Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
Placido B. Ramos and Renato L. Ramos for petitioners.
Trinidad & Borromeo for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.1 and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs P2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00 moral damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00 attorney's fees, with costs.
Not satisfied with this decision, the defendants appellee to the Court of Appeals.
Said Court, on January 15, 1964, affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by absolving defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.
Plaintiffs thereupon appealed to Us through this petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision. And appellants would argue before this Court that defendant PEPSI-COLA's evidence failed to show that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver in question.
Said point, as stated, was resolved by the Court of Appeals in PEPSI-COLA's favor, thus:
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. In view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant driver'. In the case of Campo vs. Camarote No. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as a rule that "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of service." Defendant Company has taken all these steps.2
Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing portion of the decision under review by taking issue with the testimony of Anasco upon which the findings of due diligence aforestated are rested. Thus, it is now contended that Añasco being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased and interested witness; and that his testimony is not believable.
It is rather clear, therefore, that appellants would raise herein an issue of fact and credibility, something as to which this Court has consistently respected the findings of the Court of Appeals, with some few exceptions, which do not obtain herein.3
Stated differently, Añascos credibility is not for this Court now to re-examine. And said witness having been found credible by the Court of Appeals, his testimony, as accepted by said Court, cannot at this stage be assailed. As We said in Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, L-9194, April 25, 1957, assignments of error involving the credibility of witnesses and which in effect dispute the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, cannot be reviewed in these proceedings. For a question to be one of law it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 4 And the distinction is well-known: There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.5
From all this it follows that for the purposes of this appeal, it must be taken as established that, as testified to by Añasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to his qualifications, experiences and record of service, taking all steps mentioned by the Court of Appeals in its decision already quoted.1äwphï1.ñët
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due diligence in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court in Campo vs. Camarote 53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service."
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as to due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia:
... The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
x x x x x x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
And construing a similar provision of the old Civil Code, this Court said in Bahia vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624, 627:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not duly proved by PEPSI-COLA is only due diligence in the selection of its driver. And, parenthetically, it is not surprising that appellants thus confine their arguments to this aspect of due diligence, since the record — as even appellants' brief (pp. 13-17) reflects in quoting in part the testimony of PEPSI-COLA's witness — would show sufficient evidence to establish due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its drivers, including Bonifacio.
Appellants' other assignment of errors are likewise outside the purview of this Court's reviewing power. Thus, the question of whether PEPSI- COLA violated the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and rules and regulations related thereto, not having been raised and argued in the Court of Appeals, cannot be ventilated herein for the first time. 6 And the matter of whether or not PEPSI-COLA did acts to ratify the negligent act of its driver is a factual issue not proper herein.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
May 16, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioners seek a reconsideration1 of Our decision2 in the instant case affirming in toto the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals absolving respondent PEPSI-COLA from liability. In Our decision, We refrained from passing on the merits of the question whether PEPSI-COLA, in operating the tractor-truck and trailer, violated the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law3 and the rules and regulations related thereto, for the procedural reason that it did not appear to have been raised before the Court of Appeals.
It now appears, however, that said question was raised in a motion to reconsider filed with the Court of Appeals which resolved the same against petitioners. Due consideration of the matter on its merits, convinces Us that the decision of the Court of Appeals should still be affirmed in toto.
Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars. 1 and 4(d), par. (a), Sec. 27 of M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1, dated Sept. 1, 1951, in that at the time of the collision, the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the driver.
The cited provisions read:
SECTION 27. Registration, operation, and inspection of truck-trailer combinations, semi-trailers, and tractors.
(a) No trailer or semi-trailer having a gross weight of more than 2,000 kilograms and is not equipped with effective brakes on at least two opposite wheels of the rear axle and are so controlled that the brakes will act in unison with or preceding the effective action of the brakes of the tractor-truck shall be registered for operation on public highways of the Philippines; provided, that the trialers without brakes may be registered from year to year for operation under the following conditions:
1. No such trailer shall be operated at any time at a speed in excess of 15 kilometers per hour in conjunction with a tractor-truck, the actual gross weight of which is less than twice the weight of the trailer.
x x x x x x x x x
4(d) Tractor-trucks shall be either equipped with rear-vision mirror to enable the driver to see vehicles approaching mirror the rear or shall carry a helper who shall be so stationed on the truck or trailer that he will constantly have a view of the rear. He shall be provided with means of effectively signalling to the driver to give way to overtaking vehicles.
4(e) No truck and trailer combination shall be operated at a speed greater than 30 kilometers per hour.
It will be noted that the 15 k.p.h. limit in subpar. 1, supra, refers only to trailers or semi-trailers having a gross weight of more than 2,000 kgms., AND which are "not equipped with effective brakes on at least two opposite wheels, of the rear axle and are so controlled that the brakes will act in unison with or preceding the effective action of the brakes of the tractor-truck..." This is the condition set in the proviso in par. (a), supra, wherein "trailers without [such] brakes may be registered from year to year for operation ..." i.e., they should not "be operated at any time at a speed in excess of 15 kilometers per hour in conjunction with a tractor-truck ...". But there was no finding by the Court of Appeals that the truck-trailer here did not have such brakes. In the absence of such fact, it is subpar. 4(e), supra, that will apply. And petitioners admit that the truck-trailer was being driven at about 30 k.p.h.
It is a fact that driver Bonifacio was not accompanied by a helper on the night of the collision since he was found to be driving alone. However, there is no finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-vision mirror. To be sure, the records disclose that Pat. Rodolfo Pahate, the traffic policeman who went to the collision scene, testified that he saw the tractor-truck there but he does not remember if it had any rear vision mirror.4 This cannot prove lack of rear-vision mirror. And the cited provision — subpar. 4(d) — is complied if either of the two alternatives, i.e., having a rear-vision mirror or a helper, is present. Stated otherwise, said provision is violated only where there is a positive finding that the tractor-truck did not have both rear-vision mirror and a helper for the driver.
Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law, providing that:
No motor vehicle operating as a single unit shall exceed the following dimensions:
Overall width ................ 2.5 meters.
x x x x x x x x x
since there was an express finding that the truck-trailer was 3 meters wide. However, Sec. 9 (d) of the same law, as amended, providing that —
SEC. 9. Special permits, fees for.-The chief of the Motor Vehicles Office with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications shall establish regulations and a tariff of additional fees under which special permits may be issued in the discretion of the Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office or his deputies, for each of the following special cases, and without such special permit, no such motor vehicles shall be operated on the public highways.
x x x x x x x x x
(d) For registration or use of a motor vehicle exceeding the limit of permissible dimensions specified in subsections (b) and (c) of section eight-A hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
expressly allows the registration, or use of motor vehicles exceeding the limits of permissible dimensions specified in subsec. (b) of Sec. 8-A. So, to conclude that there was a violation of law — which undisputably constitutes negligence, at the very least — it is not enough that the width of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in addition, it must also appear that there was no special permit granted under Sec. 9. Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital factual link is missing. There was no proof much less any finding to that effect. And it was incumbent upon petitioners-appellants to have proved lack of such permit since the tractor-truck and the trailer were registered.5 Compliance with law and regularity in the performance of official duty — in this case, the issuance of proper registration papers — are presumed6 and prevail over mere surmises. Having charged a violation of law, the onus of substantiating the same fell upon petitioners-appellants. Hence, the conclusion that there was a violation of the law lacks factual basis.
Petitioners would also have Us abandon the Bahia ruling.7 In its stead, We are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine of respondent superior. We cannot however, abandon the Bahia ruling without going against the explicit mandate of the law. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely clarified what that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver-employee.
Neither could We apply the respondent superior principle. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his employees. The former is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring employees. We do not — and have never — followed the respondent superior rule.8 So, the American rulings cited by petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are not authoritative here.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1For brevity hereinafter called PEPSI-COLA.
2Emphasis supplied.
3Among the exceptions to the rule that findings of fact by the Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures: Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257.
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible: Luna vs. Linatok 74 Phil. 15.
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion: Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G. 2927.
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts: Cruz vs. Sosing, L-4875, November 27, 1953.
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting: Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April 30, 1957.
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee: Evangelista vs. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., L-11139, April 23, 1958.
4Cf. II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., 412.
5See II Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 255; II Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 2784.
6Tan Si Kiok vs. Tiacho, 79 Phil. 696.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
1Typographical errors appearing in the printed motion for reconsideration have been corrected upon petitioner's request granted by Us.
2Promulgated Feb. 9, 1967.
3Act No. 3992.
4Session of Jan. 13, 1960, T.s.n., p. 68.
5See Pars. 2 and 3 of Complaint, Rollo, p. 44.
6Rule 131, Sec. 5(m) and (ff), Rev. Rules of Court.
7Bahia vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624, which held that once the employer satisfactorily shows that in the section and supervision of the driver, he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, he is relieved from liability.
8Cangco vs. M.R.R., 38 Phil. 768; Cuison vs. Norton, 55 Phil. 18.
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