alone, the appeal should be dismissed.
But even on the merits, the appeal cannot prosper. The offense for which plaintiff was indicated is prescribed by Art. 315(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code in the following language:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. (Emphasis supplied)
The information filed against plaintiff averred:3
That on or about and during the period covered from September 11, 1958 to October 9, 1958, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused Inocencio Tan y Concepcion and Antonio Conejero y Navo, the latter being then an employee of the Philippine National Bank, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Fernando E. Ricafort, Assistant General Manager of the Laureano Brothers Co., Inc., in the following manner: The said accused, during the above-mentioned period of time falsely pretending to possess influence on His Excellency, President Carlos P. Garcia and Executive Secretary Pajo, and by means of false representations and fraudulent manifestations which they made to said Fernando E. Ricafort to the effect that the accused being influential to His Excellency, President Carlos P. Garcia and Executive Secretary Pajo, they could facilitate the release of the loan applied for by Fernando E. Ricafort with the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P250,000.00, provided that the said Fernando E. Ricafort would give the accused 10% of the said sum of P250,000.00 or the amount of P25,000.00; that the sum of P25,000.00 would be given to Executive Secretary Pajo as bribe money for the said purpose of facilitating the release of the afore-mentioned loan, and by means of other similar deceits, succeeded in inducing the said Fernando E. Ricafort to give and deliver to the accused the sum of P2,000.00 (supposedly amounting to P25,000.00), both the said accused knowing fully well that their aforestated pretenses, representations and manifestations were false and fraudulent and that the same were only made for the sole purpose of obtaining, as they in fact obtained from Fernando E. Ricafort the said sum of P2,000.00, which amount they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Fernando E. Ricafort in the aforesaid sum of P2,000.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law. (Emphasis supplied)
The underscored portions of the above-quoted information clearly refute the claim that some of the supposed essential elements of estafa by means of false pretenses were not alleged. The element of false pretenses is alleged by the averment that the accused manifested and represented to the injured party that they were influential to the President and his Executive Secretary, which they knew fully well to be false and which they made only to obtain P2,000.00 from the injured party. The averment that the accused "succeeded in inducing" the injured party to part with his P2,000.00 is sufficient allegation of the element that the offended party relied upon such false pretenses. Lastly, the phrase "to the damage and prejudice of said Fernando E. Ricafort in the aforesaid sum of P2,000.00 . . ." constitutes the averment of damages. There is no basis therefore for the charge that plaintiff-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation was violated.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is, as it is hereby, affirmed. Treble costs against plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Castro, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 In L-22450 (Inocencio Tan v. People), resolution of March 16, 1964.
2 J. M. Tuason v. Torres, L-24717, Dec. 4, 1967.
3 Record on Appeal, pp. 2-4.
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