G.R. No. L-23000




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-23000 November 4, 1967 MATEO J. PABULARIO, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE HONORABLE POMPEYO L. PALARCA, City Judge of Iligan City, respondent-appellant. Alfredo C. Caballero and Cecilio Luminarias for petitioner-appellee. Dominador L. Padilla for respondent-appellant. CONCEPCION, C.J.: Appeal by Pompeyo Palarca, as respondent in Case No. 582 of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, from a decision thereof granting the writ of certiorari therein prayed for. Said case had been instituted against Palarca because, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Iligan City, he had denied a motion to quash, filed by the petitioner in the aforementioned certiorari proceeding, Mateo J. Pabulario, as defendant in Criminal Case No. 1509-AF of said municipal court, the information therein alleging: That on or about July 26, 1961, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the chauffeur and person in charge of a truck bearing Plate No. T-9000 and owned by one Louis Lee, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and operate the said truck while passing along the intersection of Sabayle, and Luna Streets, this city in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence, said truck driven and operated by him to bump and hit a passenger jeep bearing Plate No. AC-4528, driven and operated by one Florentino Ermac and owned by one Carlos Suband, thereby causing actual damages to the said passenger jeep in the total amount of P397.00, Philippine Currency, and causing physical injuries to the following persons who were passengers of the said passenger jeep, to wit: Physical injury to one Maemona Dinal de Panandegan, a passenger of the jeep to wit: Very slight bluish discoloration on left arm near the anterior part of elbow, which injury will require medical attendance for a period of from two (2) to three (3) days. Physical injury to one Macalewan Panandegan, a passenger of the jeep, to wit: Slight abrasion on the right lower extremity which injury will require a medical attendance for a period of from two (2) to three (3) days. to the damage and prejudice of the said Carlos Subang in the aforesaid sum of P397.00, Philippine Currency. Contrary to and in violation of Article 365 in relation with Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. as well as Pabulario's motions to reconsider the order denying said motion to quash. The latter was predicated upon the theory that said information charged more than one offense, namely, that of damage to property through reckless imprudence and that of multiple slight physical injuries, likewise, through reckless imprudence. Pabulario's petition for certiorari in case No. 582 was, in turn, anchored upon the proposition that said municipal court of Iligan City is without jurisdiction to hear the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 1509-AF, and that the order of Judge Palarca denying said motion to quash and Pabulario's motions for reconsideration are null and void. Inasmuch as the decision of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte sustained the foregoing contention of Pabulario, respondent Judge Palarca interposed the present appeal, which we find to be well taken. The issue in the case at bar is substantially identical to that decided in People vs. Cano,¹in which we held: The order appealed from is predicated upon the theory that the offense of slight physical injuries thru reckless negligence cannot be complexed with that of damage to property with multiple physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, because "misdemeanor" may not, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, be complexed with grave or less grave felonies. However, the information herein does not purport to complex the offense of slight physical injuries with reckless imprudence with that of damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. It is merely alleged in the information that, thru reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit another bus causing upon some of its passengers serious physical injuries, upon others less serious physical injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to damage to property. Appellee and the lower court have seemingly presumed that said information thereby charges two offenses, namely: (1) slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and (2) damage to property, and serious and less serious physical injuries, thru reckless negligence — which are sought to be complexed. This assumption is, in turn, apparently premised upon the predicate that the effect or consequence of defendant's negligence, not the negligence itself, is the principal or vital factor in said offenses. Such predicate is not altogether accurate. As early as July 28, 1955, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, had the occasion to state, in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga (G.R. No. L-6641), that: "The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "'reckless imprudence'" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines "'a lower degree of criminal liability'" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure can not be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight; the "'imprudencia punible'." Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "'homicide through reckless imprudence;'" and the like; when the strict technical offense is, more accurately "'reckless imprudence resulting in homicide';" or "'simple imprudence causing damages to property'." "Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed wilfully. For each penalty for the wilful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligence variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum if the wilful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual wilful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes." Thirdly, regardless of whether the issue adverted to above should be decided in the affirmative or in the negative, the proper procedure for the lower court was to reserve the resolution thereof until after the case has been heard on the merits, when decision is rendered thereon, there being no question that the court has jurisdiction and can properly try the defendant for damage to property and serious or less serious physical injuries thru reckless negligence. It may not be amiss to add that the purpose of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in complexing several felonies resulting from a single act; or one which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by prescribing the imposition of the penalty for the most serious crime, instead of the penalties for each of the aforesaid crimes, which, put together may be graver than the penalty for the most serious offense. Fourthly, from the viewpoint both of trial practices and justice, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether the prosecution should split the action against the defendant by filing against him several informations, namely, one for damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless negligence, before the Court of First Instance, and another for slight physical injuries thru reckless negligence, before the justice of the peace or municipal courts. One thing is, however, certain. Such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice in general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the presentation of substantially the same evidence before two different courts, the municipal court and the court of first instance. Worse still, in the event of conviction in the municipal court, and appeal to the court of first instance, said evidence would still have to be introduced once more in the latter court. Herein petitioner-appellee has not advanced any reason, and we find none, to warrant a departure from the foregoing ruling. It should be noted, also that, assuming for the sake of argument only, that the information under consideration alleges two (2) different and separate offenses, it does not follow that the municipal court of Iligan City had no jurisdiction to hear the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 1509-AF, inasmuch as the offense of damages to property amounting to P397.00, through reckless negligence, and that of multiple slight physical injuries, through reckless negligence, above referred to, are within the jurisdiction of the said court. Again, the order denying the motion to quash and the orders denying the motions for reconsideration, even if hypothetically erroneous, were not null and void. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered dismissing the petition in said Case No. 582 of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, and denying the writ therein prayed, with costs against petitioner-appellee Mateo J. Pabulario. It is so ordered. Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. Footnote ¹ G. R. No. L-19660, May 24, 1966. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation